By Kyle Mizokami
A hypothetical war between India and China would be one of the largest and most destructive conflicts in Asia.
A war between the two powers would rock the Indo-Pacific region, cause millions of casualties on both sides and take a significant toll on the global economy.
Geography and demographics would play a unique role, limiting the war’s scope and ultimately the conditions of victory.
India and China border one another in two distinct locations: Aksai Chin in India’s north, and Arunachal Pradesh in the country’s northeast.
India and China border one another in two distinct locations: Aksai Chin in India’s north, and Arunachal Pradesh in the country’s northeast.
China has made claims on both locations, which from China’s perspective belong to the far western East Turkestan and China-occupied Tibet.
China invaded both Aksai Chin and Arunachal Pradesh in 1962, with both sides fighting a monthlong war that resulted in minor Chinese gains on the ground.
Both countries have such large populations, each over 1.3 billion, that they are essentially unconquerable.
Like all modern wars, a war between India and China would be fought over land, sea, and air; geography would limit the scope of the land conflict, while it would be the air conflict, fought with both aircraft and missiles, that would do the most damage to both countries.
The trump card, however, may be India’s unique position to dominate a sea conflict, with dire consequences for the Chinese economy.
A war between the two countries would, unlike the 1962 war, involve major air action on both sides. Both countries maintain large tactical air forces capable of flying missions over the area.
A war between the two countries would, unlike the 1962 war, involve major air action on both sides. Both countries maintain large tactical air forces capable of flying missions over the area.
People’s Liberation Army Air Force units would fly from the Lanzhou Military Region against Aksai Chin, and from the expansive Chengdu Military Region against Arunachal Pradesh.
The Lanzhou district is home to J-11 and J-11B fighters, two regiments of H-6 strategic bombers, and a grab bag of J-7 and J-8 fighters.
A lack of forward bases in Xinjiang means the Lanzhou Military Region could probably only support a limited air campaign against northern India.
The Chengdu Military Region is home to advanced J-11A and J-10 fighters, but there are relatively few military airfields in Tibet anywhere near India.
Still, China does not necessarily need tactical aircraft to do great damage to India.
Still, China does not necessarily need tactical aircraft to do great damage to India.
China could supplement its aerial firepower with ballistic missiles from the People’s Liberation Army Rocket Forces.
The PLARF overseas both nuclear, conventional and dual-use ballistic missiles, and could conceivably move up to two thousand short- and medium-range DF-11, DF-15 and DF-21 ballistic missiles into positions adjacent to India.
These missiles could be used to blitz Indian strategic targets on the ground, at the cost of making them unavailable for contingencies in the South and East China Seas.
Meanwhile, India’s air forces are in a better position to contest the skies than their Chinese counterparts.
Meanwhile, India’s air forces are in a better position to contest the skies than their Chinese counterparts.
While the war would take place on China’s sparsely manned frontier, New Delhi is only 213 miles from the Tibetan frontier.
India’s air fleet of 230 Su-30Mk1 Flankers, sixty-nine MiG-29s and even its Mirage 2000s are competitive with or even better than most of China’s aircraft in theater, at least until the J-20 fighter becomes operational.
India likely has enough aircraft to deal with a two-front war, facing off with Pakistan’s Air Force at the same time.
India is also fielding the Akash medium-range air defense missile system to protect air bases and other high-value targets.
While India could be reasonably confident of having an air force that deters war, at least in the near term, it has no way of stopping a Chinese ballistic-missile offensive.
While India could be reasonably confident of having an air force that deters war, at least in the near term, it has no way of stopping a Chinese ballistic-missile offensive.
Chinese missile units, firing from Xinjiang and Tibet, could hit targets across the northern half of India with impunity.
India has no ballistic-missile defenses and does not have the combined air- and space-based assets necessary to hunt down and destroy the missile launchers.
India’s own ballistic missiles are dedicated to the nuclear mission and would be unavailable for conventional war.
The war on the ground between the Indian and Chinese armies might at first glance seem like the most decisive phase of the war, but it’s actually quite the opposite.
The war on the ground between the Indian and Chinese armies might at first glance seem like the most decisive phase of the war, but it’s actually quite the opposite.
Both theaters, the Aksai Chin/Xijiang theater and the Arunachal Pradesh/Tibet theater are in rugged locations with little transportation infrastructure, making it difficult to send a mechanized army through.
Massed attacks could be easily stopped with artillery as attacking forces are funneled through well-known valleys and mountain passes.
Despite the enormous size of both armies—1.2 million for India and 2.2 million for China—fighting on the ground would likely be a stalemate with little lost or gained.
The war at sea would be the decisive front in a conflict between the two countries.
The war at sea would be the decisive front in a conflict between the two countries.
Sitting astride the Indian Ocean, India lies on China’s jugular vein.
The Indian Navy, with its force of submarines, aircraft carrier INS Vikramaditya and surface ships could easily curtail the the flow of trade between China and Europe, the Middle East, and Africa.
It would take the Chinese Navy weeks to assemble and sail a fleet capable of contesting the blockade. Even then, the blockade would be hard to break up, conducted over the thousands of square miles of the Indian Ocean.
Meanwhile, shipping to and from China would be forced to divert through the western Pacific Ocean, where such diversions would be vulnerable to Australian, Japanese, or American naval action.
Meanwhile, shipping to and from China would be forced to divert through the western Pacific Ocean, where such diversions would be vulnerable to Australian, Japanese, or American naval action.
87 percent of the country’s petroleum needs are imported from abroad, particularly the Middle East and Africa.
China’s strategic petroleum reserves, once completed sometime in the 2020s, could stave off a nationwide fuel shortage for up to seventy-seven days—but after that Beijing would have to seek an end to the war however possible.
The second-order effects of the war at sea would be India’s greatest weapon.
The second-order effects of the war at sea would be India’s greatest weapon.
War jitters, the shock to the global economy, and punitive economic action by India’s allies—including Japan and the United States—could see demands for exports fall, with the potential to throw millions of Chinese laborers out of work.
Domestic unrest fueled by economic troubles could become a major problem for the Chinese Communist Party and its hold on the nation.
China has no similar lever over India, except in the form of a rain of ballistic missiles with high-explosive warheads on New Delhi and other major cities.
A war between India and China would be nasty, brutal and short, with far-reaching consequences for the global economy.
A war between India and China would be nasty, brutal and short, with far-reaching consequences for the global economy.
The balance of power and geographic constraints means a war would almost certainly fail to prove decisive.
| World War III Casualties | ||||
| 2016 Population | Killed | Survivors | ||
| CHINA | 1 373 541 278 | 1 057 119 689 | 77% | 316 421 589 |
| UNITED STATES | 323 995 528 | 19 089 783 | 6% | 304 905 745 |
| EUROPEAN UNION | 513 949 445 | 371 356 958 | 72% | 142 592 487 |
| RUSSIA | 142 355 415 | 30 924 816 | 22% | 111 430 599 |
| INDIA | 1 266 883 598 | 1 158 499 174 | 91% | 108 384 424 |
| PAKISTAN | 201 995 540 | 175 747 473 | 87% | 26 248 067 |
| JAPAN | 126 702 133 | 114 241 889 | 90% | 12 460 244 |
| VIETNAM | 95 261 021 | 84 340 688 | 89% | 10 920 333 |
| PHILIPPINES | 102 624 209 | 92 732 902 | 90% | 9 891 307 |
| KOREA, NORTH | 25 115 311 | 21 141 050 | 84% | 3 974 261 |
| KOREA, SOUTH | 50 924 172 | 47 636 302 | 94% | 3 287 870 |
| TAIWAN | 23 464 787 | 22 278 490 | 95% | 1 186 297 |
| 4 246 812 437 | 3 195 109 214 | 75% | 1 051 703 223 | |
Aucun commentaire:
Enregistrer un commentaire