The Necessary War

SAYING CHINA IS BLOCKING TRILLIONS IN OIL AND GAS, U.S. WILL SEND NAVY FOR ASIA DRILLS
BY TOM O'CONNOR 

The United States has accused China of preventing Southeast Asian countries from accessing trillions of dollars worth of untapped oil and gas reserves in the South China Sea as the Pentagon planned to hold its first exercise with regional powers near the strategic region.
In a press statement, State Department spokesperson Morgan Ortagus said Thursday that the "United States is deeply concerned that China is continuing its interference with Vietnam's longstanding oil and gas activities in Vietnam's Exclusive Economic Zone (EEZ) claim" following recent incursions there by Chinese survey ship Haiyang Dizhi 8 and an armed escort. 

Beijing has laid vast claims to the South China Sea and does not recognize boundaries established there by a number of Southeast Asian nations who are supported by the U.S. 

The most recent incident occurred last week near Vanguard Bank, a Vietnam-administered outpost in the Spratly Islands, and Ortagus attributed the move to China "pressuring Vietnam over its work with a Russian energy firm and other international partners."
"China's actions undermine regional peace and security, impose economic costs on Southeast Asian states by blocking their access to an estimated $2.5 trillion in unexploited hydrocarbon resources, and demonstrate China's disregard for the rights of countries to undertake economic activities in their EEZs, under the 1982 Law of the Sea Convention, which China ratified in 1996," Ortagus said.
Chinese survey vessel Haiyang Dizhi 8 conducts research on behalf of the Guangzhou Marine Geological Survey in this photo shared July 25, 2018. The ship once again entered what Vietnam's exclusive economic zone near Vanguard Bank of South China Sea's Spratly Islands on August 13 of this year.
Washington has signed, but not ratified the 1982 Law of the Sea Convention, though it justified sending warships through Beijing-claimed waters in the South China Sea by citing "freedom of navigation" operations outlined in the deal. 

China has responded by scrambling military ships and aircraft to intercept the U.S. vessels in the resource-rich region.
While China may have backed Vietnam's communist revolutionaries in their victory over U.S. and allied local forces decades ago, Beijing and Hanoi quickly became rivals and engaged in deadly border clashes, including near the Spratly Island, lasting up until the 1990s. 

In 1995, Vietnam and the U.S. normalized their relations, putting pressure on China as the region's geopolitical dynamics shifted.
As the U.S. began to increasingly assert its own presence in the South China Sea, it has sought to push back on China there, exploiting territorial tensions between Beijing and the Association of Southeast Asian Nations (ASEAN), a 10-nation grouping of which Vietnam was a part. 

Washington sided with Hanoi in 2014 when China moved its Hai Yang Shi You 981 oil rig near the disputed Paracel Islands and sank a Vietnamese fishing vessel amid a standoff there.
Last year, the U.S. sent a historic message to China by sending Nimitz-class supercarrier USS Carl Vinson to dock in Vietnam in March. 

In May, the U.S. disinvited China from the Rim of the Pacific (RIMPAC) exercise involving Vietnam and several other ASEAN states over Beijing's increased militarization of the Spratly Islands.
The U.S. also began planning joint drills with ASEAN, but it was China that secured an exercise alongside the regional collective months later in October. 

That same month, then-Defense Secretary James Mattis confirmed that a U.S.-ASEAN exercise was still in the works and on both The Bangkok Post and Nikkei Asian Review reported Thursday that the maneuvers were set to begin early next month in Thailand.

A map created July 30, 2012 details the multinational, overlapping territorial disputes involving Brunei, China, Malaysia, the Philippines, Taiwan and Vietnam in the South China Sea. Many of these countries, especially China, have expanded their presence on contested land masses known as the Spratly Islands and an incident on August 13 of this year took place on the westernmost stretch of reefs.

Tensions in the South China Sea add to an array of issues already putting a major strain on ties between the world's top two economies. 

President Donald Trump and Chinese Xi Jinping are embroiled in a multibillion-dollar trade war of tit-for-tat tariffs with Vietnam finding itself right in the middle of the feuding powerhouses.
Beijing has also repeatedly accused Washington of interfering in its internal affairs, both in the ongoing protests that U.S. officials and politicians have expressed support for in the semi-autonomous city of Hong Kong and in a recent $8 billion arms sale involving F-16V fighters jets to Taiwan, an independent island nation also claimed by Beijing.

The Coming Collapse of China

Why China's Premature Bid for Hegemony Is More Fragile Than You Imagine

Everyone is starting to resist now.
by Richard Javad Heydarian

China's futile resistance

“Never trust China,” a wrathful Hong Kong protester told this author during the large-scale protests on July 14 in the Sha Tin district earlier this month.

“We are never going to give up, people are fighting to their last breath.”
What began as a focused opposition to a controversial extradition bill, which would allow Beijing to retrieve fugitives and unwanted citizens fleeing to Hong Kong, has now morphed into a generalized call for independence altogether.
Carrie Lam, the much-derided pro-Beijing Hong Kong chief executive, has offered to resign but even if she does, that won’t be enough. 

Nor would an apology and accountability for brutal police tactics against unarmed protesters. 

As protests turn increasingly violent and radicalized, there are even fears of Chinese military intervention, which could lead to a Hong Kong version of the Tiananmen massacre.

The protests in Hong Kong, however, are part of a bigger region-wide backlash against China’s premature bid for hegemony. 

From Taiwan and the Philippines to Vietnam, Malaysia and Indonesia, a whole host of regional states are standing up against Beijing’s neo-imperial ambitions and revisionist policies. 

China’s time-tested strategy of ensuring the acquiescence of neighboring regimes through the co-optation of their corrupt elite is looking increasingly fragile. 

Moreover, Hong Kong is exhibit A of the perils of unbridled economic engagement with Beijing.

The Frontline Battle
What hundreds of thousands of Hong Kong residents are worried about is the preservation of the city-state’s unique political system. 

For them, Beijing has flagrantly violated the fundamental principles undergirding the so-called “One Country, Two Systems” regime, which was supposed to have governed Beijing-Hong Kong relations for five decades following the former British colony’s handover in 1997.
Under Xi Jinping’s rule, Hong Kong residents have seen the gradual emaciation of the promise of universal suffrage as well as the long-cherished freedoms of assembly and free press, and other civil liberties and political rights. 

China’s strongman leadership is obsessed with the “one country” at the expense of the “two systems” aspect of the bargain.
Critics argue, this has come about not only through the establishment of a de facto puppet regime in Hong Kong, but also the co-optation of the business elite, media, academy and the key institutions collectively governing the city-state. 

Beijing’s creeping intrusion is now literally concretely on display, thanks to massive state-of-the-art infrastructure projects, including the Guangzhou–Shenzhen–Hong Kong Express Rail Link (XRL) as well as the Hong Kong–Zhuhai–Macau Bridge, which potently symbolize Beijing’s long reach.
Even worse, there are even fears of Beijing’s surreptitious introduction of the infamous “social credit” surveillance regime to Hong Kong. 

That system would bring dire consequences for the basic freedoms of each and every resident, including foreign journalists, academics and businessmen based in the city-state. 

Furthermore, there are even fears of Chinese military intervention. 

Ominously, China’s defense ministry spokesman Wu Qian has made it clear that it can deploy the People’s Liberation Army (PLA) for quelling protests in Hong Kong if necessary.
“We are closely following the developments in Hong Kong, especially the violent attack against the central government liaison office by radicals on July 21,” Wu said during his briefing on China’s newly released White Paper in late-July. 

Wu suggested that the PLA garrison stationed in Hong Kong is on standby mode for any potential intervention. 

“Some behavior of the radical protesters is challenging the authority of the central government and the bottom line of one country, two systems. This is intolerable.”
What’s increasingly clear with the protests is the fragility of China’s time-tested strategy of purchasing the silence and loyalty of neighboring polities through economic penetration.
“The only thing I know is that no matter how much money I earn [because of Chinese investments],” a young teenage protestor told this author on July 14, “freedom is something I can [never] earn from China.”
For many Hong Kong youngsters, the benefits of closer economic ties with China are either too concentrated among the networked elite, namely the tycoons running the city, or else any benefits are offset by how they fully undermine Hong Kongers’ basic freedoms. 

In either case, Hong Kong’s youth show little support for closer economic engagement with Mainland China, which seeks to turn Hong Kong into just another major Chinese city. 

Beijing wants to this as part of a strategy of integrating Guangdong and neighboring economic dynamos into a Greater Bay Area masterplan.

The Regional Backlash
When asked about their advice to the region, a protester related: “Regional states should not only focus on economic growth… since China is just using economic ways to influence [other countries’].”
“Regional states should focus on their freedoms and own citizens,” she added with fervent conviction, pointing at Hong Kong as an example of what happens when you over-engage with China.
The Hong Kong protests are strengthening the hands of Beijing-skeptics across the region.
This is most especially the case in Taiwan, where the incumbent President Tsai Ing-Wen is facing a concerted challenge from pro-Beijing rivals ahead of next year’s elections. 

Inspired by the Hong Kong protests, Taiwanese officials have repeatedly emphasized the risks of economic entanglement with China.
“We now have more liberty to speak for our independence,” President Tsai told this author during an interview in June. 

Tsai discussed Taiwan’s economic decoupling from China, and the relocation of investments to Southeast Asia, in recent years. 

“People have to bear in mind that you need to be independent [economically too], since China uses economics as leverage.”
Surveys suggest that the pro-independence-leaning president has public sympathy on the issue. 

The latest survey by Academia Sinica shows that a majority of Taiwanese prefers an emphasis on national sovereignty over economic engagement with China.
In the Philippines, the pro-Beijing President Rodrigo Duterte is also facing massive public backlash, especially amid his blatant quiescence following the sinking of a Filipino fishing boat by a suspected Chinese militia vessel last month.
The most recent surveys show that a super-majority of Filipinos want the government to take a tougher stance against Beijing, with as many as 93 percent of Filipinos calling on the government to take back Philippine-claimed islands in the South China Sea currently occupied by China. 

More than eight out of ten Filipinos, the same survey shows, want the government to form alliances with like-minded nations and international organizations against China’s maritime expansionism.
Additionally, China’s trust rating in the Philippines is now at a new low. 

One recent survey, conducted from June 22 to 26, showed that the majority of Filipinos (51 percent) had “little trust” in China. 

Another showed that China has a net trust rating of nearly 50 percent.
These anti-China sentiments have gone hand in hand with growing fears over “debt traps” being set under Beijing’s infrastructure investments.
“We should do away with placing our government commercial assets [as] collateral,” Philippine Supreme Court Justice Antonio Carpio, a prominent voice on the Philippine-China relations, told this author.
He has accused Beijing of negotiating questionable contracts that would allow China to seize key Philippine assets, including oil and gas in Philippine waters, in the event of a debt default.
“Let’s not be naïve [with Chinese intentions],” he added, citing the infamous case of Sri Lanka, which had to give up the control of the Hambantota port to a Chinese company following a major debt default.
Under growing public pressure, Duterte had to call for a review of all infrastructure contracts with China.
In neighboring Malaysia, however, anti-China backlash propelled an all-out regime change, as Prime Minister Mahathir Mohamad rallied popular support by accusing his predecessor, Najib Razak, of selling out the nation to China under questionable multi-billion-dollar infrastructure investments.
“If you borrow huge sums of money you [will eventually] come under the influence and direction of the lender [China],” Mahathir told this author earlier this year, underscoring the threat of Beijing’s “new version of colonialism.” 

He warned of strategic “subservience” if smaller nations like the Philippines and Malaysia borrow from China beyond their “capacity to repay.”
In Indonesia, Southeast Asia’s largest nation, anti-China sentiments have taken a dark xenophobic turn even. 

Welcoming closer economic ties with China, incumbent President Joko Widodo repeatedly came under vicious attacks by his rivals during both his presidential campaigns, including false claims that he is of ethnic Chinese background.
In response to China’s intrusion into Indonesian waters, the Jokowi administration has stepped up its military presence in the North Natuna Sea area, while adopting a tough “sink the vessel” policy against illegal Chinese vessels. 

China’s perceived infringement on Indonesia sovereignty has led to a steep decline in its trust ratings. According to a Pew Research Center survey, favorable views of Beijing among Indonesians dropped from 66 percent in 2014 to 53 percent in 2018.
But perhaps it’s in Vietnam where Chinese is experiencing the greatest resistance. 

Recent years have seen massive, and often violent, anti-Beijing protests against Chinese investments in the country. 

One of the most protested schemes is the proposal for the establishment of a Chinese special economic zone on a ninety-nine-year-lease.
Meanwhile, in recent weeks, Vietnam has deployed several armed vessels to forestall China’s efforts to sabotage its energy exploration activities in the Vanguard Bank, an energy-rich area within Hanoi’s EEZ that is contested by China
China may be able to strong-arm each of its neighboring polities on a bilateral basis, but Beijing is bleeding credibility and trust across the region. 

No wonder then, the majority of respondents across Asia still prefer the United States over China as a regional leader. 

Even in Hong Kong, American flags were proudly on display during the protests. 

As one of the participants said: “We are not fighting to gain anything, [but] we are fighting not to lose anything. I am worried about Hong Kong becoming China.”

South China Sea: Vietnam takes up fight against China

• Vietnam isolated as China goes on charm offensive
• Divisions emerge among ASEAN nations

By Gregory Poling

When it comes to the disputed waters of the South China Sea, Vietnam's leaders must feel very lonely these days.
Their fellow Southeast Asian claimants have either reversed course after years of escalating tensions with Beijing, or are keeping their heads down and letting Hanoi take up the fight.
In June, the Vietnamese government refused a Chinese demand to halt drilling by a subsidiary of Spanish company Repsol in an oil and gas block on Vanguard Bank—an area of the seabed that, as far as international law is concerned, is undisputedly Vietnam's.
A month later Hanoi reversed course, after Beijing threatened to use military force against one of its outposts in the South China Sea, which Vietnam calls the East Sea.
Now Vietnam could be on the hook to Repsol for hundreds of millions of dollars and it will have a hard time convincing other companies that any of its offshore contracts are a smart bet.
Repsol didn't respond to a CNN request for comment, and Vietnam's Foreign Ministry said its oil and gas activities take place in waters entirely within its sovereign rights.

Chinese military bases destroy reefs in South China Sea
Deafening silence
How did Vietnam's neighbors and the international community respond to this act of bullying by China? 

With deafening silence.
After pushing back against Chinese coercion for years, the Philippines has turned defeatist under the year-old government of Rodrigo Duterte. 

Manila now appears eager to trade silence regarding its maritime claims for economic carrots from Beijing.
Malaysia, whose government is embroiled in corruption and is barreling toward political crisis in the next general election, has little appetite for confrontation with China, an important benefactor.
And Indonesia is happy to occupy a middle ground, resisting at the margins when it comes to Chinese fishing encroachments in its waters, but uninterested in taking a more active role in the disputes.
Even Singapore, which remains deeply skeptical of China's long-term intentions, is keeping its head down after being made a diplomatic punching bag by Beijing for its perceived support of the Philippines' international arbitration victory last July.

Divisions on display
The divisions within Southeast Asia were on full display during the Association of Southeast Asian Nations (ASEAN) Foreign Minister's Meeting earlier this month.
The 10 ASEAN ministers spent several days arguing over how the South China Sea disputes should be addressed in their customary joint declaration.
The Philippines, which hosted the summit, and Cambodia wanted to strip out anything that could irritate China. 

But Vietnam, smarting from the Vanguard Bank incident and convinced that China's diplomatic softening over the previous year was just a delaying tactic, argued for stronger language.
Its tactics got it singled out in a China Daily editorial, which slammed Hanoi for "hypocritically trying to insert tough language criticizing China's island building."
Late on Sunday, the group reached a compromise that reinserted several points from previous ASEAN statements, including concern over recent land reclamation and militarization.
The comprise language in the communique was weaker than some previous statements, particularly the Sunnylands Declaration signed by ASEAN leaders and President Barack Obama in 2016.
But it was stronger than the group's last statement, issued by Duterte following the ASEAN Summit in April, and helped avoid a repeat of the group's 2012 debacle when then-host Cambodia blocked the release of any statement at all.

Modest victory
Hanoi paid a diplomatic price for its activism, with China's foreign minister Wang Yi canceling a planned bilateral meeting with his Vietnamese counterpart.
Still, Vietnam had won a modest victory and received a measure of support, even if grudgingly, from its neighbors. 

But the victory was short-lived.
The next day, Philippine foreign secretary Alan Peter Cayetano sided with China, telling the press,"I didn't want to include it. It's not reflective of the present position. They (China) are not reclaiming land anymore. So why will you put it again this year?"
It was a surprising break for an organization built on consensus. 

Here was the group's chair publicly airing disagreements with the supposed consensus and appearing to back an outside power over a fellow ASEAN member.

Wang Yi arrives in Manila on August 5, 2017 to attend the ASEAN meeting, where Vietnam urged other Southeast Asian nations to take a stronger stand against Chinese expansionism in the South China Sea.

One-two punch
The one-two punch of China's successful coercion over Vanguard Bank and ASEAN's tattered consensus in Manila has left Hanoi exposed.
That isolation, which has been building for months, helps explain why Defense Minister Ngo Xuan Lich arranged a visit to Washington on the heels of the ASEAN meetings.
Following his meeting with Defense Secretary James Mattis, the Pentagon announced that the two had "agreed to deepen defense cooperation, including by expanding maritime cooperation." 

They even confirmed plans for a US aircraft carrier to visit Vietnam in the future—something that would have been unthinkable just a few years ago.
Hanoi remains convinced that China's new charm offensive in the South China Sea is mostly smoke and mirrors—a conclusion strengthened by its recent experiences—and that sooner or later its neighbors will figure it out too. 

In the meantime, it will look for support wherever it can find it.