The Necessary War

Is a US-China war inevitable?
By James Reinl
US Navy in the South China Sea

New York City -- Chinese dictator Xi Jinping's recent talk of "preparing for war and combat" is just the latest example of tough language that has stoked fears of a military flare-up with the United States.
Last week, Xi told his military commanders in Guangdong province to "concentrate preparations for fighting a war", in comments distributed by government-run media following a four-day visit to the south.
Meanwhile, retired US Lieutenant-General Ben Hodges said it was likely the US would be at war with China within 15 years thanks to a "tense relationship and increasing competition" between the world's two greatest economies.
With sabre-rattling on both sides, two long-standing issues between Beijing, Washington, and others have come to the fore as potential flashpoints -- the disputed South China Sea and Taiwan, which China views as a renegade province.
Al Jazeera spoke with US-China experts who said while all-out conflict was possible, there remained little chances to negotiate, compromise and manage a competitive relationship between Washington and Beijing.
"They're both actively preparing for war," Bonnie Glaser, a former Pentagon consultant, told Al Jazeera.

Sharpening approach
Washington's efforts to manage and accommodate China's growing economic and military clout have shifted under US President Donald Trump, who has slapped tariffs on Chinese imports and accused Beijing of trading unfairly and stealing intellectual property.
This month, Vice President Mike Pence spoke at a think-tank about cyber-attacks, Taiwan, freedom of the seas and human rights in a policy address that highlighted a sharpening US approach to China beyond the bitter trade war.
China was waging a sophisticated effort to sway the elections against President Trump's Republicans in retaliation for the White House's trade policies. 

He vowed to continue exposing Beijing's malign influence and interference.
China was deploying anti-ship and anti-air missiles on artificial islands in the disputed South China Sea, Pence said.
He also accused Beijing of bullying smaller countries and destabilising Taiwan by pressuring three Latin American countries to cut ties with Taipei.
There have already been real-world consequences.
Last month, the USS Decatur was sailing near Gaven Reef in the South China Sea, when a Chinese destroyer approached within 45 metres and forced the US vessel to manoeuvre to avoid a collision.
Washington sends warships on freedom of navigation exercises through the South China Sea and the Taiwan Strait to show they are international waters and counter Chinese claims, as well as bolster US allies in the region.
The Trump administration has struck two arms deals with Taiwan worth more than a $1.7bn combined.
In September, Washington slapped sanctions on China's military for buying fighter jets and missile systems from Russia.
China has responded by calling off high-level military-to-military talks, cancelling US Secretary of Defence James Mattis' visit to Beijing and conducting live-fire drills with bombers and fighter jets in the South China Sea.
While China's economic growth has been slowed by the trade war, it is still expanding more than twice as fast as the US' and the state is pouring money into new technologies, such as quantum computing, biotech and artificial intelligence.
According to the International Institute for Strategic Studies, China has launched more submarines, warships and other vessels since 2014 than the number of ships currently serving in the combined navies of Germany, India, Spain, Taiwan and Britain.

Analysts recall past political crises between the US and China. 

In 2001, a US spy plane was forced to land on Hainan after colliding with a Chinese fighter jet. 

In 1996, then-US president Bill Clinton dispatched aircraft carriers to the Taiwan Strait over Chinese missile tests.
"There's a whole basket of issues that could lead to a US-China conflict," Gregory Poling, an Asia and maritime law expert at the Center for Strategic and International Studies, told Al Jazeera.
"The South China Sea is the thorniest. It gets right at the heart of US primacy in the region, the international order that Washington built up since World War II and China's willingness to bully neighbours and challenge that rules-based order."
The sea covers some 1.7 million square kilometres and contains more than 200 mostly uninhabitable small islands, rocks and reefs.
It is the shortest route between the Pacific and Indian Oceans and has some of the world's busiest shipping lanes.
Brunei, China, Malaysia, the Philippines, and Vietnam are involved in a complex set of historically based territorial disputes there.
China's claims, the broadest, cover all of the Spratly and Paracel Islands -- and most of the South China Sea.
The dispute has intensified political and military rivalry across the region between the rising power of China, which has been projecting its growing naval reach, and the long-dominant player, the United States, which is deepening its ties with Japan, the Philippines and others.
"Washington needs to wake up and realise that while the South China Sea is quiet right now, we are losing. Every day the Chinese position gets stronger, the positions of the other claimants gets weaker, and they have to question the credibility of the US more every day," Poling said.
There are also signs of progress, added Poling. 

This year, the 10-member Association of Southeast Asian Nations (ASEAN) and China started formal talks on a legally binding code of conduct to ease tensions over the strategic waterway.
Taiwan is also spoken about as a powder keg.
Last week, China's Minister of Defense Wei Fenghe vowed any effort to "to separate Taiwan from China" would result in China's armed forces taking "action at any price".
China has claimed self-ruled Taiwan through its "one China" policy since 1949 and vows to bring it under Beijing's rule - by force if necessary.
The US is obliged to help Taiwan with the means to defend itself under the US Congress 1979 Taiwan Relations Act.

War with China Casualties
	2016 Population	Killed		Survivors
CHINA	1 373 541 278	1 057 119 689	77%	316 421 589
UNITED STATES	323 995 528	19 089 783	6%	304 905 745
EUROPEAN UNION	513 949 445	371 356 958	72%	142 592 487
RUSSIA	142 355 415	30 924 816	22%	111 430 599
INDIA	1 266 883 598	1 158 499 174	91%	108 384 424
PAKISTAN	201 995 540	175 747 473	87%	26 248 067
JAPAN	126 702 133	114 241 889	90%	12 460 244
VIETNAM	95 261 021	84 340 688	89%	10 920 333
PHILIPPINES	102 624 209	92 732 902	90%	9 891 307
KOREA, NORTH	25 115 311	21 141 050	84%	3 974 261
KOREA, SOUTH	50 924 172	47 636 302	94%	3 287 870
TAIWAN	23 464 787	22 278 490	95%	1 186 297
	4 246 812 437	3 195 109 214	75%	1 051 703 223

 

The Necessary War

U.S. WAR WITH CHINA MAY BE MORE LIKELY, DEADLIER
BY TOM O'CONNOR

The chances of the U.S. entering into a military conflict with China have increased in the past six years, and the stakes are higher than ever, according to a new report by the RAND Corporation.
The California-based think tank, which conducts research and analysis on behalf of the U.S. military, released the 16-page report on Tuesday.
Titled "Conflict with China Revisited," it is a sequel to a 2011 report in which the group examined the contingencies of a potential war between the world's two leading economies.
Six years later, the report has been revised to include China's many military reforms and advancements that make it a more formidable foe, and to examine a number of contemporary scenarios that could prove to be catalysts for such a confrontation.
"We still do not believe that a Chinese-U.S. military conflict is probable in any of the cases, but our margin of confidence is somewhat lower than it was six years ago," the report read.
Artillery is fired during a military drill in Qingtongxia, China, on September 25. Widespread reforms to China's military, including advances to its missile defense, have made the prospects of a future war with the U.S. more deadly.

The U.S. and China have been at odds since the latter underwent a communist revolution in 1949, expelling its nationalist government to the island of Taiwan.
Since then, Beijing has successfully isolated its rival diplomatically by inheriting its United Nations Security Council seat in 1971 and by taking punitive measures against countries that trade with Taiwan.
While U.S.-Chinese relations have improved since the 1970s, China maintains a territorial claim to Taiwan, and the RAND report listed a potential Chinese invasion of Taiwan as a potential cause for conflict. Taiwan receives arms from the U.S.
China's increased military activity in the Taiwan Strait is just one of many issues that pit Beijing and Washington against one another in the Asia-Pacific.
China claims dominion over nearly the entire South China Sea, and the U.S. has accused it of building artificial islands to host covert military sites intended to back up these claims.
As part of Xi Jinping's overall effort to streamline and modernize China's military, he's also pushed for a more powerful naval force capable of defending its interests.
The RAND document identified the North Korea nuclear weapons crisis as the greatest threat to U.S.-China peace.
Chinese diplomat Liu Jieyi said last week the crisis was "getting too dangerous," as Donald Trump has doubled down on U.S. rhetoric against China's nuclear-armed neighbor.
He has threatened to use military action to disarm Pyongyang's nuclear arsenal.
North Korea claims it has a right to wield the weapons in order to deter an invasion.
China has been North Korea's greatest ally since the fellow communist states were founded in the late 1940s and the two joined forces against U.S. and U.N.-backed South Korean troops in the 1950s. Young supreme leader Kim Jong Un's defiant commitment to nuclear weapons and his rejection of his father's affinity for Beijing, however, has caused rare, visible cracks to appear in this relationship. In Tuesday's report, the authors said it was unlikely China would try to defend North Korea from a potential U.S. strike, but would rather move swiftly to defend its own interests, which would likely clash with U.S. goals and possibly precipitate a larger conflict.
"The likelihood of confrontations, accidental or otherwise, between U.S. and Chinese forces would be high, with significant potential for escalation," the report read.
"Beyond the pressures to intervene and deal with the immediate consequences of a failed North Korea, the United States would confront the thorny issue of the desired end state: unification (the preferred outcome of South Korea) or the continued division of Korea (China’s preference)," it added.

Xi Jinping speaks during the ceremony to mark the 90th anniversary of the founding of China's People's Liberation Army (PLA) at the Great Hall of the People in Beijing on August 1. The PLA was formed in 1927 as the Chinese Workers' and Peasants' Red Army and has since grown from a communist guerrilla army to one of the world's most powerful warfighting forces.

The RAND report said that the U.S. still had a clear, overall military advantage over China, but that defending Washington's regional interests in the Asia-Pacific was becoming increasingly difficult as a result of China's modifications, which include a revamped missile force and the first aircraft carrier to be made in China.
China has traditionally invested more in its economic expansion than military abroad, but Beijing has taken a more aggressive foreign policy stance in recent years, one that often opposes U.S. hegemony and aligns more closely with Russia.
China's latest international spat, a border dispute with India this summer, threatened to bring the region to war and even drag in fellow nuclear-armed force Pakistan.
China and India ultimately resolved the issue.

Sina Delenda Est: The Necessary War

What a War Between America and China Would Look Like.
Potentially, victory could cement the US-led alliance system, making the containment of China considerably less expensive. Assuming that the war began with an assertive Chinese move in the East or South China Sea, the United States could plausibly paint China as the aggressor, and establish itself as the focal point for balancing behavior in the region. Chinese aggression might also spur regional allies (especially Japan) to increase their defense expenditures.
By Robert Farley

How does the unthinkable happen? 

What series of events could lead to war in East Asia, and how would that war play out?
The United States and China are inextricably locked in the Pacific Rim’s system of international trade. 

Some argue that this makes war impossible, but then while some believed World War I inevitable, but others similarly thought it impossible.
In this article I concentrate less on the operational and tactical details of a US-China war, and more on the strategic objectives of the major combatants before, during, and after the conflict. 

A war between the United States and China would transform some aspects of the geopolitics of East Asia, but would also leave many crucial factors unchanged. 

A conflict between China and the US might be remembered only as “The First Sino-American War.”

How the War Would Start
Fifteen years ago, the only answers to “How would a war between the People’s Republic of China and the United States start?” involved disputes over Taiwan or North Korea. 

A Taiwanese declaration of independence, a North Korean attack on South Korea, or some similar triggering event would force the PRC and the US into war.
This has changed. 

The expansion of Chinese interests and capabilities means that we can envision several different scenarios in which direct military conflict between China and the United States might begin. 

These still include a Taiwan scenario and North Korea scenario, but now also involve disputes in the East and South China Seas, as well as potential conflict with India along the Tibetan border.
The underlying factors are the growth of Chinese power, Chinese dissatisfaction with the US-led regional security system, and US alliance commitments to a variety of regional states. 

As long as these factors hold, the possibility for war will endure.
Whatever the trigger, the war does not begin with a US pre-emptive attack against Chinese fleet, air, and land-based installations. 

Although the US military would prefer to engage and destroy Chinese anti-access assets before they can target US planes, bases, and ships, it is extremely difficult to envisage a scenario in which the United States decides to pay the political costs associated with climbing the ladder of escalation.
Instead, the United States needs to prepare to absorb the first blow. 

This doesn’t necessarily mean that the U.S. Navy (USN) and U.S. Air Force (USAF) have to wait for Chinese missiles to rain down upon them, but the United States will almost certainly require some clear, public signal of Chinese intent to escalate to high-intensity, conventional military combat before it can begin engaging Chinese forces.
If the history of World War I gives any indication, the PLA will not allow the United States to fully mobilize in order to either launch a first strike, or properly prepare to receive a first blow. 

At the same time, a “bolt from the blue” strike is unlikely. 

Instead, a brewing crisis will steadily escalate over a few incidents, finally triggering a set of steps on the part of the US military that indicate to Beijing that Washington is genuinely prepared for war. These steps will include surging carrier groups, shifting deployment to Asia from Europe and the Middle East, and moving fighter squadrons towards the Pacific. 

At this moment, China will need to decide whether to push forward or back down.
On the economic side, Beijing and Washington will both press for sanctions (the US effort will likely involve a multilateral effort), and will freeze each others assets, as well as those of any co-belligerents. 

This will begin the economic pain for capital and consumers across the Pacific Rim, and the rest of the world. 

The threat of high intensity combat will also disrupt global shipping patterns, causing potentially severe bottlenecks in industrial production.

How do the Allies Respond
Whether US allies support American efforts against China depends on how the war begins. 

If war breaks out over a collapse of the DPRK, the United States can likely count on the support of South Korea and Japan. 

Any war stemming from disputes in the East China Sea will necessarily involve Japan. 

If events in the South China Sea lead to war, the US can probably rely on some of the ASEAN states, as well as possibly Japan. 

Australia may also support the US over a wide range of potential circumstances.
China faces a less complicated situation with respect to allies. 

Beijing could probably expect benevolent neutrality, including shipments of arms and spares, from Russia, but little more. 

The primary challenge for Chinese diplomats would be establishing and maintaining the neutrality of potential US allies. 

This would involve an exceedingly complex dance, including reassurances about Chinese long-term intentions, as well as displays of confidence about the prospects of Chinese victory (which would carry the implicit threat of retribution for support of the United States).
North Korea presents an even more difficult problem. 

Any intervention on the part of the DPRK runs the risk of triggering Japanese and South Korean counter-intervention, and that math doesn’t work out for China. 

Unless Beijing is certain that Seoul and Tokyo will both throw in for the United States (a doubtful prospect given their hostility to one another), it may spend more time restraining Pyongyang than pushing it into the conflict.

War Aims
The US will pursue the following war aims:
1. Defeat the affirmative expeditionary purpose of the People’s Liberation Army Navy (PLAN).
2. Destroy the offensive capability of the PLAN and People’s Liberation Army Air Force (PLAAF).
3. Destabilize the control of the CCP government over mainland China.
Except in the case of a war that breaks out on the Korean Peninsula, the first task involves either defeating a Chinese attempt to land forces, or preventing the reinforcement and resupply of those troops before forcing their surrender. 

The second task will require a wide range of attacks against deployed Chinese air and naval units, as well as ships and aircraft held in reserve. 

We can expect, for example, that the USN and USAF will target Chinese airbases, naval bases, and potentially missile bases in an effort to maximize damage to the PLAN and PLAAF. 

The third task probably depends on the successful execution of the first two. 

The defeat of Chinese expeditionary forces, and the destruction of a large percentage of the PLAN and the PLAAF, may cause domestic turmoil in the medium to long term. 

US military planners would be well-advised to concentrate the strategic campaign on the first two objectives and hope that success has a political effect, rather than roll the dice on a broader “strategic” campaign against CCP political targets. 

The latter would waste resources, run the risk of escalation, and have unpredictable effects on the Chinese political system.
The PLA will pursue these ends:
1. Achieve the affirmative expeditionary purpose.
2. Destroy as much of the expeditionary capability of the USAF and USN as possible.
3. Hurt America badly enough that future US governments will not contemplate intervention.
4. Disrupt the US-led alliance system in East Asia.
The first task requires the deployment of PLAN surface forces, possibly in combination with PLAAF airborne forces, to seize an objective. 

The second involves the use of submarines, aircraft, cruise missiles, and ballistic missiles to destroy US and allied installations and warships across East Asia.
The third and fourth tasks rest upon the second. 

The PLA will attempt to inflict sufficient casualties on US forces that future US decision-makers will hesitate to use force against the PRC. 

Similarly, the survival of the US-led alliance system requires that the United States successfully defeat Chinese aggression; if it cannot, the alliance system could deteriorate and collapse.
The United States hasn’t lost a fighter in action since the 1999 Kosovo War, and hasn’t lost a major warship since World War II. 

The sinking of a warship would likely also result in the greatest loss of life of any single action for the US military in action since the Vietnam War. 

However, both US and Chinese strategists may overestimate US casualty aversion. 

The loss of a major warship and its crew might serve to solidify US commitment (at least in the short term) rather than undermine it.

The “Hold Your Breath” Moments
The biggest moment will come when the PLA makes an overt attack against a US aircraft carrier. 

This represents the most significant possible escalation against the United States short of a nuclear attack. 

If China decides to attack a US carrier, the war no longer involves posturing and message sending, but rather a full-scale commitment of capabilities designed to defeat and destroy enemy military forces.
The means for this attack matters. 

An attack launched from a ship or a submarine makes any PLAN military vessel fair game for the United States, but doesn’t necessarily incur US attacks against PLAAF airbases, Second Artillery missile installations, or even naval installations.
The most dangerous form of attack would involve a ballistic missile volley against a carrier. 

This is true not simply because these missiles are difficult to intercept, but also because such missiles could carry nuclear warheads. 

The prospect of a nuclear state using a conventional ballistic missile against another nuclear state, especially one with a presumptive nuclear advantage, is laden with complexity.
The next “hold your breath” moment will come when the first US missiles strike Chinese targets. 

Given the overwhelming nuclear advantage that the United States holds over China, the first wave of US attacks will prove deeply stressful to the PRCs military and civilian leadership. 

This is particularly the case if the Chinese believe that they can win at the conventional level of escalation; they will worry that the United States will bump to nuclear in order to retain its advantage.
We can expect that China will deploy its submarines in advance of the onset of hostilities. 

The surface fleet is a different story, however. 

In any high intensity combat scenario, the U.S. Navy (USN) and U.S. Air Force will see Chinese warships as legitimate targets for destruction, and will attack with air and subsurface assets. 

Indeed, even hiding in port probably won’t prevent attacks on the PLAN’s largest ships, including the carrier Liaoning and the big new amphibious transport docks.
China will only sortie the PLAN under two circumstances; if it feels it has sufficient force protection to allow a task force to operate relatively unmolested, or if China’s position has become desperate. 

In either situation, US submarines will pose the most immediate threat to the surface forces.
Under most war scenarios, China needs to fight for some affirmative purpose, not simply the destruction of US or Japanese military forces. 

This means that the PLAN must invade, capture, supply, and defend some geographical point, most likely either Taiwan or an outpost in the East or South China Sea. 

The PLA will need to establish the conditions under which the PLAN can conduct surface support missions.

Who Will Win?
The most difficult question to judge is “who will win?” because that question involves assessing a wide variety of unknowns. 

We don’t know how well Chinese anti-ship ballistic missiles will function, or how destructive US cyber-attacks against the PLAN will prove, or how dangerous the F-22 Raptor will be to conventional Chinese fighters, or how effectively the different elements of the PLAN will cooperate in actual combat. 

Finally, we don’t know when the war will start; both the PLA and the US military will look much different in 2020 than they do in 2014.
However, in general terms the battle will turn on these questions:

1. Electronic Warfare:
How severely will the United States disrupt Chinese communications, electronic, and surveillance capabilities? 

Attacking US forces will depend on communication between seers and shooters. 

To the extent that the US can disrupt this communication, it can defang the PLA. 

Conversely, Chinese cyber-warfare against the United States could raise the domestic stakes for American policymakers.

2. Missiles vs. Missile Defenses:
How well will the USN and USAF be able to defeat Chinese ballistic and cruise missiles? 

The PLAN, PLAAF, and Second Artillery have a bewildering array of missile options for attacking deployed and deploying US forces in depth. 

The American capacity to survive the onslaught depends in part on the effectiveness of defenses against cruise and ballistic missiles, as well as the ability to strike and destroy launchers within and around China.

3. Joint Operations:
How well will the disparate elements of the PLA operate together in context of high intensity, disruptive military operations? 

Unlike the US military, the PLA has little relevant combat experience from the last three decades. 

On the flipside, how well will US “Air-Sea Battle” work prepare the USN and the USAF for working together?

4. Quality vs. Quantity:
Chinese forces are highly likely to achieve local numerical superiority in some types of assets, primarily aircraft and submarines. 

The (narrowing) gap between US and Chinese technology and training will determine how well American forces can survive and prevail in such situations.

How the War Would End
This war doesn’t end with a surrender signed on a battleship. 

Instead, it ends with one participant beaten, embittered, and likely preparing for the next round.
The best case scenario for an American victory would be a result akin to the collapse of the Imperial German government at the end of World War I, or the collapse of Leopoldo Galtieri’s military government after the Falklands conflict. 

Humiliating defeat in war, including the destruction of a significant portion of the PLAN and the PLAAF, as well as severe economic distress, could undermine the grip of the CCP on Chinese governance. 

This is an extremely iffy prospect, however, and the United States shouldn’t count on victory leading to a new revolution.
What if China wins? 

China can claim victory by either forcing the United States into an accommodation to US goals, or by removing the alliance framework that motivates and legitimates US action. 

The United States cannot continue the war if South Korea, Japan, Taiwan, and the Philippines no longer have an interest in fighting. 

Either of these require doing significant damage to US military forces and, potentially, to the US economy.
The impact of a defeat on US domestic politics would be tough to predict. 

The United States has “lost” wars in the past, but these defeats have generally involved negotiated settlements of areas not particularly critical to US global interests. 

It’s not clear how the US people would interpret a major military defeat at the hands of a peer competitor, especially a peer competitor that continues to grow in military and economic power. 

The President and political party that led the US into war would likely suffer dramatically at the polls, at least after the immediate shock of defeat wore off.

How the Peace Begins
The prospect for US conflict with China in the Asia-Pacific depends on a basic appreciation of the changing balance of economic and military power. World War I could not change the fact that Germany would remain the largest and most powerful state in Central Europe. 

Similarly, war is unlikely to change the long-term trajectory of Chinese growth and assertiveness.
A key to peace involves the re-establishment of productive economic relations between China, the United States, and the rest of the Pacific Rim. 

Regardless of how the war plays out, it will almost certainly disrupt patterns of trade and investment around the world. 

If either side decides to attack (or, more likely, inter) commercial shipping, the impact could devastate firms and countries that have no direct stake in the war. 

However, the governments of both the US and China will face strong pressures to facilitate the resumption of full trade relations, at least in consumer goods.
China will not find it difficult to reconstruct war losses. 

Even if the United States effectively annihilates the PLAN and the PLAAF, we can expect that the Chinese shipbuilding and aviation industries will replace most losses within the decade, probably with substantial assistance from Russia. 

Indeed, significant Chinese war losses could reinvigorate both the Russian shipbuilding and aviation industries. 

Moreover, the war will, by necessity, “modernize” the PLA and PLAAF by destroying legacy capability. 

A new fleet of ships and planes will replace the legacy force.
War losses to trained personnel will hurt, but the experience gained in combat will produce a new, highly trained and effective corps of personnel. 

This will lead to better, more realistic training for the next generations of PLA soldiers, sailors, and airmen. 

Win or lose, the Chinese military will likely be more lethal a decade after the war.
The United States may have a harder time replacing losses, and not only because US warships and aircraft cost more than their Chinese counterparts. 

The production lines for the F-15 and F-16 are near the end, and the US no longer produces F-22. Moreover, US shipbuilding has declined to the point that replacing significant war losses could take a very long time. 

This might prove particularly problematic if the war demonstrated severe problems with the F-35 Joint Strike Fighter. 

Given US intention to arm the USAF, USN, and USMC with F-35 variants over the next decade, proof of inadequacy would wreck force planning for the foreseeable future.
The United States will have to face the “was it worth it?” question. 

In victory or defeat, the US will suffer substantial military and economic damage. 

Even if the US wins, it will not “solve” the problem of China; even in the unlikely event that the CCP collapses, a successor regime will still dispute China’s littoral.
Potentially, victory could cement the US-led alliance system, making the containment of China considerably less expensive. 

Assuming that the war began with an assertive Chinese move in the East or South China Sea, the United States could plausibly paint China as the aggressor, and establish itself as the focal point for balancing behavior in the region. 

Chinese aggression might also spur regional allies (especially Japan) to increase their defense expenditures.
A war could invigorate US government and society around the long-term project of containing China. 

The US could respond by redoubling its efforts to outpace the Chinese military, although this would provoke an arms race that could prove devastating to both sides. 

However, given the lack of ideological or territorial threats to the United States, this might be a tough sell.

Sina Delenda Est

What Would Happen in the Hours and Minutes After a US-China War Started?
By Mike Pearl

The US and China could go to war.

Here's what the first day would look like.
Relations between the two countries are an uneasy stew of tension and cooperation. 

Even though China is boosting its military spending and has a history of not respecting the maritime borders of its neighbors, Sino-American relations under Barack Obama often maintained at least an appearance of bilateral cooperation.
Donald Trump, on the other hand, campaigned on the idea that China is a trickster nation who bamboozled the US on trade by futzing with its currency valuation. 

Immediately after the election, he risked offending China by talking to the president of Taiwan. 

Since then, the new administration's stance on China has been unclear at best, and for its part Beijing is preparing for a trade war, which Trump has all but promised. 

It's obvious that China is willing to fight the US.
But could the US and China come to blows militarily? 

It's not looking likely, according to M. Taylor Fravel, an associate professor of political science and a China expert in the Security Studies Program at MIT. 

Fravel explained to me that it's not in China's interest to suddenly declare war on the US. 

"The worst thing for an autocrat is losing a war," he said. 

"I do not see the use of force as solving many problems for them."
Still, war with China is something Trump advisor Steve Bannon said was inevitable a year ago. 

Chalk that up to Bannon's habit of stating things in the most dramatic way possible, but when someone in the White House feels that way, it could drive policy in unanticipated directions.
Even if you set aside the unlikely possibility of an abrupt Pearl Harbor–style surprise attack from either side, tensions could still escalate to the point where shots get fired. 

Fravel was kind enough to walk me step-by-step through the potential flashpoint that could usher in a war between two of the most powerful countries in the world.

Step 1: A friend of the US in the Pacific runs afoul of China
The US and China obviously don't share a border, so unless the flashpoint happens to be North Korea, boots-on-the-ground battlefield scenarios are pretty farfetched. 

According to a 2015 report prepared by the RAND Corporation for the US Army, "A Sino-US conflict is unlikely to involve large land combat." 

So we're most likely talking about a conflict between US and Chinese ships, planes, and lots of missiles.
Indeed, if war were to break out, one likely cause would be a "conflict on an island in the South China Sea," Flavel told me. 

He listed some candidates: A crisis could center on a maritime dispute between China and the Philippines, for instance. 

"Finally of course, you have Taiwan," he told me—referring to the island that forms the northernmost limit of the South China Sea. 

Flavel called Taiwan "the one issue that could spark a large war between the US and China, even though of course that's unlikely."
So we're going to use Taiwan as our example.
Here's a quick recap of the whole Taiwan thing: The island is Chinese soil according to mainland China, but it's an independent country according to its own people. 

The US used to recognize Taiwan as a country, but since 1979 the official US policy on Taiwan has been that mainland China owns Taiwan on paper, while at the same time, "the United States and Taiwan enjoy a robust unofficial relationship," as the State Department website says. 

The government of China doesn't like that relationship, which includes arms trading as well as a contentious deal that says the US will help Taiwan defend itself.
With that in mind, Flavel laid out a fateful scenario: "The mainland believes Taiwan is moving toward independence," and they opt to "engage in a very limited use of force to prevent that."

Step 2: China flexes its maritime muscles
Flavel clarified that "limited use of force" meant that China wouldn't just start bombing Taiwan. Rodger Baker, a VP of strategic analysis at the military think tank Stratfor, concurred. 

"In most cases," he told me in an email, "the initial path may be trying to limit further conflict," but unfortunately, "while both are seeking to mitigate, their actions could inadvertently lead to escalation."
In a conflict between Taiwan a China, this means a blockade, which Flavel called "an act of war that doesn't involve shooting." 

According to a 2012 report by the Center for Strategic and International Studies, an attempted blockade against Taiwan would feature China using its superior naval power to divert ships headed to Taiwan into mainland China for an "inspection." 

Or China could simply declare that it was using Taiwanese shipping routes for military exercises.
This would leave Taiwan cut off from receiving imports, meaning it can't do business, meaning it's in trouble.

Step 3: The US flexes right back
"The US is faced with the decision about whether or not to help Taiwan break out of a blockade," Flavel told me. 

It wouldn't have to defend Taiwan, according to a 2009 op-ed by Richard C. Bush of the Brookings Institution, but President Trump has made his animosity toward China abundantly clear.
Baker concurred that "the US would have a strong incentive to intervene," in a circumstance like this, although he added that "China's anti-ship missiles would potentially delay a strong initial US response."
China's hypersonic anti-ship missiles, also known as "carrier killers," are seriously scary. 

They're faster than any other missile in the world, meaning no known weapon could intercept one, and as their nickname suggests, they're capable of sinking a US aircraft carrier. 

Still, despite the threat of sophisticated weapons designed with just this occasion in mind, President Trump could send carriers to escort incoming ships to their Taiwanese destinations. 

The result: Everyone is on edge.

Step 4: A deadly mixup
If everything went to shit, according to Flavel, it could be due to "warning shots being fired by either US or Chinese vessels." 

The US Navy fires warning shots all the time. 

In January for instance, the Navy fired warning shots at Iranian ships, and the Iranian ships changed course.
But a 2013 report by Andrew S. Erickson of the US Naval War College describes a Chinese plan to strengthen a blockade that includes the use of its anti-ship missiles to deliver warning shots. 

If China doesn't call ahead to say, Hey, so just FYI, we're about to fire a warning shot, Erickson writes, the missiles "could easily be misinterpreted as failed attempts to strike the target. Thus the 'missed' strikes could result in escalation rather than deescalation."
In other words, China could fire a missile just as a show of force, but the US might think it's the start of actual fighting. 

The US would then launch missiles of its own, likely aimed at disabling further launches.
After that, ships would exchange fire, with missiles going after military targets on both sides. 

Before long there would be casualties. 

"Our forces are based in Japan, Korea, Guam and elsewhere," Flavel told me. 

"[China] might want to attack those forces before they arrive."

Step 5: China clarifies what it wants
China would now be at war with the world's only military superpower. 

What's next?
According to the RAND Corporation report, "If either US or Chinese political leaders authorize their military commanders to carry out plans for sharp strikes on enemy forces, a severely violent war would erupt."
It might seem like China's People's Liberation Army would seize on the sudden war scenario and invade Taiwan in an attempt try to reunify what it perceives as a divided country, but Baker doubts this. 

"The terrain is difficult, the population will not be cooperative, and the potential for a long, drawn out anti-guerilla war would be daunting," he told me.
"The mainland calculation would be that if they launch an amphibious assault in Taiwan, it would almost certainly trigger US involvement, and US involvement would be decisive," Flavel added.
So China wouldn't try to take over any Taiwanese land, and they may just want to maintain their blockade, but they may want more.

Step 6: A South China Sea war
In the ensuing days, the fight to maintain China's Taiwanese blockade could evolve into a an attempt by China to dominate the South China Sea, a body of water that sees $5 trillion in ship-based trade per year. 

This would not go well for them. 

"China, right now, in no way has the capability to do that," Flavel told me. 

"It's not going to happen in the next year, two or three."
Indeed, RAND's report on the topic says China should wait a while if it wants a shot regional maritime supremacy. 

China, RAND thinks, would be pummeled by the US if this effort had been launched in 2015, and would still probably lose if it waited until 2025. 

The report adds, "by 2025, though, US losses would increase." 

But despite being confident that the US would dominate, RAND advises the US military that "it would be far better for stability and at least as good for deterrence for the US military to emphasize, in general, planning for a prolonged high-intensity war."
The result of a prolonged war may not be that the US gets driven out with superior force, but in the end, Flavel suggested, a war for the South China Sea could create a queasy Korean War-style stalemate.
"It would basically be a war over the future of the US in Asia," Flavel told me.

World War III Casualties
	2016 Population	Killed		Survivors
CHINA	1 373 541 278	1 057 119 689	77%	316 421 589
UNITED STATES	323 995 528	19 089 783	6%	304 905 745
EUROPEAN UNION	513 949 445	371 356 958	72%	142 592 487
RUSSIA	142 355 415	30 924 816	22%	111 430 599
INDIA	1 266 883 598	1 158 499 174	91%	108 384 424
PAKISTAN	201 995 540	175 747 473	87%	26 248 067
JAPAN	126 702 133	114 241 889	90%	12 460 244
VIETNAM	95 261 021	84 340 688	89%	10 920 333
PHILIPPINES	102 624 209	92 732 902	90%	9 891 307
KOREA, NORTH	25 115 311	21 141 050	84%	3 974 261
KOREA, SOUTH	50 924 172	47 636 302	94%	3 287 870
TAIWAN	23 464 787	22 278 490	95%	1 186 297
	4 246 812 437	3 195 109 214	75%	1 051 703 223