Taiwan warns of possible attack if China's slowdown becomes serious

By Yimou Lee, Fabian Hamacher

TAIPEI -- Beijing could resort to military conflict with self-ruled Taiwan to divert domestic pressure if a slowdown in the world’s second largest economy amid trade war threatens the legitimacy of the Chinese Communist Party, the island’s foreign minister has said.
As Taiwan’s presidential elections approach in January, China has stepped up a campaign to “reunify” with what it considers a wayward province, wooing away the island’s few diplomatic allies and flying regular bomber patrols around it.
In an interview with Reuters, Taiwan’s Foreign Minister Joseph Wu drew attention to China’s slowing economy amid its bitter trade war with the United States.
“If the internal stability is a very serious issue, or economic slowdown has become a very serious issue for the top leaders to deal with, that is the occasion that we need to be very careful,” Wu said on Wednesday.
“We need to prepare ourselves for the worst situation to come...military conflict.”
China’s economy, though still growing, is expected to slow to a near 30-year low this year, underscoring a stiff challenge for Beijing in stepping up stimulus to keep up growth that has been fundamental to the Communist Party’s political legitimacy.
Wu said the economic situation in China was “OK” at the moment, but urged other countries to watch for what he saw as problems there, such as unemployment and popular discontent.
“Perhaps Xi Jinping himself is called into question of his legitimacy, by not being able to keep the Chinese economy growing,” Wu said, referring to Chinese dictator.
“This is a factor that might cause the Chinese leaders to decide to take an external action to divert domestic attention.”
China’s growing military aggression in the region has become a “very serious” source of tension, Wu said, affecting many countries, but added that Taiwan was trying whatever it could to ensure peace across the Strait.
“We certainly hope that Taiwan and China could live peacefully together, but we also see there are problems caused by China, and we will try to deal with it.”
Taiwan has lost seven diplomatic allies to China since President Tsai Ing-wen took office in 2016. Beijing suspects Tsai of pushing for the island’s formal independence, which Xi has warned would lead to a “grave disaster”.
Tsai has repeatedly said she will not change the status quo.

‘MOST DIFFICULT JOB’
Months-long anti-government protests in Hong Kong have provided a lesson for Taiwan, said Wu, who has been a vocal supporter of democracy in the Asian financial hub.
The protests in the former British colony have posed the biggest populist challenge to Xi since he came to power in 2012.
“People here understand that there’s something wrong (with) the way the ‘one country, two systems’ model is run in Hong Kong...Taiwan people don’t like to be in the same situation,” Wu said.
Beijing has repeatedly proposed to rule Taiwan under a “one country, two systems” formula similar to that prevailing in Hong Kong, guaranteeing certain freedoms, but the island has shown no interest in being run by autocratic China.
Wu vowed to help Hong Kong people “striving for freedom and democracy”, promising that, if needed, Taiwan would “provide some assistance to them on an individual basis”.
He did not elaborate, except for saying Taiwan would not intervene in the protests.
Wu, who described his post as “the most difficult ministerial job in the world,” has seen five countries switch diplomatic ties to China, whose complaints also drove many global firms to alter their descriptions of Taiwan.
“Acknowledging that Taiwan is part of China in exchange for some diplomatic space -- I believe such a condition is unacceptable,” Wu said. 

“Taiwan’s diplomacy shouldn’t be outsourced to China.”
China could snatch more of Taiwan’s remaining 15 diplomatic allies, Wu added, in a bid to influence the elections, at which Tsai is seeking re-election.
“We are working closely with the United States and other like-minded countries to make sure the switch of diplomatic relations doesn’t happen again.”
Washington has no formal ties with Taiwan but is bound by law to help defend it.

Taiwan to simulate repelling invasion amid China tensions
Reuters

A Taiwanese flag is seen behind standard Type II missiles on Kee Lung (DDG-1801) destroyer during a drill near Yilan naval base, Taiwan April 13, 2018. 

TAIPEI -- Taiwan will simulate repelling an invading force, emergency repairs of a major air base and using civilian-operated drones as part of military exercises starting next week, the defense ministry said on Tuesday amid growing tensions with China.
Over the past year or so, China has ramped up military drills around self-ruled and democratic Taiwan, including flying bombers and other military aircraft around the island.
China claims Taiwan as its sacred territory, and its hostility toward the island has grown since the 2016 election as president of Tsai Ing-wen from the pro-independence Democratic Progressive Party.
China has been issuing increasingly strident calls for Taiwan to toe the line, even as Tsai has pledged to maintain the status quo and keep the peace.
Taiwan’s annual Han Kuang drills, which start next week with a computer-aided command post exercise, do not make explicit mention of China, instead referring to “offensive forces invading Taiwan”.
The major part of it will be a live-fire field training exercise from June 4-8, including “enemy elimination on beaches”, the ministry said. 

“Civilian resources will also be integrated into this exercise to support military operations,” it added.
Tech companies will offer support with drones to mark targets and provide battlefield surveillance, and building companies will help with emergency runway repairs for the Ching Chuan Kang air base in central Taiwan, the ministry said.
The Air Combat Command will issue air raid alerts with an “aerial threat warning system” during the air defense drills, and the Coast Guard will also join in exercises with the navy, it added.
Taiwan is well equipped with mostly U.S.-made weaponry, but has been pushing for Washington to sell it more advanced equipment, including new fighter jets, to help it better deter its giant neighbor.
Military experts say the balance of power between Taiwan and China has now shifted decisively in China’s favor, and China could likely overwhelm the island unless U.S. forces came quickly to Taiwan’s aid.
The United States is bound by law to provide Taiwan with the means to defend itself, but it is unclear whether Washington would want to be dragged into what would likely be a hugely destructive war with China over the island.

Sina Delenda Est

How China Would Invade and Conquer Taiwan (And How to Stop It)

By Ian Easton

Taiwan's government and military (like the rest of Taiwanese society) are far tougher than they get credit for. 

But they can only do so much by themselves. 

The Pentagon has a critical role to play in assisting Taiwan maximize its war fighting capabilities. With America's help, Taiwan can make sure its defense investments factor into Beijing's calculations and, hopefully, prevent a future invasion from occurring in the first place.
Various sources from within the People's Republic of China have allegedly suggested that time is running out for Taiwan's democracy. 

In their narrative, China's iron-fisted leader, Xi Jinping, is "losing patience" and could order the invasion of Taiwan in the early 2020s. 

The world's most dangerous flashpoint might witness an overwhelming amphibious blitz, perhaps before July 2021 to mark the 100th anniversary of the founding of the Chinese Communist Party (CCP).
That's the narrative. 

The reality is that China will probably not attack Taiwan in such a radical and high-risk fashion. 

Xi and his top lieutenants are far more likely to draw-out and escalate the war of nerves across the Taiwan Strait. 

They will continue using disinformation and other techniques to drain Washington's confidence that Taiwan can be defended, while ramping up subversive activities to undermine the island nation's confidence and willpower.
Xi will bide his time and hope the Taiwanese government cracks under mounting pressure, allowing him to conquer his target cheaply. 

At the same time, his military generals will continue planning and preparing to deliver on their "sacred" mission. 

Coercion could easily fail, making invasion a tempting option―especially in a future scenario where the balance of power looks more favorable to Beijing than it does today.

Assessing the Threat:
The ever-tense political and security environment across the Taiwan Strait necessitates an accurate depiction of PLA capabilities, strengths, and shortfalls.
The PLA's strengths are more apparent than its weaknesses. 

China's military muscle is frequently highlighted and hyped up by the media, both in Beijing and abroad. 

Undoubtedly, China's ballistic missiles, cyber warfare capabilities, and counter-space weapons make it a force to be reckoned with. 

Perhaps even more dangerous are its espionage and covert actions abroad to shape foreign policymaking.
But there is always more to the story. 

Renowned Naval War College professor, Andrew Erickson, makes it clear in his recently published book, Chinese Naval Shipbuilding that while Beijing's fleets are growing at a remarkable clip, the PLA Navy is not ready to support the invasion of Taiwan. 

The Chinese navy still lacks the lift capacity and the air defense capability it needs. 

Nonetheless, the situation will almost certainly look very different tomorrow than it does today.
Dennis Blasko, author of The Chinese Army Today, observes that the CCP's ground forces, like the navy, are not yet ready for the ultimate fight. 

For invasion to be a realistic option, China would have to have far more helicopters, paratroopers, special operators, amphibious mechanized divisions, and marines. 

Moreover, the PLA would need to build a solid non-commissioned officer corps and provide better training to unit leaders up and down the entire chain of command. 

Much of this work has already begun and will start to bear fruit over the next decade.

Taiwan's Anti-Invasion Strategy:
So how do Taiwanese military experts plan to defend their country against attack, and how can the United States help?
Taiwan is at the tail end of a transit from a conscription force to an all-volunteer military. 

Building an elite force of professional warriors is a good thing. 

It gives Taiwan a comparative advantage. 

China has no national army and relies mostly on short-term draftees.
According to a recent RAND Corporation report, Taiwan could augment its all-volunteer military with elite reserve force units, further enhancing its ability to counter Chinese threats in the electromagnetic, air, and sea domains. 

Taiwan's armed forces could also benefit from new training opportunities. 

Bilateral training exercises and joint humanitarian missions with the U.S. military would give Taiwan a much-needed shot in the arm.
Modern wars are increasingly decided not by brute force, but by brainpower. 

This can only be harnessed with advanced training. 

One of Taiwan's primary defense goals is to prepare the island for the shock of a lightning war waged by the Peoples Liberation Army (PLA). 

Doing so requires highly-motivated personnel who are organized, trained, and equipped to meet an enemy invasion campaign with overwhelming resistance.
The asymmetry of size and economy across the Taiwan Strait requires defense planners on the island to harness every aspect of power, bringing a wide range of latent capabilities to bear when needed. Taiwan's all-out defense strategy calls for mobilizing the entire country, gearing-up every able-bodied man and woman in support of anti-invasion operations.
As Lauren Dickey of Kings College London points out, Taiwan's Ministry of National Defense (MND) is constantly honing its ability to repulse Chinese invasion. 

Every year, MND conducts intensive national and local-level military exercises, testing and sharpening plans to defend the island in the event of enemy landings.
It is estimated that Taiwan will have approximately four weeks advanced warning of a Chinese invasion. 

Given China's skill in the dark arts of strategic deception, this cannot be taken for granted. 

Yet the vast scale of the PLA's envisioned amphibious operations necessarily means its offensive intentions would be foreshadowed.
Warning signs would include troop movements, reserve mobilization, industrial stockpiling, military drills, media signaling, diplomatic messaging, and sabotage against Taiwan. 

The most obvious and worrisome sign would be the gathering of massive fleets of civilian and naval vessels at known amphibious staging areas in southeast China.
As all this was playing out, Taiwan's president, her cabinet advisors, and parliamentary leaders would debate their response options. 

They would weigh intelligence pouring in from radars, satellites, listening posts, and agents in China. Their most obvious option would be to increase readiness levels and mobilize the island to gun-down an enemy attack.
It would not take long to mine the maritime lines of approach across the Taiwan Strait, nor to fortify invasion beaches, ports, and airstrips. 

It would take only slightly longer to man all inland key points like bridges and power stations, and to evacuate non-essential personnel from potential battle zones. 

But accomplishing this would require a colossal workforce in the form of mobilized army reservists and contractors. 

For this reason, Taiwan maintains the ability to mobilize up to two and a half million men and nearly one million civil defense workers in just a few days time.
Tests of the emergency mobilization system are carried out on a yearly basis at sites across Taiwan, Penghu, and the outer islands (Kimen and Matsu). 

Their results are impressive. 

They indicate that citizen-soldiers will muster at marshalling posts in extraordinary numbers and at rapid speeds.
Taiwan’s all-out defense mobilization plan entails more than just bringing latent military capabilities into action. 

The Cabinet Office (Executive Yuan) and its subordinate ministries such as the Ministry of Transportation, Ministry of the Interior, and Ministry of Economic Affairs (among others) all play a role in the integration of civil defense units for homeland defense.

The Way Forward:
Taiwan's government and military (like the rest of Taiwanese society) are far tougher than they get credit for. 

But they can only do so much by themselves. 

The Pentagon has a critical role to play in assisting Taiwan maximize its war fighting capabilities. 

With America's help, Taiwan can make sure its defense investments factor into Beijing's calculations and, hopefully, prevent a future invasion from occurring in the first place.
The RAND report suggests the establishment of a joint working group, led on the U.S. side by an assistant secretary of defense. 

Indeed, Taiwanese forces would benefit from new types of professional military education and technical training in the United States. 

American mentors could support Taiwan’s continued transit to a potent all-volunteer force and help create a more strategically focused reserve force.
Taiwanese troops also need regular and dependable arms sales, something that unfortunately was denied them by the Bush and Obama administrations. 

For Taiwan, the positive operational and tactical effects of American weapons systems are indisputable. 

The Trump administration should offer Taiwan the same capabilities it is offering Japan and South Korea, including new stealth fighter jets, missile defense batteries, and destroyers.
In addition, American companies should be unchained by Washington, allowing them to compete for access to Taiwan's Indigenous Defense Submarine program. 

Even more important than firepower would be the huge morale boosting effects such material support would have on recruitment and retention on the island―and the powerful signal of purpose and resolve it would send to China.
Taiwan's military has developed a solid defense plan and is cultivating a force of professional warriors. 

But the grave invasion threat facing the island is growing over time. 

Keeping pace with China's offensive power will be extremely difficult unless big changes are made to the way America does business in Asia.
Going forward, the Trump White House would do well to develop a new strategy for advancing U.S.-Taiwan relations. 

Making sure Taiwan has the strong self-defense capabilities it needs will help keep the globe's greatest powder keg from ever igniting. 

Ignoring the China problem would only make it worse.

The Iron Lady

Taiwan ready for battle as fears grow of Chinese invasion
By MARK CHANDLER

Taiwan has warned about China's military drills

Beijing’s communist leaders have never renounced their claim that the island is China’s territory and have not ruled out the use of force.
And Beijing has taken an increasing hostile stance since President Tsai Ing-wen, from the pro-independence Democratic Progressive Party, won Taiwan’s elections last year.
It suspects Tsai of pushing for formal independence, a red line for China, and has held 16 rounds of military exercises close to Taiwan over the past year.
Tsai has now warned the drills are leading to mounting instability and Beijing’s military threat is growing by the day.

The president said Taiwan wanted peace but could "not have a single day without combat preparedness” and would fiercely defend the state’s security and way of life.
Tsai told senior military officers in Taipei: "In this period of time, the frequent military activities of mainland China in East Asia have already affected safety and stability in the region to a certain extent.
"Our country has always been a contributor to safety and stability in the region, this is why the national army has to keep an eye on movements of the Chinese military and take appropriate actions when needed to guarantee the safety of the country and region.”
Beijing has repeatedly claimed its drills, which have also taken place in the disputed South China Sea and the Sea of Japan, are routine and not aimed at any third party.

President Tsai Ing-wen has vowed to protect Taiwan

But it has warned Taiwan against "using weapons to refuse reunification" and its state media has given high profile to images of Chinese jets flying close to the island.
Earlier this week, China said Taiwan would have to “get used” to the “island encirclement” drills.
And tension rose this month when a senior Chinese diplomat threatened that China would invade Taiwan if any US warships made port visits there.
Taipei is well equipped with mostly US-made weapons, but has been pressing Washington to sell more advanced equipment.

China is modernising its army

The US is bound by law to provide Taiwan with the means to defend itself, much to China’s annoyance.
News of the latest war threat comes at a difficult time for US relations with China as Washington pushes Beijing to take firmer action against sabre-rattling ally North Korea.
China has also taken steps to modernise its army in recent years and announced this week that its paramilitary force, the People’s Armed Police would be brought under the control of the Central Military Commission.
The People's Armed Police serves as a backup for the military in times of war, and domestically has a role in putting down protests and counter-terrorism as well as border defence and fire-fighting.

Both Taiwan and China have held military drills

Xi Jinping leads the Central Military Commission in his role as armed forces chief and commander in chief.
Xi has steadily consolidated his power over the military, and has appointed allies to key positions of power in the armed forces.
And he has radically overhauled the old Soviet-era command structure of the military to make the armed forces nimbler and better able to respond to crises at home and abroad.
That has included condensing the command structure and giving greater emphasis on new capabilities including cyberspace, electronic and information warfare.

Why China Can't Conquer Taiwan in a War

The United States should focus on helping China’s neighbors deny China sea and air control in the region

By Zachary Keck

With Xi Jinping having consolidated his power at the 19th Party Congress, and the United States increasingly distracted at home, it may seem like a given that China will reestablish its predominance over the India-Pacific region. 

A new study casts doubt on this, however, arguing that Beijing doesn’t have the military power to defeat its neighbors. 

In fact, it probably can’t even conquer Taiwan.
The new study by Michael Beckley, an Assistant Professor of Political Science at Tufts University, was published in the academic journal International Security. 

In the article, Beckley argues that China’s neighbors could thwart Chinese military aggression through anti-access/area denial strategies with only minimal U.S. assistance.
“My main finding is that there is a budding balance of military power in East Asia, which the United States can reinforce at moderate risk to U.S. forces,” Beckley writes in the article. 

“Furthermore, this balance of power will remain stable for years to come, because China cannot afford the power-projection capabilities it would need to overcome the A2/AD forces of its neighbors. The main reasons are that power projection forces are more expensive than A2/AD forces by an order of magnitude.”
A2/AD is most commonly discussed in relation to China’s efforts to deny America the ability to intervene in any regional conflict or make it so costly that Washington is deterred from doing so. Some observers, including James Holmes, Toshi Yoshihara and Andrew Krepinevich, have argued that the United States and its Asian allies should this strategy around on China. 

Instead of seeking to maintain command of the sea and air as America has traditionally done, these scholars suggest Washington and its allies could simply seek to deny China the ability to achieve its goals. 

As Beckley puts it, “Under this strategy, the United States would abandon efforts to command maritime East Asia and, instead, focus on helping China’s neighbors deny China sea and air control in the region.
Beckley’s main contribution is to test the viability of this strategy for a number of foreseeable conflict scenarios. 

One of these, of course, is a Chinese invasion of the Taiwan strait. 

While amphibious invasions have always been the most difficult military maneuver to pull off, they are especially difficult in an era of precision-guided munitions that can pick off an invading force while they are still at sea.
To have any chance of successfully invading Taiwan, then, China would have to establish total air superiority and command of the sea in the area. 

As Beckley explains, “If Taiwan retained substantial air defenses and offensive strike platforms, a Chinese amphibious invasion would be impossible, because Taiwan could pick off PLA landing craft as they motored across the Taiwan Strait.” 

Although China has amassed an incredibly large missile force to destroy Taiwan’s defensive capabilities at the outset of a conflict, it would still need to take Taipei by total surprise to be successful. 

If Taiwan had some advanced warning of an attack, it could disperse its aircraft to some thirty-six military airfield across the islands, while also relying on a number of civilian aistrips and even some highways that double as emergency air bases. 

Taiwan also has a bunch of road-mobile missile launchers and anti-aircraft weaponry, as well as a number of ships and submarines capable of attacking Chinese forces with cruise missiles.
As Beckley points out, there is little reason to believe that China would be able to knock out all of these defenses in a surprise first strike. 

To begin with, Taiwan has sophisticated early warning air defense systems. 

Moreover, the United States has not even been able to achieve this level of destruction against much lesser enemies like Iraq during the First Gulf War or Serbia in 1999.
But if China was far more successful than the United States had been in those conflicts, Beijing’s ability to execute an amphibious invasion is still far from certain. 

For instance, Beckley notes that only ten percent of Taiwan’s coastlines are suitable for an amphibious landing, which would allow Taipei to concentrate its forces on a few key areas. 

Chinese forces trying to land would likely be severely outnumbered.
Thus, even using the the most optimistic assessments (from Beijing’s perspective), China would have its hands full trying to conquer Taiwan.

Consequently, Beckley writes, “the United States would only need to tip the scales of the battle to foil a Chinese invasion, a mission that could be accomplished in numerous ways without exposing U.S. surface ships or non-stealth aircraft to China’s A2/AD forces.” 

More specifically, by the U.S. military’s own estimates, America would need “10,000 to 20,000 pounds of ordnance to decimate a PLA invasion force on the beaches of Taiwan.” 

This could be done, Beckley notes, using a single B-2 bomber or an Ohio-class submarine.
Beckley goes on to demonstrate that China would have difficulty gaining control over the East and South China Sea, given the nearly certain resistance it would face from countries like Vietnam and Japan. 

Thus, China’s ability to militarily dominate the region is more unlikely than is commonly appreciated. 

That being said, China’s strategy to date seems to be to win without fighting. 

So far, this has been relatively successful.

The Just War

Confronting China’s invasion of South China Sea is overdue
By Austin Bay

Environmental activists in Manila display placards Tuesday as they picket the Chinese Consulate to protest alleged military build-up by China on the disputed group of islands at the South China Sea.
Since the 1990s China has insistently waged a slow and deliberate imperial war of territorial expansion in the South China Sea.
“Imperial war” is the apt description. 

China exhibits classic imperial ambition. 

Using economic, diplomatic and military muscle camouflaged by propaganda, Beijing adds territory to its imperial dominion at the expense of less powerful neighbors.
In 1950, the newly installed Communist regime in Beijing took Tibet. 

The Communists defended their action by claiming that “traditionally” Tibet was a Chinese province. 

As progressive Communists they were liberating Tibet from nonprogressives. 

If that sounds like old time Communist propaganda gospel, it was.
Invading Tibet took two weeks. By mid-1951, Beijing had full control of the country.

Weeks and months were the time metric for China’s Tibet operation. 

Soldiers armed with rifles and artillery pieces were the means.
Reporters and headline writers understand the pace and weaponry of that kind of war — rapidly seizing objectives while firing guns.
Tibet is a destination for Buddhist pilgrims and mountain climbers, not an international trade route. So who cared? 

India cared. 

Tibet is an invasion route into India. India felt threatened. 

In 1962 the Sino-Indian War flared over control of southern Himalayan passes. 

China won. 

So China’s invasion of Tibet stood and still stands.
Beijing’s South China Sea invasion moves at a different pace: decades. 

That makes recognizing the invasion difficult and confronting it even more problematic.
News media focus on hours, days and weeks, perhaps a year or two. 

Politicians, particularly in democracies, focus on electoral time. 

U.S. presidents have a four- to eight-year policy window — not even a decade.
Over the last 30 years, China’s principal weapon systems in the South China Sea haven’t been bayonets, aircraft and warships, though Beijing is making increasing use of those classic means of coercion and menace.
China’s principal weapons have been offshore construction barges, construction crews and exploratory oil drilling rigs, all supported by shepherding coast guard vessels and swarms of fishing boats.
The barge-borne construction crews usually begin with a “sea feature” like a reef or a rock in the South China Sea. 

A sea feature is not habitable. 

A sea feature is not, in and of itself, sovereign territory.
No matter. 

To Beijing only power matters. 

The construction crews add thousands of cubic meters of dredged sand and reinforced concrete to the sea feature. Voila, an artificial islet. 

The crews top their manufactured islet with military-grade runways capable of handling high-performance combat aircraft. 

If the final product looks something like a stationary naval aircraft carrier surrounded by a strip of sand, that isn’t a glitch — it’s a feature.
The counterfeit archipelago Beijing has created now extends south from the Chinese coast and Hainan Island to close to Borneo and the Filipino island of Palawan.
Beijing has added a political coup de grace: The counterfeit archipelago is now sovereign Chinese territory, like Shanghai. 

Beijing’s claim is utter fraud. 

It has no legitimate historical claim to the area.
China’s man-made islands encroach on the sovereign territory and Exclusive Economic Zones (EEZs) of the Philippines, Malaysia and Vietnam. 

The islets and Beijing’s claim to sovereignty also challenge Indonesian territorial sovereignty. Singapore is wary, and Singapore sits on the Strait of Malacca, the primary shipping route between the Indian and Pacific Oceans.
Every year, ships hauling goods worth about $5 trillion traverse the South China Sea. 

China’s counterfeit islands disrupt this traffic.
This isn’t the distant Shangri-La of Tibet. 

This is a nontheoretical threat to global trade.
China’s aggression has provoked intense resistance, particularly from Vietnam and the Philippines. But 2017 finds the Philippines buckling, despite its court victory. 

During the Obama Administration the US Navy did conduct Freedom of Navigation Operations to assert maritime right of passage. 

However, Beijing read the Obama Administration as feckless and unwilling to lead. 

Its island-creation program intensified.
The Trump Administration has said China’s South China Sea invasion won’t stand. 

This response from Washington is long overdue.