China’s Intimidation Exposes Vietnam’s Lack of Deterrence

Hanoi does not seem to have a strategy to develop the resources that international law says rightfully belong to it. And the economic costs of this predicament are rising.
By Bill Hayton

A Chinese coast guard vessel sails near an oil drilling rig in disputed waters in the South China Sea in 2014. 

Vietnam has lost another sea battle: a $200 million oil and gas development project — known as the ‘Red Emperor’ development — off Vietnam’s southeast coast has been suspended, possibly cancelled. 

Hanoi’s hopes of a hydrocarbon boost to its stretched government budget have been dashed. 

And the culprit is Vietnam’s ‘good neighbour, good comrade and good friend’ to the north.
The project, many years in the making, was a joint venture between Repsol of Spain, Mubadala of Abu Dhabi and the state-owned energy company PetroVietnam. 

Commercial drilling was due to begin this April and oil and gas were expected to flow for at least 10 years. 

A specialised platform built in the port of Vung Tau lies idle, as do the contracted drilling rig and storage tanker.
So far, the Vietnamese government has not admitted that the project has been suspended. 

Nor has it confirmed that another Repsol project on a neighbouring block of seabed was cancelled last year.
Both the Repsol blocks lie within Vietnam’s claimed exclusive economic zone. 

A reasonable interpretation of international law would give it the right to the resources in the blocks. Unfortunately for Vietnam, China does not subscribe to that reasonable view.
Over the past decade, China has increased the degree of intimidation that it is prepared to use to achieve its strategic objectives. 

In 2007, Beijing threatened international energy companies, suggesting that their businesses in China were at risk if they pursued offshore ventures with Vietnam. BP and Chevron were among the companies that folded. 

In 2011 and 2012, Chinese ships used force against Vietnamese oil survey vessels, cutting and snagging their seismic cables. 

In 2017, China threatened to attack Vietnamese positions on the Vanguard Bank in the South China Sea if Repsol’s development was not halted.
It is not yet clear what kind of threat was issued in the latest confrontation. 

But the Vietnamese decision did coincide with China’s deployment of a 40-ship naval flotilla off Hainan, just two days sailing from the drill location. 

This is the situation that Vietnamese leadership finds itself in: a huge neighbour is prepared to imply the use of military force to threaten Vietnam’s vital economic interests.
Vietnam is facing significant economic woes. 

Its public debt is the highest of the ASEAN countries (excluding Singapore). 

Debt has risen rapidly from 50 per cent of GDP in 2011 to 64 per cent in 2016 and is now thought to be bumping the legal ceiling of 65 per cent. 

To try to avoid breaching that limit, sales of stakes in state-owned companies have risen sharply and ministers have pledged to cut the state payroll, including for the police. 

Austerity is being imposed on the traditional tools of Communist Party control.
In addition, taxes are going up. 

The government has introduced a new levy on fuel, ostensibly to cut carbon emissions, but really to try to balance the books. 

Tax increases are never popular but as existing oil fields become exhausted the government urgently needs to replace declining revenue sources. 

The Red Emperor field was planned to be productive within months but the suspension now creates a hole in next year’s state budget. 

Ironically, China’s moves out at sea have made its communist comrade more vulnerable on land.
What options does Hanoi have? 

For some years it has been trying to build up its naval deterrent capabilities with new ships, submarines and missiles. 

Vietnam could probably sink a few Chinese ships if it came to a fight, but the consequences for it — both military and economic — would be dire. 

By backing down over this oil drill Vietnam has demonstrated its lack of a credible naval deterrent. 

Not even the visit of one of the mightiest warships on earth, the USS Carl Vinson, to Da Nang days before the scheduled start of Repsol’s oil drilling was sufficient to give Vietnam the confidence to ignore Chinese threats.
Another option is diplomacy. 

In the days after the Repsol decision, the Chinese Foreign Minister Wang Yi visited Hanoi. 

Talks were friendly but there was a sharp disconnect in the official statements. 

The Chinese talked of ‘exploring feasible ways for joint development’ whereas the Vietnamese suggested that ‘the issues must be tackled in respect of … the United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea’.
Diplomacy with third countries is tricky for Vietnam given its long-standing aversion to alliances and the Communist Party’s distrust of the United States. 

Vietnam’s current leadership team under General-Secretary Nguyen Phu Trong are ‘system-loyalists’ determined to maintain Communist Party leadership. 

They see their Chinese counterparts as more reliable than the democracy-loving Americans. 

The hardliners are currently engaged in a severe crackdown on political dissidents, reasoning that Washington is unlikely to sanction them given the current geopolitical climate. 

For the same reasons, Beijing can be reasonably sure that Hanoi is not about to jump into the US camp simply because of the loss of oil revenue from the South China Sea.
Hanoi’s options are very limited. 

It, along with all the other Southeast Asian claimant states in the South China Sea, is still refusing to concede on the main Chinese demand for ‘joint development’. 

It continues to court international support and to engage China in discussions. 

But it does not seem to have a strategy to develop the resources that international law says rightfully belong to it. 

And the economic costs of this predicament are rising.

Grand bargain with China over North Korea would make U.S. a paper tiger

As frustrating as it may seem, our long-standing strategy of containment and deterrence toward North Korea remains our best hope.
By Michael Auslin

With North Korea’s latest test of an intercontinental ballistic missile, one apparently capable of reaching the U.S. West Coast, the American foreign policy community is struggling to find a way — short of war — to end the threat from Pyongyang. 

In the media and behind closed doors, some are suggesting that the U.S. should approach China for a grand bargain.
The idea is deceptively simple: China would intervene in North Korea, most likely by removing Kim Jong Un from power and installing a puppet in his place. 

In return, the U.S. would withdraw or significantly reduce our forces in South Korea and potentially forces farther afield in Asia.
This may sound like an effective, realpolitik means of breaking a decades-long stalemate. 

After all, American presidents have been saying for years that China is the key to solving the North Korea puzzle. 

Such a pact would force Beijing into taking action rather than offering platitudes. 

It would also end the charade of American sanctions, which are regularly watered down or undercut by China and Russia. 

Most of all, it would rid the world of Kim — a brutal, dangerous despot — and end his family’s absolute rule.
But in reality, a grand bargain with China is likely to destroy America’s global influence, making it impossible for Washington to maintain stability in strategic areas, particularly in Asia and Europe. Indeed, merely proposing an agreement of this sort would make the U.S. into a paper tiger and compromise American credibility in Asia and around the world.
A grand bargain would effectively transfer America’s dominance to China. 

No matter how the White House spun such a deal, world leaders would infer that the U.S. had gone hat in hand to China. 

Recognizing China as the true foreign power on the peninsula, South Korea and other Asian nations would tilt inevitably toward Beijing. 

It’s also possible that South Korea and Japan, among other countries, would decide that they had no choice but to develop nuclear weapons for their own national defense.
Moreover, having seen the U.S. kowtow, Beijing would likely take a more assertive posture in the South China Sea and push Washington further, demanding a more comprehensive drawdown of American military forces from East Asia. 

Even if Washington refused to buckle, Sino-U.S. relations would enter a period of heightened tension and antagonism, undoubtedly encouraging both Moscow and Tehran to double down on their destabilizing behavior.
In short, a bargain would spell serial diplomatic failure for the U.S. 

As frustrating as it may seem, our long-standing strategy of containment and deterrence toward North Korea remains our best hope.

This strategy will test our patience, but there are a few policies the White House can adopt to make its position more credible.
First, Washington ought to acknowledge openly that North Korea is a country with weapons of mass destruction that can strike not just other Asian countries, but also the continental United States. Washington also needs to end the fantasy of North Korean denuclearization, which, short of all-out war, will never happen. 

That will at least free up American diplomats from endless, meaningless negotiations. 

It is better to be feared by Pyongyang than held in contempt for our willingness to believe that it might one day give up its nuclear program.
Second, the U.S. should announce an assured destruction policy in response to any use of nuclear weapons by the North. 

If Pyongyang has no intention of using its weapons, then we have little to worry about. 

But if Kim is tempted to do so, our threat may give him pause, or create rifts within the elite that could result in Kim being neutered. 

This move would also outflank any attempts at nuclear blackmail by Kim, since Washington would make clear that the use of nuclear weapons would result in the complete destruction of his regime.
Finally, the Trump administration would be wise to commit to a comprehensive missile-defense program in order to defend against North Korea’s relatively limited, though lethal, ICBM capability. 

The cost of exploring all possible means of missile defense, including air-based and space-based directed-energy weapons, is a small investment next to the potential of a catastrophic war.
Acknowledging our diplomatic failures and taking these steps would increase our chances of containing North Korea. 

The alternative — a misguided and rushed grand bargain with China — would do little to end Pyongyang’s threat, and almost certainly would spell the end of American global primacy, leaving the world a far more uncertain and unstable place.

Sina Delenda Est: Standing Up to China Is Smart Foreign Policy

China's fifth column is making the argument to do nothing to antagonize China, even if it means forfeiting American interests and ideals. That would be a historic mistake.
By James Holmes and Toshi Yoshihara

The Japan Times must be having a hard time finding copy to fill its op-ed pages. 

Exhibit A: a screed from an “adjunct senior scholar” at the Chinese Communist Party–affiliated National Institute for South China Sea Studies in Haikou, China, concerning U.S. strategy toward China in the age of Trump. 

In "Mark Valencia"’s telling, Donald Trump’s ascent to the presidency has liberated “U.S. China-bashers” to have a “field day” at China’s expense. 

“Extremism” rules the day in Washington and academic precincts.
Zounds!
Wicked times are afoot, you’d think. 

But bear in mind that a lot of things look like extremism to someone who’s fronting for an extremist regime. 

To build his case "Valencia" refers obliquely to “two academics from the Naval War College.” 

The nameless academics, he says, suggest that “America should revive its past ‘daring-do’ [we think you mean derring-do, "Mark"] and ‘recognize that close quarters encounters, cat and mouse games between submarines and opposing fleets, and even deliberate collisions’ could become routine elements of the U.S.-China rivalry.”
We confess to being the scurrilous duo. 

The passages "Valencia" quotes come from an article we wrote for Orbis, a journal published by the University of Pennsylvania’s Foreign Policy Research Institute. (Look for the article here since "he" doesn’t bother furnishing a link.)
We compiled the article long before the election, and aimed it at whichever candidate might prevail. Our bottom line: China is already competing with America in the China seas and Western Pacific. Close-quarters encounters between Chinese and American ships and planes are already routine elements of the U.S.-China rivalry—just as they were between Soviet and American ships and planes during the Cold War. 

And Chinese seamen and airmen initiate these encounters.
Washington can either wrest the initiative away from Beijing, or it can remain passive and continue losing ground in the strategic competition. 

Better to seize the initiative. 

To do so the new U.S. administration must relearn the art of deterrence, and to deter Chinese aggression the administration must accept that hazards come with the territory. 

That’s Strategy 101—basic stuff for anyone fluent in statecraft.
"Valencia" is a lumper. 

He lumps our analysis with other commentators’ views, many quite different from our own, before attempting the equivalent of an op-ed drive-by shooting. 

All of our views are equivalent for him; all are expressions of “extremism.” 

The others—Gordon Chang and James Kraska, to name two—can doubtless speak up for themselves should they choose. 

We’ll stick to speaking up for ourselves.
And anyone who takes the trouble to read our item—download early, download often—will realize "Valencia" excerpts a couple of quotations out of context and retrofits them to a predetermined storyline. 

First write conclusion, then fit facts to it!
Let’s go through this point by point. 

First, Valencia implies that Trump’s victory initiated our analysis. 

“This deluge,” he opines, “was stimulated by statements by Trump and his nominees for secretary of state, Rex Tillerson and secretary of defense, James Mattis.” 

He goes on to assert that such “statements by incoming government leaders and influence peddlers provided an opportunity for America’s China hawks to promote their views.”
Wrong.
"Valencia" has it precisely backward. 

And a simple internet search would have revealed the blunder before he committed it. 

Explains Orbis editor-in-chief Mackubin Owens helpfully: “This special issue of Orbis features articles by FPRI associates offering ‘advice to the next president.’ 

Written before the election [our italics], these essays offer recommendations for national security affairs in general, as well as for regional issues.”
And so it was. 

We drafted the article in August—months ahead of the election, and when Hillary Clinton remained the odds-on favorite to win the White House. 

We assumed a Clinton administration would be the primary audience, but wrote it to advise whoever might prevail in November. 

In short, this was a nonpartisan venture, compiled in the spirit of our running counsel to the Obama administration.
And it should have bipartisan appeal.

As secretary of state, it’s worth recalling, Clinton was also the architect of America’s “pivot,” a.k.a. “rebalance,” to Asia—an undertaking aimed at counterbalancing China. 

Considering China’s record of bellicosity in maritime Asia, and considering Clinton’s diplomatic past, we had good reason to believe that she and her lieutenants would prove as receptive to our message as Trump.
More so, maybe. 

In any event: it’s misleading and false for "Valencia" to accuse us of devising “U.S. tactics in the Trump era.” 

We are devising strategy to deter a domineering China—no matter who occupies the Oval Office. 

That our article appeared after Trump prevailed represents mere happenstance.
Second, "Valencia" insinuates that we hold extremist views. 

Well, we guess so... insofar as anyone who wants to deter an aggressor from further aggression entertains extremist views. 

Deterrence involves putting an antagonist on notice that it will suffer unacceptable consequences should it take some action we wish to proscribe. 

It involves fielding military power sufficient to make good on the threat, whether the requisite capabilities be nuclear or conventional. 

And it involves convincing the antagonist we’re resolute about making good on our threats.
We’re glad to keep company with such hardnosed practitioners of deterrence as Harry Truman, Dwight Eisenhower, and John Kennedy—extremists all, no doubt. 

Statesmen of yore made Moscow a believer in American power and resolve—and largely held the line against communism.
Except in that trivial sense, though, there’s nothing extreme about our argument. 

We maintain that China and the United States are pursuing irreconcilable goals in maritime Asia. 

The United States wants to preserve freedom of the sea, China wants anything but. 

Both contenders prize their goals, and both are presumably prepared to mount open-ended efforts of significant proportions to obtain those goals. 

If Beijing and Washington want nonnegotiable things a lot, then the Trump administration must gird itself for a long standoff.
Simple as that.
We also point out that China embarked on a massive buildup of maritime power over a decade ago. Excluding the U.S. Navy’s Pacific Fleet, Beijing already boasts the largest naval and coast-guard fleets in Asia, not to mention a seagoing militia to augment its navy and coast guard. 

And these forces continue growing. 

China’s navy may number over 500 vessels by 2030. 

By contrast, the U.S. Navy espouses an eventual fleet of 355 vessels, up from 274 today. 

President Trump is on record favoring a 350-ship force. 

Defense budgets may—or may not—support a U.S. Navy that large.
These are objective facts about which the Chinese media regularly brag. 

Based on these material trends, we postulate that maritime Asia is becoming increasingly competitive, that China is a formidable competitor, and that the trendlines are running in its favor. How’s that for extreme?
We thus urge U.S. policymakers to acknowledge that the forward U.S. presence in Asia will come under mounting danger in the coming years. 

Washington may have to gamble from time to time to shore it up. 

It may have to hold things that Beijing treasures—things like the Chinese navy’s surface fleet—at risk. 

We encourage decision-makers to embrace risk as an implement of statecraft rather than shy away from it. 

Manipulating and imposing risk is a universal strategy that practitioners in Beijing routinely employ. Washington should reply in kind.
And as "Valencia" well knows—or should know—risk-taking constitutes part of the art of strategy. 

The approach we recommend is well-grounded in theory, as articulated by the late Nobel laureate Thomas Schelling and many others.
There is nothing novel about risk, then. U.S. leaders must rediscover this elemental fact. 

For too long Washington recoiled from taking risk, treating it as a liability while conflating it with recklessness. 

But a risk-averse nation has a hard time deterring: who believes a diffident statesman’s deterrent threats? 

We simply implore civilian and military leaders to realign their attitude toward risk to match the changing strategic landscape in Asia. 

Nothing ventured, nothing gained.
Our argument, then, is a far cry from the extremism "Valencia" deplores in his hit piece. 

A casual reader of his commentary can be pardoned for concluding that we advocate reckless action on the U.S. Navy’s part. 

But it’s "Valencia" who failed his audience.
Third, "Valencia" claims that because of recent statements from U.S. policy-makers—and by implication because of our writing, which he falsely depicts as a product of those statements—“the damage to the U.S.-China relationship and the stability of the region has already been done.” 

But what damage is he referring to? 

As of this writing, the Trump administration has been in office less than a week. 

The White House has issued no official policy touching the South China Sea. 

As far as we know, our fleets in the Western Pacific have done nothing unusual.
"Valencia", it appears, is objecting to a few China-related tweets from Trump following the November elections. 

"Valencia" is indulging in hype.
China, by contrast, has inflicted colossal damage on regional concord. 

Beijing has repeatedly intimidated the Philippines, Vietnam, and Japan in offshore areas. 

It has built islands occupying thousands of acres of land in the heart of the South China Sea. 

It has fortified these manufactured islets, breaking Xi Jinping’s pledge not to militarize them. 

It has rattled its saber through successive military drills, and issued stark warnings about war through various media mouthpieces.
And lastly, "Valencia" suggests that the United States should relinquish vital interests—including those of its Asian allies—to mollify Chinese sensibilities. 

He cites, for example, a Chinese scholar voicing concern that “The theme of clash of civilizations [is] becoming increasingly popular in Chinese circles.” 

"Valencia" also frets about “a possible Thucydian trap [we think you mean Thucydides trap, "Mark"],” a “supposedly ‘inevitable’ conflict between a status-quo power and a rising power.”
His implication, presumably, is that Washington, the guardian of the status quo, should acquiesce in Beijing’s bullying to escape the Thucydides trap. 

That would square with China’s party line. 

And indeed, aggressors do love to win peacefully.
"Valencia" further objects that the timing of a U.S. policy turnabout is inconvenient for the Chinese. 

He observes that the 19th Party Congress will convene this fall to determine China’s leadership transition. 

Xi Jinping might take a hard line in advance of the congress to placate nationalist audiences. 

A U.S. policy shift might box him in.
That may be true, but Chinese Communist Party politics cannot form the basis of U.S. foreign policy. 

Nor, it bears mentioning, do the Chinese consult or respect American political timelines as they pursue foreign-policy aims. 

Just the opposite: they regard the last months of a departing administration and early months of an incoming administration as opportune times to make mischief.
"Valencia"’s message to America is plain: do nothing to antagonize China, even if it means forfeiting American interests and ideals. 

He falls squarely into the don’t provoke China school we take to task at Orbis. 

It is precisely this camp’s thinking that begat paralysis in U.S. maritime strategy in Asia. 

Inaction is no longer tolerable as the strategic circumstances change around us.
As for the Japan Times and its readership: Japanese leaders and rank-and-file citizens should pray the Trump administration rejects "Mark Valencia"’s words. 

If the administration heeded them, it would loosen or abandon the alliance that underwrites Japan’s security and prosperity. 

That would constitute Beijing’s price for U.S.-China amity. 

And if America paid that price, surrendering the Senkaku Islands to China would represent the least of Japan’s worries. 

Dark days would lie ahead.
Let’s make China worry instead.

Sina Delenda Est: Why Agni’s Arc Worries China

The Agni-V test has set off Beijing’s deepest insecurities of being encircled, resulting in the dragon issuing petulant statements not befitting a country of its size and strength. Without firing a shot in anger, India clearly has won the battle of the mind.

By Rakesh Krishnan
The shrill, disjointed and illogical rants emanating from Beijing after the fourth successful test of the Agni-V missile is an adequate proof that nothing succeeds like deterrence. 

By developing a missile designed solely for raining down nuclear warheads at the Han heartland, India has effectively neutralised the Chinese nuclear threat.
Deterrence is the threat of massive retaliation in order to prevent an enemy attack. 

It is a fundamental principle for India, which has declared a “no first use” policy on nuclear weapons – and by extension ballistic missiles. 

The deterrence provided by the 5,500 km Agni-V will force Beijing to abandon attack and remain in a state of status quo or paralysis.
The missile was cold launched from a hermetically sealed canister mounted on a tractor-erector-launcher (TEL). 

“Launch from a canister integrated with a TEL enables launch in minutes as compared with a silo – or open – launch. It also has advantages of higher reliability, longer shelf life, less maintenance and enhanced mobility,” says the Defence Research & Development Organisation (DRDO).
A mobile system will allow India to keep the Agni-Vs constantly moving along its road network, thereby keeping the enemy guessing all the time. 

Throw in several dozen dummy canisters and TELs, and you add more uncertainty about the exact whereabouts of the real missiles.
A road mobile inter-continental ballistic missile (ICBM) force makes it virtually impossible for the enemy to hit all of India’s nuclear missiles in a first strike scenario. 

This greatly enhances the country’s land-based nuclear arsenal's deterrence factor. 

Just the threat of a second strike ability guarantees deterrence.

China Faces Agni Pareeksha
Indians have lived under the shadow of the Chinese nuclear arsenal for more than five decades. 

Now the Chinese will know how it feels to have their cities in the Agni’s arc. 

Once the road mobile Agni-V is deployed – or rather scattered in locations known only to India’s strategic forces command – China will be sandwiched between two well-armed and adversarial nuclear powers.
The US has around 7,100 atomic warheads deployed on several hundred ICBMs, submarine launched ballistic missiles (SLBMs), land attack cruise missiles and strategic aviation. 

Against this formidable arsenal, the Chinese have an estimated 260 warheads on 75 to 100 silo-based and road mobile ICBMs. 

The status of the Chinese SLBM force is hazy, but it can deploy no more than 24 missiles and has never conducted a deterrence patrol, which is essential for a credible sea-based nuclear force.
Now imagine upstart India with approximately 100 nuclear warheads and no ICBMs suddenly embarking on a massive ballistic missile build-up aimed at China. 

India’s rise could be similar to Russia’s. 

After the 1962 Cuban Missile Crisis, a chastened Moscow had launched an unprecedented military expansion to achieve parity with the US. 

By the year 1969, it had overtaken the US in nearly all areas of nuclear delivery, especially silo-based and road mobile ICBMs. 

Similarly, India’s growing economy will allow it to quickly narrow down the gap with China.
In fact, India doesn’t have to spend recklessly like the Soviet Union. 

At the peak of the Cold War in the mid 1980s, Russia had 40,000 nuclear warheads and thousands of missiles. 

The US had over 25,000 warheads. 

Against such large megaton capabilities, the Chinese had between 20 and 70 ICBMs. 

If such a puny number of missiles gave China deterrence capability against the US and Russia, then even fewer Agnis aimed at downtown Beijing and Shanghai will do the same for India vis-à-vis China.
The Chinese, in whose strategic reckoning India has rarely caused more than a ripple, are no doubt discombobulated by this new threat from across the Himalayas. 

The state-controlled media has denounced India for deliberately testing the missile in a flat trajectory to suppress its range in order not to upset Europe and the US. 

The Chinese are certain the Agni-V has a range of 8,000 km rather than 5,500 km as claimed by India. 

While this allegation may or may not be correct, what is more likely is that China is clearly alarmed at discovering a missile with its name on it.

Road rage
Apart from the envy factor – the Chinese have had little success with their similar Dongfeng-31A launcher – India’s new mobile missile complicates Chinese nuclear strategy. 

Currently, China keeps most of its ICBMs in silos while the nuclear warheads are in storage. 

This strategy conveys a message to the US: “Yes we are puny but we can cause unacceptable damage if you attack us.”
The Chinese are aware of the dangers of entering a wasteful missile race with the US and are therefore keen not to set off alarm bells in the Pentagon. 

“Overall, China appears to be playing the numbers game very cautiously to consciously avoid a missile race. It has learnt its lesson from the Soviet experience,” says nuclear security expert Manpreet Sethi of the Centre for Air Power Studies in a paper titled ‘China’s Ballistic Missile Capability and India’s Preparedness’.
This is where the Agni-V plays spoiler. 

Since road or rail mobile missiles are deployed far from nuclear storage depots, they must be mated with warheads to be able to pose a credible deterrence. 

So in the future we could have a situation where a large number of ready to fire Indian missiles are aimed at China without Beijing having a corresponding ability. 

The relentless Indian missile development therefore places Beijing in a strategic straightjacket.
“Just as China sows doubt in the US mind that its nuclear forces are invulnerable to a disarming first strike, and willing and capable of mounting a punishing second strike, India too has to underline that a nuclear attack by China would result in assured retaliation to cause unacceptable damage,” says Sethi.
The recent stridency in China’s tone towards India is due to New Delhi’s relentless ballistic missile development programme that threatens to upset the strategic balance currently in Beijing’s favour – but certainly not for long. 

In this backdrop, the Agni-V is a true gamechanger.
According to the fifth century Chinese strategist Sun Tzu, the ideal victory is that which is won without actual fighting – that is by guile or persuasive diplomacy. 

The Agni-V test has set off Beijing’s deepest insecurities of being encircled, resulting in the dragon issuing petulant statements not befitting a country of its size and strength. 

Without firing a shot in anger, India clearly has won the battle of the mind̻.