Mattis accuses China of intimidation and coercion in South China Sea

Mattis takes hard line on China in Singapore speech

By Joshua Berlinger

Singapore -- US Defense Secretary James Mattis accused China of "intimidation and coercion" in the Indo-Pacific and declared that the United States does not plan to abandon its role in the region during a speech Saturday in Singapore.
"Make no mistake: America is in the Indo-Pacific to stay. This is our priority theater," Mattis said.
Mattis specifically called out Beijing's militarization of artificial islands in the South China Sea, home to some of the world's busiest sea lanes.
"We are aware China will face an array of challenges and opportunities in coming years, we are prepared to support China's choices if they promote long-term peace and prosperity for all in this dynamic region," Mattis said.
"Yet China's policy in the South China Sea stands in stark contrast to the openness our strategy promotes. It calls into question China's broader goals," he said.
Mattis and some of his counterparts from the Asia Pacific region are in Singapore for the Shangri-La Dialogue, an annual gathering of security officials, contractors and academics in the Asian city-state.
The South China Sea has been a hot topic of discussion during the summit's opening, amid ongoing attempts by China to assert its dominance in the region.
China, Vietnam, Malaysia, Indonesia, the Philippines and Brunei all have competing claims to the territory. 

But while other countries have built military features and artificial islands, none come close to matching Beijing's in scale or ambition, which stretch hundreds of miles south and east from its most southerly province of Hainan.
In May, the Chinese military landed nuclear-capable bombers on its artificial islands for the first time.
Weeks earlier, US intelligence announced there was a high possibility Beijing had deployed anti-ship and anti-aircraft missiles as part of ongoing military exercises.
"China's militarization of artificial features in the South China Sea includes the deployment of anti-ship missiles, surface-to-air missiles, electronic jammers and, more recently, the landing of bomber aircraft at woody island," said Mattis, confirming previous intelligence reports.
"Despite China's claims to the contrary, the placement of these weapon systems is tied directly to military use for the purposes of intimidation and coercion," he said.
On Sunday, two US Navy warships sailed close to a handful of disputed islands claimed by China in the Paracel island chain, east of Vietnam, in a move that drew the ire of Beijing.
"I think it goes to a fundamental disconnect between the way the international tribunals have looked at these waters -- these waters look to us as free and open waters," said Mattis, addressing last week's freedom of navigation operation directly.
"We do not do freedom of navigation for America alone, we do freedom of navigation for all nations... we do not see it as a militarization by going through what has traditionally been international water space. We see it as affirmation of the rules-based international order."
Though Mattis appeared to draw a firm line between the actions of the US and China, he insisted the US is not asking other countries in the region to choose sides.
"China should and does have a voice in shaping the international system, and all of China's neighbors have a voice in shaping China's role," said Mattis, adding that he would travel to Beijing soon "at China's invitation."
China claims its actions in the South China Sea are entirely peaceful and meant to protect its citizens and trading interests.

Korean summit
Mattis only briefly mentioned the status of the Korean Peninsula in his formal remarks, which come just hours after Donald Trump announced that he will hold a summit with North Korean leader Kim Jong Un in Singapore on June 12, just days after Mattis departs.
The Defense Secretary stuck to fairly common talking points from Washington: highlighting the importance of US alliances and the ultimate goal of complete, verifiable and irreversible denuclearization of the Korean Peninsula.
Much of the speech was focused on longer-term challenges in the region known as the Indo-Pacific, a phrase used throughout India and Southeast Asia and recently embraced by the Trump administration.
He also mentioned the importance of upholding US alliances and partnerships in the region, specifically highlighting Australia, New Zealand and India. 

Indian Prime Minister Narendra Modi gave the keynote opening speech this year, also emphasizing the importance of a free and open Indo-Pacific.
Mattis also touched upon the status of Taiwan, an issue bound to ruffle feathers in Beijing. 

China views the island as a renegade province and seeks its eventual reunification with the mainland.
Beijing has been accused of ramping up the pressure on Taipei in recent weeks, with Taiwan accusing using its diplomatic and economic weight to isolate the island from the international community. 

It has also punished business for recognizing Taiwan as independent country.
"We oppose all unilateral efforts to alter the status quo and will continue to insist any resolution of differences accord with the will of the people on both sides of the Taiwan Strait," he said.
Mattis delivered the keynote address at the event last year.

Sina Delenda Est

COUNTERING CHINESE COERCION: THE CASE OF DOKLAM
By ORIANA SKYLAR MASTRO and ARZAN TARAPORE

Two nuclear-armed powers have stepped back from the brink — for now. 

Yesterday India and China announced they had agreed to end a two-month border confrontation, in which a few hundred troops had faced off in the Doklam area claimed by both China and Bhutan, and many thousands more had been placed on heightened alert. 

The immediate crisis seems to be over, but it offers tantalizing insights into Chinese coercive strategies and how they may be thwarted. 

This has implications not only for India in its own land border disputes, but also for several Southeast Asian nations and the United States, as they all confront China’s attempts to expand its control and influence.

Background: The Standoff at Doklam
China had every reason to believe that a short stretch of new road, high in the remote Himalayas, would reinforce its claims on the “tri-junction” where the borders of China, Bhutan, and India meet. In mid-June, Chinese military road crews began to extend a road in an area known as Doklam, disputed by China and Bhutan. 

The road had been built into the disputed territory as early as 2003, and PLA troops had often conducted foot patrols in the area of the proposed road extension. 

But China knew the area was disputed, and had acknowledged as much in agreements with Bhutan in 1988 and 1998, and with India in 2012. 

Extending the road would be a relatively cheap and clear way for Beijing to advance its claims in the dispute. (The details of the competing territorial claims have been ably covered, including here at War on the Rocks.)
Almost immediately after the road crews began their work, however, they were surprised by an Indian Army intervention. 

Indian troops entered the disputed territory, with at least the tacit consent of Bhutan, and physically impeded the construction of the road. 

India saw the Chinese encroachment as a threat to its security and its regional influence — it historically regarded Bhutan as a pliant buffer and remains its security guarantor today, even as their alignment has loosened in the past decade. 

New Delhi denounced the Chinese road building as an attempt to unilaterally change the status quo in contravention of the 2012 agreement.
Monday’s agreement to end the standoff returns to the situation to the status quo ante, exactly as India and Bhutan demanded. 

Troops from both sides have disengaged, and China claims it will continue patrolling and asserting its sovereignty claims. 

The official statements are vague on some details, presumably to save face among their respective publics. 

Most importantly, the statements only imply — rather than saying outright — that China will abandon the road construction that triggered the crisis. 

Beijing seems to have blinked. 

What explains this setback for Chinese policy?

China’s Coercion Playbook
China used the same playbook in Doklam as it has in other territorial disputes, especially Vietnam and the Philippines. 

This playbook usually involves four elements. 

The first step is to develop a larger or more permanent physical presence in areas where China has already has a degree of de facto control — whether that means new islands in the South China Sea or roads in the Himalayas. 

Using its military to build infrastructure in the Doklam area was likely an attempt to consolidate China’s control along its southwestern border, including this disputed area where it has patrolled for some time.
This consolidation usually goes hand-in-hand with the second element, coercive diplomacy. 

Here, China couples its threats or limited military action with diplomatic efforts designed to persuade the target state to change its policies or behavior. 

The strategy is to put the onus on the other side, often in a weaker position militarily, to risk confrontation over these gradual changes to the status quo. 

The goal is to ensure the target country does not counter China’s consolidation attempts, and ideally to compel them to engage in bilateral negotiations. 

It is in such talks that China can then leverage its stronger physical position to secure a favorable settlement.
China has used this model of coercive diplomacy not only against weaker claimants in the South China Sea, but also against the United States. 

In the 2009 U.S. Naval Ship Impeccable incident, for example, it used coercive diplomacy and other elements of its playbook against U.S. maritime surveillance operations. 

The Doklam case carried the added enticing prospect of opening new channels of diplomatic communication — and influence — with Bhutan, with which China currently lacks formal diplomatic relations.
Third, China uses legal rhetoric and principles to present its position as legitimate and lawful, thereby staking a claim to a broader legitimizing principle in territorial disputes. 

In the case of Doklam, China portrayed the Indian response as a violation of Chinese sovereignty — it claimed Indian troops entered Chinese territory through the Sikkim sector of the Sino-Indian border and had been “obstructing Chinese border troop activities.” 

China declared its road construction was entirely lawful, designed to improve infrastructure for the local people and border patrols. 

China’s policy position was that the border was delimited in 1890, formally reaffirmed several times since, and reinforced by the routine presence of Chinese troops and herders. 

Its legal argument thus rested in part on the first element of the playbook: the physical presence that it sought to make permanent with the road at Doklam.
Lastly, China leverages its government-controlled media to highlight its narrative and issue threats. These tend to involve warnings about not underestimating Chinese resolve and the Chinese people’s determination to protect their sovereignty just because China has restrained itself so far. 

The Chinese media was replete with such articles, warning India, for example, not to “play with fire” lest it “get burned.” 

They cautioned the Indian government not to be driven by nationalism and arrogance, to avoid miscalculation and repeating the mistakes of the 1962 war. 

This is not just a war of words; research shows that escalating threats in the media can be a precursor to China’s use of force.
While other countries may also seek to impose a territorial fait accompli — such as Russia in Ukraine — China always follows its multi-pronged playbook. 

It consistently demonstrates a preference for ambiguity, risk manipulation and controlling the narrative to win without fighting. 

Any use of coercion — which involves threats and use of force — carries the risk of escalation to conflict, even if China has previously managed to resolve most of its disputes without war. 

How China advances its claims in South and East Asia will determine whether those regions remain peaceful and stable.

Thwarting Coercion With Denial
China’s playbook, however, did not go according to plan this time, because it did not account for India’s unexpectedly swift and assertive response to its road-building. 

India did not simply voice displeasure or threaten to punish China if it continued to pursue its territorial claims as the United States and Southeast Asian countries have done in the South China Sea. 

In those cases, China used its coercive playbook effectively, forcing its adversaries to either back down or raise the ante. 

And as China’s uncontested gains have shown, its adversaries have generally lacked the capabilities, and especially the political resolve, to escalate crises.
But in this situation, India thwarted China’s coercion through denial — blocking China’s attempt to seize physical control of the disputed territory. 

By physically denying China’s bid to change the status quo, India created a stalemate, which suited its strategic policy. 

It did not acquiesce to a Chinese fait accompli, and it did not have to summon the capabilities or resolve to reverse China’s position, which would have risked a general war. 

India was able to do this because of a local military advantage and its broader policy of standing up to China. 

As a result, China did not have the option of proceeding under the guise of peaceful legitimate development, per its playbook; pressing its claims on Doklam would have required it to ratchet up military pressure. 

The stalemate thwarted Chinese coercion — but as long as it lasted, it was pregnant with risks of escalation and conflict.

Disengagement, But Dangers Persist
The immediate risks of conflict have receded, but the border dispute remains unresolved, and the broader Sino-Indian relationship remains fraught. 

First, on Doklam, while China has backed down for now, its statement that “China will continue fulfilling its sovereign rights to safeguard territorial sovereignty in compliance with the stipulations of the border-related historical treaty” suggests it has not changed its position on the border tri-junction. 

Indeed, during the standoff, China reportedly offered financial inducements to cleave Bhutan away from its traditional relationship with India — it has other ways, and continued ambitions, to press its claims.
Second, the India-China relationship remains tense, and prone to military risk, especially if China seeks to reassert itself after a perceived slight at Doklam. 

This could include an incursion somewhere along the India-China Line of Actual Control — indeed, such actions have already been reported. 

Or China might pursue a “cross-domain” response, for example with punitive cyber attacks or threatening activity in the Indian Ocean.
Third, over the longer term, India should be wary of learning the wrong lessons from the crisis. 

As one of us has recently written, India has long been preoccupied with the threat of Chinese (and Pakistani) aggression on their common land border. 

The Doklam standoff may be remembered as even more reason for India to pour more resources into defending its land borders, at the expense of building capabilities and influence in the wider Indian Ocean region. 

That would only play into China’s hands. 

Renewed Indian concerns about its land borders will only retard its emergence as an assertive and influential regional power.

The Lessons of Doklam
With the crisis only just being de-escalated, it is too early to derive definitive lessons from Doklam. However, a few policy implications are already apparent. 

First, Chinese behavior in territorial disputes is more likely to be deterred by denial than by threats of punishment. 

China will continue the combination of consolidating its physical presence and engaging in coercive diplomacy, lawfare, and media campaigns unless it is stopped directly. 

This is what India did at Doklam — it directly blocked Chinese efforts to change the status quo. Denial in other areas would require different military tasks — for example, in the Indian Ocean, it may involve anti-submarine warfare and maritime domain awareness.
Second, denial strategies may be effective, but they have their limitations. 

Denial is inherently risky. 

Countering China’s playbook involves risks of escalation — which most smaller adversaries, and at times even the United States, are unwilling to accept. 

Moreover, denial strategies can only serve to halt adversary action, not to reverse what the adversary has already done. 

As Doklam shows, India could convince China not to proceed with its road-building — but China did not relinquish its claims or its established pattern of presence in the area. 

Denial by itself offers no pathway to politically resolving the crisis.
Third, the agreement to disengage suggests that Beijing’s position in crises can be flexible, and perhaps responsive to assertive counter-coercion. 

Domestic audiences, even those in autocracies, often prefer sound judgment to recklessly staying the course. 

If the Doklam standoff had escalated to a shooting war, anything short of a decisive victory might have put Xi Jinping in an unfavorable position at the 19th Party Congress and hurt the PLA’s image with the Chinese people. 

But short of that, the Chinese government was always in the position to sell Doklam as a non-event, something the decreasing domestic media coverage suggests it was preparing to do. 

Beijing will frame the disengagement agreement as further proof of Chinese strength, especially relative to India. 

As the stronger power, China could magnanimously agree to a mutual disengagement for now while reserving the right to move forward when it sees fit.
Finally, the Doklam agreement tells us that when China confronts a significantly weaker target, such as Bhutan, it will only be deterred by the actions of a stronger third party — in this case, India. 

Had India not acted, China would likely have been successful in consolidating its control and extracting territorial concessions from Bhutan. 

Third-party involvement may not be as easy in other cases — India had a privileged position in Bhutan. 

Such a strategy may also have significant second-order effects. 

In the near term, it is potentially escalatory — China argued that India has no basis for interfering in this bilateral dispute, and had many options for escalating the crisis at a time and place of its choosing. 

More broadly, such third-party involvement could intensify geopolitical competition between China and other powers such as the U.S. or India, if they intercede in other countries’ disputes with China. 

The lesson of Doklam for the United States is that arming small states and imposing incremental costs may not be enough. 

Washington has to accept the greater risks associated with intervening more directly if it hopes to counter Chinese expansion in East Asia.