Calling the Chinese Bully’s Bluff

By Brahma Chellaney

NEW DELHI – The more power China has accumulated, the more it has attempted to achieve its foreign-policy objectives with bluff, bluster, and bullying. 

But, as its Himalayan border standoff with India’s military continues, the limits of this approach are becoming increasingly apparent.
The current standoff began in mid-June, when Bhutan, a close ally of India, discovered the People’s Liberation Army trying to extend a road through Doklam, a high-altitude plateau in the Himalayas that belongs to Bhutan, but is claimed by China. 

India, which guarantees tiny Bhutan’s security, quickly sent troops and equipment to halt the construction, asserting that the road – which would overlook the point where Tibet, Bhutan, and the Indian state of Sikkim meet – threatened its own security.
Since then, China’s leaders have been warning India almost daily to back down or face military reprisals. 

China’s defense ministry has threatened to teach India a “bitter lesson,” vowing that any conflict would inflict “greater losses” than the Sino-Indian War of 1962, when China invaded India during a Himalayan border dispute and inflicted major damage within a few weeks. 

Likewise, China’s foreign ministry has unleashed a torrent of vitriol intended to intimidate India into submission.
Despite all of this, India’s government, led by Prime Minister Narendra Modi, has kept its cool, refusing to respond to any Chinese threat, much less withdraw its forces. 

As China’s warmongering has continued, its true colors have become increasingly vivid. 

It is now clear that China is attempting to use psychological warfare (“psywar”) to advance its strategic objectives – to “win without fighting,” as the ancient Chinese military theorist Sun Tzu recommended.
China has waged its psywar against India largely through disinformation campaigns and media manipulation, aimed at presenting India – a raucous democracy with poor public diplomacy – as the aggressor and China as the aggrieved party. 

Chinese state media have been engaged in eager India-bashing for weeks. 

China has also employed “lawfare,” selectively invoking a colonial-era accord, while ignoring its own violations – cited by Bhutan and India – of more recent bilateral agreements.
For the first few days of the standoff, China’s psywar blitz helped it dominate the narrative. 

But, as China’s claims and tactics have come under growing scrutiny, its approach has faced diminishing returns. 

In fact, from a domestic perspective, China’s attempts to portray itself as the victim – claiming that Indian troops had illegally entered Chinese territory, where they remain – has been distinctly damaging, provoking a nationalist backlash over the failure to evict the intruders.
As a result, Xi Jinping’s image as a commanding leader, along with the presumption of China’s regional dominance, is coming under strain, just months before the critical 19th National Congress of the Chinese Communist Party (CCP). 

And it is difficult to see how Xi could turn the situation around.
Despite China’s overall military superiority, it is scarcely in a position to defeat India decisively in a Himalayan war, given India’s fortified defenses along the border. 

Even localized hostilities at the tri-border area would be beyond China’s capacity to dominate, because the Indian army controls higher terrain and has greater troop density. 

If such military clashes left China with so much as a bloodied nose, as happened in the same area in 1967, it could spell serious trouble for Xi at the upcoming National Congress.
But, even without actual conflict, China stands to lose. 

Its confrontational approach could drive India, Asia’s most important geopolitical “swing state,” firmly into the camp of the United States, China’s main global rival. 

It could also undermine its own commercial interests in the world’s fastest-growing major economy, which sits astride China’s energy-import lifeline.
Already, Indian Foreign Minister Sushma Swaraj has tacitly warned of economic sanctions if China, which is running an annual trade surplus of nearly $60 billion with India, continues to disturb border peace. 

More broadly, as China has declared unconditional Indian troop withdrawal to be a “prerequisite” for ending the standoff, India, facing recurrent Chinese incursions over the last decade, has insisted that border peace is a “prerequisite” for developing bilateral ties.
Against this background, the smartest move for Xi would be to attempt to secure India’s help in finding a face-saving compromise to end the crisis. 

The longer the standoff lasts, the more likely it is to sully Xi’s carefully cultivated image as a powerful leader, and that of China as Asia’s hegemon, which would undermine popular support for the regime at home and severely weaken China’s influence over its neighbors.
Already, the standoff is offering important lessons to other Asian countries seeking to cope with China’s bullying. 

For example, China recently threatened to launch military action against Vietnam’s outposts in the disputed Spratly Islands, forcing the Vietnamese government to stop drilling for gas at the edge of China’s exclusive economic zone in the South China Sea.
China does not yet appear ready to change its approach. 

Some experts even predict that it will soon move forward with a “small-scale military operation” to expel the Indian troops currently in its claimed territory. 

But such an attack is unlikely to do China any good, much less change the territorial status quo in the tri-border area. 

It certainly won’t make it possible for China to resume work on the road it wanted to build. 

That dream most likely died when India called the Chinese bully’s bluff.

Axis of Evil

Here's why China's supposed influence over North Korea is a bluff
By Xander Snyder

Xi Jinping is not Father Christmas

The US is pushing China deeper into a corner over the crisis with North Korea. 

It wants the Chinese to persuade the North Koreans to give up their nuclear weapons and ballistic missile programs.
The popular perception is that Beijing has substantial leverage over Pyongyang, partly because China is North Korea’s largest trading partner. 

This impression also stems from China’s proposals to mediate trade concessions between North Korea and the United States.
The US has recently urged China to continue to use its leverage over North Korea and said there will be consequences if China does not. 

However, on June 20, Trump tweeted that China’s efforts to influence North Korea appeared to have failed.
Later that night, US satellites reportedly detected modifications to an underground North Korean test site that may be preparing for the country’s sixth nuclear test.
This raises some questions: Does China have the power to deter the North Koreans? and how much influence does Beijing actually have over Pyongyang?

Steps Taken
China has already taken action to apply pressure on North Korea. 

In February, Beijing said it halted imports of North Korean coal, according to UN sanctions. 

These sanctions limit North Korean coal exports—which were worth $1 billion in 2014—to $400 million for the year.
Earlier this month, after North Korea did another round of missile tests, the UN expanded sanctions by freezing the assets of four North Korean companies and 14 members of the regime and imposing a travel ban on the same individuals.
China supported this motion. 

China has also taken action with regard to migrant laborers from North Korea. 

In March 2016, the Chinese government informally told Chinese companies to stop hiring North Korean workers.
Remittances from North Koreans living abroad are a vital source of hard currency for the regime, up to $2.3 billion annually according to some estimates.

What Can China Do That It Hasn't Yet Done?
The answer is… not a whole lot.
It could impose greater financial sanctions. 

But it seems unlikely that financial sanctions could deter North Korea from pursuing a program that it considers central to its security interests. 

Especially given that current pressure has not done so already.
That leaves Chinese crude oil exports as Beijing’s strongest remaining point of leverage. 

North Korea generates most of its electricity from coal, but its military would depend on crude oil if a conflict were to break out.
Without it, Pyongyang’s ability to wage war would be significantly reduced.
China no longer discloses how much crude oil it exports to North Korea. 

However, some estimate that it could account for 500,000 tons per year, or about 3.7 million barrels.
North Korea is believed to have only minimal capacity to produce crude oil. 

Its imports from Russia are not substantial either. 

That means it’s a real threat to North Korea and gives China some strong leverage.

But China decides that it’s not in its interest to cut oil supplies to North Korea. 

If this move doesn’t stop the North Koreans and war does break out, China doesn’t want to be on Pyongyang’s list of enemies.

The US Will Push China More Going Forward
Given these options, there are two reasons the US would continue to demand further action from China.
First, the US will explore all options within a certain window of time before resorting to force. 

In the lead-up to the Iraq War in 2003, the international community tried to mediate a solution, and the US declined the offer.
This time, it will seek mediation from anyone willing to offer—even Dennis Rodman, who visited North Korea just last week.
If it decides that a strike is necessary, the US wants to be able to point out that it tried every diplomatic solution, including using China as a mediator, before resorting to force.
And by pushing China to act as an intermediary, it can argue that it was China, in fact, that failed to prevent the war.
The second reason the US will demand further action from China is that China has long used its supposed influence over North Korea as a way to gain concessions from the US.
The US is now calling China’s bluff. 

If China can’t sway the North Koreans, then it will no longer be able to use them as a bargaining chip in future negotiations with the US.
Statements by officials are often just smoke and mirrors.
In this case, the US’s demands for China show that it’s time to act. 

Public posturing gives the US real leverage in its private discussions with Beijing. 

But China’s window of opportunity is closing, and if Trump’s tweet is any indication, it may have already closed.