China’s hybrid warfare against Taiwan

By David Ignatius

A political campaign rally in Taipei, Taiwan, on Nov. 23. 

TAIPEI, Taiwan — As Taiwanese military experts describe how their forces could punish a Chinese invasion of the island, they might almost be describing D-Day in 1944: amphibious landings, fighter planes dueling for air supremacy, and tank battles for control of the capital.
Chinese claims that they could subdue Taiwan in 100 hours are “impossible” because of the island’s stiff defenses, one expert insists. 

“If they fail within 100 hours, with great casualties, they might reconsider,” he argues, because of the risk for “internal instability" for Xi Jinping.
The specter of war across the Taiwan Strait has animated military planners since 1949, when Gen. Chiang Kai-shek fled here with his nationalist army after the Communist Party gained control of mainland China. 

The Ministry of Defense distributes a book with glossy photos of Taiwan’s defensive weapons and stirring captions: Air force jets are “Eagles that Dominate the Skies;” a navy destroyer is a “Blade that dominates the sea.”
But traditional military combat may be the least of Taiwan’s worries. 

More immediate and threatening, is the daily campaign to undermine Taiwan’s democracy and promote fealty to Beijing. 

This hybrid warfare is cheaper and harder for an open, democratic society such as Taiwan to resist than a conventional military assault. 

And it’s a challenge that Taiwanese experts are struggling to understand and address.
Taiwan’s self-defense dilemma was discussed in nearly every conversation here this week during a visit by a bipartisan study group organized by the German Marshall Fund, of which I’m a trustee. Polls show that Taiwanese favor the current balance, in which the country maintains its own democracy but doesn’t formally assert independence. 

Beijing keeps squeezing, in what appears to many Taiwanese to be an effort to make the island a province of China, without using overt force.
“The Taiwanese have faced an immense conventional military threat for decades, yet now they also have to be concerned about Beijing’s increasingly sophisticated efforts to lure their citizens back to ‘mother China.’ 

It’s a challenge that requires significant coordination across government and civil society, and ultimately can’t be solved by more missiles or jets,” argues Jamie Fly, a former Republican Senate staffer who organized the German Marshall Fund trip.
Here’s how one Taiwanese official explains the subtle Chinese threat, spread through social media, newspapers and television in an influence campaign that touches every business, farm and worker: “If you support the DPP [the ruling Democratic Progressive Party, which favors Taiwanese self-determination], the whole island will be punished. But if you help Beijing, you will benefit.”
Explains another senior official: “To promote peaceful unification, China will try to influence this country so that Taiwan will have a more China-friendly government.” 

The showdown will come in the 2020 presidential election, which will pit a pro-Beijing party against the DPP.
Ketty Chen, vice president of the Taiwan Foundation for Democracy, explains that every day, pro-Beijing operatives post thousands of pieces of disinformation on Facebook and other social media platforms. 

For example, a site called “I love to exercise” intersperses fitness tips with propaganda against President Tsai Ing-wen, a DPP-backed lawyer and economist elected in 2016.

“We want a healthy relationship with China, but we don’t want to be ruled by China,” argues Raymond Sung, director of Taiwan Democracy Watch, at a roundtable organized by the Prospect Foundation, a government-backed think tank. 

A similar desire for self-determination was expressed by a half-dozen students at National Chengchi University. 

“We’re trying to make a new identity for ourselves on this island,” explained one student. 

“We’re going through a nation-building process.”

How can the United States help militarily? 

It’s tricky.
Taiwan wants American weapons and tactical support, but not so directly or visibly that it triggers a Chinese escalation. 

If the United States considers a show of force to deter Chinese military action, for example, the Taiwanese believe that a joint effort, conducted with other nations, would be safer than unilateral U.S. action.
The Taiwanese also insist that they wouldn’t need direct U.S. combat support if conflict began; indeed, U.S. intervention might prove counterproductive by drawing a punishing Chinese response.
President Tsai is walking a tightrope as she manages these security issues. 

Her goal is to preserve the status quo, but I erred in a recent column by implying that she accepts the idea that there is one China and Taiwan is part of it. 

Instead, Tsai’s aides explain, she wants a continuation of peaceful relations across the strait and a status that’s neither independence nor unification — the same middle ground that polls say is overwhelmingly favored by Taiwanese.

Countering China's Anti-Taiwan Campaign

In theory, time favors Taiwan because it is on the right side of history. Militarily, however, it is not clear that the Taiwanese self-defense forces could resist China.
By Ian Easton

Taiwan’s rise as one of Asia’s most vibrant democracies and an alternative to China’s repressive authoritarian model is viewed with extreme concern in Beijing’s halls of power. 
From China’s perspective, the existence of Taiwan as a democracy is a grave challenge to its political legitimacy.
The Chinese Communist Party (CCP) views Taiwan as its most dangerous external national-security threat, and the People’s Liberation Army (PLA), as the armed wing of the party and guarantor of the regime’s ever fragile legitimacy, has been tasked with the mission of preparing for an assault on the island as its principal war planning scenario.
The overarching plan is referred to in restricted-access Chinese military writings as the “Joint Island Attack Campaign.”
The campaign includes operations that span the entire spectrum of the modern battlefield, including the air, land, sea, space and cyberspace domains.
Even media outlets are a target.
The fundamentally political nature of the dispute means that the Chinese government conducts an ongoing, clandestine campaign of diplomatic, economic and psychological warfare around the globe. 
This includes operations that spin the news and manipulate international law to delegitimize and demoralize Taiwan.
The Chinese military refers to this as “political warfare.”
To better prepare the future battlefield, China’s undercover agents of influence blanket Asia, and especially Taiwan, with disinformation.
They use state media outlets, business enterprises and cross-Strait educational exchanges as platforms for covert actions. 
The mission of these messengers is to poison the powers of resolve and weaken resistance to eventual takeover.
The American public has little visibility on China’s anti-Taiwan campaign, which is being waged primarily in Mandarin on the far side of the Pacific.
Many Americans experience the effects of it only indirectly.
There are a considerable number of Chinese agents in the United States, who pose as diplomats, reporters, scholars, language instructors, lobbyists and entrepreneurs. 
Their job is to shape foreign perceptions about China and Taiwan, and to undercut arms sales and other forms of support for the island. 
These hostile influence operations are particularly noticeable in Washington and on university campuses across the country.
The result is that an increasing number of everyday Americans have been unconsciously gripped by the hand of Chinese propaganda and treat false information as if it were the truth. 
Making matters worse, an astonishing number of American companies and colleges have their financial futures anchored in China, making them vulnerable to being subjected to pressures and situations that may run against their moral and ethical principles. 
The CCP has worked hard to create opportunities for obtaining leverage over those it wants to manipulate or control, and few issues are more important to them than defeating Taiwan.
When viewed from the perspective of Beijing, the risks associated with Taiwan are growing.
With thousands of students from China now studying on the island, it may only be a matter of time before greater demand for good governance on the mainland overwhelms its oppressive authoritarian system.
In theory, time favors Taiwan because it is on the right side of history.
Militarily, however, it is not clear that the Taiwanese self-defense forces can continue to resist China’s buildup.
There is a growing chorus of voices that argue the island’s military will soon become too weak to defend against the world’s second most powerful country.
China’s growing national strength has enabled it to advance efforts to politically marginalize Taiwan in the international community.
The main focus of Chinese efforts has been Washington, where Beijing has had some remarkable successes over the past decade. 
Under both the George W. Bush and Barack Obama administrations, China secured long freezes or delays in new notifications of arms sales to Taiwan, and especially important sales were canceled, including new F-16 fighters, diesel-electric submarines, Aegis destroyers and Abrams tanks. 
At the same time, a string of influential Americans have published articles arguing that Washington should abandon or reinterpret its legal obligations to help defend Taiwan under the Taiwan Relations Act, the law of the land.
China’s successes have been only partial.
Attempts at driving a deeper wedge between Taiwan and the international community have served to embitter and repulse the island’s electorate. 
As has been the case with Japan and many other nations, Taiwan’s greater involvement in the Chinese economy not only failed to cement greater political cooperation, it actually fostered a growing sense of vulnerability and confrontation.
In light of demographic trend lines, polling data and election results, it has become increasingly clear that the people of Taiwan want to be treated as citizens of a country recognized around the world for what it actually already is: independent, free and sovereign.
This sentiment has not gone unnoticed in China, where the military has been planning for the worst all along.
Internal PLA writings have recently emerged that confirm China plans to use force when it believes that other means are not achieving its strategic objective, and especially when there is a good chance that the United States can be kept out of the fight.
These writings state that once China has “exhausted” all nonlethal options to ensure the annexation and occupation of Taiwan, a large-scale amphibious attack will be launched against the island.
According to Chinese military documents, there are scenarios other than invasion.
The PLA could prosecute coercive operations against Taiwan, including long-duration (but intermittent) and low-intensity naval blockades and air campaigns.
However, they make clear that these are suboptimal solutions that cannot be expected to get at the root problem.
Intimidation will fail if the Taiwanese government and the people are impervious to it and unwilling to submit to Beijing’s authority under pressure. 
For this reason, the PLA is focused on the employment of an all-out invasion campaign.
The chilling official narrative seen in the PLA’s internal literature is that a future invasion of Taiwan is probably inevitable.
The exact timing is uncertain, but attacking and conquering the island is a “historic mission” that will not be put off indefinitely.
The problem is cast in remarkably simple terms: Taiwan is a “separatist province,” and China’s national territorial integrity remains under severe threat until it is returned to the ancestral “Fatherland.”
The following lines crystallize the pro-invasion PLA view: In the end, only by directly conquering and controlling the island can we realize national unification . . . otherwise ‘separatist’ forces, even if they momentarily compromise under pressure, can reignite like dormant ashes under the right conditions.
Internal documents show that the Chinese military refers to all Taiwanese government and military personnel as “separatist enemies,” with no distinction made for political party affiliation or self-identity.
All those who want to maintain the status quo are painted as China’s enemies.
Yet despite the bellicosity of PLA writings, it would be a mistake to think the Chinese military establishment is overly eager for the fight.
One PLA field manual, for example, warns its readers (Chinese military officers) that, “The Island has complex geography, and its defensive systems are rock solid around critical targets.”
PLA officers are told that only through a massive and masterful military campaign could they take Taiwan.
The operation would be an extremely challenging undertaking, the likes of which China has never conducted before, and the sacrifices required would be tremendous.
Much can be done by the Trump administration to bolster Taiwan’s self-defense capabilities and keep the world’s most dangerous flashpoint from erupting in violent action.
Unfortunately, the crisis of the moment, North Korea, appears to do occupying the foremost time and talent of official Washington.
Much more attention needs to be paid to countering China’s anti-Taiwan campaign.

China Threat

How China Would Invade Taiwan And How to Stop It

By Ian Easton

Various sources from within the People's Republic of China have suggested that time is running out for Taiwan's democracy. 

In their narrative iron-fisted Xi Jinping is "losing patience" and could order the invasion of Taiwan in the early 2020s. 

The world's most dangerous flashpoint might witness an overwhelming amphibious blitz, perhaps before July 2021 to mark the 100th anniversary of the founding of the Chinese Communist Party (CCP).
That's the narrative. 

The reality is that China will probably not attack Taiwan in such a radical and high-risk fashion. 

Xi and his top lieutenants are far more likely to draw-out and escalate the war of nerves across the Taiwan Strait. 

They will continue using disinformation and other techniques to drain Washington's confidence that Taiwan can be defended, while ramping up subversive activities to undermine the island nation's confidence and willpower.
Xi will bide his time and hope the Taiwanese government cracks under mounting pressure, allowing him to conquer his target cheaply. 

At the same time, his military generals will continue planning and preparing to deliver on their "sacred" mission. 

Coercion could easily fail, making invasion a tempting option―especially in a future scenario where the balance of power looks more favorable to Beijing than it does today.

Assessing the Threat:
The ever-tense political and security environment across the Taiwan Strait necessitates an accurate depiction of PLA capabilities, strengths, and shortfalls.
The PLA's strengths are more apparent than its weaknesses. 

China's military muscle is frequently highlighted and hyped up by the media, both in Beijing and abroad. 

Undoubtedly, China's ballistic missiles, cyber warfare capabilities, and counter-space weapons make it a force to be reckoned with. 

Even more dangerous are its espionage and covert actions abroad to shape foreign policymaking. But there is always more to the story.

Renowned Naval War College professor, Andrew Erickson, makes it clear in his recently published book, Chinese Naval Shipbuilding that while Beijing's fleets are growing at a remarkable clip, the PLA Navy is not ready to support the invasion of Taiwan. 

The Chinese navy still lacks the lift capacity and the air defense capability it needs. 

Nonetheless, the situation will almost certainly look very different tomorrow than it does today.
Dennis Blasko, author of The Chinese Army Today, observes that the CCP's ground forces, like the navy, are not yet ready for the ultimate fight. 

For invasion to be a realistic option, China would have to have far more helicopters, paratroopers, special operators, amphibious mechanized divisions, and marines. 

Moreover, the PLA would need to build a solid non-commissioned officer corps and provide better training to unit leaders up and down the entire chain of command. 

Much of this work has already begun and will start to bear fruit over the next decade.

Taiwan's Anti-Invasion Strategy:
So how do Taiwanese military experts plan to defend their country against attack, and how can the United States help?
Taiwan is at the tail end of a transit from a conscription force to an all-volunteer military. 

Building an elite force of professional warriors is a good thing. 

It gives Taiwan a comparative advantage. 

China has no national army and relies mostly on short-term draftees.
According to a recent RAND Corporation report, Taiwan could augment its all-volunteer military with elite reserve force units, further enhancing its ability to counter Chinese threats in the electromagnetic, air, and sea domains. 

Taiwan's armed forces could also benefit from new training opportunities. 

Bilateral training exercises and joint humanitarian missions with the U.S. military would give Taiwan a much-needed shot in the arm.
Modern wars are increasingly decided not by brute force, but by brainpower. 

This can only be harnessed with advanced training. 

One of Taiwan's primary defense goals is to prepare the island for the shock of a lightning war waged by the Peoples Liberation Army (PLA). 

Doing so requires highly-motivated personnel who are organized, trained, and equipped to meet an enemy invasion campaign with overwhelming resistance.
The asymmetry of size and economy across the Taiwan Strait requires defense planners on the island to harness every aspect of power, bringing a wide range of latent capabilities to bear when needed. Taiwan's all-out defense strategy calls for mobilizing the entire country, gearing-up every able-bodied man and woman in support of anti-invasion operations.
As Lauren Dickey of Kings College London points out, Taiwan's Ministry of National Defense (MND) is constantly honing its ability to repulse Chinese invasion. 

Every year, MND conducts intensive national and local-level military exercises, testing and sharpening plans to defend the island in the event of enemy landings.
It is estimated that Taiwan will have approximately four weeks advanced warning of a Chinese invasion. 

Given China's skill in the dark arts of strategic deception, this cannot be taken for granted. 

Yet the vast scale of the PLA's envisioned amphibious operations necessarily means its offensive intentions would be foreshadowed.
Warning signs would include troop movements, reserve mobilization, industrial stockpiling, military drills, media signaling, diplomatic messaging, and sabotage against Taiwan. 

The most obvious and worrisome sign would be the gathering of massive fleets of civilian and naval vessels at known amphibious staging areas in southeast China.
As all this was playing out, Taiwan's president, her cabinet advisors, and parliamentary leaders would debate their response options. 

They would weigh intelligence pouring in from radars, satellites, listening posts, and agents in China. Their most obvious option would be to increase readiness levels and mobilize the island to gun-down an enemy attack.
It would not take long to mine the maritime lines of approach across the Taiwan Strait, nor to fortify invasion beaches, ports, and airstrips. 

It would take only slightly longer to man all inland key points like bridges and power stations, and to evacuate non-essential personnel from potential battle zones. 

But accomplishing this would require a colossal workforce in the form of mobilized army reservists and contractors. 

For this reason, Taiwan maintains the ability to mobilize up to two and a half million men and nearly one million civil defense workers in just a few days time.
Tests of the emergency mobilization system are carried out on a yearly basis at sites across Taiwan, Penghu, and the outer islands (Kimen and Matsu). 

Their results are impressive. 

They indicate that citizen-soldiers will muster at marshalling posts in extraordinary numbers and at rapid speeds.
Taiwan’s all-out defense mobilization plan entails more than just bringing latent military capabilities into action. 

The Cabinet Office (Executive Yuan) and its subordinate ministries such as the Ministry of Transportation, Ministry of the Interior, and Ministry of Economic Affairs (among others) all play a role in the integration of civil defense units for homeland defense.

The Way Forward:
Taiwan's government and military (like the rest of Taiwanese society) are far tougher than they get credit for. 

But they can only do so much by themselves. 

The Pentagon has a critical role to play in assisting Taiwan maximize its war fighting capabilities. With America's help, Taiwan can make sure its defense investments factor into Beijing's calculations and, hopefully, prevent a future invasion from occurring in the first place.
The RAND report suggests the establishment of a joint working group, led on the U.S. side by an assistant secretary of defense. 

Indeed, Taiwanese forces would benefit from new types of professional military education and technical training in the United States. 

American mentors could support Taiwan’s continued transit to a potent all-volunteer force and help create a more strategically focused reserve force.
Taiwanese troops also need regular and dependable arms sales, something that unfortunately was denied them by the Bush and Obama administrations. 

For Taiwan, the positive operational and tactical effects of American weapons systems are indisputable. 

The Trump administration should offer Taiwan the same capabilities it is offering Japan and South Korea, including new stealth fighter jets, missile defense batteries, and destroyers.
In addition, American companies should be unchained by Washington, allowing them to compete for access to Taiwan's Indigenous Defense Submarine program. 

Even more important than firepower would be the huge morale boosting effects such material support would have on recruitment and retention on the island―and the powerful signal of purpose and resolve it would send to China.
Taiwan's military has developed a solid defense plan and is cultivating a force of professional warriors. 

But the grave invasion threat facing the island is growing over time. 

Keeping pace with China's offensive power will be extremely difficult unless big changes are made to the way America does business in Asia.
Going forward, the Trump White House would do well to develop a new strategy for advancing U.S.-Taiwan relations. 

Making sure Taiwan has the strong self-defense capabilities it needs will help keep the globe's greatest powder keg from ever igniting. 

Ignoring the China problem would only make it worse.