Affichage des articles dont le libellé est U.S.. Afficher tous les articles
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mardi 26 novembre 2019

Sore Loser

After Massive Electoral Loss in Hong Kong, Beijing Points Finger at U.S.
China accused the United States of meddling in its internal affairs following an election that was a rebuke of Xi Jinping.
By Javier C. Hernández

Supporters of Hong Kong’s pro-democracy movement celebrating on the streets outside a polling station in Tuen Mun, Hong Kong, early Monday.

BEIJING — The Chinese government, still coming to terms with a stunning electoral victory for the pro-democracy movement in Hong Kong, is directing its ire at a popular foe: the United States.
The Chinese Ministry of Foreign Affairs summoned the American ambassador to Beijing on Monday, a day after the local elections in Hong Kong that were a rebuke to the authoritarian policies of Xi Jinping.
Chinese officials warned the ambassador, Terry Branstad, that the United States should “stop interfering in China’s internal affairs,” according to the ministry. 
They also criticized Congress for passing a bill recently to support the protesters.
The state-run news media on Tuesday revived a popular line of attack against the United States, accusing American politicians of harboring “sinister intentions” and encouraging unrest in Hong Kong as a way of containing China’s rise.
By directing their anger at the United States, Chinese officials are reviving a theme that will likely be popular with the masses and allow the government to avoid taking responsibility for the defeat.
“Beijing knows very well that they lost the game in the election,” said Willy Lam, a political analyst who teaches at the Chinese University of Hong Kong. 
“Beijing had to blame somebody, so in this case it is blaming outside foreign forces, particularly in the United States, for interfering in the elections.”

A rally in Hong Kong in October calling for the United States Congress to pass the Hong Kong Human Rights and Democracy Act.

The flash of anger from Beijing reflected the central government’s deep anxieties about months of unrest in Hong Kong, one of the most sustained challenges to Communist Party rule in decades. 
The victory for the pro-democracy candidates appeared to take Beijing by surprise.
Pro-democracy candidates captured 389 of 452 elected seats, far more than they had ever won. Beijing’s allies held just 58 seats, down from 300.
The elections on Sunday were for district councils, some of the least powerful positions in Hong Kong’s government. 
But the vote was seen as a barometer of public attitudes toward Beijing and a referendum on the protests, which began in June over an unpopular extradition bill and have since turned into a call for greater freedom in the semiautonomous territory.
Carrie Lam, Hong Kong’s embattled leader, on Tuesday disputed the idea that the bruising defeat of pro-Beijing candidates had broader implications. 
But she acknowledged that there appeared to be dissatisfaction with how the government handled the extradition bill.
“There are people who want to express the view that they could no longer tolerate this chaotic situation,” Mrs. Lam said at a regular news briefing. 
“There are of course people who felt that our government has not handled competently the legislative exercise and its aftermath.”
At the meeting with Ambassador Branstad on Monday, Zheng Zeguang, a vice foreign minister, criticized the passage of the bill, known as the Hong Kong Human Rights and Democracy Act.
“Any attempt to destabilize Hong Kong and undermine its stability and prosperity will never succeed,” Mr. Zheng said, according to the ministry
The House and Senate both passed the bill, which could impose sanctions on Chinese officials for cracking down on the protesters, with a veto-proof majority this month. 
The White House, which is engaged in delicate trade negotiations with China, has not said whether Trump will sign it.
At their meeting on Monday, Mr. Branstad told Zheng that the United States was watching the situation in Hong Kong with “grave concern,” according to a spokesman for the American embassy in Beijing. 
Mr. Branstad added that “the United States believes that societies are best served when diverse political views can be represented in genuinely free and fair elections,” according to the embassy.

vendredi 4 octobre 2019

It Is Time for the United States to Stand Up to China in Hong Kong

Washington must make clear that it expects Beijing to live up to its commitments—and it will respond when China does not.
BY ELIZABETH WARREN
People hold signs reading “Don’t shoot our kids” as they gather in the Tsuen Wan area of Hong Kong on Oct. 2. 

As the Chinese Communist Party commemorates 70 years of the People’s Republic of China by parading its military hardware in Beijing, the people of Hong Kong are struggling for their rights.
For months, the world has watched as protesters in Hong Kong stood bravely in the face of police and state violence. 
They deserve our support.
What is happening in Hong Kong illustrates the challenge posed by China and the limitations of the United States’ current approach.
The United States must stand firm when its interests and values are threatened.
China’s economic policies undercut American workers.
Its military ambitions and coercive diplomacy threaten peace in Asia and beyond.
Its repression at home, including its treatment of the Uighur minority, and attacks on norms abroad risk eroding liberal values around the world.
Despite Beijing’s promise to maintain Hong Kong’s autonomy, in recent years, it has eroded key democratic institutions, leading hundreds of thousands of citizens to take to the streets to protest peacefully.
In return, the government of Hong Kong has responded with repression and increasing violence.
Instead of standing up for the people of Hong Kong, Donald Trump has repeatedly sent Chinese dictator Xi Jinping an unmistakably clear and dangerous message: The United States doesn’t care about Hong Kong and the principles at stake there—it cares only about a trade deal that serves Trump’s own interests.
Hong Kong plays a unique role in the global economy and an essential role for China.
That role is sustainable only if Hong Kong is allowed to retain its democratic orientation and traditions.
The United States has a strong interest in Hong Kong’s continued economic success; the two had more than $67 billion in two-way trade in 2018.
Chinese intervention would send shockwaves through the global economy at an already fragile moment.
The United States’ approach to the situation in Hong Kong must be grounded in a realistic approach to China.
Getting China right takes more than bellicose tweets coupled with fawning summits.
The United States must send a clear message that it and its partners expect China to live up to its commitments—and that they will respond when China does not.
To send that message over the situation in Hong Kong, the United States should take two steps.
First, it must stop exports of police gear to Hong Kong. 
Protesters have asked for an independent investigation into the credible claims that the Hong Kong police have used excessive force.
Until the report of such an investigation is released, the United States should stop all exports of U.S. security, police, or surveillance equipment to Hong Kong.
Second, it should provide temporary protected status or deferred enforced departure to Hong Kong residents. 
As the country did following Beijing’s 1989 crackdown on Tiananmen, the United States should protect Hong Kong residents involved in protests and who travel to the United States until they are confident that they will not be punished for exercising the right to peaceful assembly.
The current situation must be resolved peacefully through dialogue.
And China needs to know that the United States has options if it resorts to force in Hong Kong.

vendredi 25 janvier 2019

Huawei's Chinese Spy Raises Red Flags for Poland and the U.S.

Warsaw and Washington are probing deep ties Beijing has established in the strategically important country on NATO’s eastern frontier
By Bojan Pancevski and Matthew Dalton

An undated photo of Huawei executive Wang Weijing, Chinese spy arrested in Poland. Huawei Technologies Co. has 50% of the Polish telecommunications infrastructure market. 

WARSAW—Authorities in Poland and the U.S. are probing the deep ties Beijing has forged in this strategically important country on NATO’s eastern frontier in the wake of high-profile arrests of a Chinese executive and a former Polish official.
Wang Weijing, who worked in Poland for Huawei Technologies Co., and Piotr Durbajlo, a former senior Polish counterintelligence official, were detained this month and charged with spying for China
Wang was fired by Huawei following his arrest.
Neither Durbajlo nor his lawyer could be reached for comment.

China's spy nest: Huawei’s headquarters in Shenzhen, China. 

Part of the investigation—which officials said Poland is coordinating with the U.S.—involves events at Poland’s elite Military University of Technology, whose graduates often go on to take sensitive security and military jobs. 
Durbajlo has served as an instructor at the university.
Wang had visited the university in conjunction with a contest run by Huawei called “Seeds of the Future,” according to the university. 
In recent years, students there have been among the winners of the contest, which offers all-expenses-paid trips to China, including a week at company headquarters in Shenzhen.
The investigation—which officials said has been going on for at least two years—is forcing Polish officials to consider whether China’s growing presence has left the country vulnerable to security and intelligence breaches. 
Huawei by some estimates has nearly 50% of the Polish telecommunications infrastructure market.
“The Chinese have been very active for years,” said a senior Polish lawmaker who has been briefed on the investigation. 
“To give them so much freedom, so much space to maneuver was too much.”
One fear among both Polish and U.S. officials is that China might have accessed allied intelligence shared with Poland and passed it on to Moscow.

Poland’s Pressure on Huawei: Poland is urging its NATO allies to coordinate their response to cybersecurity challenges raised by the Chinese company. This jeopardizes a key market for Huawei. 

Senior U.S. officials say they are exploring how to roll back the deep involvement of Chinese companies such as Huawei in the economies and infrastructure of Poland and other European countries.
“We are figuring out how to deal with that,” said a senior U.S. official with detailed knowledge of the region. 
The broader telecommunications infrastructure is at risk “now that some countries have been infected.”
Huawei operates as a Trojan horse for the Chinese government. 
Chinese laws dictate that authorities can freely access information or data from companies incorporated there.
Poland was once part of the same Communist world as China. 
After the collapse of the Soviet Union, Poland joined major Western institutions, such as the European Union and the North Atlantic Treaty Organization.
The Polish government has sought in recent years to attract Chinese investment. 
Warsaw kept the investigation into Wang and Durbajlo classified partly out of fear of provoking Chinese retaliation, said the Polish lawmaker. 
But the trial, he added, would inevitably draw attention to the case.
“The whole world will be watching this because there have been rumors about the criminal activities of Huawei but never any proof.”

A train arrived in Warsaw from Chengdu, China, in 2016. 

Polish officials are now trying to get a sense of which people who have held sensitive government positions may have ties to China, the lawmaker said.
And Polish counterintelligence is looking into some of the state institutions Durbajlo worked for, officials said.
In addition to serving as a cryptology lecturer at the military academy, Durbajlo has held senior positions at Poland’s Internal Security Service and the agency that oversees classified government communications, as well as Poland’s cybersecurity body, working in different capacities for the government until 2017. 
Since his arrest, he has been suspended from his job at Orange SA, the French telecommunications carrier, which serves about a quarter of Polish mobile phone subscribers.
A former Huawei employee described Wang, who spoke fluent Polish, as quiet and affable. 
Wang attended meetings at the Polish military university to discuss cooperation with Huawei and tout the “Seeds for the Future” contest to officials there, according to university news releases.

“Now trade is booming, but there is no [Chinese] investment,” said Witold Waszczykowski, a former Polish foreign minister. 

The recent arrests come as Poland is becoming disillusioned with China as an economic partner, said Witold Waszczykowski, a former Polish foreign minister and one of the architects of efforts to boost economic ties.
Hoped-for investments, including an airport in Warsaw and high-speed train lines, haven’t materialized, he said. 
“Now trade is booming, but there is no [Chinese] investment,” Mr. Waszczykowski said.
The most sensitive U.S. project in Poland is a missile base due to become operational by 2020 as part of a nuclear shield NATO says will protect against potential attacks by Iran but which Russia has said is really aimed at countering Moscow. 
Any intelligence about the base would be of great value to Beijing, said Fabrice Pothier, former top aide to two NATO chiefs.
“Because of the relationship with the U.S. and membership in the NATO alliance and in the EU, we are an important target,” said Krzysztof Liedel, former director of the National Security Bureau, one of Poland’s security and defense agencies. 
“We are a gate through which to gather information and data on our allies.”

mercredi 6 juin 2018

China's isolation at the Shangri-La Dialogue

Britain, France Join U.S. in Responding to Chinese Intimidation and Coercion in South China Sea
By Patrick Goodenough

Ships and submarines participating in the biennial RIMPAC exercise in 2012. The Obama administration invited China to take part in 2014 and 2016, but the Pentagon has rescinded the invitation for the 2018 exercises. 

Britain and France are backing U.S.-led efforts to challenge what Defense Secretary James Mattis at the weekend called Chinese “intimidation and coercion” in the disputed South China Sea.
The two European defense ministers indicated in Singapore – where they and Mattis were taking part in the annual Shangri La security dialogue – that their navy ships will conduct “freedom of navigation” operations in the region in the coming days.
French armed forces minister Florence Parly said French and British ships would visit Singapore in the days ahead before “sailing together to certain areas.”
“I mean those areas where, at some point, a stern voice intrudes into the transponder, and tells us, sail away from supposedly territorial waters,” she continued. 
“But our commander then calmly replies that he will sail forth, because these – under international law – are indeed international waters.”
British Defense Secretary Gavin Williamson, who spoke at the security event and addressed sailors onboard a Royal Navy frigate docked in Singapore, said Britain has sent three warships to the region, where their presence aims “to send the strongest of signals.”
“We believe that countries should play by the rules,” he said, stressing the importance of the “rules-based order.”
Like the U.S., France and Britain do not themselves have territorial claims in the resource-rich South China Sea, a vital thoroughfare for international trade.
As China has moved military assets to and around the islands, reefs and artificial islands it claims as Chinese, the U.S. has led the pushback.

China is engaged in disputes with the Philippines, Vietnam, Malaysia and Brunei over resource-rich areas of the South China Sea, an area that includes some of the world’s most important shipping trade corridors. 

A recent U.S. “freedom of navigation” operation in the area saw two U.S. Navy warships sail within 12 nautical miles of islands claimed by China, Vietnam and Taiwan in the Paracel group. 
Their presence drew sharp criticism from Beijing although Vietnam, which accuses China of illegally occupying the islands, welcomed the U.S. move.
In response to steps taken by China to back up its territorial claims by deploying military assets, the Pentagon has rescinded an invitation to China to participate in a major international military exercise in the Pacific this summer.
While China is excluded from the Rim of the Pacific (RIMPAC) exercises – after participating in the last two at the invitation of the Obama administration – Vietnam has been invited to take part for the first time since they began in 1971.
Other participants among the 26 nations include several further countries locked in territorial disputes with China in the South and East China Seas, including Japan, the Philippines, Malaysia and Brunei.

‘Much larger consequences’

Speaking at the security dialogue, which is hosted by the International Institute For Strategic Studies, Mattis had strong words for China.
He noted that Beijing has deployed anti-ship missiles, surface-to-air missiles, electronic jammers in the South China Sea and recently landed long-range bombers on an island in the Paracel group.
“Despite China’s claims to the contrary, the placement of these weapons systems is tied directly to military use for the purposes of intimidation and coercion,” Mattis said, adding that it also contravened assurances Xi Jinping gave to the U.S. during a visit to the White House in 2015.
During a question-and-answer session Mattis described the decision to disinvite China from “the world’s largest naval exercise” as a “relatively small consequence” of its behavior, but warned there could be “much larger consequences in the future” if it continues down its path. 
He did not elaborate.
Militarizing features in the contested region, he said, is “not going to be endorsed in the world” and is not going to enhance China’s standing.
“There are consequences that will continue to come home to roost, so to speak, with China if they do not find the way to work more collaboratively with all of the nations who have interest” in the region.
Beijing’s defense ministry early this year invited Mattis to visit during the first half of the year, in what would be the first visit by a U.S. defense secretary in four years. 
Speaking to reporters as he flew home from Singapore, Mattis said he still planned to go to China, despite the tensions over the South China Sea.

lundi 19 février 2018

A four-nation alliance may be rising to counter China's Belt and Road

  • The U.S., Japan, India and Australia could join forces to establish an alternative to China's Belt and Road Initiative
  • Australian Prime Minister Malcolm Turnbull would discuss the plan with President Donald Trump during his visit to the U.S. later this week
Yen Nee Lee






















Four countries — the U.S., Japan, India and Australia — could join forces to set up an alternative to China's Belt and Road Initiative in an attempt to counter Beijing's growing influence, the Australian Financial Review reported Sunday.
The plan was on the agenda of Australian Prime Minister Malcolm Turnbull's meeting with President Donald Trump later this week, according to the report, which cited one unnamed senior U.S. official.
The source, however, added that the plan was still "nascent" and "won't be ripe enough" to be announced when the two leaders meet in the U.S.
China's multibillion-dollar Belt and Road Initiative aims to connect Asia, Europe, the Middle East and Africa with a vast logistics and transport network, using roads, ports, railway tracks, pipelines, airports, transnational electric grids and even fiber optic lines.
The project is widely seen as Beijing's push to increase global clout. 
The plan at one point included 65 countries, which together accounted for one-third of global GDP and 60 percent of the world's population, or 4.5 billion people, according to Oxford Economics.
Talks about an alternative infrastructure scheme have been brewing since last year. 
Secretary of State Rex Tillerson pitched for greater cooperation between the U.S. and India to counter China's strategy during his official visit to New Delhi in October 2017, according to the Hindustan Times.
The U.S. was also pushing to revive talks with Japan, India and Australia to deepen security cooperation and coordinate alternatives to China's Belt and Road project, Reuters reported, adding that the quartet held talks in Manila last November on the sidelines of the ASEAN and the East Asia summits.

mercredi 31 janvier 2018

Wanted: A Strategy to Limit China's Grand Plans for the South China Sea

The United States needs to play an active role in helping broker resistance to the Chinese political push.
By Dean Cheng

The United States has significantly accelerated the pace of it freedom of navigation operations (FONOPs) in the South China Sea. 
Last year it conducted four such operations in the span of five months. 
This contrasts with the four FONOPs conducted during Barack Obama’s entire second term.
On January 17, the USS Hopper, a U.S. Arleigh Burke-class destroyer, conducted the first FONOPs of 2018. 
This one occurred near Scarborough Shoal, much farther north than the previous operations. 
Like those earlier FONOPs, it rapidly drew a rebuke from the People’s Republic of China.
China’s Defense Ministry spokesman declared that the repeated “illegal” entry (feifa jinru 非法进入) of American warships to Chinese island groupings and maritime regions in the South China Sea endangered both sides. 
He condemned the operations as a threat to Chinese sovereignty and security and said they disrupted regional security and stability.
Scarborough Shoal has been a source of ongoing friction. 
Claimed by both China and the Philippines, it was the scene of a confrontation between Manila and Beijing in 2012. 
The United States brokered what was supposed to be a mutual withdrawal, but which saw the Chinese remain establishing effective control over the area. 
Thus far, however, Beijing has refrained from engaging in the kind of island reclamation or building at Scarborough that it has conducted in the Spratly Islands and the Paracel Islands.
But that restraint may be coming to a close. 
China’s state-run news agencies now openly acknowledge that the nation has, indeed, engaged in significant land reclamation and artificial island building in the South China Sea region. 
Chinese media have also unveiled a number of new dredges. 
This includes the Tian Kun Ho, one of the most powerful excavation vessels in Asia. 
The 140-meter-long vessel can reportedly dredge six thousand cubic meters per hour, and reach thirty-five meters below the ocean surface. 
Beijing appears to be warning that it can engage in rapid island development at any time—and Scarborough Shoal is potentially one of those sites.
The People’s Republic of China has long promulgated a map of the South China Sea that includes a “nine dash line” encompassing most of the region. 
Based upon a map initially published by the Republic of China, Beijing has been ambiguous over what exactly the nine-dash line represents. 
Is it a claim over the land features within it, including the Paracel Islands, Spratly Islands and Scarborough Shoal? 
Or is it an assertion that the entire region, including the waters, belongs to Beijing, essentially making the South China Sea its territorial waters? 
Its behavior, including repeatedly interfering with American warships and military aircraft transiting the region, would seem to suggest the latter. 
Beijing, however, has protested this view, arguing that it has never interfered with civilian ships on the sea lanes that traverse the area.
In 2016, the Permanent Court of Arbitration (PCA) ruled on a complaint against China filed by the Philippines, as part of the binding arbitration applicable to signatories of the UN Convention on the Law of the Sea (UNCLOS), to which both the Philippines and China are parties. 
The PCA ruled on a number of elements, in almost all cases finding in favor of Manila. 
This included a ruling that China’s claims to "historic" rights, or other sovereign rights or jurisdiction, within the area encompassed by the nine-dash line was contrary to the UN Convention on the Law of the Sea (UNCLOS), and without lawful effect.
But Beijing bluntly rejected the findings, often in very intemperate terms. 
Chinese Foreign Ministry spokesman Lu Kang described the PCA as a “law-abusing tribunal” engaging in a “farce.” 
China’s ambassador to the United States, Cui Tiankai, accused the tribunal of “professional incompetence” and “questionable integrity.” 
Indeed, since the ruling, Beijing has expanded its military presence, despite promises to Obama not to “militarize” the South China Sea.
Meanwhile, Chinese actions have also increasingly worried Indonesia. 
Indonesian territory extends to Natuna Island and an associated array of natural gas fields in the southwestern portion of the South China Sea. 
Chinese fishing boats have steadily encroached on its waters—much like they had on Scarborough Shoal. 
More alarming, one Chinese fishing boat detained by Indonesian authorities for illegal fishing has been seized back by the China Coast Guard. 
China’s growing naval capabilities have therefore also raised concerns. 
Most worrisome, Indonesian requests to clarify whether Natuna Island (and the surrounding waters) are encompassed within the nine-dash line have not received official clarification from Beijing. Instead, the PRC has said that, while it recognizes Indonesian sovereignty over Natuna island, it still retains “overlapping claims to maritime rights and interests.”
These issues led Indonesia to expand military facilities near Natuna in 2016. 
This has included expanding the island’s runway and increasing the number of troops deployed there. In 2017, Djakarta announced that it would rename the area near Natuna, within its own Exclusive Economic Zone, the North Natuna Sea. 
The Chinese promptly rejected this move, warning that it would not be “conducive” to good relations.
The name change has been endorsed by the United States, however. 
Secretary of Defense James Mattis used the term while visiting Indonesia, saying, “We can help maintain maritime domain awareness in the South China Sea, the North Natuna Sea. . . . This is something that we look forward to doing.”

An Integrated Course of Action for the Future

There is no reason to think the Chinese will back away from their increasingly assertive stance toward the South China Sea. 
Far from opening to compromise, Beijing has steadily tightened its grip over the area, while its actions toward Indonesia suggest that its ambitions may extend even further. 
Beijing is clearly engaged in a long-term effort. 
It is essential, then, for the United States to have short-, medium-, and long-term responses.

Short-Term: Slowing Down Chinese Actions

One of the great challenges has been China’s island construction. 
Literally moving earth and sea, Beijing has built entirely new islands, complete with airfields and military installations, and thereby changing the facts on the ground. 
The growing strength of all parts of the People’s Liberation Army (PLA)—including the PLA Navy, PLA Air Force, and the PLA Rocket Forces—makes challenging China an ever more dangerous proposition.
But China’s ability to build these islands rests upon certain companies, such as the state-owned China Communications Construction Company, and their attendant ability to build and maintain dredging capabilities. 
Insofar as their dredging equipment relies on imported parts, restricting the sale and supply of those parts can affect the pace of operations. 
The Tian Kun Hao’s predecessor, the Tianjing, clearly relies on imported equipment.
It is also possible to restrict the operations of companies engaged in Beijing’s dredging operations. 
Not all are state-owned enterprises. 
Some are commercial entities, based in China and Hong Kong. 
Denying them the ability to bid on commercial contracts in the United States (and, ideally, Japan, Australia and Europe), would compel them to assess whether South China Sea operations are worth the price. 
State-owned enterprises, too, can be vulnerable to sanctions. 
Even though they are less vulnerable to sanctions, China would nonetheless like to expand their global footprint. 
By publicizing their role in South China Sea activities, and imposing sanctions on their operations, it may be possible to limit their international presence, or at least affect perceptions of them.
Medium-Term: Improving Local Coordination and Capacity

Perhaps the greatest political challenge to limiting Chinese action is the lack of coordinated responses among the other claimants. 
In the Spratly Islands, it is not a matter of ASEAN states versus China, but rather an array of mutually challenging claims. 
Malaysia, Vietnam, Brunei and the Philippines all claim at least parts of the Spratly Islands. 
For there to be any hope for balancing the Chinese political push, the local states must first reach a common negotiating stance among themselves. 
The United States needs to play an active role in helping broker such a stance among Kuala Lumpur, Manila and Hanoi.
Similarly, any kind of common Southeast Asian response to China must eventually include Indonesia, the most populous of the ASEAN members. 
ASEAN is unlikely to assume a direct military-security role, but enhancing the members’ mutual information-sharing, maritime domain awareness, and general situational awareness would facilitate intra-ASEAN confidence. 
The inability to determine the fate of Malaysian Airlines MH17 underscores the general utility such improved information sharing could have, regardless of Chinese claims in the region.
Improving local coordination will also require rehabilitating relations with Thailand. 
Within ASEAN, Thailand is the fourth most populous nation, boasting the second largest GDP (in nominal terms) and one of the largest militaries. 
It is also a U.S. ally and has been a key partner in many U.S. military interventions in the post–Cold War era. 
It is also centrally located as part of the “Indo-Pacific” region.
But Thailand’s 2014 coup and the regime’s subsequent suppression of public dissent are inconsistent with American sensibilities, severely complicating Washington’s relations with Bangkok. 
The United States should certainly not approve of such moves, and should strive to shift Thailand back on a path to civilian rule and orderly civil-military relations. 
But just as the United States nonetheless maintained coordination and interaction with the Egyptian military in the wake of its toppling of Mohammed Morsi, strategic calculations should be integrated into our handling of Thailand.

Long-Term: Building New Approaches

At the end of the day, these moves underscore that the United States cannot, by itself, manage, much less resolve, the South China Sea issue. 
But as President Trump indicated at the recent World Economic Forum, “America first” is not the same as America alone. 
Similarly, while there are many things that America can do to help balance China, more can be achieved in conjunction with other states.
The nascent “quad” of the United States, Japan, Australia and India offers a potential new path for addressing some of the South China Sea issues. 
When officials from the four states met during President Trump’s November circuit of Asia, it gave new life to the concept, which has hibernated for nearly a decade.
The “quad” is not—and should not be—an effort at creating a regional-alliance structure. 
The four states have very divergent views on security, as well as national constraints on their ability to interoperate. 
But facilitating political and diplomatic coordination among these states, and perhaps advancing certain economic and political policies jointly, can provide a significant underpinning for individual- and bilateral-security moves.
For example, making clear that all four states believe in freedom of the seas and reject the idiosyncratic Chinese interpretation is a political, not a military, move, which could then be buttressed by individual national naval activities. 
Simply having all four nations maintain a steadfast position on the importance of keeping the region’s sea lanes open is likely to have salutary effects.
At the same time, should China choose to adjust its approach and refrain from further destabilizing the region with its artificial island construction efforts, an informal “quad” is far better placed to respond positively than a formal alliance which presupposes incipient hostilities.

Prospects: Still a Question Mark

The Trump administration continues to be a work-in-progress. 
For that matter, so is Xi Jinping’s administration.  
We have yet to fully understand the impact of the personnel changes announced in the 19th Party Congress, including the elevation of Yang Jiechi to the Chinese Communist Party Politburo and Wang Huning to the Politburo Standing Committee. 
The next several years may see a mutual focus on domestic economic development, and, if so, then there will be a significant likelihood of cooperation.
But the past decade suggests that there is growing friction in the South China Sea, and recent events give us little reason to believe that trend is changing. 
What will follow in the wake of the USS Hopper FONOPs remains to be seen, but it might be best to batten the hatches.

jeudi 11 janvier 2018

China Is Starting to See India as a Major Threat


More and more, Chinese see India replacing Japan as the second biggest threat to Beijing, following the U.S.
By Hemant Adlakha

As the new year gets underway, and Chinese foreign policy analysts join their counterparts around the world in assessing the events of 2017, the emerging international relations (IR) discourse in Beijing is quite a revelation — at least to the Japanese and Indian strategic affairs community.
While most Chinese believe Japan to be the second biggest threat to China’s “peaceful rise,” according to a few Chinese experts, the rising global profile of India, especially under the “right-wing” nationalist Prime Minister Narendra Modi and his Bharatiya Janata Party (BJP), has gone unacknowledged.
In February 2015, The Diplomat carried an article by a Chinese scholar titled “Why China Doesn’t See India as a Threat.” 
In April 2017, Sanjeev Nayyar, an independent columnist, wrote: “One thing China must understand is that the Indian government is not obsessed with being a threat to China but only wants a rightful place for India in the world.” 
And in the fall of 2017, China’s semi-official, hyper-nationalist Global Times dismissed with disdain any talk of India worrying China in an article titled “India-Japan intimacy poses no real threat to China.” 
The article was written in response to Japanese Prime Minister Shinzo Abe’s India visit in September.
The Global Times also – it now seems ignorantly – wrote off India’s successful test of its long-range ballistic missile Agni-IV a year ago, commenting: “China should realize that Beijing wouldn’t hold back India’s development of Agni-IV. However, Chinese people don’t think India’s development has posed any big threat to it.”
As the year 2017 was drawing to a close, however, Yin Guoming, a Chinese foreign affairs analyst, argued that India, and not Japan, is now the second biggest threat to China after the United States. Here’s an excerpt:
"China-India standoff has compelled us to regard India as a serious rival. 
"During the Doklam confrontation, it became very clear to everyone – from ordinary "Chinese to foreign policy experts – China must reckon India to be its second biggest rival. 
"And that China needs to re-assess, re-examine, and reformulate its India strategy."
However, more significantly, the article pointed out that most people in China were not yet ready to recognize the Indian threat.
China’s strategic affairs community has been arguing for some time now that, viewed geopolitically, Sino-Indian relations are the second most important bilateral ties for Beijing following the Sino-U.S. relationship. 
Most Chinese came in for a rude shock in the summer of 2017, when the Indian army openly crossed into Doklam border region and for weeks refused to withdraw. 
Writing in an influential, widely read online patriotic portal based in China’s Hainan province and popular among rich, educated urban Chinese, Li Yang, a current affairs commentator wrote in July – midway through the Doklam confrontation – “The biggest mistake we have made in the past two decades has been to underestimate India and ignore India. During these years of India’s rapid progress, we did not trouble India, did not make India stumble or make India shed tears.”
Earlier, in May 2017, India announced – just a day in advance – that it would not be present at the inauguration of China’s first mega-diplomatic event of the year, the Belt and Road Forum, citing sovereignty concerns. 
The Chinese, though angered by India’s last minute boycott, chose to officially remain silent. 
A section of China’s foreign affairs commentators did indeed hint it was a mild setback to their diplomacy.
By comparison, the Doklam faceoff, which cropped up within a few weeks of Belt and Road Forum, was a “game changer.” 
It went well beyond the Chinese imagination. 



Interestingly, as the days passed, India’s refusal to withdraw its troops as well as its dismissive attitude toward engaging with the Chinese on the issue, simply left the Chinese puzzled and clueless as to the Indian game plan. 
Not surprisingly, Shen Dingli, a Chinese international relations scholar at Fudan University, counted the Doklam crisis as among China’s top five diplomatic failures under the so-called “Xi-style Diplomacy.”
Current trends in Chinese discourse on the potential India threat, if acknowledged and accepted at the official level by the central authorities in Beijing, would mean further intensification of China and India viewing each other as a hostile “enemy” in the future. 
The following arguments have been offered by some Chinese scholars as to why India, and not Japan, will pose a bigger threat and challenge for China in the coming years.
In the context of geopolitics, China believes it enjoys a greater advantage over Japan. 
Japan is a maritime nation and maritime trade and transportation forms Japan’s economic as well as survival lifeline. 
Geographically too, Japan’s location makes its energy supply route from the Middle East longer than China’s. 
Both logistically and economically, the South China Sea route is the shortest path. 
Once China establishes its full hegemony in the South China Sea (and also regains control over Taiwan, which has long been Beijing’s dream), China would naturally be able to easily place a stranglehold on Japan by dominating maritime trade routes – crucial for Japan’s existence.
In contrast, China’s own crucial maritime energy supply route passes through the Indian Ocean, which falls within the Indian military threat zone. 
During the Doklam confrontation, the Chinese took due notice of Indian analysts making statements that in the event of a India-China military clash, India would cut off China’s maritime access to the Indian Ocean.
Of course, it is true many Chinese dismiss the Indian threat as nothing but a joke. 
But that is more because India has not yet fully realized its potential, not because India is not capable of becoming a future threat to China.
Some analysts in China have also expressed their frustration over India’s “unchecked” rapid economic progress during the past two decades. 
These experts and scholars are rather candid in admitting China had failed to anticipate the “revolutionary” transformation Narendra Modi has brought about in the Indian national psyche. 
True, it is not a revelation to the Chinese that India has always viewed China is its “imaginary enemy.” 
Moreover, it is not hidden from the Chinese either that the Indian defeat during the 1962 boundary war has since remained the single most crucial factor in determining India’s national defense strategy. Yet, it is only now and under Modi, as India’s stature in global politics has risen, that China has suddenly realized that — unlike Japan — India is a nuclear weapon state. 
Finally, thanks to the Modi government’s uncharitable stance, it has dawned upon China’s strategic affairs community that Beijing’s Belt and Road strategy is bound to produce more and more structural contradictions between the two neighbors, already rapidly becoming hostile.
No wonder, if the media reports from Beijing are true, that the People's Republic of China for the first time keenly awaited the outcome of this year’s assembly elections in India. 
Following the Gujarat elections, the mandarins watching India in the Chinese foreign affairs ministry, it is believed, have predicted in their dossier that Modi will enjoy a second term as the prime minister in 2019.
Going by the current Chinese discourse, Beijing is certainly not going to just sit and watch and let India become a threat. 
The question that looms large, then, is what China is going to do about it.

jeudi 4 janvier 2018

Exporting Authoritarianism With Chinese Characteristics

Scholars and political leaders describe increasing concerns about Chinese government influence over teaching and research in the U.S. and Australia.
By Elizabeth Redden


































Two times in Kevin Carrico’s six years of teaching he’s been approached by students from China who told him that things they said in his classroom about sensitive subjects somehow made their way to their parents back home.
The first time it happened, when Carrico was teaching at a university in the United States, a student informed him that a presentation he’d given about the pro-democracy protests in Tiananmen Square in 1989 had been reported to his father in China, where the father held a position in government. “This was a situation where the father’s superiors -- I wasn’t given a lot of specifics -- but his superiors mentioned this to him and raised this as something that [the father] should know about, supposedly,” said Carrico, who’s now a lecturer in Chinese studies at Australia’s Macquarie University.
The second time, which happened after Carrico moved to Australia, a student told him that a class presentation she’d given on self-immolation in Tibet had been reported to her parents in China.


Kevin Carrico

“The only way that this could have been communicated back to China would have been from somebody in the class,” Carrico said. 
“I suppose another possibility is that the files on the student’s computer are somehow corrupted and can be read or monitored, but that’s probably unlikely.”
“It raises really complicated issues about, ethically, what am I supposed to do as somebody who teaches contemporary China issues in an ostensibly free environment, while some of my students may be in a less free environment such that what they say in class could in some cases be communicated back to China,” Carrico continued. 
“Awareness of that could affect student participation, which is part of their grades, and lack of awareness of that could have implications for students and their families.”
“It leaves me with a real dilemma as someone who is dedicated to not censoring what I teach or write about China, but who also doesn’t want to create an environment in which students are worried about what they say in class or are pressured to contribute to discussions that could somehow be risky for them and somehow or other reported back to officials or to family.”
Carrico finds it hard to judge just how big the problem is based on the two instances his students told him about.
“Two is not a lot,” he said, “but at the same time I do feel like it’s two too many.”
In recent years the Chinese government has stepped up its crackdown on domestic dissent at the same time it continues to expand the country's global influence. 
A confluence of events has China studies scholars raising concerns about whether the Chinese Communist Party is exporting its censorship regime abroad, and what the implications are for free discussion and research at universities outside China.
Some of the concerns -- such as academic freedom concerns raised by the Confucius Institutes, centers of Chinese language and cultural education that are funded and staffed by a Chinese government entity and housed on U.S. and other international campuses, or concerns about foreign scholars self-censoring their writings or choices of research topics so they can continue to get visas to China -- are familiar. 
Others have risen to the forefront over the past few months.

In several recent cases, international scholarly publishers have ceded to requests from Chinese censors to block access to selected journal articles in China. 
Cambridge University Press originally agreed to block access in China to more than 300 articles -- mostly on sensitive topics like Tiananmen, Tibet, Taiwan and the Cultural Revolution -- from its prestigious China Quarterly journal before reversing course and reinstating the content after coming under heavy criticism. 
Other Cambridge-published journals, the American Political Science Review and the Journal of Asian Studies, have also reported receiving -- and rebuffing -- requests to block access to some of their articles in China.
The giant publisher Springer Nature has, on the other hand, complied with censorship requests. 
After Financial Times reported that more than 1,000 articles had been removed from the Chinese websites of two political science journals published by Springer Nature, the publisher confirmed that “a small percentage of our content (less than 1 percent) is limited in mainland China” and said it is “required to take account of the local rules and regulations in the countries in which we distribute our published content.” 
Springer Nature described the blocking of content as “deeply regrettable” and said it was necessary so as not to avoid jeopardizing access to the remainder of its published content in China.
Shuping Yang

Beyond the issue of scholarly publishing, Chinese nationalism is also posing challenges to foreign universities that host Chinese students. 
After a student delivered a commencement speech last spring at the University of Maryland, College Park, criticizing air pollution in her home city in China and praising “the fresh air of free speech” she found in the U.S., the student, Shuping Yang, came under heavy criticism on Chinese social media and from some of her Chinese classmates. 
The backlash prompted Yang to apologize and for her university to issue a statement defending her right to free expression.
In another commencement controversy, the Chinese Students and Scholars Association at the University of California, San Diego, led a protest of the university’s choice of the Dalai Lama, the Tibetan spiritual leader, as this spring’s graduation speaker. 
A nationalistic Chinese newspaper, The Global Times, blasted UCSD for the invitation to the Dalai Lama, whom Beijing considers to be a separatist, and said its chancellor “must bear the consequences for this.” 
In September it came to light that the China Scholarship Council was freezing funding for government-funded scholars headed to UCSD.
Academic exchange between the U.S. and China is arguably as high as it's ever been (even though it is true that the number of Americans studying in China has actually declined in recent years). 
More than 350,000 Chinese students study at American colleges and universities, making up the single largest group of international students by nationality. 
American universities have grown increasingly dependent on the tuition revenue Chinese students bring and welcome the chance to bring more diverse and global perspectives to the classroom.
But there are increasing concerns about whether mainland Chinese students always feel free on American campuses to articulate perspectives that may deviate from Beijing's party line. 
Earlier this year, The New York Times published an article on the links between campus-based chapters of Chinese Students and Scholars Associations and Chinese embassies and consulates and the ways in which the student groups have, in the words of reporter Stephanie Saul, “worked in tandem with Beijing to promote a pro-Chinese agenda and tamp down anti-Chinese speech on Western campuses.”
Wang Dan, a leader of the Tiananmen Square protests who holds a doctorate in history, recently published an op-ed in The New York Times in which he described surveillance of Chinese students and scholars on campuses by some of their compatriots. 
“The Chinese government encourages like-minded Chinese students and scholars in the West to report on Chinese students who participate in politically sensitive activities,” he wrote.
“Chinese students who are seen with political dissidents like me or dare to publicly challenge Chinese government policies can be put on a blacklist. Their families in China can be threatened or punished.”

At a hearing in December on China's foreign influence operations held by the Congressional Executive Commission of China, Senator Angus King, an Independent from Maine who caucuses with Democrats, asked speakers at the hearing about this issue. 
He asked whether there is "any evidence that the Chinese government is recruiting some of those students as agents, either gathering intelligence or otherwise malign activities in our country."
Sophie Richardson testifying.

“We’ve been doing some research for a couple of years on threats to academic freedom from the Chinese government outside China, and a piece of that has involved looking at the realities for students and scholars who are originally from the mainland on campuses in the U.S., Australia and elsewhere,” Sophie Richardson, the China director for Human Rights Watch, said in response to King's question.
"It's not a new pathology that Chinese government officials want to know what those students and scholars are saying in classrooms. One doesn't have a perfect year-on-year data set to say that it’s gotten worse, but it’s certainly a sufficiently real dynamic for people. For example, we have a graduate student who told us about something that he discussed in a closed seminar at a university here, and two days later his parents got visited by the Ministry of Public Security in China asking why their kid had brought up these touchy topics that were embarrassing to China in a classroom in the U.S. So I think that that surveillance is real.”

China’s ‘Long Arm’
The congressional hearing -- which bore the title “The Long Arm of China: Exporting Authoritarianism With Chinese Characteristics” -- was not exclusively focused on academe, but much of the hearing focused on Chinese censorship of academic publications and the Chinese government's efforts to wield influence internationally through academic and other people-to-people exchanges
“It seems to me there’s a continuum,” Senator King mused at one point. 
“I mean, we have people-to-people programs, we bring students from other parts of the world here, we have various information about our country that has … a positive narrative. But at some point the question is where does puffery stop and -- um, I don’t know what the right word might be -- but some kind of subversion begin?”
The committee's chair, Senator Marco Rubio, a Republican from Florida, said in his opening remarks that the Chinese government is “clearly targeting academia. The Party deems historical analysis and interpretation that do not hew to the Party’s ideological and official story as dangerous and threatening to its legitimacy. Recent reports of the censorship of international scholarly journals illustrate the Chinese government’s direct requests to censor international academic content... Related to this is the proliferation of Confucius Institutes and with them insidious curbs on academic freedom.”
“I think in one sense what distinguishes the Chinese efforts to wield influence in the United States is that they are spending a great deal more money to do that,” Glenn Tiffert, a visiting fellow at Stanford University's Hoover Institution, said at the hearing, where he spoke about his research on censorship of two Chinese law journals (a webcast of the full hearing is available here). 
“They have commercial advantages and so they’re able through, for example, Confucius Institutes to promote a particular view of China and to close out discussion of certain topics on campus.”
“China’s not necessarily appealing to hearts and minds,” Tiffert said. 
“It’s appealing to wallets.”
Jonathan Sullivan, the director of the China Policy Institute at the University of Nottingham, in the United Kingdom, said in an email interview with Inside Higher Ed that the increasing concerns about Chinese influence over international higher education “are the result of an accumulation of developments and concerning trends in China (and the West).”
“Every sector of Chinese society has tightened under Xi Jinping -- the Party, business, media, internet, [human rights] lawyers, activists, citizen journalists, migrants, Chinese academia,” he said. 
“The expansion of Chinese interests around the world and determination and ability to push back against what it sees as Western hegemony that has acted against China have steadily increased during the same period. At the same time, we have witnessed the erosion of our own values at home via Trump, Brexit, rise of the far right. Taken as a whole, these trends are cause for concern. Although China has long had a censorship regime … there has never been a confluence of these three trends before, i.e., concerted tightening across the board within China, China’s willingness and ability to actively promote its interests in the West, and the erosion of support for core values by our own leaders.”
Carrico, of Macquarie University, added that the "ideological hardening" within China has had implications outside the country.
“People have come to realize that there’s no longer any kind of great firewall between academic practice in China and academic practice outside of China. There is this kind of increasing pressure on academics working outside of China, and ironically, I think this increasing pressure is leading people to realize just how problematic the current system is in China,” he said.

Clashes on Campus
Rowena He

Rowena He, an assistant professor of history at St. Michael’s College, in Vermont, has written that when she was a graduate student in the U.S. and Canada, she dodged questions from college classmates about her research topic -- the Tiananmen Square movement -- and worried about whether she could ever go home and about whether her family members in China would get into trouble. “When my work became better known, angry young Chinese students accused me of lying about historical facts, while thousands of online messages labeled me a ‘national traitor’ who criticized China to get money from ‘the West,’” He wrote in a 2011 op-ed for The Wall Street Journal.
He has also written about the treatment of Grace Wang, who as a freshman at Duke University in 2008 was vilified online and subjected to threats -- her contact information and directions to her parents' apartment in China were posted on the internet -- after she attempted to mediate between pro-Tibet and pro-China protesters on the North Carolina campus.
“In the past decade, I have observed the development of Chinese student nationalism, first as a graduate student, later as a scholar and faculty member, and always as a first-generation Chinese living in Canada and United States,” He, who’s also a researcher with Harvard University’s Fairbank Center for Chinese Studies, said via email. 
I experienced firsthand the intimidation of hypernationalist discourse in classrooms, in public lectures, in cyberspace and in daily lives. Some media stories describe such phenomena as ‘cultural conflicts’ that the ‘West’ needs to understand and accommodate; meanwhile, within the academy, many consider these reactions as perspectives of ‘the other,’ which thus should be embraced under the principles of inclusion. This sort of conciliatory approach may come easily to some college administrators who have to deal with budgetary pressures and welcome the tuition from Chinese students.”
“It is particularly disturbing to see that, in contrast to the experiences that I have documented in my studies among the previous generation of Chinese diasporas, such ultranationalism of the new generation did not abate as students matured in societies that offer easy access to information and freedom of speech,” He continued. 
“Instead, it appears that Chinese students are becoming even more assertive and aggressive, taking advantage of the freedom of their host countries, and operating with increasingly open support from the Chinese authorities.”
Concerns about these kinds of issues have been especially acute in Australia, bound up as they are in part of a broader public debate about the extent of Chinese influence over the country's politics.
The head of Australia's domestic intelligence agency warned in October of a need to be "very conscious" of foreign interference in universities, according to the Australian Broadcasting Corporation. 
"That can go to a range of issues. It can go to the behavior of foreign students, it can go to the behavior of foreign consular staff in relation to university lecturers, it can go to atmospherics in universities," Duncan Lewis, the intelligence chief, said.




































Australian Foreign Minister Julie Bishop

Australia's foreign minister, Julie Bishop, gave a speech in October in which she urged Chinese students to respect freedom of speech in Australia. 
"This country prides itself on its values of openness and upholding freedom of speech, and if people want to come to Australia, they are our laws," she said.
"We want to ensure that everyone has the advantage of expressing their views, whether they are at university or whether they are visitors," Bishop said.
"We don't want to see freedom of speech curbed in any way involving foreign students or foreign academics."
The comments from top Australian government officials followed a series of incidents in Australia in which lecturers at the country's universities came under fire on social media or in Chinese-language newspapers for things they said or did in the classroom.
In one case, reported on by The Australian, a lecturer at the University of Newcastle came under criticism for using teaching materials that referred to Hong Kong and Taiwan as separate countries (Hong Kong is a special administrative region within China, while under the "one China" policy Taiwan is regarded by the government in Beijing as a breakaway province that will eventually be reunited with the mainland). 
According to a statement from the university, the lecturer agreed to meet with concerned students after class to discuss the materials, which came from a Transparency International report that used the word “countries” to refer to both countries and territories. 
The discussion was “covertly recorded” and released to the media. 
“You have to consider all the students’ feelings … Chinese students are one-third of this classroom; you make us feel uncomfortable … you have to show your respect,” a student is heard saying on the recording. 
The Chinese consulate-general in Sydney reportedly contacted the university about the matter.
In another case, a lecturer at Australian National University apologized after students complained that he had translated a warning against cheating into Mandarin, making it appear as if the warning was targeting Chinese students specifically, according to Chinese media
In yet another case, a lecturer at the University of Sydney publicly apologized for using a map in class that showed Chinese-claimed territory as being part of India, according to The Australian.
“Does this mean that all of Australia’s universities recognize all of China’s territorial claims?” asked Clive Hamilton, a professor of public ethics at Charles Stuart University. 
“It’s madness.”
A book by Hamilton about the extent of Chinese government influence on Australian politics and academe is in limbo after its publisher, Allen & Unwin, delayed its publication indefinitely, saying it was concerned about “potential threats to the book and the company from possible [legal] action by Beijing.” 
Hamilton withdrew the book, which is titled Silent Invasion: How China Is Turning Australia Into a Puppet State, and is looking for another publisher.
“I’m very concerned about the message it sends,” Hamilton said. 
“I wonder whether it will scare off other publishers. They’ll see the story and think, ‘OK, let’s be very careful about any books on China or Chinese influence on the West because there might be blowback from Beijing.’ I’m also worried about the message it sends to other authors. Do they look at this case and say, ‘Well, I might have trouble finding a publisher if I’m too critical of the Chinese Communist Party, so I’ll tone down my criticism or stay away from controversial areas, like the Tiananmen Square massacre’?”
Hamilton said the large influx of Chinese students into Australia -- he calculated for his book that proportionally there are five times as many Chinese students in Australia as in the U.S. -- has made Australian university leaders anxious about causing any offense to the Chinese government and potentially cutting off the substantial flow of tuition revenue from the mainland.
“I think it would be frightening for many university administrators to face up to how dependent they’ve become on a foreign source of money that doesn’t share basic Western values -- or the founding values of Western universities, let’s put it that way," Hamilton said.

Looking for Evidence
David Shambaugh

David Shambaugh, the Gaston Sigur Professor of Asian Studies, Political Science and International Affairs at George Washington University and the author of a book on increasing Chinese assertiveness on the global stage, emphasized the importance of being highly empirical in discussing these issues. 
"I am aware of no empirical evidence of Chinese interference with normal academic activity inside the United States," he said via email. 
"Unlike Australia -- where there have been multiple recent reports of monitoring of lecturers in the classroom, intimidation and silencing of Chinese students in class, detentions of Australian academics traveling in China, and general monitoring of China-related activities on campuses by the Chinese Students and Scholars Association -- I am aware of no evidence of any such actions or activities in the United States. These activities may occur in the future, but so far they have not. I have informally polled a number of my Chinese studies colleagues in U.S. universities, and they also report no such activities."
What has happened, he said, is, that the Chinese Embassy and consulates liaise with Chinese Students and Scholars Associations on U.S. campuses. 
And “Chinese individuals do occasionally make comments and challenge public speakers at university events -- but this is part of free speech and not out of the ordinary,” he said.
Other things that have happened, he said, include the social media attacks on the students at Duke and Maryland, retaliation against universities that have hosted the Dalai Lama, and the refusal of China to grant visas to certain U.S. scholars.
“The other thing to mention is that [over] the past six to seven years it has become increasingly much more difficult for American (and other foreign) scholars to conduct social science research in China, either individually or in collaboration with Chinese scholars. This has entirely to do with the increasingly strict and repressive political atmosphere in the country, whereby the authorities are on the lookout against alleged ‘foreign hostile forces.’ A dark political cloud has descended over Chinese academe in recent years -- and this has negatively affected opportunities for normal scholarly research and collaboration.”
Sen. Marco Rubio

At the mid-December congressional hearing on Chinese foreign influence activities, Senator Rubio asked the witnesses whether they were willing to share if they have experienced any intimidation as a result of the work they have done on this topic.
“Personally, I have not to date within the United States,” replied Tiffert, of Stanford. 
“In China working on the topics that I work on, I come under significant pressure, and the informants and people that I speak to also do, and I think that goes with the territory and it’s well recognized among people who work on modern China and contemporary issues in China.”
He continued, “I have to say that in the classroom I’ve not experienced any negative activity or any of the personal outrage that we’ve seen at other universities, say, in Australia. In my teaching I’ve been spared that. I’ve found Chinese students to be extremely thoughtful and even open-minded about issues that are passionately felt at home.”
“But there definitely is the danger -- and early-career academics are highly conscious of this -- there’s always the possibility that a minority might express unhappiness or outrage at something that is taught because it’s different than the way they’ve been taught it and that produces unwelcome controversy … Because of the decline of tenure, faculty become risk averse. They don’t want to cause controversy because they’re also concerned that their universities might not adequately support them in the event that the Chinese Students and Scholars Association or even a smaller group of students takes issue with something they said in the classroom. And so there’s a self-censorship, a chilling of speech, that occurs as well.”

A Set of Standards?

What, if anything, can universities and scholarly publishers do about some of these issues?
Scholars have urged publishers to stand together in resisting Chinese requests that they actively censor they content for the China market, and an online petition calling for a peer review boycott of publications that censor their content in China has garnered more than 1,000 signatures.
“This is an issue that is only going to occur over and over with the Chinese authorities, and [that] foreign journal editors and publishers need to anticipate and take a united stand on,” said Shambaugh, of George Washington University.
“My own view is that all publishers need to take a very principled [stance] and adopt the simple position in favor of freedom of speech and publishing over a position of (a) craven financial gain, or (b) the argument that it’s better to have a large number of journals available to Chinese readers than none at all (my view is none at all if China tries to ban a single one).”
Jeffrey Wasserstrom, the Chancellor's Professor of History at the University of California, Irvine, and editor of the Cambridge-published Journal of Asian Studies, added that scholarly publishers have leverage they can use.
“The reason why I'm particularly distressed about the situation with Springer,” he said, “is that with the desire to compete internationally, the Chinese authorities actually really care about the journal Nature" -- a premier scientific journal published by Springer.
“It would be seen as problematic, I think, to scientists to be operating in a university setting that didn't have access to that sort of premier publication. I think Springer had more to bargain with because of the prestige of that publication. But on the other hand, they're a private company, so they were less beholden to the interest of academics and less concerned, I think, to the damage that could be done to their brand within intellectual circles,” Wasserstrom said.
After the Cambridge Press decision to censor content -- which was quickly reversed -- James A. Millward, a professor of history at Georgetown University's School of Foreign Service, published an open letter in Medium criticizing the censorship and characterizing Cambridge's concession as “akin to The New York Times or The Economist letting the Chinese Communist Party determine what articles go into their publications  --  something they have never done.”
“It wasn’t decrying Chinese censorship so much as it was decrying non-Chinese institutions going along with it and actively abetting it,” Millward said of the letter.
“I have a history of visa bannings related to work on Xinjiang, along with a bunch of other scholars, and I’ve always been upset at the sort of weak reaction of my own and other universities to that kind of thing and the fear of what will happen, what will China do to us if we actually stand up and say, ‘boo.’” (Millward was one of a group of contributors to a book on China's Xinjiang region who were unable to get visas to China after the book was published. He has since been able to return, he said, but only after jumping through extra hoops.)
"We need some open statements or standards, guidelines, about how these situations should be dealt with, and we don't really have that," Millward said.
"There's this kind of general sense of what academic freedom is and so on and so forth, but universities just want to go forth alone."
In the congressional hearing last month, the final question, which came from Senator Rubio, had to do with just this issue.
“Are any of you aware of efforts, whether it’s in academia or entertainment or anywhere, for universities, for example, to come together and confront this threat to academic freedom, establish some level of standards about what they will and will not do in the universities, a collective effort to affirmatively say, ‘We don’t care if you’re going to deny us trips and access to the marketplace or even to students or to exchanges or the ability to have campuses in the mainland; we are not going to allow you to pressure and undermine academic freedom’?” Rubio asked.
Among the witnesses who replied was Richardson, from Human Rights Watch.
“Just by chance I happened to spend Sunday morning with a group of China-focused U.S. academics, and this issue dominated our conversation,” she said.
“I think it’s fair to say that there’s enormous interest in having some sort of set of principles or code of conduct, but I think there’s also a recognition of how difficult it would be to get institutions to sign on to that for fears about loss of funding or the desires of fund-raisers or administrators versus the interests of faculty. But I think there is momentum to capitalize on.”

mercredi 20 décembre 2017

Rogue China is trying to gain political influence abroad

  • Officials in the U.S., Australia, New Zealand and Germany are questioning the extent of political interference by Beijing in their home countries
  • China's Communist Party is using education, spying, political donations and people-to-people diplomacy to influence decision-making within these counries
Nyshka Chandran

Western countries are growing increasingly cautious of China's Communist Party.
Officials in the U.S., Australia, New Zealand and Germany — major recipients of Chinese foreign direct investment — have been questioning the extent of Beijing's interference on their home turfs amid recent developments that suggest rising Chinese clout.
Last Wednesday, the U.S. Congressional-Executive Commission on China (CECC) held a hearing on Beijing's influence-wielding attempts states-side.
That same week, China summoned Australia's ambassador after Prime Minister Malcolm Turnbull cited "disturbing reports about Chinese influence."
Meanwhile, security experts in New Zealand warned Prime Minister Jacinda Ardern about Chinese attempts to access sensitive public and private sector information, according to a Financial Times report last week.
And in Germany, intelligence officials recently revealed how Chinese spies used LinkedIn to snoop on politicians, according to Reuters.
Beijing is using education, spying, political donations and people-to-people diplomacy to gain a greater say in local decision-making in these countries. 
And at a time when Beijing is dominating the global trade conversation, the issue threatens to strain bilateral relations between China and Western economies.
China has vehemently rejected all claims of political interference, referring to them as "symptoms of McCarthyism" in a recent Global Times editorial.
That said, Chinese money can be found across the world in the form of loans, acquisitions, currency swaps, foreign direct investment and infrastructure projects as Xi Jinping's government emerges as the world's largest provider of capital.
Xi's team also has spent billions "to shape norms and attitudes in other countries, relying on the cultivation of relationships with individuals, educational and cultural institutions, and centers of policy influence," Shanthi Kalathil, director at the International Forum for Democratic Studies, the National Endowment for Democracy, said at the CECC hearing.
This complex network of liaisons falls under the domain of the United Front Work Department, a Communist Party agency driving the nation's push for global sharp power.
Confucius Institutes, Beijing-sponsored educational organizations aimed at promoting Chinese language and culture on global university campuses are a major example of how Beijing is looking to alter global narratives.

Created as an arm of the Chinese state, these institutes are controversial due to a lack of transparency and constant self-censorship on China-related topics, which is a clear disregard of academic freedoms. 
"Confucius Institutes are far and away the best known vehicle by which the Chinese government is carving out a space in American education," Glenn Tiffert, visiting fellow at Stanford University's Hoover Institution, said at the CECC hearing.
The Chinese state also monitors foreign academics, he added.
"We are routinely targeted by malware, phishing schemes, and fake social media profiles designed to compromise our information security, and our Chinese informants. In many instances, our Chinese colleagues are already under surveillance, and face far more harrowing constraints."
Down Under, there are similiar fears.
The head of Australia's domestic intelligence agency warned in October that Canberra must be "very conscious" of foreign interference in universities," which includes the behavior of both Chinese students and foreign consular staff in relation to university lecturers.
"Chinese security forces have engaged in a campaign to monitor Chinese nationals, including students — even warning them not to offer any criticism of Beijing lest their relatives in China be harmed," Joshua Kurlantzick, senior fellow for Southeast Asia at the Council on Foreign Relations, said in a recent note.
That's led Australian officials to consider "whether the threat of monitoring students and tactics taken by Chinese officials to scrutinize teaching on China in classrooms has censored debate about China within Australian higher education," the note continued.
In New Zealand, links between local politicians and Beijing have also stirred concern.

China's most dangerous mole in New Zealand: Jian Yang

Australia's Manchurian Senator Sam Dastyari.

Member of parliament Jian Yang came under scrutiny in September following revelations that he once worked at the Luoyang Foreign Languages Institute, a Chinese military-linked academy.
Meanwhile, Australian senator Sam Dastyari recently resigned over a scandal concerning his links with Chinese donors.
Beijing has also provided financial support to former New Zealand politicians in an attempt to promote Chinese interests, according to a September report by Anne-Marie Brady, a professor at the University of Canterbury.
Xi's administration, "which is encouraging more overseas Chinese to become engaged in politics," also funds interest groups abroad, Brady said.
One of them is the Peaceful Reunification of China Association of New Zealand, which "engages in a range of activities which support Chinese foreign policy goals, including block-voting and fund-raising for ethnic Chinese political candidates who agree to support their organization's agenda," Brady explained.
In Australia, about 80 percent of foreign political donations to national political parties came from China during 2000 to 2016, according to a recent report from the University of Melbourne's law school.
Turnbull has proposed a ban on overseas donations in an effort to limit overall foreign influence in Australian politics.