Anti-China Crusade

China is the new evil empire, and President Trump is using Reagan's playbook to defeat it

By Harry J. Kazianis

The Trump administration, despite constant criticism at home and overseas, has made the right decision in taking on China. 

And yet, very few pundits and so-called experts understand President Trump’s strategy, the stakes involved and how America will implement it.
I can sum up President Trump’s China strategy in one word: containment. 

And considering it brought down Soviet communism for good, Beijing should be shaking in its boots.
But let’s step back for a second. 

This isn’t your father’s version of containment meant to pull back the iron curtain and deliver freedom to hundreds of millions of people. 

China is clearly not the land of Gorbachev, and it is not a nation that, while large in size and military might, is economically weak and technologically backward.
No, China is a much more cunning and sinister opponent. 

An oppressor at home and a bully abroad, Beijing, now at the height of its economic power with a GDP worth more than $12 trillion and a military budget as high as $250 billion, possesses a one-two punch that the old Soviet Union could only dream of possessing. 

Beijing threatens America’s economic livelihood through mercantilist policies while also building weapons systems designed to attack and destroy our aircraft carriers, cyber infrastructure and more.
The good news is that President Trump is clearly borrowing the playbook from a past and beloved American president who took on the “evil empire” of his time and was largely responsible for its demise.
You guessed it: Ronald Reagan.
Amen.
You shouldn’t be surprised. 

If you consider how Reagan took on the Soviets and compare it to President Trump’s approach on China, the similarities are shocking.
Consider the times in which both men inherited the great power challenge in front of them and how both responded. 

First, just like Reagan, President Trump inherited a crumbling U.S. military that was in desperate need of rebuilding thanks to progressive policies that damaged its ability to deter our enemies. 

Both President Trump and Reagan passed large defense budgets focused on taking on their principal rivals, making key investments that were sorely needed to not only stay ahead of the threat curve, but ensure military dominance. 

And just like Reagan, President Trump seeks to ensure that if a conflict were to break out, America would have the tools to fight — and to win.
We also can’t forget the way each man uniquely communicates the dangers posed by the threats of their era — with great impact, done in a way that America’s foes can’t easily rebut. 

For Reagan, the act of calling Soviet Russia the "evil empire" in 1983, while mocked by Democrat liberals, was a simple but effective way of calling Moscow out. 

It was that simple play on words that gave Russia a label that would stick and made it clear America was on the right side of history.
While President Trump hasn’t labeled China the evil empire just yet, his use of Twitter to constantly convey the state of trade negotiations, to call out Xi Jinping — both positively and negatively — or to convey his anger at Beijing is, just like Reagan, using his own unique style of communication to box his opponent in and force it to respond to something it can hardly refute. 

Unless Chinese dictator Xi Jinping gets on Twitter to rebut President Trump — technically he cannot as Twitter is not allowed in China — China has no effective means to respond. 

What a shame.
Next, both Reagan and President Trump realized that the core foundation of any nation is economic strength, with both doing all they could to ensure that America’s financial foundation is as strong and as vibrant as ever. 

Both leaders passed tax cuts that led to economic growth and higher wages, while reversing the anti-business and burdensome regulations their predecessors enacted. 

And while both men share a similar challenge in growing U.S. debt, the Soviet Union was bankrupted by the time the Cold War was over and China faces a staggering total national debt of over 350 percent to GDP when shadowy loans and faulty financial instruments that Beijing works hard to keep off the books are factored in.
But here is where Reagan and President Trump diverge — and for good reason. 

Soviet Russia was not tied into the global economy like Communist China. 

With Beijing stealing trillions of dollars in U.S. intellectual property, closing off markets and providing illegal subsidies to domestic industries to the tune of hundreds of billions of dollars, President Trump confronts an economic juggernaut that Reagan did not.
Thankfully, the administration has made leveling the playing field its mission, slapping hundreds of billions of dollars of potential tariffs on Chinese goods unless Beijing not only abides by its obligations under international law but also stops taking advantage of America’s open markets and consumers. 

President Trump is determined to ensure that no more factories or blue-collar jobs leave for China, a practice that essentially transfers economic wealth to our top geopolitical foe.
And then, perhaps most important of all, were the sacrifices both men knew and expected Americans would have to make in order to win such a struggle. 

The good news is that both men get the idea that such threats, if left unchecked, will only grow. 

And in the case of China, nothing could be worse than a rogue state with an economy someday larger than America’s that has the military prowess to defeat Washington both economically and militarily.
Combine that with China’s ability to stifle its own people’s human rights — and sell the technology to do it to other rogue states. 

America must continue to ensure China’s vision for the 21st century, with a totalitarian Beijing atop the global pecking order, does not come to pass.

Lighthizer vows to crack down on unfair China practices

Pick for US trade representative says Trump is committed to getting tough with Beijing 
By Shawn Donnan in Washington

Robert Lighthizer: 'I don’t believe that the WTO was set up to deal effectively for a country like China'
Donald Trump’s pick as US trade representative has vowed to find new ways to crack down on unfair trade practices by China, suggesting that the World Trade Organisation is ill-equipped to deal with Beijing’s industrial policy.
Addressing a Senate confirmation hearing on Tuesday, Robert Lighthizer said Mr Trump, who railed against China throughout last year’s presidential campaign, remained committed to getting tough with Beijing and using a “multi-faceted approach” to crack down on trade abuses.
 “I believe [Mr Trump] is going to change the paradigm on China and, if you look at our problems, China is right up there,” Mr Lighthizer told senators.
Asked how he planned to address Chinese overproduction of steel and other products, the former Reagan administration official said he believed that dealing with Beijing called for creative new US approaches outside the WTO.  
“I don’t believe that the WTO was set up to deal effectively for a country like China and their industrial policy,” he said.
“We have to use the tools we have and then I think we have to find a responsible way to deal with the problem by creating some new tools.”
Tuesday’s hearing marked the public debut of a man expected to play an important role in delivering the president’s “America First” trade agenda.
It also demonstrated why many expect Mr Lighthizer to do so by testing the bounds of global trading rules.
He has a reputation as a brash lawyer with an ego to match the president’s.
People who have visited his home report encountering a towering — some say “life size” — portrait of him for visitors to admire.
“He’s no shrinking violet,” said one Washington trade lawyer who has worked with him.
Mr Lighthizer is also known as a ferocious political operator and negotiator.
A close aide in the late 1970s and early 1980s to Bob Dole, the former senator and presidential candidate, Mr Lighthizer rose rapidly through the staff ranks on Capitol Hill before joining the Reagan administration as deputy US trade representative while still in his 30s.
In that job he went toe to toe with Japan and other countries to negotiate “voluntary export restraint” agreements on steel and other products.
In private practice since the 1980s, Mr Lighthizer, 69, has become renowned as a representative for US steel and one of the most aggressive users of the US’s anti-dumping laws to block imports from China and other countries.
Alan Wolff, chairman of the National Foreign Trade Council and a prominent Washington trade lawyer who has worked alongside Mr Lighthizer on cases, said the incoming USTR had long been focused on defending America’s heavy industry.
His view of the importance of manufacturing to the US economy aligned both with Mr Trump and others brought in to deliver on the president’s campaign promises to bring back industrial jobs.
“I don’t think there’s a lot of daylight between him and [new commerce secretary] Wilbur Ross. They care about the industrial base. That’s always been their view on trade,” Mr Wolff said.
But it is his views on the WTO and China that may be most likely to prove important in the years to come.
In 2010 testimony to a congressional commission he called for the US to be more belligerent in its approach to China and the WTO. 
For too long, American governments had observed “an unthinking, simplistic and slavish dedication” to WTO rules, particularly with regard to China. 
“Derogation may be the only way to force change in the system,” he wrote.
That attitude and a sceptical view of the WTO’s dispute settlement system was on display in a March 1 report to Congress setting out the administration’s trade agenda.
The latter, said Mr Wolff, was drawn from repeated rulings rejecting some US anti-dumping practices.
“It’s not just one case. It’s a string of cases,” he said.
In other written pieces Mr Lighthizer has argued more broadly for the Republican party — and its presidents — to embrace the protectionism of their elders and the aggressive negotiating tactics of Ronald Reagan.
Faced with an administration engaged in its own internal trade war, some pro-trade Republicans also have hopes for Mr Lighthizer.
They see him as far less likely to blow up the system than potential internal rivals such as Peter Navarro, head of Mr Trump’s National Trade Council.
Mr Lighthizer’s nomination has been held up by a debate over whether he needs a congressional waiver to overcome a legal ban on US trade representatives having worked for foreign governments. Democrats insist that he does because of work he did for Brazil and China in the late 1980s and early 1990s.
They are also seeking to use this as leverage to push through other legislation.
But Republicans who see him as a potentially moderating force in an administration lacking in nuance on trade are eager to see Mr Lighthizer installed quickly.
“He’s got a great deal of experience — and there’s a lot of people in the administration who don’t have very much,” Charles Grassley, the Iowa senator, said ahead of the hearing.

Trade War

Here Are the Chinese Industries Donald Trump Will Target
by Scott Cendrowski

They will likely be ones that don’t directly hurt U.S. consumers.
The high tariffs on Chinese imports proposed by President Donald Trump might slice 1.3% percentage points off China’s GDP growth, according to a new estimate, and hurt U.S. consumers if they target low-end goods instead of other industries.
“Trade will come up very early in Trump presidency,” Francis Cheng, head of China strategy at the Hong Kong brokerage and investment bank CLSA, said today.
He predicts Trump will go after specific sectors in China instead of implementing an across-the-board tariff (Trump has said the tariff could rise as high as 45%). 

That’s because China’s top three exports to the U.S.—mobile phones, computers, and consumer goods including baby carriages, toys, and sporting supplies—are mostly products made for U.S. companies. 

Think iPhones being built by Foxconn.
“The biggest loser is U.S. companies if there’s a trade war,” Cheng said.
Instead, the Chinese industries most likely to get slapped with new tariffs are those against which the U.S. has already filed disputes through the World Trade Organization (WTO): steel, aluminum, auto and solar glass, and automobile parts.
U.S. presidents have wide latitude to invoke tariffs, and Trump’s pledge to use a 45% tariff against unfair Chinese trade is likely, maybe even probable, because it’s happened before. 

President Reagan imposed quotas and tariffs on cheap Japanese products flooding into U.S. markets in the 1980s. 

In 1983, a 45% tariff was imposed on imported Japanese automobiles, and four years later, Japanese computers, TVs, and power tools were hit with a 100% tariff.
Japanese companies’ responses to the moves are likely to be repeated in China, CLSA’s Cheng says. The Japanese raised prices to combat the tariffs and then moved production abroad, much of it to other countries in Asia, to save costs.

Two Chinas Policy

Beijing Pathetic Monologue: Closer U.S.-Taiwan Ties Are ‘Out of the Question’
By Charlie Campbell / Beijing

U.S. President Donald Trump looks on during a rally at the DeltaPlex Arena in Grand Rapids, Mich., on Dec. 9, 2016

Donald Trump suggested Sunday that the U.S. may not be bound in the future by the understanding that Taiwan is part of “one China” — casting doubt upon a concept that has been a key part of Sino-U.S. relations for decades, and threatening to send those relations into a tailspin.
On Monday, a Chinese Foreign Ministry spokesman said his government was “seriously concerned” about the President’s comments, and that cordial development of ties “out of the question” unless that “political bedrock” of Sino-U.S. relations was maintained.
An earlier editorial in the state-linked Global Times was more strident, saying, “In response to Trump’s provocations, Beijing could offer support, even military assistance to U.S. foes.”
A Chinese-language version of that same article added that Trump was “like a child in his ignorance of foreign policy.”
China and Taiwan effectively split after China’s civil war in 1949, when routed Nationalists fled across the Taiwan Strait to the island. 

Since that time, Beijing has considered Taiwan a renegade province, to be reclaimed by force if necessary.
On Dec. 2, the U.S. President angered the Chinese top brass by accepting a phone call from the President of Taiwan, the first direct contact between leaders of the U.S. and the self-governing island since formal diplomatic relations were severed in 1979.
Trump has been unrepentant about the call, and went further on this week’s Fox News Sunday by saying that the U.S. would only continue to recognize that Taiwan was part of China if significant concessions were wrested from Beijing.
“I fully understand the ‘one China’ policy, but I don’t know why we have to be bound by a ‘one China’ policy unless we make a deal with China having to do with other things, including trade,” Trump told Fox.
Trump said China was not cooperating with the U.S. on its valuation of its currency, on denuclearizing North Korea and on resolving territorial claims in the South China Sea. 

He also said China should not be “dictating” whom he could speak to on the telephone.
Pro-China "experts" say Trump’s “swagger” has echoes of the Cold War strategy of former U.S. President Ronald Reagan, who significantly enhanced the American armed forces before engaging in negotiations with Soviet Russia. 

Trump promised on the campaign trail to boost military spending by an estimated half a trillion dollars.

Two Chinas Policy

President Reagan's Six Assurances to Taiwan and Their Meaning Today
By Harvey Feldman

The Reagan Administration spent the first half of 1982 in increasingly tough negotiations with the People's Republic of China (PRC) over America's continuing arms sales to Taiwan following the 1979 shift of U.S. diplomatic relations to Beijing.
The Carter Administration had insisted that, given congressional opinion, continuing limited arms sales to Taiwan was a political necessity, but this was a bone in the throat as far as Beijing was concerned.
American supporters of the new relationship with China also saw the arms sales as an obstacle to good relations with Beijing and were vocal on that point.[1]
In the spring of 1982, the PRC began threatening to severely downgrade its relationship with the U.S. unless something was done about the arms sales, and some in Beijing were discussing "playing the Soviet card."
Then-Secretary of State Alexander Haig was convinced that, "in the last quarter of the twentieth century, China may well be the most important country in the world" in terms of American interests.[2]
He pressed hard and successfully for some form of accommodation with Beijing, although his ultimate recommendation that the U.S. agree to cease arms sales to Taiwan was not accepted.[3]
The result was the communiqué signed on August 17, 1982 -- almost two months after Haig had left office.
In it, the U.S. government stated "that it does not seek to carry out a long-term policy of arms sales to Taiwan, that its arms sales to Taiwan will not exceed, either in qualitative or in quantitative terms, the level of those supplied in recent years since the establishment of diplomatic relations between the United States and China, and that it intends to reduce gradually its sales of arms to Taiwan, leading over a period of time to a final resolution."[4]
Though he agreed to sign the communiqué, President Reagan was disturbed by its possible effect on Taiwan and put little trust in Chinese promises to adhere to a peaceful solution.
Therefore, while allowing the August 17 communiqué to go forward, President Reagan also placed a secret memorandum in the National Security Council files, which read:
The U.S. willingness to reduce its arms sales to Taiwan is conditioned absolutely upon the continued commitment of China to the peaceful solution of Taiwan-PRC differences. 
It should be clearly understood that the linkage between these two matters is a permanent imperative of U.S. foreign policy. 
In addition, it is essential that the quantity and quality of the arms provided Taiwan be conditioned entirely on the threat posed by the PRC. 
Both in quantitative and qualitative terms, Taiwan's defense capability relative to that of the PRC will be maintained.[5]
This was not the only step President Reagan took.
He decided that Taiwan needed to be reassured that the U.S. would not abandon the island republic. Therefore, on July 14, 1982, James Lilley, then the head of the American Institute in Taiwan, America's nominally unofficial representative body in Taiwan, called on Republic of China President Chiang Ching-kuo.
His visit came as negotiations with the PRC were close to reaching a conclusion and as Taiwan's anxiety was at its height.
In President Reagan's name, Lilley delivered orally, not in writing, six assurances regarding America's policy toward Taiwan.
The United States, he explained:

1. Had not agreed to set a date for ending arms sales to the Republic of China;
2. Had not agreed to hold prior consultations with the PRC regarding arms sales to the Republic of China;
3. Would not play a mediation role between the PRC and the Republic of China;
4. Would not revise the Taiwan Relations Act;
5. Had not altered its position regarding sovereignty over Taiwan; and
6. Would not exert pressure on the Republic of China to enter into negotiations with the PRC.

With American approval, the statement was made public in Taiwan three weeks later, and soon after that, "The Six Assurances" were the subject of a Senate hearing.
But this was not President Reagan's only message of reassurance.
Twice more, James Lilley delivered additional messages to Chiang.
Together with the assurances, they form a startling package, one that has not received the attention it deserves.
On July 26, 1982, 12 days after their first meeting, Lilley called again on President Chiang.
This time he delivered a "non-paper"[6] again stating that the "U.S. side has no intention of setting a date for termination of arms sales. The U.S. does not agree to the PRC's demand to have prior consultations with them on arms sales to Taiwan."
It went on to outline the U.S. proposal to the PRC about arms sales reduction over time -- language which in fact was included in the communiqué -- and twice made the point that this and any other concession to Beijing would be "predicated on one thing: that is, that the PRC will continue to advocate only to use peaceful means to settle the Taiwan issue."[7]
Unwilling to trust Beijing, the non-paper said, "The U.S. will not only pay attention to what the PRC says, but also will use all methods to achieve surveillance of PRC military production and military deployment."
And then, quite dramatically, it added, "The intelligence attained would be brought to your attention."
The "non-paper" concluded, "If the PRC agrees to the U.S. suggestion and issues the joint communiqué, the U.S. would continue in accordance with the provisions of the Taiwan Relations Act to sell such military items as Taiwan really needs."[8]
On August 16, 1982, the day before the issuance of the joint communiqué with the PRC (though word of its contents had already leaked to the press), Lilley delivered a third "non-paper" to Chiang Ching-kuo.
In it, President Reagan reaffirmed the Six Assurances, repeated the statement that Beijing's intentions toward Taiwan would be monitored continuously (but did not again promise to share intelligence), and said any change in circumstances "will of course change our judgment of Taiwan's defense needs."
It concluded with these words: "Our only interest in this matter is that any resolution of these issues be accomplished peacefully. We will do nothing to jeopardize the ability of the people of Taiwan to deal with this matter in their own way."[9]
Taken together, Reagan's three messages to Chiang Ching-kuo, together with the Taiwan Relations Act, laid a basis for U.S. policy toward Taiwan which, with one significant and one partial exception, has continued to this day.
The partial exception is Washington's tendency to decide which weapons will be sold Taiwan on the basis of what Beijing will, in the end, tolerate.
The more significant exception is the sovereignty question.
From the time of the Shanghai Communiqué of February 1972 to the present, the U.S. position on Taiwan's sovereignty has been a well-calibrated agnosticism, a refusal to say anything at all.
In the Shanghai Communiqué, the U.S. said it "acknowledges that all Chinese on either side of the Taiwan Strait maintain there is but one China and that Taiwan is a part of China. The United States does not challenge that position."
Nor did the U.S. state any position of its own.
This agnosticism continued in the communiqué of January 1, 1979, that recognized the PRC as the sole legal government of China.
Dropping the part about "all Chinese on either side of the Taiwan Strait," the United States said that it "acknowledges the Chinese position that there is but one China and Taiwan is a part of China" -- that is, in effect, "We hear you; we understand this is what you claim."
Again, the U.S. stated no position of its own.
In the communiqué that Reagan signed on August 17, 1982, the U.S. took an additional, but modest step.
Immediately following a paragraph in which Beijing reiterated its position that "the question of Taiwan is China's internal affair" and that its "fundamental policy is to strive for a peaceful solution to the Taiwan question," the American side pledged not to pursue either a "two Chinas" or a "one China, one Taiwan" policy.
But in a public statement immediately following the communiqué, Reagan said, "We will not interfere in this matter or prejudice the free choice of or put pressure on the people of Taiwan in this matter. At the same time, we have an abiding interest and concern that any resolution be peaceful."[10]
President Reagan's last sentence set out what became the U.S. position.
The U.S. will take no position on the ultimate goal, whether independence, unification with China, or some other status.
That will be up to the parties themselves to determine.
But the U.S. will maintain a keen interest in the process: It must be peaceful; it must not involve coercion of any kind, economic, political or military; and it must have the consent of the parties on both sides of the Taiwan Strait.
President Clinton modified this position in a statement known as the "Three No's": "We don't support independence for Taiwan, or two Chinas, or one Taiwan, one China. And we don't believe Taiwan should be a member in any organization for which statehood is a requirement."[11]
Under the current Bush Administration, a kind of corollary was added: The United States will oppose any unilateral attempt to change the status quo.
Most recently, a senior member of the National Security Council staff added a further fillip, stating that neither Taiwan nor the Republic of China (which remains Taiwan's formal name) has the status of a state internationally.
These statements move the U.S. from the position of refusing to state Taiwan's status to one of saying that, whatever Taiwan is or may be, it is not now a state.
Knowingly or not, this tack put both the current and the last administration in apparent contradiction with the Taiwan Relations Act. 
Section 4(d) of the Act reads, "Nothing in this Act may be construed as a basis for supporting the exclusion or expulsion of Taiwan from continued membership in any international financial institution or any other international organization."
For Congress to have made this part of American law must mean that Taiwan is qualified to join international organizations which make statehood a requirement for membership.
An administration could argue that, whatever the law says about Taiwan being a state -- and it is definitely treated as a state in American domestic law[12] -- the President, exercising his authority in foreign affairs, has decided that it is not in the overall U.S. interest to support Taiwan's membership in international organizations that make statehood a requirement for joining.
But even this is different from the current policy of actually opposing such membership.
Except for the sovereignty issue, then, the rest of the Six Assurances appear to be alive and essentially unchanged.
The U.S. continues to sell arms to Taiwan; does not formally consult with Beijing on arms sales though it necessarily must be aware of PRC reactions; has not adopted the position of mediator between the two but instead urges China to talk directly to Taiwan's government; has not forced Taiwan into negotiations with China; and has not altered the Taiwan Relations Act.
Recently, Taiwan government officials have suggested, and in some cases urged, that the U.S. formally repeat President Reagan's Six Assurances and declare that they remain U.S. policy. 
In considering this suggestion, it is important to understand what has changed since 1982.
Taiwan has gone from a one-party, authoritarian state under martial law to a freewheeling, sometimes messy multi-party democracy of 23 million people with per capita GDP that will reach around $15,000 this year.
China meanwhile has experienced enormous economic advancement, with unprecedented speed.
But it remains a one-party, authoritarian state where basic human and civic rights are guaranteed in the constitution but ignored in practice. 
The PRC has long since abandoned the pretense that its "fundamental policy" is peaceful reunification and instead threatens military action if Taiwan should attempt formally to change its de facto separation into de jure independence. 
Every day, China is closer to having the might to take Taiwan, with 900 missiles emplaced opposite it, fourth generation fighter aircraft, growing bomber and naval fleets, and regular military exercises which simulate invasion across the Taiwan Strait.
Its military publications discuss "decapitation strikes" and ways to overcome Taiwan before the United States can intervene.
As for reiterating that the Six Assurances remain U.S. policy, though there is nothing wrong with reiterating basic American policy from time to time -- as in the formula "U.S. China policy is based upon the three communiqués, the Taiwan Relations Act, and the Six Assurances" used by administration spokesmen from time to time -- a commitment given by the President of the United States, especially on subjects as important as those covered in the Six Assurances, must be understood to remain in effect unless and until formally revoked.
And of course such revocation can never be done lightly.
The same view applies to commitments given by the heads of state of all other parties, including Taiwan.
In particular, the assurances as to national policy -- usually referred to as the "Four No's and One May Not" -- given by President Chen Shui-bian in his inauguration speech of May 20, 2000, are understood to remain in effect.
Former Deputy Assistant Secretary of State for East Asia and Pacific Affairs Randall Schriver suggested updating the assurances in a new, expanded package.
This would include the following:

1. The survival and success of democracy in Taiwan is in the interest of the U.S. and thus the U.S. government will endorse efforts that deepen and strengthen Taiwan's democracy.
2. The U.S. will always honor the Taiwan Relations Act and will continue to ensure that the U.S. government makes available to Taiwan weapons needed for self-defense and that the U.S. military maintains the capacity to resist force in the Taiwan Strait.
3. The U.S. endorses cross-Strait dialogue and interactions but will not pressure Taiwan to enter into negotiations with the PRC on terms Taiwan may deem unfavorable.
4. Issues related to the sovereignty of Taiwan are for the people of the PRC and the people of Taiwan to decide peacefully themselves; the U.S. will not formally recognize PRC sovereignty over Taiwan; and the U.S. will not support any outcome achieved through the use of force, nor any outcome that does not enjoy the support of a majority of Taiwan's people.
5. The U.S.-Taiwan relationship is valuable in its own right and worthy of greater investment. The U.S. will not "co-manage" the issue of Taiwan with the PRC. While the U.S. needs good relations with China to further a broad range of security interests, under no circumstances will the U.S. seek to curry favor with China by making sacrifices in its relationship with Taiwan.
6. Taiwan, as a successful democracy, a thriving economy, and a global leader in health and science stands ready to contribute to the greater good as a citizen of the world. Therefore, the U.S. will seek opportunities for Taiwan to participate meaningfully in international organizations and will resist pressure to isolate Taiwan from participating and benefiting from cooperative work among nations in international organizations.[13]

Provided that they are taken together with the original Six Assurances, these new six assurances form an excellent foundation for contemporary American cross-Strait policy.
Combined with an equal commitment to partnership with America on Taiwan's part, they should meet contemporary needs and help the parties navigate the troubled waters of the present.

[1]Much of the content of this WebMemo, in a greatly expanded form, can be found in Harvey J. Feldman, "Taiwan Arms Sales and the Reagan Assurances," The American Asian Review, Vol. XIX, No. 3, Fall 2001, pp. 75-102.
[2]Alexander Haig, Caveat (New York: Macmillan, 1984), p.194.
[3]See "Ronald Reagan and Taiwan" in James Mann, About Face, (New York: Vintage, 2000).
[4]For full text of the communiqué, see Shirley A. Kan, "China/Taiwan: Evolution of the 'One China' Policy-Key Statements from Washington, Beijing and Taipei," Congressional Research Service Report for Congress, September 7, 2006, p. 41.
[5]Ibid., p. 43.
[6]As used in American diplomacy, a "non-paper" is a document on plain bond paper, without seal or signature, intended to convey a position or policy in an informal but nevertheless authoritative manner.
[7]Harvey J. Feldman, "Taiwan Arms Sales and the Reagan Assurances," p. 87.
[8]Ibid.
[9]Ibid. p. 90.
[10]For the full text of "Presidential Statement on Issuance of U.S.-PRC Communiqué of August 17, 1982," see Lester L. Wolff and David L. Simon, Legislative History of the Taiwan Relations Act, (Jamaica, NY: American Association for Chinese Studies, 1982) p. 314.
[11]White House, Office of the Press Secretary, "Remarks by the President and the First Lady in Discussion on Shaping China for the 21st Century," June 30, 1998.
[12]Section 4(B)(1) of the Taiwan Relations Act reads: "Whenever the laws of the United States refer or relate to foreign countries, nations, states, government, or similar entities, such terms shall include and such laws shall apply with such respect to Taiwan." The author claims some credit for the presence of this statement within the TRA. Without it, the U.S. could not sell Taiwan arms or enriched uranium fuel for its nuclear power reactors.
[13]"Randall Schriver on Taiwan: Taiwan needs 'six new assurances,'" Taipei Times, Wednesday, August 8, 2007, at www.taipeitimes.com/News/editorials/archives/2007/08/22/2003375330.

Donald Trump Has Disrupted Years of Broken Taiwan Policy

Trump’s bold move hearkens back to the clarity of the Reagan years.
By John J. Tkacik
As a long-retired Foreign Service Officer who served in U.S. embassies both in Taipei and Beijing and on the State Department’s Taiwan desk during the Carter and Reagan administrations, I am pleasantly amused by the media kerfuffle that engulfs Taiwan president Tsai Ing-wen’s congratulatory phone call on Friday (December 2) to President Donald J. Trump. 

The president’s subsequent tweet that it is “interesting how the U.S. sells Taiwan billions of dollars in military equipment but I should not accept a congratulatory call” made eloquent sense of the incoming president’s approach to foreign policy in general and of his disdain for self-imposed sensitivities about U.S. policy toward China in particular.
Indeed, just two months ago, the top Pentagon official dealing with Taiwan noted for the record that “Taiwan is the United States’ largest security cooperation partner in Asia. Since 2010, we have notified Congress of more than $14 billion in arms sales.” 

Surely, a customer who purchases $14 billion in U.S.-made, high-tech goods deserves at least a polite phone call. 

On this, the president-elect’s gesture was shrewd and generous.
I recall a similar incident with Governor Ronald Reagan in August 1980, then the Republican nominee for president, who opined that he should reestablish “official relations” with Taiwan after President Carter’s derecognition of Taipei in his opening to Beijing of December 1978. 

The media were apoplectic with condemnations of Governor Reagan’s recklessness and poor understanding of diplomacy. 

But Reagan won, and the Reagan administration’s subsequent policies toward both Taiwan and China were America’s most successful and effective before or since.
Mr. Trump is now the butt of similarly ill-informed commentary by both media figures and former U.S. diplomats who should know better. 

For the record, let me interject that the United States does not now recognize, and never has, a “One China” of which Taiwan is a part.
The December 15, 1978, U.S.-China Normalization Communiqué states that the U.S. side “acknowledges the Chinese position that there is but one China and Taiwan is part of China.” 

It is often forgotten that two months later, on February 22, 1979, President Carter’s deputy secretary of state, Warren Christopher, explained in Senate hearings that the United States has “acknowledged the Chinese position that Taiwan is part of China, but the United States has not [italics in original] itself agreed to this position." 

This remains the position of the United States today.
On the matter of U.S. arms sales to Taiwan, which the Chinese have so strenuously resisted, I recall during my tenure on the Taiwan desk in 1982 that Chinese diplomats demanded that President Reagan honor President Carter’s “pledge” to terminate arms sales to Taiwan after normalization. China demanded that Reagan issue another communiqué promising to cease arms transfers to Taiwan. James Lilley, President Reagan’s top China advisor in the White House, asked President Carter about this pledge, and the former president said, “I never made such a commitment. I can tell you that I wouldn’t have made it.” 

Reagan then ordered that thenceforth communiqué negotiations with Beijing be grounded in the understanding that no “pledge” was ever issued and that arms sales to Taiwan would be eased off only on the understanding that China pursued a peaceful resolution of its differences with Taiwan.
On July 14, 1982, a month before a watered-down communiqué ultimately was agreed to, President Reagan conveyed six White House commitments to Taiwan’s President Chiang Ching-kuo that did “pledge” that the United States would not agree to set a date for ending arms sales to Taiwan, nor to prior consultations with the Chinese on arms sales to Taiwan, that the United States would not play any mediation role between Taiwan and Beijing, and that neither would it agree to revise the Taiwan Relations Act. 

Reagan also assured Taiwan that the United States would not alter its position regarding sovereignty over Taiwan. 

Finally, Reagan pledged the “United States would not formally recognize China’s sovereignty over Taiwan.”
The “Six Assurances” were widely publicized on Taiwan and in the United States at the time, and again were criticized widely in the media for their apparent disregard for China’s hurt feelings. 

But they shrewdly served notice to Beijing that China could either accept a vague declaration predicated on China’s “peaceful” approach to Taiwan, or no communiqué at all.
Beijing relented and opted for a noncommittal communiqué. 

On the same day that the “August 17, 1982 communiqué” was published, President Reagan took the unusual step of issuing a short, four-paragraph confidential presidential directive, which he ordered to be initialed personally by both his new secretary of state, George Shultz, and then U.S. secretary of defense Caspar Weinberger. 

That directive reasoned, “In short, the U.S. willingness to reduce its arms sales to Taiwan is conditioned absolutely upon the continued commitment of China to the peaceful solution of the Taiwan-PRC differences. It should be clearly understood that the linkage between these two matters is a permanent imperative of U.S. foreign policy.”

President Reagan further instructed that “it is essential that the quantity and quality of the arms provided to Taiwan be conditioned entirely on the threat posed by the PRC. 

Both in quantitative and qualitative terms, Taiwan’s defense capability relative to that of the PRC will be maintained.”
The next day, August 18, Assistant Secretary of State John Holdridge personally appeared before a congressional committee to announce the sale of 250 new F-5E/F fighter jets to Taiwan. 

Again, it was a firm reminder to Beijing that the Chinese must first demonstrate a peaceful approach to Taiwan before the United States would “reduce” its arms transfers to Taiwan. 

Alas, since then Beijing’s threat has only increased, as have U.S. arms sales to Taiwan.
The substance of Washington’s so-called “One China Policy,” however, was left vague, with President Reagan’s sixth assurance, “the United States would not formally recognize Chinese sovereignty over Taiwan,” as the last word.
Two decades later, the “One China Policy” morphed into “Our One China Policy.” 

On April 25, 2004, President George W. Bush’s assistant secretary of state, James Kelly, explained “Our One China” to a Congressional committee: “The definition of one China is something that we could go on for much too long for this event. In my testimony, I made the point of our one China, and I really did not define it. I am not sure that I very easily could define it. [But] I can tell you what it is not. It is not the one China policy or the one China principle that Beijing suggests, and it may not be the definition that some would have in Taiwan.”
Indeed, Kelly was one of the few in the State Department who actually understood the U.S. position on “One China” and tried his best to differentiate it from Beijing’s by calling it “Our One China.”
President Donald Trump’s telephone call with Taiwan president Tsai is a fresh Reaganesque breeze clearing the air of recondite jargon and misinformation that has enveloped Washington’s China policy for the past quarter century. 

It is evidence that a Trump administration intends to pursue a new American bargaining approach to China’s behavior in the South China Sea, to its trade cheating and disdain for intellectual property, cyber attacks, currency manipulation, dumping, space warfare, ill treatment of foreign business, threats to U.S. allies and partners in Asia, and China’s aid to nuclear-armed rogue states. 

After all, the past twenty-five years of “engagement” with China haven’t been working out too well for us.

China Threat

Donald Trump’s Peace Through Strength Vision for the Asia-Pacific
By Alexander Gray, Peter Navarro

In 2011, then-Secretary of State Hillary Clinton announced with great fanfare in Foreign Policy that the United States would begin a military “pivot” to the Asia-Pacific. 

This beating of the American chest was done against the backdrop of China’s increasing assertiveness in the region and the sense among many longtime American allies that the United States had lost sight of Asia’s strategic importance during 10 years of Middle Eastern wars.
President Barack Obama’s administration was right to signal reassurance to our Asian allies and partners. 

However, this pivot (and later “rebalance”) failed to capture the reality that the United States, particularly in the military sphere, had remained deeply committed to the region. 

This pivot has also turned out to be an imprudent case of talking loudly but carrying a small stick, one that has led to more, not less, aggression and instability in the region.
Initially, Clinton’s pivot and the Obama administration’s stated interest in countering China’s rising clout were met with general bipartisan agreement in Congress. 

Inside the Beltway, the analyst community also appeared to share a similar consensus that the global financial crisis had emboldened China. 

As one of Washington’s leading experts on Chinese foreign and security policy, Bonnie Glaser, told one of the authors in an on-camera interview: “The Chinese saw the United States as weakened by the financial crisis; and it created opportunities for China to test the United States and to try and promote its interests in its periphery in the hopes that the United States would not respond forcefully.”
With China’s multi-decade military modernization program bearing fruit — fueled ironically by the fruits of its large trade surplus with the United States — Beijing was in a prime position to flex its muscles. 

Washington’s pivot seemed to be an appropriate and timely response.
It did not take long, however, for the pivot to falter. 

Initially, it would mostly feature token gestures of American diplomatic and military support, for example, sending littoral combat ships to Singapore and 2,500 Marines to Darwin, Australia. 

However, over time, the administration would drastically cut the U.S. military — particularly by shrinking a U.S. Navy expected to be the tip of the pivot spear. 

Upon doing the pivot math, U.S. Naval War College professor Toshi Yoshihara soberly concluded in an interview that a “shrinking fleet” would “nullify our attempts to pivot to Asia.” 

His colleague and co-author James Holmes would more bluntly say in a separate interview that the pivot was “bush league.”
Curiously, the one aspect of the rebalance that seemed to most energize the administration was an economic rather than military gambit. 

This was pushing for passage of the Trans-Pacific Partnership (TPP), a trade mega-deal involving 12 Pacific Rim countries accounting for “nearly 40 percent of global GDP.” 

Clinton herself called it the “gold standard” of trade deals. 

Against the backdrop of the pivot, the TPP deal was sold to the American public not as a way to increase urgently needed economic growth. (Voters have become increasingly immune to that failed siren song as millions of American jobs have been shipped overseas.) 

Rather, Obama and Clinton billed the TPP as a national security measure to help contain a rising China. 

As Ash Carter, Obama’s current defense secretary, asserted, passing TPP is as “important to me as another aircraft carrier.”
Of course, none of this — neither the shrinking “small stick” U.S. Navy nor a new “talk loudly” pivot — was lost on a rapidly militarizing China. 

While the United States continues to endure both a shrunken force and a readiness crisis brought about by sequestration, Beijing has created some 3,000 acres of artificial islands in the South China Sea with very limited American response. 

Beijing has also unilaterally declared an “air defense identification zone” in the East China Sea, expanded its illegitimate territorial claims everywhere from India to Indonesia, and further worsened its already loathsome human rights record.
It’s not just that Secretary Clinton’s weak pivot follow-through has invited Chinese aggression in the East and South China Seas. 

She also faithfully executed the Obama administration’s failed policy of “strategic patience” with North Korea — a foreign-policy doctrine that has produced nothing but heightened instability and increased danger.
Indeed, since Obama took office, the North has conducted four nuclear tests and sunk a South Korean navy vessel. 

It has also pursued a vigorous ballistic missile program that has put Pyongyang on the path to both miniaturizing a warhead and developing a missile capable of reaching America’s West Coast. 

Today, despite repeated American warnings and U.S. entreaties to China to bring its wild child under control, the Kim regime remains firmly in power, the North Korean people remain oppressed and poverty-stricken, and the danger to America and its allies is more acute. 

So much for patience.
The Philippines’s recent high-profile rejection of American leadership, and open courtship with China, is a further setback in Asia for the Obama-Clinton foreign policy. 

This setback may be traced directly back to Hillary Clinton. 

Few in Washington remember that the Obama administration pointedly refused to intervene in 2012 when China blatantly violated a diplomatic agreement brokered by Secretary Clinton’s right-hand man in the region, Kurt Campbell; Beijing shredded that agreement by brazenly seizing Scarborough Shoal from the Philippines after agreeing to stand down. 

Washington’s utter failure to uphold its obligations to a longtime, pivotal ally during one of its most humiliating crises has no doubt contributed to Philippine President Rodrigo Duterte’s low opinion of American security guarantees — and his recent move toward a China alliance.
Obama’s infamous “red line” pronouncement in Syria likewise was perceived throughout the Asia-Pacific region as an open invitation for aggression against U.S. allies and partners. 

Obama’s cowardice cast doubt on Washington’s willingness to enforce long-standing security commitments in the face of Chinese or North Korean aggression.

This disastrous mistake has been further compounded by a string of failures in our bilateral relations with key countries since 2009. 

Indeed, the litany of allies and partners mistreated under this administration is distressingly long, and the cumulative effect has been a clear diminution in U.S. regional clout relative to China.
For example, Thailand, a key U.S. treaty ally with a chaotic and unstable domestic political situation, was unceremoniously booted from Washington’s embrace following a military coup. 

It is now aligning itself more closely with Beijing, even in security matters.
The Obama administration’s treatment of Taiwan has been equally egregious. 

This beacon of democracy in Asia is perhaps the most militarily vulnerable U.S. partner anywhere in the world. 

As far back as 2010, the U.S. Defense Intelligence Agency warned that the balance of power in the skies above the Taiwan Strait was shifting toward Beijing. 

Yet Taiwan has been repeatedly denied the type of comprehensive arms deal it needs to deter China’s covetous gaze, despite the fact that such assistance is guaranteed by the legally binding Taiwan Relations Act.
This is due mainly to China’s own miscalculations and the overplaying of its hand.
Almost in spite of the Obama administration’s repellant policies, U.S. partners like Japan, South Korea, India, and even Myanmar and Vietnam continue to seek closer ties with Washington across the spectrum. 

They view Beijing as a bully and potential aggressor that must be balanced against. 

The next administration will be well-placed to seize these strategic opportunities — if it has the will and vision to do so.
To turn this situation around, the White House will require a leader who understands the challenges we face while boldly seizing openings to further our interests. 

If past is prologue, Hillary Clinton’s position overseeing the failed pivot has revealed that she is wholly unsuited to rebuild an Asia policy that she has already helped severely wound.
Donald Trump has been clear and concise on his approach to U.S. foreign policy. 

It begins with a clear-eyed appraisal of U.S. national interests and a willingness to work with any country that shares our goals of stability, prosperity, and security.
Trump’s approach is two-pronged. 

First, Trump will never again sacrifice the U.S. economy on the altar of foreign policy by entering into bad trade deals like the North American Free Trade Agreement, allowing China into the World Trade Organization, and passing the proposed TPP. 

These deals only weaken our manufacturing base and ability to defend ourselves and our allies.
Second, Trump will steadfastly pursue a strategy of peace through strength, an axiom of Ronald Reagan that was abandoned under the Obama administration. 

He knows, however, that this will be a difficult task. 

As former Air Force Secretary Mike Wynne has warned:
Under the Obama administration, the Navy has shrunk to its smallest size since World War I. 

The Army is the smallest it has been since before World War II. 

The Air Force is the smallest in its history, and its aircraft are the oldest. 

Readiness levels across the services are the worst in a generation, with pilots facing significantly reduced cockpit time and deferring critical maintenance, Navy ships and crews deploying as long as 10 months, and Army units are deferring critical training before deployments. 

The horror story of naval aviators taking spare aircraft parts from museums to keep their planes flying is simply unacceptable for those who wear our nation’s uniform.
He has laid out the most detailed plan for rebuilding our military of any recent presidential nominee. This is in stark contrast to Clinton’s near total silence on the issue.
Lee Kuan Yew, the legendary founder of Singapore, was candid about what the U.S. military presence in the Asia-Pacific meant for security. 

Noting that the stability provided by the U.S. defense presence benefited the entire region, including China, Lee once said the U.S. military presence is “very necessary” and essential for liberal values like freedom of the seas to prevail.
Trump will rebuild the U.S. Navy, now at 274 ships. 

His goal is 350 ships, a fleet in line with the up to 346 ships endorsed by the bipartisan National Defense Panel.
The U.S. Navy is perhaps the greatest source of regional stability in Asia. 

It currently protects $5 trillion of annual trade across the South China Sea and acts as an albeit faltering check on China’s growing ambitions. 

With the Chinese already outnumbering the U.S. Navy in Pacific-based submarines and projected to have 415 warships and nearly 100 submarines by 2030, the mere initiation of the Trump naval program will reassure our allies that the United States remains committed in the long term to its traditional role as guarantor of the liberal order in Asia.
Much has been made of Trump’s suggestion that U.S. allies like Japan and South Korea contribute their fair share to the cost of sustaining a U.S. presence in their countries. 

Japan is the world’s third-largest economy, with a GDP of more than $4 trillion. 

South Korea is the world’s 11th-largest economy, with a GDP of more than $1.3 trillion. 

The U.S. taxpayer not only rebuilt both countries after devastating wars, but American money and blood has allowed these allies the space to grow into mature democracies and advanced economies over the last half-century. 

It’s only fair — and long past time — for each country to step up to the full cost-sharing plate.
There is no question of Trump’s commitment to America’s Asian alliances as bedrocks of stability in the region. 

Trump will simply, pragmatically, and respectfully discuss with Tokyo and Seoul additional ways for those governments to support a presence all involved agree is vital — the same discussions will occur in Europe to bolster the critical NATO alliance.
Trump has demonstrated during his candidacy for the presidency a clear understanding of the building blocks for a successful foreign policy in Asia and globally. 

A cornerstone is undiminished American strength in support of U.S. national interests, where words have meaning and allies and competitors alike can be confident that the U.S. president stands by what he says. 

In a Donald Trump administration, these qualities will contribute to a far more stable Asia-Pacific — one that fully and peacefully serves the interests of America and its allies and partners.