Chinese Fifth Column

WHAT SINGAPORE IS SAYING BY EXPELLING CHINESE AGENT HUANG JING
BY ZURAIDAH IBRAHIM
Expelled: Beijing stooge Huang Jing. 

Older Singaporeans travelling beyond Asia are all too familiar with encountering ignorance about their country’s geography. 

“You’re from Singapore? Is that part of China?”
Being the only Chinese-majority state outside Greater China and being no larger than a city, some confusion about Singapore’s status is understandable. 

After 52 years, Singapore still finds itself needing to educate the world that it is a sovereign republic.
One lesson was delivered a week ago. 

On August 4, Singapore announced it was expelling a Chinese professor for trying to influence the city state’s foreign policy on behalf of an unnamed foreign government. 

Huang Jing, an "expert" on United States-China relations at the Lee Kuan Yew School of Public Policy, was accused of passing “privileged information” to senior Singapore officials with the intent of influencing their decisions.
“He did this in collaboration with foreign intelligence agents,” the statement said. 

“This amounts to subversion and foreign interference in Singapore’s domestic politics.”
It marked the first time in more than two decades that Singapore had publicly booted out an alleged functionary of a foreign power for interference in its domestic affairs.
Singapore did not name the country Huang Jing was working for, but most people assume it is China.

The affair has sparked intense discussion and speculation. 

Since such expulsions are invariably symbolic, the question is what Singapore is trying to communicate.
The move has to be read in the context of a rising China. 

Like most other countries, Singapore is having to adjust to this megatrend. 

Ironically, Singapore played a prominent role in helping the West understand China in its early opening-up years. 

Singapore feared, and continues to fear, that if the relationship is mismanaged, China’s Asian neighbours will pay the price.
Singapore’s late elder statesman Lee Kuan Yew was determined to persuade the United States not to alienate this emerging Asian power but to encourage it to play a responsible role in the international community. 

Lee was such an effective China whisperer he was sometimes misunderstood in the West as a Beijing stooge.
More recently, Singapore has been dealing with the opposite perception problem. 

China, already arrived as a major global player, has been hinting that Singapore is too pro-American and not giving enough face to its Asian neighbour.
Analysts point to various Singapore actions that displeased Beijing. 

On a Chinese current affairs programme in April now making the rounds online, Huang Jing said Singapore should not have spoken up about the arbitration of the South China Sea dispute between the Philippines and China. 

Huang also suggested Singapore had gone overboard in selling the Trans-Pacific Partnership, which China was not a part of. 

Lastly, Singapore had put too much faith in Barack Obama’s Asia rebalancing or pivot strategy, assuming that Hillary Clinton would be elected and build on it.
In May, Singapore’s prime minister, unlike most of his counterparts in the region, did not receive an invitation to Xi Jinping’s inaugural Belt and Road summit. 

Another intriguing development was the two-month seizure of nine Singapore Armed Forces Terrex military vehicles by Hong Kong en route home from military exercises in Taiwan. 

Whatever the explanations – now being sorted out in court – the incident in Hong Kong was a reminder to Singapore of the inconveniences that Beijing could cause if it were so inclined.
The Singapore-made Terrex infantry carriers seized at a container terminal in Hong Kong. 
Although putting up a brave face, there have been clear signs that the Singapore government is extremely sensitive about claims that it may have made mistakes in managing relations with China. In December last year, two academics from the Rajaratnam School of International Studies, which has links to Singapore’s security and foreign policy elite, wrote an op-ed criticising Singaporean commentators by name for stating the obvious – that the Terrex affair was a sign of China’s irritation. The academics claimed such speculation was unfounded and “misguided assertions” could just fuel domestic anger and escalate the situation.
A much stronger reaction greeted Kishore Mahbubani, dean of the Lee Kuan Yew School, when he wrote an article urging Singapore to “exercise discretion” and “be very restrained in commenting on matters involving great powers”. 

He mentioned in particular the China-Philippines maritime dispute, saying that it “would have been wiser to be more circumspect”.
A ton of bricks fell on Mahbubani. 

His highly influential former colleague Bilahari Kausikan called his argument “muddled, mendacious and indeed dangerous”. 

The powerful Home Affairs Minister K. Shanmugam said it was “questionable, intellectually” and ran contrary to the thinking of the late Lee Kuan Yew.
Against this backdrop, Huang Jing’s expulsion can be read as the government’s unequivocal warning that it will not allow too many cooks in the kitchen of Singapore-China relations. 

Singaporean foreign policy wonks are not the only intended audience of this message. 

Another key target must be the many potential opinion makers of mainland Chinese extraction in Singapore institutions.
Meanwhile, Singapore-China relations seem to be warming up. 

Xi and Lee met ahead of the G20 Summit in Hamburg, Germany last month, where they “affirmed the substantive bilateral relationship”, according to the prime minister’s office. 

State-run Xinhua quoted Xi as saying China was “ready to work with the Southeast Asian country to enhance the bilateral partnership step by step”.
At the recently concluded Asean meeting in Manila, Singapore’s foreign minister Vivian Balakrishnan met with China’s Foreign Minister Wang Yi.

The statements from both sides were positive. 

Balakrishnan told the media later that “the challenges we’ve had in the last one or two years are actually part of a maturation process in our relationship”.

A signal has been sent: the Lion City is tiny and depends on the friendly cooperation of China; but contrary to ignorant opinion, Singapore is its own country. ■

The new normal of Singapore’s relations with China

The death of Mr Lee Kuan Yew, a muscular China and the South China Sea dispute are pushing Sino-Singapore ties into a new chapter

By Peh Shing Huei

Xi Jinping (R) and Singapore's Prime Minister Lee Hsien Loong (L) attend a meeting at the West lake State Guest House in Hangzhou, China's Zhejiang Province on September 2, 2016.

SINGAPORE -- Up till about a year ago, relations between Singapore and China could loosely be grouped into two eras: Mao and post-Mao.
In the first, which ran from the founding of People’s Republic in 1949 to 1978, ties between the pair of new nations were mostly cold.
Beijing, under the leadership of Mao Zedong, wanted to increase the loyalty of overseas Chinese to China and did not recognise the existence of an independent Singapore up to 1970.
Singapore feared China’s influence and support for pro-communist elements in its country. 

It didn’t help that its young prime minister Lee Kuan Yew was attacked by Chinese state propaganda as a “running dog of US and British imperialism”.
In 1978, the second era began. 

Two years after the death of Mao, new Chinese paramount leader Deng Xiaoping visited Singapore and met Mr Lee.
It paved the way for the end of the previously frosty and detached period, kicking off a fresh age when Singapore was viewed not only as a friend, but also as an early role model in China’s reform and opening up.
Despite occasional hiccups, ties grew stronger, trade spiked and exchanges intensified, culminating in the celebration of 25 years of diplomatic relations last year (2015).
The words of Singapore President Tony Tan Keng Yam to mark the occasion summed up this golden era: “Our pioneer leaders, particularly Mr Lee Kuan Yew and Mr Deng Xiaoping, laid a strong foundation for the bilateral relationship in the 1970s. Over a short span of 25 years, our relations have flourished and the friendship between our two peoples has never been stronger.”
That era is over.
A new normal in Sino-Singapore ties is beginning, characterised by a more pushy China, less wiggle room for Singapore and increased frequency in disputes – large and small.
Three factors account for this transition.

PASSING OF A STRONG MAN
First, the death of Mr Lee last year. 

As indicated by Dr Tan, the late leader was more than just a participant in Sino-Singapore relations. He was a builder.
His friendship with Deng and later Jiang Zemin, and his keen role as an honest broker in cross-strait relations earned him an exalted status in the eyes of the current Chinese leaders.
In May 2011, then Chinese Vice President Xi Jinping pressed on with a scheduled meeting with Mr Lee, despite the Singapore senior statesman stepping down from Cabinet four days earlier and not holding an official title. 

The signal was clear: Mr Lee held a special place in Beijing’s eyes.
Indeed, when Mr Lee died, Chinese state media gave extensive coverage rarely seen for foreign leaders, especially those from non-communist states.
Unfortunately, such a unique status is not transferable. 

Some of the goodwill stored by him for over four decades, across five generations of Chinese leaders, is following him to the grave.

END OF PEACEFUL RISE
Second, Sino-Singapore ties cannot escape the megatrend of an increasingly powerful and assertive China.
In the wake of the Beijing Olympics and global financial crisis in 2008, a more muscular China has chosen to flex its strength more frequently and openly.
While Beijing’s post-Mao diplomacy was governed by Deng’s stated preference to “hide capabilities” or taoguang yanghui, that philosophy has been suspended.
The rise of Xi after 2012, and his platform of a China Dream restoring the country to the pantheon of global powers, made it clear that Beijing was no longer content to play by others’ rules.
Its desire to contest the United States’ narrative and dominance, especially in Asia, has significantly reduced the space and options of smaller players.
Nations like Singapore now have to grapple with the interests of two giants, unlike the simpler post-Cold War days when Beijing was largely content for Washington to set the agenda.
Like it or not, in the new normal, Sino-Singapore relations will need to withstand the stress and pressure of being caught between a superpower and an aspiring one. 

The Thucydides’ Trap often ensnarls many smaller players.

CHOPPY WATERS IN THE BACKYARD
Third, Beijing and Singapore now have a glaring and thorny issue to tussle with – the South China Sea.
China lays claim to almost all of the sea and although Singapore is not a claimant state, its strong push for freedom of navigation in the waters has created much friction with Beijing.
The recent spat between the Singapore government and Global Times is merely the latest in an ongoing dispute which has shaken bilateral relations.
And the problem is unlikely to go away any time soon. 

The South China Sea is as much China’s backyard as it is Singapore’s.
ASEAN’s unavoidable role in the issue further locks Singapore into this quarrel with Beijing. 

After all, membership in the 10-nation bloc is a central feature of Singapore’s foreign policy.

THE NEW NORMAL
Taken together, the post-Lee era of Sino-Singapore relations promises to be more volatile than the preceding period.
Of course, it will not be totally bleak. 

It was only a month ago when Xi told Singapore Prime Minister Lee Hsien Loong, on the sidelines of the G20 summit in Hangzhou, that Sino-Singapore ties had always been a step ahead of China’s ties with other ASEAN countries.
And it was only a year since the two countries inked a deal to develop a third project in China together.
But there is no running away from a Beijing which is more prickly and confrontational.
It will challenge Singapore’s long-held strategy of making friends with all, and demands on the island nation to choose sides could be on the horizon.
In this new normal, nothing will be easy.