Affichage des articles dont le libellé est Xi Jinping Thought. Afficher tous les articles
Affichage des articles dont le libellé est Xi Jinping Thought. Afficher tous les articles

samedi 11 novembre 2017

The Great Dictator

Xi Jinping should heed the lessons from history, former official says
By Simon Denyer

Bao Tong, the most senior Communist party official to be jailed for sympathizing with the 1989 Tiananmen Square protests, at his apartment in Beijing. 

BEIJING — Twice Bao Tong rose within the Chinese Communist Party’s hierarchy, and twice he was dramatically cut down. 
He has endured long spells in jail and “re-education” for failing to fall into line behind the hard-liners holding power.
So it is perhaps no surprise that this 85-year-old views the Chinese president’s latest attempt to impose his dogma on the entire nation — under the banner of Xi Jinping Thought — with a considerable degree of skepticism.
“In China’s history of more than 3,000 years, there were other leaders who tried to use their own thoughts to regulate the thoughts of others,” he said in an interview in his modest Beijing apartment. “But none were successful. There were only failed attempts.
Bao was the most senior Communist Party official to be incarcerated for sympathizing with the 1989 Tiananmen Square protests, thrown into jail May 28, a week before a military crackdown that left hundreds if not thousands dead.
He was to remain in solitary confinement for seven years, and even today lives under constant surveillance, with three agents following him on foot and others in a car whenever he leaves his home. 
Yet he still manages an occasional interview with the foreign media, his manner affable, his opinions trenchant, and with a cigarette never far from his lips.
In the late 1980s, Bao had worked as a top aide to Communist Party General Secretary Zhao Ziyang, helping push China in a more liberal, reformist direction — until the June 4 crackdown ended that dream. 
Zhao was demoted, purged and placed under house arrest for expressing sympathy for the students’ demands and opposing Deng Xiaoping’s decision to send in the troops.
Bao was thrown into Beijing’s maximum-security Qincheng Prison, a destination for many of the nation’s most important political prisoners.
Today, a photograph of Zhao sits proudly on a shelf in his apartment, and he talks affectionately of a man who “treated everyone as equals” and wanted to turn over decision-making power from the party to the people.
There is no such affection in his comments about Xi Jinping, whom he describes as a “hard-liner” and a throwback to Mao Zedong.
Last month, the Communist Party enshrined Xi’s name in its constitution as it granted him five more years in power: Xi Jinping Thought now sits alongside Mao Zedong Thought and Deng Xiaoping Theory in the party’s ideological canon.
“It is called Xi Jinping Thought, the new thought, but they are just old ideas, not new ideas,” said Bao. 
“Ideas like ‘the party leads everything’ — they are exact quotes from Mao Zedong. Why call them new ideas?”
Bao knows only too well the madness that can be unleashed when one man rises to absolute power over the Chinese people, and when officials are too scared to tell him when he is wrong.
“The mistakes Mao made were all huge,” he said. 
“Mao didn’t recognize his mistake when the Great Leap Forward led to a famine that caused millions of deaths; he didn’t recognize his mistake in the Cultural Revolution in which tens of millions were purged.”
In 1966, only days after the beginning of the Cultural Revolution, Bao, who was working as a bureaucrat, was denounced as a “capitalist roader.”
Barred from his office, he spent a year cleaning toilets, another year doing hard labor in a re-education camp and the better part of a decade working the fields of rural China. 
He was only rehabilitated, like millions of others, after Mao’s death in 1976.
“There was only one slogan at that time — ‘Down with anyone who opposes Chairman Mao,’ ” he said. 
“But in the end Mao failed, too. He failed so badly his wife was labeled a counterrevolutionary, and so he himself became part of a counterrevolutionary family.”
Mao’s widow Jiang Qing was arrested after his death for her role in the Cultural Revolution and sentenced to life imprisonment, finally committing suicide in 1991.
Bao also draws lessons from much further back in his nation’s history to warn of the dangers of unchecked power, starting with King Li of the Zhou dynasty, who ruled in the 9th century B.C. 
The General History of China, an 18th-century text by French Jesuit historian Jean-Baptiste Du Halde, describes Li as proud, conceited and cruel.
Indeed, so conscious was he of how much he was hated, he forbade his subjects “on pain of death to converse together, or even whisper to one another,” Du Halde wrote, so that people could be seen walking the streets with downcast eyes, “in mournful silence.”
Eventually, peasants and soldiers rose up against Li, and he died in exile.
Emperor Qin Shi Huang is remembered as the first ruler of a united China in the 3rd century B.C., and for his mausoleum guarded by the Terracotta Army, but he also banned and burned books, and executed scholars.
The Hongwu Emperor, who established the Ming dynasty in the 14th century, expected total obedience from his subjects, inflicting torture and death on those who opposed him, including, it is said, some of his own advisers.
But in the end, Bao said, these rulers’ dynasties foundered and were overthrown.
“If you want to imitate Chairman Mao, that’s okay, but the problem is whether you will succeed,” Bao said, referring to Xi. 
“I can’t say whether his attempt will succeed or not. Only time will tell.”
Bao blames Deng for ending the dream of political change in China, and for instigating an era of corruption and growing economic inequality that “broke” Chinese society.
But he has no faith in Xi’s anti-corruption campaign, which the government says has led to some form of punishment for more than a million officials.
It’s a selective anti-corruption campaign. Its nature is the selective protection of corruption,” he said. 
“When you purge some corrupt officials, you are protecting the others. You protect the corrupt system, and you protect corrupt people who support you.”
Bao was one of the first signatories of Charter 08, a manifesto for democratic changes issued in late 2008. 
The only way to fight corruption properly, he says, is for independent supervision of the effort.
“Power tends to corrupt,” he said, quoting Britain’s Lord Acton, “and absolute power corrupts absolutely.”

China Has Donald Trump Just Where It Wants Him

Trump does not really have ideas. He has impulses.By Roger Cohen

Trump with Xi Jinping in Beijing on Thursday. 

YANGON, Myanmar — Trump is incidental to China’s ambitions, a mere blip on a 33-year plan. 
In a speech last month, Xi Jinping set out the objectives with great clarity. 
By 2035 China will be a “global leader in innovation,” showing “solid progress” toward “prosperity for everyone.” 
By 2050, China will be a “global leader in terms of composite national strength” and a “great, modern socialist country.”
Xi gave Trump a warm welcome this week, said the Pacific was big enough for both nations and offered business agreements. 
Trump made nice and suggested that China and the United States could solve “almost all” of the world’s problems, “and probably all of them.” 
This was the noise. 
The real story is growing Chinese strength, steady Chinese purpose aimed at midcentury dominance and erratic American outbursts suggestive of a petulant great power’s retreat.
China is busy. 
It has the reserves, the surpluses and the growth to shape the world. 
More important, it has the pride and the confidence to think long term. 
America First, Trump’s ugly slogan, reeks of retrenchment. 
By contrast, Xi’s One Belt, One Road initiative is an enormous infrastructure project designed to use Chinese money and technology to reconnect the old Silk Road and tie nations to China. 
In scope and value it dwarfs the Marshall Plan, the postwar reconstruction program for Europe that was a farsighted expression of American confidence almost 70 years ago.
Xi’s speech to the 19th National Congress of the Communist Party of China marked his apotheosis. He has joined the pantheon along with Mao Zedong and Deng Xiaoping
His thought is now dogma. 
His China has entered a different phase. 
Having grown independent and then rich, it is now “becoming strong.”
To what end will the strength be used? 
China, Xi said, “offers a new option for other countries and nations who want to speed up their development while preserving their independence.” 
A new era has begun “that sees China moving closer to center stage.”
There could scarcely be a more explicit offer of China as an alternative, single-party, authoritarian model to the liberal democratic system of the United States (of which Trump has been such a feeble advocate). 
China is now “actively pursuing an ideological competition with the United States,” said Yun Sun, a senior associate at the Stimson Center. 
Xi’s speech was “a declaration of the Chinese saying that we have won this game, we are winning this game.”
They are, for now. 
The Chinese gambit — in the past, China has been reticent about offering itself as a global paradigm — comes at a moment of American democratic fracture. 
It’s a good moment for Beijing to talk of arriving “center stage.” 
Trump does not really have ideas. 
He has impulses.
On his Asian swing, the president spoke of pursuing a “free and open Indo-Pacific region” built around democracies including India, Japan and Australia. 
This was the right thing to say to counter China. 
Hundreds of millions of Asians outside China don’t want to find themselves obliged to study Xi Jinping Thought. 
They prefer liberalism to Leninism.
Xi Jinping Thought calls for building the Chinese military into “world-class forces that obey the party’s command, can fight and win.” 
It portrays the leadership of the Communist Party as “the defining feature” of Chinese society.
So Trump’s commitment to Indo-Pacific freedom is significant. 
It’s also dubious. 
Trump likes surpluses, hates deficits. 
It’s not clear whether any Trump strategy can get beyond such zero-sum rabble-rousing.
Around Asia, the last thing countries want is to have to choose between China and the United States. From Singapore to Myanmar, they know that America is the only possible balance to China. 
If China is money and investment, the United States is security and freedom. 
The Chinese-American relationship is what the regional order depends on.
Those Chinese targets for 2035 and 2050 presuppose one essential thing: regional stability. 
That’s the headline, not Trump’s machinations. 
A second Korean War would be a nuclear war. 
This is the last thing China wants.
The second-to-last thing is the end of the North Korean regime and a united Korean Peninsula at its border, allied to the United States. 
China’s rise to dominance is predicated on stability until that dominance is achieved. 
Kim Jong-un, the North Korean leader, must be managed in this context.
Therefore, China will try to squeeze Kim, not to the point of denuclearization (let alone collapse) but to the point where he does not further provoke the United States or Japan. 
The question is whether Kim is controllable.
The other question is whether Trump is controllable. 
Xi projects the image of a reliable partner committed to an open, stable trading system. 
Trump, meanwhile, goes on walkabout with the Saudis.
For now, a conventional Saudi-backed war in Lebanon against Iranian-backed Hezbollah is more likely than nuclear war with Pyongyang. 
These things happen when an America-First American president can’t think beyond next week (or money).