Chinese Aggressions

Using satellites to count buildings in South China Sea

By Greg Torode

HONG KONG -- Shrouded in Chinese military secrecy and hidden from the eyes of journalists, Beijing’s build-up of man-made islands on reefs deep in the maritime heart of Southeast Asia is a vexing story to report.
Reuters deputy head of graphics Simon Scarr, based in Singapore, had previously dealt with private sector satellite imagery providers but always felt more could be done within the highly competitive field.
Late last year in a conversation with Earthrise Media, an independent group helping journalists obtain and analyze satellite data, Scarr wondered if it would be possible to count buildings on China’s seven man-made islands in the Spratly archipelago of the hotly contested South China Sea.
During a six-week period, Earthrise digitally scrutinized hundreds of images dating back to 2014 when China started rapidly building up those islands. 

Reuters journalists checked the data with a range of military and academic contacts.
On a spread sheet of figures confirming extensive construction across the South China Sea, one number stood out – Subi reef was home to nearly 400 buildings, more than expected and nearly double the number on similar islands.
“It was great data to have, and it really helped us build-up the webpage, with imagery and information from other sources, too,” Scarr said.
The Subi information helped journalists in Hong Kong, Beijing and Sydney research the story that would anchor the package on the islands.
For multimedia package on the data, click tmsnrt.rs/2szwA0a
It also provided insight into Chinese intentions for military bases on islands that Beijing once described as mostly civilian. 

The buildings on Subi, along with extensive facilities on Fiery Cross and Mischief reefs, appeared to match military bases inside China and could house up to 2,400 personnel.

Chinese structures are pictured in Subi Reef at disputed South China Sea, April 21, 2017. 
Subi is the largest of China’s seven man-made outposts in the Spratlys. 

The so-called “Big Three” of Subi, Mischief and Fiery Cross reefs all share similar infrastructure – including emplacements for missiles, 3km runways, extensive storage facilities and a range of installations that can track satellites, foreign military activity and communications.
Determined to use the package to test their innovations, a Reuters RTV team headed to the Hong Kong coast to shoot footage that would be overlaid with animation to illustrate the development.
“This was one of the most elaborate things we’ve done,” said senior producer Ryan Brooks.

Sina Delenda Est

Concrete and coral: Beijing's South China Sea building boom fuels concerns

By Greg Torode, Simon Scarr

HONG KONG/SINGAPORE -- At first glance from above it looks like any clean and neatly planned small town, complete with sports grounds, neat roads and large civic buildings.
But the town is on Subi reef in the Spratlys archipelago of the hotly contested South China Sea and, regional security experts believe, could soon be home to China’s first troops based in the maritime heart of Southeast Asia.
Private sector data analysis reviewed by Reuters shows Subi, some 1,200 km (750 miles) from China’s coast, is now home to nearly 400 individual buildings – far more than other Chinese islands.
Subi could be the future location of hundreds of People’s Liberation Army marines, as well as a possible administrative hub as China cements its claim with a civilian presence, security analysts and diplomatic sources say.
The data from Earthrise Media, a non-profit group supporting independent media with imagery research, was based on surveys of high-resolution images obtained by DigitalGlobe satellites, dating back to when China started dredging reefs in early 2014.
The images show neat rows of basketball courts, parade grounds and a wide variety of buildings, some flanked by radar equipment.
Earthrise founder Dan Hammer said his team’s count included only free-standing, permanent and recognizable structures.
“When I look at these pictures I see a standard PLA base on the mainland – it is incredible, right down to the basketball courts,” Singapore-based security analyst Collin Koh said after reviewing the data and images.
“Any deployment of troops will be a huge step, however – and then they will need to secure and sustain them, so the military presence will have to only grow from where it is now.”
Senior Western diplomats describe the placement of troops or jet fighters on the islands as a looming test of international efforts to curb China’s determination to dominate the vital trade waterway.
Subi is the largest of China’s seven man-made outposts in the Spratlys. 

The so-called “Big Three” of Subi, Mischief and Fiery Cross reefs all share similar infrastructure – including emplacements for missiles, 3km runways, extensive storage facilities and a range of installations that can track satellites, foreign military activity and communications.
Mischief and Fiery Cross each house almost 190 individual buildings and structures, according to the Earthrise analysis. 

The previously unpublished data details the building count on more than 60 South China Sea features, including those occupied by Vietnam, Malaysia, Taiwan and the Philippines.
While the data shows well developed infrastructure on some on islands such as Vietnam's Spratly Island, the Philippines' Thitu Island and Taiwan's Itu Aba, the scale and development by Beijing dwarfs its rivals. (For a multimedia package on the data, click tmsnrt.rs/2J3cWne)
The number of buildings on Subi makes it similar in size to Woody Island in the Paracels, a Beijing-controlled group much closer to China also claimed by Vietnam.
Woody is the base and surveillance post which foreign military attaches say is the headquarters of the military division across the South China Sea, reporting to the PLA’s southern theater command.
Koh and other analysts said the facilities on Subi, Mischief and Fiery Cross could each hold a regiment - between 1,500 to 2,400 troops.
China’s precise intentions remain unclear and Chinese experts say much will depend on whether Beijing feels threatened by regional security trends, particularly U.S. activity such as its so-called “freedom of navigation patrols”.
China’s defense ministry did not respond to Reuters questions about the build-up on Subi or what the facilities could be used for. 
Beijing has consistently said the facilities on its reclaimed islands are for civilian use and necessary self-defense purposes. 

China blames Washington for militarizing the region with their freedom of navigation patrols.
Ding Duo, a researcher at the Chinese government-backed National Institute for South China Sea Studies, said Beijing needs a military presence in the Spratlys to protect its civilian infrastructure.
“As for how big that presence is depends on the threat assessment China has going forward for the Spratly Islands,” he said.
“The Spratly region faces severe military pressure, especially since Trump took office and increased freedom of navigation patrols. So China has raised its threat assessment.”

LOOMING TEST
The White House said this month it had raised concerns with China about its latest militarization after CNBC reported anti-ship cruise missiles and surface-to-air missile systems had been installed on Subi, Mischief and Fiery Cross.
This weekend, China revealed bombers had conducted take-off and landing training on some of its islands and reefs in preparation for what it called “the battle for the South China Sea”.
Some U.S. analysts noted PLA photographs appeared to show a bomber landing on Woody Island in the Paracels, and the Chinese military has yet to confirm planes actually landed on its Spratlys holdings.
On Wednesday, the Pentagon withdrew an invitation for China to join a major naval drill because of Beijing’s continued militarization of its islands in the South China Sea.
Admiral Philip Davidson, the nominee to be the next commander of all U.S. forces in the Pacific, said last month the bases were now complete and lacked only deployed forces.
“Any forces deployed to the islands would easily overwhelm the military forces of any other South China Sea-claimants,” Davidson told a congressional panel.
So far, repeated U.S. naval patrols close to Chinese features and growing international naval deployments through the region have had little obvious impact on Beijing’s plans.
“There is a real sense among Western nations that a new strategy is needed, but there is little sign anything meaningful coalescing,” said one senior Western diplomat familiar with discussions across several countries. 

“The deployment of jet fighters – even temporarily – will sorely test that lack of a cohesive response.”

Satellite photo dated March 28, 2018 shows Woody Island. 
Already large Chinese amphibious landing vessels and other ships have used the full-scale naval wharves at Fiery Cross, Subi and Mischief – pointing to what foreign naval officers describe as virtually a permanent presence throughout hotly contested waters.
Chinese forces are using their island holdings to police of what Chinese naval officers tell other navies is a “military alert zone” – an ambiguous term that both Asian and Western military officials say holds no basis in international law.
People briefed on recent Western intelligence reports describe an intensifying pattern of radio challenges to foreign military ships and aircraft delivered from Chinese naval ships and monitoring stations on Fiery Cross.
Australian officials recently publicized a “robust but polite” Chinese challenge to three of its naval ships plying the South China Sea en route to Vietnam.
Sources say such exchanges between Chinese and foreign militaries are far more frequent than is widely known.
“They have become the rule rather than the exception across significant areas of the South China Sea,” one person familiar with recent Western security reports told Reuters.
Ships and aircraft from India, France, Japan, New Zealand and rival claimants Vietnam, Malaysia and the Philippines have also been similarly warned, according to regional military officials and analysts.
With the claimed “military alert zone” having no basis in international law or military practice, foreign naval officials routinely stress they are in international waters and continue on their way.
Zhang Baohui, a Chinese security expert at Hong Kong’s Lingnan University, said Beijing was likely to be cautious about any offensive moves, such as the stationing of combat aircraft.
“Now the islands are complete, I think we will see a degree of caution in Beijing’s next moves,” he said. 

“Sustaining that presence so far from the Chinese coast is a massive undertaking, and I think the deployment of troops and jet fighters would really cross a threshold for China’s neighbors.”
U.S. military officials insist they are leaving little to chance, warning the bases are already helping China project military power into areas once dominated by its neighbors.
“In short, China is now capable of controlling the South China Sea in scenarios short of war with the United States,” Davidson said in his testimony last month.

China Deploys Military Plane to Third South China Sea Airstrip

• Landing follows deplopment of missile systems in Spratlys
• Vietnam, Australia protest militarization of structures

By David Tweed

Subi Reef in the South China Sea. 

China has landed a military plane on the last of its three airstrips in the disputed South China Sea, a Washington-based research institution said, amid renewed complaints about the country expanding its military presence in the busy shipping lane.
The Asia Maritime Transparency Initiative said satellite images from April 28 showed the first confirmed deployment of a military aircraft -- a Shaanxi Y-8 transport plane -- on Subi Reef. 

The structure hosts one of three runways China has built as part of a massive dredging and reclamation operation in the Spratlys chain since 2013, and was the last of three where military aircraft had been observed.
“This should be particularly concerning to the Philippines,” AMTI, a unit of the Center for Strategic and International Studies, said on its website. 

About 100 Philippine civilians and a small military garrison are stationed on the Thitu islet, about 12 nautical miles away from Subi.
The Chinese Ministry of Foreign Affairs didn’t immediately respond Thursday to a faxed request for comment.
China claims more than 80 percent of the South China Sea, a $5 trillion-a-year shipping route where five other countries including the Philippines and Vietnam also have claims. 

Regional concerns about China’s presence in the area reemerged earlier this month after the foreign ministry confirmed reports that the People’s Liberation Army had installed missile systems on Subi, Mischief Reef and Fiery Cross, where it has military-grade airstrips.

U.S. Warning
Chinese military aircraft have previously landed on other Chinese structures in the Spratlys, AMTI said. 

The first was a naval patrol aircraft -- possibly a Y-8 -- that landed on Fiery Cross in April 2016 to evacuate three people who had fallen ill. 

The Philippine Daily Inquirer last month published an aerial photo dated Jan. 6 showing two Xian Y-7 military transport aircraft on Mischief Reef.
China has installed anti-ship cruise missiles and surface-to-air missile systems on Subi Reef, Mischief Reef and Fiery Cross, CNBC reported earlier this month. 

Chinese foreign ministry spokeswoman Hua Chunying defended the move, saying the deployment was necessary to protect China’s sovereignty.
White House Press Secretary Sarah Huckabee Sanders warned that there would be “near-term and long-term consequences” of China’s militarization of the waters. 

Australia’s Foreign Minister Julie Bishop said any military build-up would run counter to China’s commitments, in an apparent reference to Chinese dictator Xi Jinping’s pledge not to militarize the structures.
Vietnam asked China to remove the military equipment deployed on its features in the Spratly Islands, Vietnam News reported Wednesday, citing Le Thi Thu Hang, spokeswoman for its foreign ministry. 

Hang said the placement of the missiles violated Vietnam’s sovereignty.
“If not already clear, China’s installation of anti-ship cruise missiles, surface-to-air missiles, and electronic jamming equipment in the Spratly Islands is indication that it has every intent of enforcing its maritime claims,” said Felix Chang, a senior fellow at the Foreign Policy Research Institute in Philadelphia.
Last month, Xi showed off his growing South China Sea military might, presiding over a the country’s largest-ever fleet review. 

Xi observed 48 vessels, 76 aircraft and more than 10,000 service personnel at the naval hub of Sanya.

Sina Delenda Est

White House warns China on growing militarization in South China Sea
By Ben Westcott, Ryan Browne and Zachary Cohen

The White House warned Beijing on Thursday that there will be consequences for its growing militarization in the South China Sea, following reports of missiles being deployed to three of the country's outposts in the disputed region.
US intelligence assessed that there is a high probability the Chinese military had deployed anti-ship and anti-aircraft missiles to three artificial islands during recent military drills on the contested sea.
But a US defense official told CNN it was unclear if the missiles remained on the outposts following the April exercises.
The South China Sea is one of the most contested regions in the world, with overlapping territorial claims by China, the Philippines and Vietnam, among several others.
The move would mark the first reported Chinese missile deployment in the Spratly Islands, a series of small inlets and reefs that Beijing has slowly built into militarized, artificial islands to reinforce its claims.
White House Press Secretary Sarah Sanders said Thursday that the United States has "raised concerns" with the Chinese. 

We're well aware of China's militarization of the South China Sea," she said.
"There will be near-term and long-term consequences, and we'll certainly keep you up to date," she added.
CNBC first reported the Chinese military had deployed the weapons systems to Subi Reef, Fiery Cross Reef and Mischief Reef, east of the Philippines, on Thursday, quoting a source with knowledge of US intelligence reports.
According to CNBC, the YJ-12B anti-ship missiles would be able to strike ships up to 295 nautical miles away from the artificial islands.
Beijing previously announced in 2016 it had already deployed similar weapons to Woody Island in the Paracel Islands, on the northwestern edge of the South China Sea.

This aerial photograph of Fiery Cross reef obtained by the Philippine Inquirer and taken on November 28, 2017.

'Point of no return': expert
China's militarization has alarmed countries both in the region and around the world, prompting freedom of navigation operations by the US Navy to assert its right to travel in international waters.
"The United States has long raised concerns about the militarization of outposts on disputed features in the South China Sea," said a State Department official who was not authorized to speak publicly on the matter.
"China's leadership has publicly pledged not to pursue militarization in the disputed Spratlys. We are concerned that China is not acting in accordance with this pledge."
Speaking during a visit to Australia on Wednesday, French President Emmanuel Macron said it was important not to have any one "hegemony" in the region.
"What's important is to preserve a rules-based development in the region, especially the Indo-Pacific region and to preserve the necessary balances," he said.
Australia's Foreign Minister Julie Bishop told CNN-affiliate Sky News Australia on Friday said if the media reports were correct, she would be "concerned."
"This would be contrary to China's stated aspiration that it would not militarize these features," she said.
But China's steady military buildup on the islands is reaching a "point of no return," Collin Koh, research fellow at the S. Rajaratnam School of International Studies' Maritime Security Program, told CNN

China's unmovable aircraft carriers
Beijing claims an enormous swath of territory through the center of the sea, delineated by the Chinese government's controversial "nine-dash line" which runs all the way from Hainan Province down to Malaysia and back past Taiwan.
In a ruling in July 2016, the Permanent Court of Arbitration at the Hague ruled China's territorial claims had no legal basis.
Nevertheless, Beijing has attempted to reinforce its hold on the area by creating and militarizing artificial islands in the Spratlys and the Paracels.
Koh said China's string of militarized islands -- equipped with airfields and radar facilities -- have become like a series of immovable aircraft carriers.
He said that the missiles will allow China's armed forces to form "a multilayer military umbrella over the South China Sea," with interlocking sensors and weapons systems.
Satellite imagery had previously emerged of China building installations to hold these missiles, said Bonnie Glaser, the director of the China Power Project at Center for Strategic and International Studies in Washington.
"This is exactly what we have expected the Chinese to do," she said. 

"Next thing we'll see is fighter aircraft to deploy, probably on rotation, then they'll begin exercises near the islands. I just think that (Beijing) believes everybody, including the claimants, understands this is inevitable."
Pentagon chief spokeswoman Dana White reaffirmed the United States' commitment to the international waters.
She said the Chinese must understand that "they cannot, and should not, be hostile, and understand that the Pacific is -- is a place in which much commerce goes through. And it's in their interest to ensure that there's a free navigation of international waters."

Rapid militarization
The missile deployments are just the latest example of Beijing tightening its hold on the South China Sea in recent years, as the world's attention focused farther north, on the Korean Peninsula.
In April, the Wall Street Journal reported US officials had confirmed China had installed military radar jamming equipment on the Spratly Islands.

The same month, Australian warships en route to Vietnam were challenged by the Chinese navy as they traversed the South China Sea, leading Prime Minister Malcolm Turnbull to assert Australia's right to travel international waters.
Hanging over everything was a massive display of Chinese military might in the sea on April 12, culminating in a parade led by Beijing's only aircraft carrier and personally reviewed by Xi Jinping.
The United States under the Trump administration has increased the number of freedom of navigation operations near China's artificial islands, but Glaser said it was difficult for the United States to stand up to Beijing with little support in the region.
"(China) believes they can get away with it and they have probably calculated correctly," she said.
"The big question has always been: How do we impose enough costs so we stop the Chinese where they are, and not go any further? And so far we haven't been successful in that."
Adm. Philip Davidson, nominated to take charge of the US Pacific Command, told his confirmation hearing last month that China is already the master of the South China Sea.
"China is now capable of controlling the South China Sea in all scenarios short of war with the United States," Davidson said in written testimony to the Senate Armed Services Committee.
"The PLA [People's Liberation Army] will be able to use these bases to challenge US presence in the region, and any forces deployed to the islands would easily overwhelm the military forces of any other South China Sea-claimants," Davidson wrote.
The admiral also pointed to the fact that China's current activity contradicts what Chinese dictator Xi Jinping said during a White House meeting with then-US President Barack Obama in 2015.
On the topic of the South China Sea, Xi said at the time that "China does not intend to pursue militarization."
But, speaking at his testimony last month, Davidson noted that China's "forward operating bases" now appear complete. 

"The only thing lacking are the deployed forces," said Davidson.

Sina Delenda Est: China installed missile systems on Spratly Islands

• China has installed anti-ship cruise missiles and surface-to-air missile systems on three of its fortified outposts in the South China Sea
• The new coastal defense systems are a significant addition to Beijing's military portfolio in one of the most contested regions in the world.

By Amanda Macias 

A PLA Navy fleet including the aircraft carrier Liaoning, submarines, vessels and fighter jets take part in a review in the South China Sea on April 12, 2018.

China has quietly installed anti-ship cruise missiles and surface-to-air missile systems on three of its fortified outposts west of the Philippines in the South China Sea, a move that allows Beijing to further project its power in the hotly disputed waters, according to sources with direct knowledge of U.S. intelligence reports.
Intelligence assessments say the missile platforms were moved to the outposts in the Spratly Islands within the past 30 days, according to sources who spoke on the condition of anonymity.
The placement of the defensive weapons also comes on the heels of China's recent South China Sea installation of military jamming equipment, which disrupts communications and radar systems. 

By all accounts, the new coastal defense systems represent a significant addition to Beijing's military portfolio in one of the most contested regions in the world.
The United States has remained neutral – but expressed concern – about the overlapping sovereignty claims to the Spratlys.
"We have consistently called on China, as well as other claimants, to refrain from further land reclamation, construction of new facilities, and militarization of disputed features, and to commit to managing and resolving disputes peacefully with other claimants," a Pentagon official told CNBC when asked about China's recent military activity in the area. 

"The further militarization of outposts will only serve to raise tensions and create greater distrust among claimants."
The recent intelligence, according to sources, indicates the deployment of anti-ship cruise missiles and surface-to-air missiles on Fiery Cross Reef, Subi Reef and Mischief Reef in the Spratly Islands. The Spratlys, to which six countries lay claim, are located approximately two-thirds of the way east from southern Vietnam to the southern Philippines.

Satellite photo of Fiery Cross Reef in the South China Sea taken on January 1, 2018.

The land-based anti-ship cruise missiles, designated as YJ-12B, allow China to strike surface vessels within 295 nautical miles of the reefs. 

Meanwhile, the long-range surface-to-air missiles designated as HQ-9B, have an expected range of targeting aircraft, drones and cruise missiles within 160 nautical miles.
The defensive weapons have also appeared in satellite images of Woody Island, China's military headquarters in the nearby Paracel Islands.
"Woody Island serves as the administrative and military center of China's presence in the South China Sea," Gregory Poling, Center for Strategic and International Studies fellow and director of the Asia Maritime Transparency Initiative, told CNBC in a prior interview.
"We assume that anything we see at Woody will eventually find its way farther south to more directly menace China's neighbors," he added.

A hotly contested part of the world
The South China Sea, which is home to more than 200 specks of land, serves as a gateway to global sea routes where approximately $3.4 trillion of trade passes annually.
The numerous overlapping sovereign claims to islands, reefs and rocks — many of which disappear under high tide — have turned the waters into an armed camp. 

Beijing holds the lion's share of these features with approximately 27 outposts peppered throughout.
Beijing's interest in developing the crumbs of land across the South China Sea is by no means new.
For instance, China first took possession of Fiery Cross Reef and Subi Reef in 1988 and has since outfitted the features with deep-water ports, aircraft hangars, communication facilities, administration offices and a 10,000-foot runway.
Last week, U.S. Navy Adm. Philip Davidson, the expected nominee to replace U.S. Pacific Command Chief Adm. Harry Harris, described China's increased presence in the South China Sea as "a substantial challenge to U.S. military operations in this region."
In written testimony to the U.S. Senate Armed Services Committee, Davidson said the development of China's forward operating bases in the hotly contested waters appear to be complete.
"The only thing lacking are the deployed forces. Once occupied, China will be able to extend its influence thousands of miles to the south and project power deep into Oceania," Davidson wrote. 

"In short, China is now capable of controlling the South China Sea in all scenarios short of war with the United States."
Davidson's comments echo a steady drumbeat of warnings made by Harris regarding China's growing strength.
Earlier this year, Harris told Congress that Beijing's impressive military buildup, including its pursuit of hypersonic weapons, could challenge the United States "across almost every domain."
"While some view China's actions in the East and South China Seas as opportunistic, I do not. I view them as coordinated, methodical and strategic, using their military and economic power to erode the free and open international order," Harris told the House Armed Services Committee.
Harris, whom President Donald Trump is reportedly set to nominate as U.S. ambassador to South Korea, currently oversees approximately 375,000 military personnel and is responsible for defending a theater that spans nearly half of the Earth's surface.
"Ladies and gentlemen, China's intent is crystal clear. We ignore it at our peril," Harris said.

Chinese Aggressions

Stunning new pictures show the scope of Chinese building in the South China Sea
By Emily Rauhala and Olivier Laurent 

Subi Reef. 

BEIJING — Sometimes you’ve got to see it to truly believe it. 

That is certainly true of a remarkable set of pictures published by a Philippine newspaper this week.
For years now, we’ve read about Chinese land reclamation and building in the contested waters of the South China Sea — construction that has put Beijing at odds with many of its Asian neighbors, as well as the United States.

Subi reef. 

In 2016, an international tribunal ruled that China’s expansive maritime claims had no legal basis. But Beijing kept building, insisting repeatedly that it was all for civilian, not military, purposes.
Few outside China buy that. 

Foreign experts, most notably the people at the Asia Maritime Transparency Initiative, were left to scour grainy satellite images for proof. 

Finally, we have better pictures.

Subi reef. 

The Philippine Daily Inquirer this week published a set of exclusive photographs that show what China is up to in three dimensions and vivid color.
The images, which were given to the paper by an unknown individual, were reportedly shot between June and December 2017, from an estimated height of 1,500 meters (4,900 feet).

Mischief reef. 

“This is the most complete, detailed batch of aerial pics available of China’s [South China Sea] military outposts,” tweeted Bonnie Glaser, a senior adviser for Asia at the Center for Strategic and International Studies in Washington.

Johnson South reef.

While the buildings and boats seen in the photographs are not news, seeing them up-close is striking. In satellite images, bases, radars and runways look like fuzzy rectangles. 

In these pictures, they look like bases, radars and runways.
The pictures will not change China’s position, nor are they likely to shape the U.S. response. 

But for those following the conflict from a distance, they provide a revealing glimpse of what is happening on these distant rocks and reef — and it sure does not look civilian.

Fiery Cross reef. 

Take a look for yourself. 

And read more about the South China Sea conflict here.

Chinese aggressions

China has continued to militarise disputed islands in the South China Sea by installing high-frequency radars while the world has been distracted by the North Korean nuclear crisis
By NICOLE STINSON

It comes military expert Li Jie warned that China has started preparing its military to support North Korea if World War 3 breaks out with the US.
And now satellite images reveal Chinese activity has been detected on the Spratly and Paracel islands, contested with several other Asian nations, spanning 72 acres (29 hectares).
Over the last several months China has constructed what appears to be a new high-frequency radar array at the northern end of Fiery Cross Reef in the Spratlys, according to a report by the Washington's Center for Strategic and International Studies’ Maritime Initiative.
Subi Reef has seen tunnels built which the expert believe may be used for ammunition.
The think tank also believes Chinese tunnels are potentially hiding another radar antenna array and radar domes.

China has continued to militarise disputed islands in the South China Sea by installing radars

Meanwhile construction on Mischief Reef includes underground storage for ammunition and hangars, missile shelters and radar arrays.
Smaller-scale work had continued in the Paracel Islands, including a new helipad and wind turbines on Tree Island and two large radar towers on Triton Island.
Triton Island has been at the centre of recent tension between China and Vietnam and the site of multiple US Navy drills.
The operations by the US Navy have been used assert what it sees as its right to free passage in international waters.
Woody Island, China's military and administrative headquarters in the South China Sea, saw two first-time air deployments "that hint at things to come at the three Spratly Island air bases farther south”, according to the report.
At the end of October, the Chinese military released images showing J-11B fighters at Woody Island for exercises, while on November 15, AMTI spotted what appeared to be Y-8 transport planes, a type that can be configured for electronic surveillance.
The US and its allies – including the UK – have condemned China's building of artificial islands in the South China Sea and their militarisation.
But China has hit back claiming the construction is “peaceful” and “completely normal”.
China’s foreign ministry spokesman Lu Kang said: "It's completely normal for China to conduct peaceful construction and build essential defence equipment on its own sovereign territory.
"We believe certain people who have ulterior motives are making mountains out of molehills and stirring up trouble."

A new helipad and wind turbines on Tree Island

China has constructed what appears to be a new high-frequency radar array on Fiery Cross
The Pentagon has conducted several patrols near Chinese-held South China Sea territory this year, even as it has sought China's help in northeast Asia to press North Korea to give up its nuclear weapons program.
On Tuesday, US Secretary of State Rex Tillerson reiterated a call for a "freeze" in China's island building and said it was unacceptable to continue their militarisation.
Last week the Chinese People’s Liberation Army (PLA) conducted military exercises along the North Korean border sparking speculation Beijing was preparing a war breaking out between the US and North Korea.
Construction on Mischief Reef includes underground storage for ammunition and missile shelters
The fear of war between the two countries has risen over the past several months after China’s neighbour carried out a number of illegal missile tests and threatened to target the US territory of Guam with a nuclear missile.
Following the announcement regarding China’s new military drills, military expert Li Jie has given her verdict as to who the country would side within any future conflict.

Rogue Nation

A CONSTRUCTIVE YEAR FOR CHINESE BASE BUILDING
ASIA MARITIME TRANSPARENCY INITIATIVE

International attention has shifted away from the slow-moving crisis in the South China Sea over the course of 2017, but the situation on the water has not remained static. 

While pursuing diplomatic outreach toward its Southeast Asian neighbors, Beijing continued substantial construction activities on its dual-use outposts in the Spratly and Paracel Islands. 

China completed the dredging and landfilling operations to create its seven new islands in the Spratlys by early 2016, and seems to have halted such operations to expand islets in the Paracels by mid-2017. 

But Beijing remains committed to advancing the next phase of its build-up—construction of the infrastructure necessary for fully-functioning air and naval bases on the larger outposts.
AMTI has identified all the permanent facilities on which China completed or began work since the start of the year. 

These include buildings ranging from underground storage areas and administrative buildings to large radar and sensor arrays. 

These facilities account for about 72 acres, or 290,000 square meters, of new real estate at Fiery Cross, Subi, and Mischief Reefs in the Spratlys, and North, Tree, and Triton Islands in the Paracels. This does not include temporary structures like storage containers or cement plants, or work other than construction, such as the spreading of soil and planting of grass at the new outposts.

Fiery Cross Reef

Fiery Cross saw the most construction over the course of 2017, with work on buildings covering 27 acres, or about 110,000 square meters. 

This counts work previously documented by AMTI, including completion of the larger hangars alongside the airstrip, work on large underground structures at the south of the island likely intended to house munitions or other essential materiel, a large communications/sensor array at the northeast end of the island, various radar/communications facilities spread around the islet, and hardened shelters for missile platforms at the south end.

The large underground tunnels AMTI identified earlier this year as likely being for ammunition and other storage have been completed and entirely buried. 

They join other underground structures previously built on the island, which include water and fuel storage.

In addition to the work previously identified at Fiery Cross, in the last several months China has constructed what appears to be a high frequency radar array at the north end of the island. 

It consists of a field of upright poles, similar to those erected at Cuarteron Reef in 2015. 

This high-frequency radar is situated next to the large communications/sensor array completed earlier in the year (the field of radomes in the image below).


Subi Reef

Subi Reef also saw considerable building activity in 2017, with work on buildings covering about 24 acres, or 95,000 square meters. 

This included buried storage facilities identical to those at Fiery Cross, as well as previously-identified hangars, missile shelters, radar/communications facilities, and a high-frequency “elephant cage” antenna array for signals intelligence at the southwest end of the island.

Like at Fiery Cross, the new storage tunnels at Subi were completed and covered over in the last few months. They join other buried structures on the islet, including large storage facilities to the north.

China is poised to substantially boost its radar and signals intelligence capabilities at Subi Reef. 

Since mid-year, it has built what looks like a second “elephant cage” less than 500 meters west of the first, as well as an array of radomes on the southern end of the outpost that appears similar to, if smaller than, the one on Fiery Cross Reef.



Mischief Reef

This year construction was undertaken on buildings covering 17 acres, or 68,500 square meters, of Mischief Reef. 

Like at Fiery Cross and Subi, this included underground storage for ammunition and other materiel, the completion of hangars and missile shelters, and new radar and communications arrays.

The new storage tunnels at Mischief were completed over the last several months and have been buried, joining previously-built underground structures to the north.

In addition to previously-identified structures, China has started work on a new radar/communications array on the north side of the outpost.

China has continued construction, though on a smaller scale, at its bases in the Paracel Islands. 

The most significant of this work in 2017 was at North, Tree, and Triton Islands.

Tree Island

Like North Island, dredging and reclamation work at Tree Island continued as late as mid-2017. 

In total, China built facilities covering about 1.7 acres, or 6,800 square meters, of the island. These included a new helipad next to the harbor and solar arrays and a pair of wind turbines on the north shore of the island.

North Island

China had earlier tried to connect North Island to neighboring Middle Island, but gave up the project after the land bridge it created was washed out by a storm in October 2016. 

Earlier this year, it built a retaining wall around the remaining reclaimed land at the southern end of North Island and built a large administrative building on the feature.

Triton Island

Triton Island saw completion of a few buildings this year, including two large radar towers, which are especially important given that Triton is the southwestern-most of the Paracels and the waters around it have been the site of several recent incidents between China and Vietnam, as well as multiple U.S. freedom of navigation operations.

Woody Island
Woody Island is China’s military and administrative headquarters in the South China Sea. Developments at Woody are usually a precursor to those at Fiery Cross, Subi, and Mischief in the Spratlys. 

There was no substantial new construction at the island this year, but it did see two first-time air deployments that hint at things to come at the three Spratly Island airbases farther south.
First, at the end of October, the Chinese military released images showing People’s Liberation Army Air Force J-11B fighters deployed to Woody Island for exercises. 

This was the first confirmed deployment of J-11s to Woody. 

Previous deployments to the island involved the less-advanced People’s Liberation Army Navy J-10, which is what AMTI has used as a basis—perhaps too conservatively—to estimate Chinese power projection capabilities from its South China Sea bases.


Then on November 15, AMTI spotted several large planes that appear to be Y-8 transport aircraft, which in certain configurations are capable of electronic intelligence gathering. 

AMTI earlier noted that the larger hangars built at each of the Spratly airbases could accommodate Y-8s, suggesting their presence at Woody could be a sign of things to come.

Beijing Sails Ahead in South China Sea

China is starting to dictate terms in one of the world’s strategic waterways, and the United States is largely missing in action.
BY DAN DE LUCE

A Chinese navy formation, including the aircraft carrier Liaoning, takes part in military drills in the South China Sea on Jan. 2.

In his 12-day trip to Asia, Donald Trump largely focused on North Korea and trade, all but avoiding the simmering disputes in the South China Sea and steering clear of sharp criticism of Beijing’s increasingly aggressive activities there.
With the Trump administration focused elsewhere for now, China is quietly pressing ahead with its agenda in one of the world’s most strategic waterways, building more military facilities on man-made islands to buttress its expansionist claims and dramatically expanding its presence at sea at the expense of its smaller neighbors.
Beijing’s under-the-radar advances in the South China Sea could be bad news for countries in the region, for U.S. hopes to maintain influence in the Western Pacific, and for the rules-based international order that for decades has promoted peace and prosperity in Asia.
At the Chinese Communist Party congress last month, Xi Jinping cited island building in the South China Sea as one of his top achievements so far, and touted the “successful prosecution of maritime rights.” 

Those rights appear at odds with international law: Xi is now assuring nervous neighbors that China will offer “safe passage” through the seas to other countries in the region.
“The South China Sea has fallen victim to a combination of Trump’s narrow focus on North Korea and the administration’s chaotic and snail-paced policymaking process,” said Ely Ratner of the Council on Foreign Relations, who served as an advisor to former Vice President Joe Biden.
China’s recent advances in the South China Sea aren’t as eye-popping as the overnight creation of artificial atolls in recent years, a massive engineering project dubbed the “great wall of sand” by a top U.S. admiral. 

That’s one reason the disputes got pushed to the back burner on Trump’s big trip.
“Because there’s no sense of immediate or medium-term crisis (in the South China Sea), they didn’t make it a big priority on the trip,” said Evan Medeiros of the Eurasia Group, who oversaw Asia strategy in the Obama White House.
But experts say the quiet moves — including expanding military bases, constructing radar and sensor installations, hardened shelters for missiles, and vast logistical warehouses for fuel, water, and ammunition — are threatening to turn China’s potential stranglehold on the region into reality.
Much of the activity has centered on three reefs converted into artificial islands through large-scale dredging: Fiery Cross, Mischief Reef, and Subi Reef in the Spratly Islands, about 650 miles from Hainan Island in southern China. 

Satellite imagery in June revealed a large dome had been erected on Fiery Cross with another under construction, suggesting a substantial communications or radar system, experts say. 

At Mischief Reef, workers were installing two more domes.
With runways, hangars for fighter jets, and communications hardware in place on the artificial islands, China can deploy military aircraft and missiles whenever it wants, solidifying its grip over the area and flouting international maritime law. 

The three newly built bases in the Spratlys, combined with another on Woody Island, will enable Chinese warplanes to fly over nearly the entire South China Sea.

That could be the precursor to an “air defense identification zone” similar to the one that China slapped onto the East China Sea in 2013.
And the new bases have given China much greater reach at sea. 

Beijing has deployed more naval ships, Coast Guard vessels, and a flotilla of fishing boats that act as a maritime militia virtually around the clock. 

The ships can now dock nearby to refuel and resupply, rather than sail home, extending their time on station and their ability to project Chinese power through the area. 

That is changing the balance of power as fishing ships and coast guard vessels from other claimant countries like Vietnam and the Philippines are elbowed away from disputed features.
This summer, for example, Vietnam hoped to drill for natural gas off its own coast. 

But China reportedly summoned the Vietnamese ambassador and threatened military action if Hanoi went forward with development in its own exclusive economic zone. 

Sensing little backing from Washington, Vietnam quietly backed down and stopped drilling.
“The sheer numbers are starting to push the Filipinos, the Vietnamese, and the Malaysians out,” said Gregory Poling of the Center for Strategic and International Studies.
More than nine months into the Trump administration, contrasts with U.S. policy under Barack Obama toward the South China Sea are apparent — as they are with the initial saber-rattling tone of Trump administration officials. 

The Obama administration put a focus on diplomacy and consistently sought to uphold international law regarding the disputed waterway, though it often shied away from sailing U.S. Navy ships through the waters to send a tough signal to Beijing.
The Trump administration has taken almost the opposite approach: Navy cruises to assert the right of navigation have become commonplace, but there is little sign yet of a concerted U.S. policy to diplomatically push back against Chinese encroachment or offer encouragement to U.S. allies and partners threatened by Beijing’s advances.
“By having no South China Sea policy, Trump ensures that all the initiative lies with Beijing,” said Mira Rapp-Hooper, a senior fellow at Yale’s Paul Tsai China Center.
Former U.S. officials and congressional aides said the Trump administration appears to be pulling its punches on the South China Sea, as well as trade issues, in hopes of securing Beijing’s cooperation to cut off North Korea’s access to fuel and cash to fund its nuclear weapons program. 

So far, China has stopped short of drastic action to squeeze the regime in Pyongyang — and Chinese officials just contradicted Trump’s claims that the two countries have found more common ground.
At the end of his Asia trip, Trump did offer to “mediate” between Vietnam and China, but that spooked officials in Hanoi who fear they could be a pawn in a bigger U.S.-China game centered on North Korea.
The White House did not respond to requests for comment on its approach to the South China Sea.
However, some former Obama officials are cautiously optimistic that the Trump administration, hamstrung so far by short staffing at key positions, especially regarding Asia policy, is starting to craft a more coherent policy toward the region, including a sharper focus on China’s activities in the South China Sea. 

Joint communiques in Japan and Vietnam stressed continued U.S. support for the rule of law and an end to coercion in maritime disputes, for example.
Ratner, the former Biden advisor, said he expects the Trump administration to chart a more proactive course as it settles into office.
“They appear to finally be getting their policy feet under them and I’m expecting more focus on South China Sea in the months ahead,” he said. 

“So it’s premature to declare it’ll remain a low priority going forward.”

The United States Has Not Yet Lost the South China Sea

Despite many setbacks, the United States has not totally lost influence in the vital waterway.
By Tuan N. Pham

The last two months saw an uptick in tensions in the South China Sea (SCS) following a period of relative calm since the arbitral tribunal at the Hague handed down its historic and sweeping award on maritime entitlements in the SCS, overwhelmingly favoring Manila over Beijing. 

After a year of successfully diminishing the legal and diplomatic impact of the unfavorable ruling, China has resumed a pattern of brazen intimidation against its fellow SCS claimants.
In July, Beijing bullied Hanoi into suspending oil drilling in a disputed oil block 250 nautical miles off the southeast coast of Vietnam. 

China threatened that it would attack Vietnamese bases in the Spratly Islands if the oil drilling did not cease immediately. 

A month later, Beijing sent a flotilla of Chinese fishing boats, escorted by People’s Liberation Army-Navy (PLAN) ships and Chinese Coast Guard (CCG) vessels to Thitu Island, the largest land feature claimed and occupied by the Philippines in the Spratly Islands.
The purpose of the deployment remains unclear, but some have speculated that it may have been a coercive demonstration to dissuade Manila from carrying out announced infrastructure repairs and upgrades on Thitu; or a more provocative move of posturing (or threatening) to blockade or even land on one or more of the adjoining unoccupied sand bars. 

If the latter, however unlikely, it would suggest a similar modus operandi to the illegal seizure of Scarborough Shoal in 2012 and a destabilizing escalation with strategic ramifications if one of those sand bars includes Sand Cay – an unoccupied high-water feature that could affect the sovereignty and maritime jurisdiction of nearby Chinese-claimed Subi Reef (one of China’s seven artificial islands in the SCS). 

As per United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea (UNCLOS), Subi Reef cannot generate its own territorial sea, but it has the potential to supersede a territorial sea claim from Sandy Cay because the distance between them (unlike Thitu) is less than 12nm.

Also of consequence was the disappointing outcome of the 24th Meeting of the Association of Southeast Asian Nations (ASEAN) Regional Forum (ARF) in Manila 2-8 August. 

The joint communique of the ASEAN Foreign Ministers Meeting mostly favored China’s positions over those of the United States, Australia, and Japan. 

Beijing wanted no discussion or reference to its claims or activities in the SCS, last year’s arbitration ruling, and need for an ASEAN Code of Conduct (COC). 

Washington, meanwhile, advocated for the implementation of the 2016 arbitration decision and a substantive and legally binding COC. 

In the end, Chinese positions largely won out. 

The communique wording was far less forceful and China-specific than Vietnam and the United States and its allies preferred. 

Indeed, it was sufficiently ambiguous that Beijing and its supporters within ASEAN could tolerate and accept – another successful diplomatic obstruction on China’s part.
So, what does all of this means for the region and the United States? 

Part one of this two-part series provides perspectives and context to the strategic question. 

Part two examines ways and means the United States could turn the tide and regain the strategic initiative, recover the high ground of regional influence, and stave off losing the SCS.

Prevailing Perspectives
Pundits within U.S. and foreign think tanks were quick to analyze the recent developments and assess the strategic implications thereof. 

The assessments vary from diminished U.S. regional influence to loss of the SCS by the United States. 

The following are two exemplars of such judgments:
A scholar with the National Institute for South China Sea Studies, a Chinese think tank, wrote in the International Public Policy Review and later republished by The Diplomat that the recent ASEAN meetings capped an trend of eroding U.S. regional influence (soft diplomatic power) and that this decrease is both absolute and relative to that of China. 

The United States, the piece argued, is realizing that “its soft power relationships in Southeast Asia are shallower and more ephemeral than it thought.” 

Washington, therefore, needs to enhance its soft power commitments in the region if it hopes to keep pace with Beijing, or stem China’s growing influence.
A former journalist and noted author, now an associate fellow with the Chatham House, wrote in Foreign Policy that Vietnam’s capitulation shows China’s neighbors fear that the United States no longer has their backs. 

If Hanoi thought Washington had its back, Beijing could have been deterred and the credibility of the United States in the region strengthened. 

Instead, Washington has left the region drifting in the direction of Beijing.

One More Perspective
Although one can quibble on the scope, nature, and extent, America has indeed lost some influence over the years – especially with some allies, partners, and organizations in the region. 

The whys and wherefores vary, but largely revolve around the geostrategic contest between the United States and China for regional dominance with the SCS as a prominent manifestation of that strategic rivalry.
Washington has generally responded to Chinese assertiveness in the SCS with an ambiguous restraint policy, concurrently accommodating and balancing Beijing. 

The former reassures China and encourages a cooperative relationship to maintain the regional status quo and acceptance of the greater international system from which Beijing itself has greatly benefited. 

The latter seeks to dissuade China to not alter the regional order through an amalgamation of soft and hard deterrent powers.
In the beginning, the policy favored accommodation (cooperative), but has since migrated to a more balancing (competitive) posture because of Beijing’s increasingly strident behavior despite repeated U.S. overtures and deference to Chinese national interests. 

Moreover, the U.S. response to China’s call for a “new type of great-power relationship” has been mostly disjointed, uneven, and at times, confusing. 

There is still a distinct disconnect in how Beijing and Washington perceive and understand the model. What the United States views as a way to manage competition (weaken instability) and promote cooperation (strengthen stability), China sees it as a framework to acknowledge its new global status and respect its core strategic interests – one of which is territorial integrity and, by extension, maritime sovereignty claims in the SCS.
Most Southeast Asian countries (Vietnam, Malaysia, Brunei, Indonesia, Thailand, and Singapore) have responded to China’s aggression by pursuing a security strategy that seeks to hedge against the prevailing uncertainty, insecurity, and instability from the Sino-American strategic rivalry. 

They address their security concerns and supplement their security shortfalls by pursuing stronger relations with the United States; maintaining good ties with China; building up their own military capabilities and capacities; forging security partnerships among themselves; and looking to regional institutions (ASEAN) and international law (UNCLOS) to manage disputes and temper U.S.-Chinese competition. 

Much is driven by the uncertainty of U.S. commitment and policy constancy; geographic reality of China (proximity); and the economic benefits derived from good ties with both Beijing and Washington. 

All told, this creates a geo-political situation in which many regional countries are unwilling to choose between the United States and China, and resist any initiatives that may be perceived as a counterbalancing coalition against Beijing. 

That may change though, if China overreaches and pushes them too far.
The loss of regional influence did not happen overnight, but was the result of a cumulative aggregation of events through the years. 

Hindsight suggests China’s seizure of Scarborough Shoal in 2012 was the beginning of the steady slide in regional trust and confidence in America’s traditional role as the guarantor of the global economy and provider of regional security, stability, and leadership. 

Beijing interpreted the weak international and U.S. responses to its bold provocation as an opportunity to press ahead with its strategic agenda in the SCS.
For the next three years, China built land out of extant geographic features for permanent presence and occupation; militarized the new land outcrops for maritime security and power projection; and employed an aggressive legal and diplomatic crusade to characterize the developed geographic features as islands deserving of maritime zones. 

In 2014, Beijing unilaterally placed an oil-drilling rig in waters 120nm from Vietnam’s coast – near islands claimed by both countries and well within Hanoi’s 200nm exclusive economic zone (EEZ) set by international law – and surrounded it with a protective cordon of Chinese fishing boats, PLAN ships, and CCG vessels. 

In 2015, Beijing tried to intimidate Manila to not submit its arbitration case to the PCA and spent the following year undermining the authority and legitimacy of the court and diminishing the legal and diplomatic impact of the unfavorable ruling.
Hence, the recent events are just the latest in a series of Chinese bullying acts against its regional neighbors and incremental erosion of U.S. standing as the preeminent naval power that ensures the seas are free and open to commerce for all nations. 

In sum, Southeast Asian leaders took notice of perceived American passivity and acquiescence through the years, and adjusted their foreign policies accordingly and will continue to do so as Washington and Beijing posture (compete) for relative regional dominance.
All things considered, America has had several setbacks, but has not lost the SCS yet. 

The SCS is a fluid environment that makes any recalibrations transitory. 

The strategic shift in China’s favor – change in Philippine foreign policy, Manila and Washington’s failure to capitalize on the arbitral tribunal ruling, ASEAN under Manila’s chairmanship, warming relations between Beijing and Bangkok, closer Chinese ties with Laos and Cambodia, Trans-Pacific Partnership withdrawal, inclusion of the RMB in the International Monetary Fund’s Special Drawing Rights basket, and rise of the Chinese economy to second largest in the world – is not permanent.
Regional sentiments constantly change with the geopolitical and economic tides as evidenced by the tenuous ties between Manila and Beijing; rising friction between Hanoi and Beijing; Hanoi joining the U.S.-led coalitionat the last ARF; Hanoi agreeing to host a U.S. aircraft carrier port visit next year; Jakarta renaming the resource-rich northern portion around its Natuna Islands, which lie in the southern end of the SCS (and part of Beijing’s disputed nine-dash line claim), as the North Natuna Sea; developing United States-Japan-Australia trilateral alliance; Tokyo’s continuing outreach to SEA capitals; New Delhi’s making greater inroads into SEA (Act East policy); and slowing Chinese economic growth and persistent worries over rising debt, credit, banking, and social demographic challenges. 

Opportunities exist for America to regain the strategic initiative in the vital waterway and recover the high ground in diminished regional influence.
This concludes a short discourse on the recent developments in the SCS and the strategic implications thereof; and sets the conditions for further discussion in part two on the ways and means the United States could turn the tide and regain the strategic initiative, recover the high ground of regional influence, and stave off losing the SCS.

Chinese Aggressions

China’s latest moves in the South China Sea have sparked fears of a new land grab
By Steve Mollman

Filipino patriotism on Thitu Island.

In 2012, China wrested control of Scarborough Shoal in the South China Sea from the Philippines. With the shoal—reefs, rocks, and a vast lagoon—located just 220 km (137 miles) from the Philippines’ main island Luzon, the incident heightened tensions and embarrassed Manila, which the following year opened a case in an international tribunal challenging Beijing’s territorial moves in the sea.

 

The Spratly archipelago. 

So alarm bells went off earlier this month when Chinese ships gathered at Sandy Cay, a set of sandbars close to Philippines-occupied Thitu Island in the sea’s Spratly archipelago. 

The island has a small civilian population and a decrepit runway the Philippines has been meaning to repair.
The flotilla was seen as intimidating at the very least. 

“China’s ongoing maritime activity around Thitu is worrisome… if the objective of the operation is to occupy Sandy Cay, that would mean a significant escalation in tension in the South China Sea. Asia has acquired yet another flashpoint it could well do without,” wrote Euan Graham, a security analyst with the Lowy Institute for International Policy in Sydney.
A number of nations have claims to various features in the Spratlys. 

China, for its part, claims nearly the entire sea for itself, based on its infamous nine-dash line. 

The tribunal invalidated that sweeping claimin a nearly 500-page ruling issued in July 2016, but Beijing dismissed the legal proceedings entirely.
Satellite images shared by the Center for Strategic and International Studies’ Asia Maritime Transparency Initiative, based in Washington, DC, confirmed the presence of the flotilla, which included fishing, coastguard, and navy ships. 

The Philippines military confirmed it as well. 

It’s unclear at the time of this writing whether the vessels are still present.

Filipinos living on Thitu Island.

The governments of both countries have remained tight-lipped about the murky incident. 

Chinese foreign ministry spokesperson Hua Chunying said that people with ulterior motives were trying to “stir up conflicts between China and the Philippines.” 

Philippines foreign minister Alan Peter Cayetano said the mere presence of the Chinese ships was no cause for alarm “despite the lack of details that we give you,” saying the matter would be resolved through diplomatic channels. 

That followed similar reassurances a day earlier from Rodrigo Duterte.
But not everyone in the Philippines is so sure. 

The Chinese ships were reportedly blocking access to Sandy Cay, about 5 km (3.1 miles) from Thitu Island. 

They also blocked a vessel from the Philippine Bureau of Fisheries and Aquatic Resources, according to lawmaker Gary Alejano, who last week shared photos of the Chinese ships. 

For many Filipinos the thought of a Chinese blockade dredges up bad memories. 

When China took over Scarborough Shoal, it blocked Philippine ships from accessing it.

A contested sea.

Something for Subi
If China did occupy Sandy Cay (not to be confused with the nearby Sand Cay) and claim territorial waters around it, that could bolster the legal status of another nearby feature: Subi Reef, where China has built a militarized artificial island.

A sandbar seen from Thitu Island.

When the tribunal made its ruling, it went by the rules of the UN Convention on the Law of the Sea (Unclos), which is at the core of modern maritime law. 

The tribunal designated Subi Reef a “low-tide elevation.” 

Such legal designations matter a great deal, as they determine what kind of rights a nation gets in the surrounding waters.
Under Unclos, a “low-tide elevation”—above water at low tide but submerged at high tide—generates no territorial sea. 

A territorial sea extends out 12 nautical miles (22 km or 13.9 miles) from shore, and within it a nation can better enforce its rules.
A “rock,” by contrast, does generate a territorial sea. 

An “island” generates an exclusive economic zone, which grants a nation sole rights to natural resources in an area extending 200 nautical miles from the shore.
In its ruling, the tribunal didn’t determine Sandy Cay’s legal designation. 

But Antonio Carpio, a Supreme Court senior associate justice in the Philippines, said on Aug. 19:
“Sandy Cay is a Philippine land territory that is being seized (to put it mildly), or being invaded (to put it frankly), by China. If China acquires sovereignty over Sandy Cay, it can now claim Subi Reef as part of the territorial sea of Sandy Cay, legitimizing China’s claim over Subi Reef.”
Carpio said Duterte should send navy vessels to defend Sandy Cay. 

Were China to start a skirmish with them, he noted, the government could then invoke the mutual defense treaty with the US. 

Duterte, however, said he would not invoke the treaty in such a case: “I will not call on America. I have lost trust in the Americans.”
In a situation where Sandy Cay was designated a “rock” and China established sovereignty over it, its territorial sea would be extended by Subi Reef, noted Conor Cronin, a research associate with the Asia Maritime Transparency Initiative. 

In other words, Subi Reef would then generate territorial waters.
That’s something Subi Reef doesn’t have now, and didn’t have when the US conducted a nearby “freedom of navigation” operation challenging China’s claims in 2015.
The USS Lassen’s 2015 freedom of navigation operation near Subi Reef.

Testing the waters
For China, occupying the sandbar would probably not matter much right now. 

But one day, it might.
“I suppose that in a future world where China and the Philippines agree to divide up sovereignty over the islands and rocks, China is better off with Sandy Cay if it ever had to give up its claim to Thitu Island,” said Julian Ku, a professor at the law school of Hofstra University in New York.
Thitu Island seen from the sky.

It’s possible that China, by occupying Sandy Cay—or simply putting a flotilla near it—could be testing the waters in terms of reactions in the Philippines.
“I think the occupation of Sandy Cay would be a useful way for China to test the Philippines (and to a lesser extent the US),” Ku added. 

“As a legal matter, the Philippines also claims Sandy Cay, and if they allow China to occupy it… it would be a signal the Philippines will not resist Chinese changes to the status quo.”
Another theory is that China is trying to intimidate the Philippines against building at Sandy Cay itself, or against bolstering its presence on Thitu Island.
Either way, the flotilla has given Asia one more flashpoint to worry about.

Chinese Aggressions

CONFIRMING THE CHINESE FLOTILLA NEAR THITU ISLAND
ASIA MARITIME TRANSPARENCY INITIATIVE

On August 15, Philippine Congressman Gary Alejano released photographs of Chinese vessels, including fishing, coast guard, and navy ships, that he claimed had been operating within 1 to 3 nautical miles of Philippine-occupied Thitu, or Pag-asa, Island. 

Citing military sources, the congressman said that at least two fishing ships, two Chinese naval vessels, and a China Coast Guard ship were operating around Thitu by August 12, with others, including at least one more navy ship, arriving over the next three days. 

Thitu is the largest of the Philippines’ 10 occupied features in the Spratly Islands and is home to more than 100 Filipino civilians.

Alejano further claimed that the fishing ships included members of China’s maritime militia and that these vessels prevented a ship from the Philippine Bureau of Fisheries and Aquatic Resources from approaching the area on August 13. 

Finally, he said that a helicopter dispatched from one of the Chinese naval vessels was seen flying over unoccupied sandbars to the west/northwest of Thitu twice on August 15. 

All of this suggested to Alejano that, “The Chinese have a sinister plan to occupy sandbars just west of Pag-asa that belong to us.”












So far neither Secretary of National Defense Delfin Lorenzana nor Secretary of Foreign Affairs Alan Peter Cayetano have confirmed or denied Alejano’s claims. 

AMTI imagery of the area from August 13 can help shine some light on the situation. 

On that day, there were nine Chinese fishing ships and two naval/law enforcement vessels visible near Thitu (locations 1 and 2), with others possibly under cloud cover. 

It is impossible to know if any of those ships might be affiliated with the maritime militia, but at least two appear to be actively fishing (locations 6 and 8), with their nets visibly in the water. 

There also appears to be a Philippine fishing boat docked at the nearest of the unoccupied sandbars (location 12), possibly sent out from Thitu to investigate the Chinese presence.
The fishing vessels (locations 3-11) are all located between 1 and 5 nautical miles from Thitu, while the nearest military/law enforcement ship is about 3.6 nautical miles from the island. 

The ships are between 9 and 14.25 nautical miles from Chinese-occupied Subi Reef to the southwest. It is important to note that ownership of the territorial waters in which these ships are operating is still legally disputed. 

Subi was a low-tide elevation before China built an artificial island on it. 

As such, it does not generate its own territorial sea but could bump out the territorial sea of at least one of the unoccupied sand cays, which is dry at high tide and located less than 12 nautical miles from it. 

So it could be claimed that these ships are all operating within the territorial sea of both Thitu and the sand cay(s) with which Subi is associated.
Setting aside whether Chinese ships legally can fish within 1 nautical mile of Thitu Island, there is no doubt that doing so is highly provocative and runs counter to the narrative of a stable mutually-beneficial new status quo that Beijing has sought to project. 

The fact that law enforcement and naval vessels accompanied the fishermen makes it clear that this was not done without Chinese authorities being aware. 

At best, they permitted their operation. 

At worst, they escorted and guarded them. 

The number and rapid coordination of naval and coast guard ships suggests that this was purposely organized in advance and was not just an ad hoc response by government vessels that happened to be in the area.
One possible explanation for the flotilla’s sudden and provocative appearance is that Beijing wanted to dissuade Manila from planned construction on Thitu. 

The Philippine government has said it plans to spend about $32 million on upgrades including a beaching ramp, desalination facilities, and long-overdue repairs to the islet’s crumbling runway. Those upgrades have been delayed, reportedly due to inclement weather, but Lorenzana has made clear that they remain in the pipeline. 

In light of this week’s events, Manila might feel that those upgrades are even more urgent.