Affichage des articles dont le libellé est Woody Island. Afficher tous les articles
Affichage des articles dont le libellé est Woody Island. Afficher tous les articles

vendredi 10 mai 2019

Would China's South China Sea Bases Be Wiped Out In A War?

A top naval expert gives us his take.
by Robert Farley

The islands of the SCS have some military relevance, but are more important as a political claim to waterways and undersea resources. 
Militarily, they represent a thin crust on China’s A2/AD system. 
Under certain conditions this crust could disrupt U.S. freedom of action, but it won’t be hard for the United States’ Air Force and Navy to punch through.
China has built some islands in the South China Sea. 
Can it protect them?
During World War II Japan found that control of islands offered some strategic advantages, but not enough to force the United States to reduce each island individually. 
Moreover, over time the islands became a strategic liability, as Japan struggled to keep them supplied with food, fuel and equipment. 
The islands of the SCS are conveniently located for China, but do they really represent an asset to China’s military? 
The answer is yes, but in an actual conflict the value would dwindle quickly.

The Installations
China has established numerous military installations in the South China Sea, primarily in the Spratly and Paracel Islands. 
In the Spratlys, China has built airfields at Subi, Mischief and Fiery Cross, along with potential missile, radar and helicopter infrastructure at several smaller formations. 
In the Paracels, China has established a significant military installation at Woody Island, as well as radar and helicopter facilities in several other areas. 
China continues construction across the region, meaning that it may expand its military presence in the future. 
The larger bases (Subi, Mischief, Fiery Cross and Woody Island) have infrastructure necessary for the management of military aircraft, including fighters and large patrol craft. 
These missiles, radars and aircraft extend the lethal reach of China’s military across the breadth of the South China Sea.

Missiles
Several of the islands serve as bases for SAM systems (including the HQ-9, with a range of 125 miles, and perhaps eventually the Russian S-400) and ground-launched cruise missiles (GLCMs). These missiles serve to make the South China Sea lethal for U.S. ships and aircraft that do not have stealth capabilities, or that do not enjoy a layered air-defense system. 
The SAM installations, buoyed by networks of radars, can effectively limit the ability of enemy aircraft to enter their lethal zone without significant electronic-warfare assistance. 
The GLCMs can add another set of launchers to China’s A2/AD network, although not necessarily with any greater effectiveness than missiles launched from subs, ships or aircraft.
But it is an open question how survivable the missile installations would be in a conflict. 
Land-based missiles survive air attack because they can hide among hills, forests and other natural cover. 
There is no effective natural cover on the islands that China has created, and even man-made defensive installations may not survive concerted attack. 
Moreover, missile launchers depend upon an at least somewhat robust logistical network for fuel, power and munitions, which China may not be able to reliably provide during a shooting war.

Airfields
The four largest military installations in the SCS have extensive facilities for the operation of military aircraft. 
This includes advanced fighters, but more importantly patrol, electronic-warfare and advanced early-warning aircraft. 
The ability to use these airfields effectively extends the reach of China’s A2/AD bubble, enabling the transmission of targeting data to missile launchers at sea and in mainland China. 
The fighter aircraft themselves serve to make the skies over the SCS even more lethal than they otherwise would be, as well as threaten U.S. ships at a distance with cruise missiles.
But in conflict, the durability of an airfield depends on the availability of materials and equipment to execute repairs after an attack. 
It is not obvious that the islands China has created in the South China Sea will be robust enough to continue in operation after U.S. missile and bomb attacks. 
Although the larger islands have aircraft shelters, it is an open question whether these shelters could long survive a concerted U.S. attack.

Radars
SAMs, GLCMs and combat aircraft depend on accurate targeting data for effectiveness. 
The most important contribution that the SCS islands may offer to the Chinese military is through the radar installations that China has established on many of the islands. 
These installations, while individually vulnerable, help to provide a much fuller picture of the battle space than China would otherwise enjoy. 
Together, they significantly enhance the lethality of China’s defensive networks.
That said, the radars themselves are vulnerable to a wide array of U.S. attacks. 
These include kinetic methods such as missiles (launched from submarines, stealth aircraft or other platforms), electronic warfare, cyberattacks and even special-forces raids. 
In a conflict, China could quickly lose access to the radar network that it has established. 
Still, the network offers a relatively low-cost way of complicating the job that the U.S. military faces in penetrating the SCS.

Logistics
All the military capabilities of China’s SCS islands depend upon secure communications with mainland China. 
Most of the islands constructed by China cannot support extensive logistics stockpiles, or keep those stockpiles safe from attack. 
In a shooting war, the need to keep the islands supplied with fuel, equipment and munitions would quickly become a liability for presumably hard-stretched Chinese transport assets. 
Assuming that the PLAN and PLAAF would have little interest in pursuing risky, expensive efforts at resupplying islands under fire, the military value of the islands of the SCS would be a wasting asset during a conflict. 
Unfortunately for China, the very nature of island warfare, and the nature of the specific formations that China has determined to support, make it difficult to keep installations in service in anything but the very short term.

Ships vs. Forts
As Lord Horatio Nelson may have quipped, “a ship’s a fool to fight a fort.” 
But there are situations in which ships have a major advantage over forts. 
China’s islands in the SCS are not mobile, and are not large enough to hide much in the way of military equipment and material. 
The United States will be able to meticulously map the military installations on each of the islands in the SCS, and will probably be able to track shipments of military equipment to the islands. 
This will make the islands extremely vulnerable to attack from ships, subs and aircraft, as missiles will not require real-time targeting data.
One positive step for the United States would be to reverse the decision to “retire in place” the Advanced Gun System on the Zumwalt-class destroyer. 
Making available a munition for this gun would enable the Zumwalts to strike Chinese island installations at range, potentially causing serious, practically irreparable damage at a relatively low cost. 
Otherwise, the islands will suck up cruise missiles that might effectively be used on more juicy targets.
The islands of the SCS have some military relevance, but are more important as a political claim to waterways and undersea resources. 
Militarily, they represent a thin crust on China’s A2/AD system. 
Under certain conditions this crust could disrupt U.S. freedom of action, but it won’t be hard for the United States’ Air Force and Navy to punch through.

mercredi 30 mai 2018

Sina Delenda Est

US will continue to confront China over disputed islands, Mattis says
By Lukas Mikelionis

U.S. Defense Secretary Jim Mattis lands in Kabul on March 13, 2018 on an unannounced trip to Afghanistan. 

Defense Secretary Jim Mattis said Tuesday that the U.S. will continue to confront China’s increasing militarization of islands in the South China Sea -- despite the U.S. angering Beijing over the weekend by sending two Navy ships to the region.
Mattis rebuked China and said the country hasn’t abided by its promise to stop militarization of the Spratly Islands, a disputed territory whose ownership is contested by Brunei, Malaysia, the Philippines and Vietnam.
Mattis said U.S. ships are maintaining a "steady drumbeat" of naval operations and will confront “what we believe is out of step with international law."
“You’ll notice there is only one country that seems to take active steps to rebuff them or state their resentment [to] them, but it’s international waters and a lot of nations want to see freedom of navigation,” Mattis told reporters while enroute to Hawaii.

His comments came after the two U.S. warships sailed close to the Paracel Islands, north of the Spratlys, promoting an angry response from China, which claims to have sent ships and aircraft to counter the U.S. Navy’s presence in the area.
The U.S. operation on Sunday was planned in advance, but similar military exercises have become routine amid China’s increasing militarization of the islands.
Officials at the Pentagon have long criticized China’s actions in the disputed islands, claiming the Chinese government has not been open about its military build-up and has been using the islands to gather intelligence, Reuters reported.

China deployed truck-mounted surface-to-air missiles or anti-ship cruise missiles at Woody Island, according to recent satellite photos. 
Earlier this month, China also landed bombers in the islands.
“When they (Chinese) do things that are opaque to the rest of us, then we cannot cooperate in areas that we would otherwise cooperate in,” Mattis told reporters, adding that American diplomats were working on the issue and heard concerns about Chinese actions not just from the U.S. government but other regional allies as well.
He is expected to raise the issue with Chinese officials during a security forum in Singapore later this week.

jeudi 24 mai 2018

Sina Delenda Est

Concrete and coral: Beijing's South China Sea building boom fuels concerns
By Greg Torode, Simon Scarr

HONG KONG/SINGAPORE -- At first glance from above it looks like any clean and neatly planned small town, complete with sports grounds, neat roads and large civic buildings.
But the town is on Subi reef in the Spratlys archipelago of the hotly contested South China Sea and, regional security experts believe, could soon be home to China’s first troops based in the maritime heart of Southeast Asia.
Private sector data analysis reviewed by Reuters shows Subi, some 1,200 km (750 miles) from China’s coast, is now home to nearly 400 individual buildings – far more than other Chinese islands.
Subi could be the future location of hundreds of People’s Liberation Army marines, as well as a possible administrative hub as China cements its claim with a civilian presence, security analysts and diplomatic sources say.
The data from Earthrise Media, a non-profit group supporting independent media with imagery research, was based on surveys of high-resolution images obtained by DigitalGlobe satellites, dating back to when China started dredging reefs in early 2014.
The images show neat rows of basketball courts, parade grounds and a wide variety of buildings, some flanked by radar equipment.
Earthrise founder Dan Hammer said his team’s count included only free-standing, permanent and recognizable structures.
“When I look at these pictures I see a standard PLA base on the mainland – it is incredible, right down to the basketball courts,” Singapore-based security analyst Collin Koh said after reviewing the data and images.
“Any deployment of troops will be a huge step, however – and then they will need to secure and sustain them, so the military presence will have to only grow from where it is now.”
Senior Western diplomats describe the placement of troops or jet fighters on the islands as a looming test of international efforts to curb China’s determination to dominate the vital trade waterway.
Subi is the largest of China’s seven man-made outposts in the Spratlys. 

The so-called “Big Three” of Subi, Mischief and Fiery Cross reefs all share similar infrastructure – including emplacements for missiles, 3km runways, extensive storage facilities and a range of installations that can track satellites, foreign military activity and communications.
Mischief and Fiery Cross each house almost 190 individual buildings and structures, according to the Earthrise analysis. 
The previously unpublished data details the building count on more than 60 South China Sea features, including those occupied by Vietnam, Malaysia, Taiwan and the Philippines.
While the data shows well developed infrastructure on some on islands such as Vietnam's Spratly Island, the Philippines' Thitu Island and Taiwan's Itu Aba, the scale and development by Beijing dwarfs its rivals. (For a multimedia package on the data, click tmsnrt.rs/2J3cWne)
The number of buildings on Subi makes it similar in size to Woody Island in the Paracels, a Beijing-controlled group much closer to China also claimed by Vietnam.
Woody is the base and surveillance post which foreign military attaches say is the headquarters of the military division across the South China Sea, reporting to the PLA’s southern theater command.
Koh and other analysts said the facilities on Subi, Mischief and Fiery Cross could each hold a regiment - between 1,500 to 2,400 troops.
China’s precise intentions remain unclear and Chinese experts say much will depend on whether Beijing feels threatened by regional security trends, particularly U.S. activity such as its so-called “freedom of navigation patrols”.
China’s defense ministry did not respond to Reuters questions about the build-up on Subi or what the facilities could be used for. 
Beijing has consistently said the facilities on its reclaimed islands are for civilian use and necessary self-defense purposes. 
China blames Washington for militarizing the region with their freedom of navigation patrols.
Ding Duo, a researcher at the Chinese government-backed National Institute for South China Sea Studies, said Beijing needs a military presence in the Spratlys to protect its civilian infrastructure.
“As for how big that presence is depends on the threat assessment China has going forward for the Spratly Islands,” he said.
“The Spratly region faces severe military pressure, especially since Trump took office and increased freedom of navigation patrols. So China has raised its threat assessment.”

LOOMING TEST
The White House said this month it had raised concerns with China about its latest militarization after CNBC reported anti-ship cruise missiles and surface-to-air missile systems had been installed on Subi, Mischief and Fiery Cross.
This weekend, China revealed bombers had conducted take-off and landing training on some of its islands and reefs in preparation for what it called “the battle for the South China Sea”.
Some U.S. analysts noted PLA photographs appeared to show a bomber landing on Woody Island in the Paracels, and the Chinese military has yet to confirm planes actually landed on its Spratlys holdings.
On Wednesday, the Pentagon withdrew an invitation for China to join a major naval drill because of Beijing’s continued militarization of its islands in the South China Sea.
Admiral Philip Davidson, the nominee to be the next commander of all U.S. forces in the Pacific, said last month the bases were now complete and lacked only deployed forces.
“Any forces deployed to the islands would easily overwhelm the military forces of any other South China Sea-claimants,” Davidson told a congressional panel.
So far, repeated U.S. naval patrols close to Chinese features and growing international naval deployments through the region have had little obvious impact on Beijing’s plans.
“There is a real sense among Western nations that a new strategy is needed, but there is little sign anything meaningful coalescing,” said one senior Western diplomat familiar with discussions across several countries. 
“The deployment of jet fighters – even temporarily – will sorely test that lack of a cohesive response.”

Satellite photo dated March 28, 2018 shows Woody Island. 
Already large Chinese amphibious landing vessels and other ships have used the full-scale naval wharves at Fiery Cross, Subi and Mischief – pointing to what foreign naval officers describe as virtually a permanent presence throughout hotly contested waters.
Chinese forces are using their island holdings to police of what Chinese naval officers tell other navies is a “military alert zone” – an ambiguous term that both Asian and Western military officials say holds no basis in international law.
People briefed on recent Western intelligence reports describe an intensifying pattern of radio challenges to foreign military ships and aircraft delivered from Chinese naval ships and monitoring stations on Fiery Cross.
Australian officials recently publicized a “robust but polite” Chinese challenge to three of its naval ships plying the South China Sea en route to Vietnam.
Sources say such exchanges between Chinese and foreign militaries are far more frequent than is widely known.
“They have become the rule rather than the exception across significant areas of the South China Sea,” one person familiar with recent Western security reports told Reuters.
Ships and aircraft from India, France, Japan, New Zealand and rival claimants Vietnam, Malaysia and the Philippines have also been similarly warned, according to regional military officials and analysts.
With the claimed “military alert zone” having no basis in international law or military practice, foreign naval officials routinely stress they are in international waters and continue on their way.
Zhang Baohui, a Chinese security expert at Hong Kong’s Lingnan University, said Beijing was likely to be cautious about any offensive moves, such as the stationing of combat aircraft.
“Now the islands are complete, I think we will see a degree of caution in Beijing’s next moves,” he said. 
“Sustaining that presence so far from the Chinese coast is a massive undertaking, and I think the deployment of troops and jet fighters would really cross a threshold for China’s neighbors.”
U.S. military officials insist they are leaving little to chance, warning the bases are already helping China project military power into areas once dominated by its neighbors.
“In short, China is now capable of controlling the South China Sea in scenarios short of war with the United States,” Davidson said in his testimony last month.

mercredi 23 mai 2018

Chinese Aggressions

Pentagon disinvites China from major naval exercise over South China Sea buildup
By Missy Ryan

This May 19 video still from China's CCTV shows a Chinese H-6K bomber aircraft is seen flying along a runway in the South China Sea. The Chinese air force landed long-range bombers for the first time at an airport, a move that has further fueled concerns about Beijing's expansive claims over the disputed region. 

The Pentagon disinvited China from participating in a major naval exercise on Wednesday, signaling mounting U.S. anger over Beijing’s expanded military footprint in disputed areas of the South China Sea.
A Pentagon spokesman, Lt. Col. Christopher Logan, said the Defense Department had reversed an earlier invitation to the Chinese Navy to the Rim of the Pacific (RIMPAC), a biennual naval exercise that includes more than two dozen nations, over its decision to place anti-ship missiles, surface-to-air missiles, and electronic jammers in the contested Spratly Islands. 
China has also landed bomber aircraft at Woody Island, farther to the north in the disputed Paracel Islands, the Pentagon said.
“While China has maintained that the construction of the islands is to ensure safety at sea, navigation assistance, search and rescue, fisheries protection, and other non-military functions, the placement of these weapon systems is only for military use,” Logan said in a statement.
While the Trump administration does not assert a U.S. claim to the islands and smaller features, it has challenged Chinese claims of sovereignty over virtually all the South China Sea, which U.S. allies in the region see as key to their economic interests and security.
Chinese officials were notified about its exlcusion from RIMPAC, which last about a month, on Wednesday morning, a Pentagon official said. 
Beijing began participating in the exercise in 2014. 
There was no immediate public response from the Chinese government.
Logan described China’s activities as a “violation of the promise that Xi Jinping made to the United States and the world.”
“We have called on China to remove the military systems immediately and to reverse course on the militarization of disputed South China Sea features,” Logan said.

As Trump Focuses on Korea, Beijing Flaunts Its Takeover of South China Sea

China lands a strategic bomber in disputed territory, gauging how America will react at a time when Beijing appears to be outmaneuvering Washington on several fronts.
By BRENDON HONG

HONG KONG—Over the weekend, the Chinese military landed a bomber on Woody Island in the disputed waters of the South China Sea, where Beijing has a slew of construction projects on unpopulated atolls and rocks it claims as part of its territory.
Beijing is leveraging its position as a broker for a deal between Donald Trump’s administration and North Korea’s Kim Jong Un, figuring that despite the obvious provocation, Trump will just have to suck it up. 
At the same time, the Chinese Communist Party is issuing new reminders to its neighbors, reminding them who’s the real boss in this part of the world, just in case they didn’t get the point from the war games held in April.
So, one of Beijing’s bombers touches down on Woody. 
Was there ever any doubt such a thing would happen?
China’s air force had previously landed its fighter jets in the area, but the plane in question this time is the Xi'an H-6K bomber, a nuclear-capable strategic aircraft known as China’s B-52. 
The People’s Liberation Army Air Force says its engineers have extended the original aircraft’s flight range. 
Depending on the payload, the bomber can travel between 3,000 km (1,900 miles) and 6,000 km (3,700 miles) without aerial refueling. 
With refueling, its range increases to 14,000 kilometers (8,700 miles). 
They’ve extended its visibility range, and made its strikes more accurate.

Chinese bombers including the H-6K conduct takeoff and landing training on an island reef at a southern sea area

From Woody Island, the H-6K can easily reach all of China’s neighbors. 
Taiwan and Vietnam have also made claims of sovereignty over Woody and its surrounding waters, and Woody is less than 1,000 kilometers from Manila, which disputes some of China’s other claims in the waters of the South China Sea.
The Chinese defense ministry has stated that the landing was part of a military exercise that involved simulated air-to-sea strikes, in preparation for “the battle for the South China Sea”—which may be just as ominous as it sounds. 
Analysts say the main function of the H-6K would likely be to hunt and kill enemy ships in the vast Pacific using its payload of supersonic missiles.
China’s claim over the South China Sea is a constant source of consternation within the region. 
The Philippines even brought a case against the People’s Republic to The Hague. 
The tribunal ruled in July 2016 that China had no “historical rights” to the disputed territory, but before the end of that year, Philippine President Rodrigo Duterte, who was once the most outspoken among the South China Sea claimants, said that he would “set aside” the ruling and “not impose anything on China.” 
When Trump offered to mediate the conflict last year, Duterte said that the matter is “better left untouched,” allowing Beijing to continue its construction of military installations and performance of military drills with no substantial opposition.
After the H-6K bomber’s touchdown, Duterte again said that he would not do anything to push the buttons of Beijing: “You know they have the planes... And with their hypersonic, they can reach Manila within seven to 10 minutes.”
Though Duterte faces criticism for kowtowing to China’s dictator Xi Jinping, his assessment of the great game in the South China Sea is sound. 
Within East and Southeast Asia, in particular among the nations that claim some part of those waters as their own, there is no nation with the resources to counter China’s encroachment. 
Major powers on other continents have little reason to enter a skirmish with the Chinese military for desolate rocks, despite the significance of the South China Sea for international trade.
As China continues to entrench itself in these waters, U.S. actions and responses have not evolved. 
American warships occasionally sail near the disputed islands, sparking rebukes from Chinese officials. 
After the H-6K landing, Pentagon spokesman Lt. Col. Christopher Logan said, “China’s continued militarization of disputed features in the South China Sea only serves to raise tensions and destabilize the region.” 
Washington has said that Beijing would face “consequences” for its actions. 
But these are vague threats at best, and from the Chinese Communist Party’s standpoint, American lip service is business as usual, so the the South China Sea takeover barrels ahead as planned.
On three outposts located on the Spratly Islands, south of Woody and even closer to the Philippines, the Chinese military already has installed anti-ship and surface-to-air missile systems to counter unwanted intrusions.
But why land a bomber in the hotly contested region now?
The move is not so much designed to antagonize those whose claims in the South China Sea have fallen flat. 
Rather, China is gauging how America will react at a time when Beijing appears to be outmaneuvering Washington on several fronts. 
In trade negotiations, the fight for intellectual-property protection seemingly has been abandoned, tariffs that were slapped on Chinese goods have been suspended, the American president has tweeted about saving Chinese jobs, and what Trump’s negotiators call Chinese “concessions” are actions that Beijing intended to take even before trade-war talks.
“American lip service is business as usual, so the the South China Sea takeover barrels ahead as planned.”
More importantly, Trump’s success or failure at the planned summit with Kim Jong Un depends heavily on the guarantees that can be made to Kim by North Korea’s primary sponsor, China. 
Beijing sees itself as holding the upper hand in matters that America is much more heavily invested in, and is using this as cover while it tightens its grip on the South China Sea.
The Chinese Communist Party is flexing its geopolitical muscle westward, too. 
Sri Lanka’s government has already signed away control of one of its major ports to China, using a 99-year lease to knock off a chunk of $8 billion worth of debt to Chinese state-owned corporations. 
Also saddled with massive debt, Burma may eventually have to do the same.
Meanwhile, matters of territorial sovereignty can easily be used to whip up fervent nationalistic sentiment among the Chinese population. 
This month, a group of tourists from China arrived in Vietnam wearing T-shirts showing a map of their homeland, including the nine-dash line that traces the South China Sea and marks it as part of the People’s Republic. 
Vietnamese airport officials asked the visitors to change their attire before letting them enter the country. 
Tasteless as the choice of couture may have been, China is already the victor in those waters.

jeudi 3 mai 2018

Sina Delenda Est: China installed missile systems on Spratly Islands

  • China has installed anti-ship cruise missiles and surface-to-air missile systems on three of its fortified outposts in the South China Sea
  • The new coastal defense systems are a significant addition to Beijing's military portfolio in one of the most contested regions in the world.
By Amanda Macias 

A PLA Navy fleet including the aircraft carrier Liaoning, submarines, vessels and fighter jets take part in a review in the South China Sea on April 12, 2018.

China has quietly installed anti-ship cruise missiles and surface-to-air missile systems on three of its fortified outposts west of the Philippines in the South China Sea, a move that allows Beijing to further project its power in the hotly disputed waters, according to sources with direct knowledge of U.S. intelligence reports.
Intelligence assessments say the missile platforms were moved to the outposts in the Spratly Islands within the past 30 days, according to sources who spoke on the condition of anonymity.
The placement of the defensive weapons also comes on the heels of China's recent South China Sea installation of military jamming equipment, which disrupts communications and radar systems. 
By all accounts, the new coastal defense systems represent a significant addition to Beijing's military portfolio in one of the most contested regions in the world.
The United States has remained neutral – but expressed concern – about the overlapping sovereignty claims to the Spratlys.
"We have consistently called on China, as well as other claimants, to refrain from further land reclamation, construction of new facilities, and militarization of disputed features, and to commit to managing and resolving disputes peacefully with other claimants," a Pentagon official told CNBC when asked about China's recent military activity in the area. 
"The further militarization of outposts will only serve to raise tensions and create greater distrust among claimants."
The recent intelligence, according to sources, indicates the deployment of anti-ship cruise missiles and surface-to-air missiles on Fiery Cross Reef, Subi Reef and Mischief Reef in the Spratly Islands. The Spratlys, to which six countries lay claim, are located approximately two-thirds of the way east from southern Vietnam to the southern Philippines.

Satellite photo of Fiery Cross Reef in the South China Sea taken on January 1, 2018.

The land-based anti-ship cruise missiles, designated as YJ-12B, allow China to strike surface vessels within 295 nautical miles of the reefs. 
Meanwhile, the long-range surface-to-air missiles designated as HQ-9B, have an expected range of targeting aircraft, drones and cruise missiles within 160 nautical miles.
The defensive weapons have also appeared in satellite images of Woody Island, China's military headquarters in the nearby Paracel Islands.
"Woody Island serves as the administrative and military center of China's presence in the South China Sea," Gregory Poling, Center for Strategic and International Studies fellow and director of the Asia Maritime Transparency Initiative, told CNBC in a prior interview.
"We assume that anything we see at Woody will eventually find its way farther south to more directly menace China's neighbors," he added.

A hotly contested part of the world
The South China Sea, which is home to more than 200 specks of land, serves as a gateway to global sea routes where approximately $3.4 trillion of trade passes annually.
The numerous overlapping sovereign claims to islands, reefs and rocks — many of which disappear under high tide — have turned the waters into an armed camp. 
Beijing holds the lion's share of these features with approximately 27 outposts peppered throughout.
Beijing's interest in developing the crumbs of land across the South China Sea is by no means new.
For instance, China first took possession of Fiery Cross Reef and Subi Reef in 1988 and has since outfitted the features with deep-water ports, aircraft hangars, communication facilities, administration offices and a 10,000-foot runway.
Last week, U.S. Navy Adm. Philip Davidson, the expected nominee to replace U.S. Pacific Command Chief Adm. Harry Harris, described China's increased presence in the South China Sea as "a substantial challenge to U.S. military operations in this region."
In written testimony to the U.S. Senate Armed Services Committee, Davidson said the development of China's forward operating bases in the hotly contested waters appear to be complete.
"The only thing lacking are the deployed forces. Once occupied, China will be able to extend its influence thousands of miles to the south and project power deep into Oceania," Davidson wrote. 
"In short, China is now capable of controlling the South China Sea in all scenarios short of war with the United States."
Davidson's comments echo a steady drumbeat of warnings made by Harris regarding China's growing strength.
Earlier this year, Harris told Congress that Beijing's impressive military buildup, including its pursuit of hypersonic weapons, could challenge the United States "across almost every domain."
"While some view China's actions in the East and South China Seas as opportunistic, I do not. I view them as coordinated, methodical and strategic, using their military and economic power to erode the free and open international order," Harris told the House Armed Services Committee.
Harris, whom President Donald Trump is reportedly set to nominate as U.S. ambassador to South Korea, currently oversees approximately 375,000 military personnel and is responsible for defending a theater that spans nearly half of the Earth's surface.
"Ladies and gentlemen, China's intent is crystal clear. We ignore it at our peril," Harris said.

samedi 16 décembre 2017

Rogue Nation

A CONSTRUCTIVE YEAR FOR CHINESE BASE BUILDING
ASIA MARITIME TRANSPARENCY INITIATIVE

International attention has shifted away from the slow-moving crisis in the South China Sea over the course of 2017, but the situation on the water has not remained static. 
While pursuing diplomatic outreach toward its Southeast Asian neighbors, Beijing continued substantial construction activities on its dual-use outposts in the Spratly and Paracel Islands. 
China completed the dredging and landfilling operations to create its seven new islands in the Spratlys by early 2016, and seems to have halted such operations to expand islets in the Paracels by mid-2017. 
But Beijing remains committed to advancing the next phase of its build-up—construction of the infrastructure necessary for fully-functioning air and naval bases on the larger outposts.
AMTI has identified all the permanent facilities on which China completed or began work since the start of the year. 
These include buildings ranging from underground storage areas and administrative buildings to large radar and sensor arrays. 
These facilities account for about 72 acres, or 290,000 square meters, of new real estate at Fiery Cross, Subi, and Mischief Reefs in the Spratlys, and North, Tree, and Triton Islands in the Paracels. This does not include temporary structures like storage containers or cement plants, or work other than construction, such as the spreading of soil and planting of grass at the new outposts.

Fiery Cross Reef

Fiery Cross saw the most construction over the course of 2017, with work on buildings covering 27 acres, or about 110,000 square meters. 
This counts work previously documented by AMTI, including completion of the larger hangars alongside the airstrip, work on large underground structures at the south of the island likely intended to house munitions or other essential materiel, a large communications/sensor array at the northeast end of the island, various radar/communications facilities spread around the islet, and hardened shelters for missile platforms at the south end.

The large underground tunnels AMTI identified earlier this year as likely being for ammunition and other storage have been completed and entirely buried. 
They join other underground structures previously built on the island, which include water and fuel storage.

In addition to the work previously identified at Fiery Cross, in the last several months China has constructed what appears to be a high frequency radar array at the north end of the island. 
It consists of a field of upright poles, similar to those erected at Cuarteron Reef in 2015. 
This high-frequency radar is situated next to the large communications/sensor array completed earlier in the year (the field of radomes in the image below).


Subi Reef

Subi Reef also saw considerable building activity in 2017, with work on buildings covering about 24 acres, or 95,000 square meters. 
This included buried storage facilities identical to those at Fiery Cross, as well as previously-identified hangars, missile shelters, radar/communications facilities, and a high-frequency “elephant cage” antenna array for signals intelligence at the southwest end of the island.

Like at Fiery Cross, the new storage tunnels at Subi were completed and covered over in the last few months. They join other buried structures on the islet, including large storage facilities to the north.

China is poised to substantially boost its radar and signals intelligence capabilities at Subi Reef. 
Since mid-year, it has built what looks like a second “elephant cage” less than 500 meters west of the first, as well as an array of radomes on the southern end of the outpost that appears similar to, if smaller than, the one on Fiery Cross Reef.



Mischief Reef

This year construction was undertaken on buildings covering 17 acres, or 68,500 square meters, of Mischief Reef. 
Like at Fiery Cross and Subi, this included underground storage for ammunition and other materiel, the completion of hangars and missile shelters, and new radar and communications arrays.

The new storage tunnels at Mischief were completed over the last several months and have been buried, joining previously-built underground structures to the north.

In addition to previously-identified structures, China has started work on a new radar/communications array on the north side of the outpost.

China has continued construction, though on a smaller scale, at its bases in the Paracel Islands. 
The most significant of this work in 2017 was at North, Tree, and Triton Islands.

Tree Island


Like North Island, dredging and reclamation work at Tree Island continued as late as mid-2017. 
In total, China built facilities covering about 1.7 acres, or 6,800 square meters, of the island. These included a new helipad next to the harbor and solar arrays and a pair of wind turbines on the north shore of the island.

North Island

China had earlier tried to connect North Island to neighboring Middle Island, but gave up the project after the land bridge it created was washed out by a storm in October 2016. 
Earlier this year, it built a retaining wall around the remaining reclaimed land at the southern end of North Island and built a large administrative building on the feature.

Triton Island

Triton Island saw completion of a few buildings this year, including two large radar towers, which are especially important given that Triton is the southwestern-most of the Paracels and the waters around it have been the site of several recent incidents between China and Vietnam, as well as multiple U.S. freedom of navigation operations.

Woody Island
Woody Island is China’s military and administrative headquarters in the South China Sea. Developments at Woody are usually a precursor to those at Fiery Cross, Subi, and Mischief in the Spratlys. 
There was no substantial new construction at the island this year, but it did see two first-time air deployments that hint at things to come at the three Spratly Island airbases farther south.
First, at the end of October, the Chinese military released images showing People’s Liberation Army Air Force J-11B fighters deployed to Woody Island for exercises. 
This was the first confirmed deployment of J-11s to Woody. 
Previous deployments to the island involved the less-advanced People’s Liberation Army Navy J-10, which is what AMTI has used as a basis—perhaps too conservatively—to estimate Chinese power projection capabilities from its South China Sea bases.


Then on November 15, AMTI spotted several large planes that appear to be Y-8 transport aircraft, which in certain configurations are capable of electronic intelligence gathering. 
AMTI earlier noted that the larger hangars built at each of the Spratly airbases could accommodate Y-8s, suggesting their presence at Woody could be a sign of things to come.