Affichage des articles dont le libellé est Huawei Technologies. Afficher tous les articles
Affichage des articles dont le libellé est Huawei Technologies. Afficher tous les articles

mercredi 20 mars 2019

Inside China’s Plan for Global Supremacy

How the fight for the next communications ecosystem could make a world dependent on Chinese technology, Chinese software, Chinese e-commerce, Chinese venture capital, and the Chinese market
By David P. Goldman


In 2013 my friend Eduardo Medina-Mora became Mexico’s ambassador to the United States. 
We had known each other since 1988, when I was preparing a study of Mexico’s tax and regulatory system for a U.S. consulting firm, and Eduardo was running a small Mexico City law firm after a stint as press officer for the Ministry of Fisheries. 
We kept in touch over the years. 
In 2003, when he headed Mexico’s foreign intelligence service, the CISEN, and I ran the fixed income research department of Bank of America, we compared notes over dinner in Mexico City. 
He went on to serve as attorney general and other senior posts.
Eduardo complained that no one in the Obama administration seemed responsible for Mexico. 
“We don’t even know who to call when a problem comes up,” he told me at his office at Mexico’s Embassy on Pennsylvania Avenue, where I called on him to offer my congratulations. 
“It’s easier for [then Mexican President Enrique] Peña Nieto to get the president of China on the phone than Barack Obama. What would you advise me to do?”
A few months earlier I had joined Reorient Group, a Hong Kong investment banking boutique, as managing director in charge of the Americas. 
I suggested that we remove the batteries from our BlackBerrys to prevent official eavesdropping. 
We did so. 
“You can invite the Chinese in to build a broadband network,” I then offered. 
“That will get the attention of the Americans.” 
It didn’t. 
But I did get a look at how China’s strategy for global economic hegemony worked from the inside.
A year and a half and many machinations later I brought Mexican Ambassador Alicia Buenrostro Massieu to the headquarters of Huawei Technologies in Shenzhen. 
Ambassador Buenrostro, the niece of a former finance minister whom I had known for years, came with as many of her Hong Kong entourage as would fit in a minivan. 
The trip to Shenzhen took a bit less than an hour including a stop to pass Chinese customs. 
The new bullet train from West Kowloon Station in Hong Kong to Shenzhen takes only eight minutes, one more technological wonder among the many that make some Chinese cities look like sets for science fiction films.
Huawei's highly-incentivized employees put in terrifying hours.  
The Huawei campus covers 500 acres and makes Stanford University look dowdy. 
The executive dining center features an enormous artificial waterfall, young women in traditional costume playing ancient Chinese instruments, and three-star quality Cantonese food (or so I’m told; I eat kosher). 
We dined in a small private room with a Huawei executive, whence a guide escorted us to the exhibition hall. 
We passed thousands of Huawei workers returning from lunch. 
“They all have a futon under their desks,” said our guide. 
“They take a nap after lunch because they work until 10 o’clock.”
The Huawei tour took three hours. 
It might be the largest technology museum in the world, bigger than the Henry Ford Museum in Dearborn, Michigan, or the Franklin Institute in Philadelphia, except it shows only new things. 
One exhibit consisted of a 4-by-6-yard wall map of Guangdong City, glistening tens of thousands of small lights. 
“Every one of the lights is a smartphone,” said our guide. 
“We can track the location of every phone and correlate position to online purchases and social media posts.”
And what do you use this information for, I inquired? 
“Well, if you want to open a new Kentucky Fried Chicken franchise, this will help you to find the best location,” said the guide. 
Yeah, right, I thought. 
The Ministry of State Security knows where everyone is at all times and whom they are with; if the phones of two Chinese who posted something critical about the government are in proximity, the State Security computers will detect a conspiracy. 
That was before China installed high-definition video cameras with facial recognition software powered by Huawei chips at 100-meter intervals in major cities.
In response to Huawei’s domination of fifth generation broadband networks, the U.S. government is currently trying to isolate the company. 
Secretary of State Mike Pompeo on Feb. 21 warned that the U.S. would cut off information-sharing with countries that use Huawei systems. 
Last Dec. 1, while President Donald Trump dined with Chinese dictator Xi Jinping during the Group of 20, the Canadian government arrested Huawei’s chief financial officer at an airport transit lounge in Vancouver. 
But I’m getting ahead of my story.
***
At the end of the tour, the Mexicans and I sat on a semicircular bench in a small amphitheater, and a young Chinese man stepped to the podium and turned on a projector. 
You Mexicans have a big economy, he said, but very low broadband penetration, and he showed some charts and graphs to this effect. 
Your economy is backward today, but you can become a great and rich economy, just like China. 
Let us build a national broadband network for you, he urged. 
Then we will bring in e-commerce and e-finance and create a whole new ecosystem that will make you a modern economy. 
He sounded vaguely like the Borg: We will assimilate you. 
Resistance is futile.
Ambassador Buenrostro was astonished. 
After some time she asked, “How long have you been doing this?” 
The man from Huawei said, “Oh, six or seven years.” Buenrostro said, “In Mexico, nothing ever changes.”
The United States is drifting toward the export profile of Brazil, with strength in agricultural commodities and energy but overall weakness in high-technology manufacturing and exports.
Not necessarily, though. 
In 2014 and 2015 I traveled to Mexico to introduce Huawei executives to senior officials of Mexico’s Communications Ministry, hoping to land a role for Reorient Group in financing the project. 
Reorient was a startup created by a Hong Kong entrepreneur whose business acumen and connections were impressive. 
He helped to launch an Africa-centered logistics firm headed by Erik Prince, the founder of Blackwater, with backing from CITIC, China’s largest financial firm.
Mexico might as well have been on the dark side of the moon where Reorient Group was concerned, but I wanted to follow the red thread and see where it led. 
Since 2011, Huawei had been promoting the idea of national broadband networks as the centerpiece of a new economic “ecosystem,” flanked by the likes of Alibaba, the Chinese e-commerce giant, and other services firms.
Huawei’s mantra was the same that I had heard at their Shenzhen headquarters: Invite us in, and we’ll make you rich like China. 
That wasn’t an idle boast. 
In 1987, China’s per capita GDP was $251, according to the World Bank. 
By 2017, it had risen to $8,894, or by 35 times. 
Nothing like that had happened in all of economic history, least of all to the world’s most populous country. 
And it isn’t just individual incomes that have risen. 
China’s high-speed trains, superhighways, skyscrapers, urban mass transit, and ports are gargantuan monuments to the country’s new wealth. 
They make American airports, railroads, and roads look like worn-out relics of the Third World.
Mexico was the first “developing country” I studied as an economic consultant; I would go on to Peru, Nicaragua, Russia and other countries before leaving the field in favor of relative value research on Wall Street. 
The main thing you notice about developing countries is that they don’t develop—or if they do, only small parts of them develop. 
Most people work a subsistence plot with poor implements, or they sit all day in a market stall waiting for someone to come along and buy a liter of cooking oil. 
They barely make enough to eat, and they don’t pay taxes, which means that the government has no money to spend on infrastructure or services. 
More than half of Mexico’s employment is what economists euphemistically call “informal,” that is, off-the-book businesses that have no access to capital.
East Asia is different. 
The Chinese economic model is only a souped-up, bigger and more ruthless version of the Asian model that began with Japan’s restoration of the Emperor Meiji in 1868, and was replicated by South Korea and Taiwan: Move subsistence farmers to the cities and build factories for them to work in. While its per capita GDP rose 35 times, China moved 550 million people from the countryside to the cities, and it built the equivalent of all of the cities of Europe to house them.
Modernization in China isn’t the enclave of a middle-class modernity, as in India, but a movement that reaches into the capillaries of society. 
Entrepreneurs in Chinese villages connect to the world market through mobile broadband, sell their products and buy supplies on the Alibaba platform, and obtain credit from microfinancing platforms. Information and capital flow down to the roots of the economy and products flow back up to the world market.
China now proposes to export its model to Southeast Asia, Central Asia, Latin America, parts of the Middle East and Africa. 
This involves a Faustian bargain of sorts; the same technologies that have lifted billions of East Asians out of dire poverty and the ever-present risk of starvation into prosperity and economic security can also give dictatorial regimes previously unimagined tools for social control. 
China’s Belt and Road Initiative (BRI) has a $1 trillion war chest for infrastructure investments and export loans.
In making such offers, Chinese planners are thinking a generation ahead. 
The scarcest resource in the world is labor, specifically workers who can read an instruction manual, learn skilled or semi-skilled jobs, and show up for work on time. 
Virtually all of the world’s population growth during the 21st century will take place in sub-Saharan Africa and the Indian subcontinent—this last mostly in Pakistan, where the average female has four children compared with 2.2 in India.
The problem is that the productive parts of the world are all aging together. 
There are plenty of young people in the world, but low educational levels, abysmal infrastructure and political instability sideline the regions where population growth is most rapid. 
The people of aging countries with shrinking populations cannot find enough young people to absorb the investments they need to make to fund their prospective retirements. 
China’s own labor force stopped growing a couple of years ago. 
In 2018, kindergarten admissions in China fell by 740,000, the first decline on record, and the birth rate fell to 11 per 1,000 people in 2018 from 13 per 1,000 people in 2016.
The good news is that the prospects are good for a quantum jump in productivity in the developing world. 
The bad news is that China is acting aggressively to position itself as the dominant equipment supplier, investor, joint venture partner and technology provider in this revolution. 
By contrast, the United States is drifting toward the export profile of Brazil, with strength in agricultural commodities and energy but overall weakness in high-technology manufacturing and exports.
5G technology, a source of bitter contention between the United States and China, is a game changer. For the military, it makes possible the control of vast numbers of autonomous weapons systems, like drone swarms that can overwhelm anti-missile defenses. 
For industry, it allows robots and control devices to exchange vast amounts of data at speeds 2,000 times that of 4G LTE. 
It also cheapens the cost of delivering broadband to homes, by transmitting over the airwaves more data than fiber-optic cable now can carry. 
Developing countries will therefore be able to go straight to 5G at much lower cost, and Huawei is both the cheapest and the most technologically advanced provider. 
It spends $20 billion a year on R&D, about double the combined R&D budgets of its only major competitors, Sweden’s Ericsson and Finland’s Nokia.
Not since the invention of gunpowder has China led the world in the introduction of a disruptive new technology, and the United States still can’t believe that it has been leapfrogged. 
For years the conventional wisdom held that the Chinese only could copy but not innovate. 
That wisdom has now been proven wrong.
In 2003, Huawei admitted that it had stolen code from Cisco, then the top producer of internet hardware. 
But Cisco long since exited the hardware businesses, because the “capital light” services businesses offered higher margins. 
Cisco presently has more than $70 billion of cash in the bank. 
That’s roughly the whole of Huawei’s R&D budget for the past six years. 
Why didn’t Cisco spend the money and maintain its dominant position in internet systems? 
The answer lies in Huawei’s business model, which bids 40 percent below the nearest competition. 
Its pricing power almost certainly depends on subsidized credit from China’s state-owned banks. 
That money buys plenty of innovation.
***
When I first worked in Mexico City in 1988, Eduardo Medina-Mora’s little law firm employed a secretary who did nothing all day but dial the telephone, because it took five or six tries to get through to a local number. 
By 2015 the system had improved, to be sure, but Mexico still had the most expensive broadband in the world and one of the lowest penetration rates (in subscriptions per capita) relative to the size of its economy. 
Scrambling to get to a meeting at the Communications Ministry, I used Waze to direct the taxi driver, who did not use the program, because broadband was too expensive.
In 2015, Mexico announced that it would create a wholesale broadband network, the red compartida (shared network), that would lease broadband to any carrier that wanted it. 
The consortium that won the bid to build the $7 billion network, ATLAN, engaged Huawei and Nokia to build the actual infrastructure. 
The first elements of the network went live in March 2018.
By then, I was out of the picture. 
In the summer of 2015, Alibaba’s billionaire founder, Jack Ma, bought Reorient Group through his private equity firm, Yunfeng Capital. 
Early in 2016 he fired all of Reorient’s Western bankers, and there ended my Forrest Gump-like observations of great events in the broadband world.
But as the man with the PowerPoint at Huawei headquarters had told the Mexican delegation, it’s not about selling a broadband network. 
It’s about the ecosystem. 
As Daniela Guzman reported in Bloomberg News recently, “As America recedes into the background, Chinese foreign direct investment in Latin America and the Caribbean has skyrocketed over the last ten years, according to a 2018 report by the Economic Commission for Latin America and the Caribbean. China dropped close to $90 billion in the region between 2005 and 2016. With a growing emphasis on telecommunications, Chinese investment in emerging technology is increasingly the primary fuel behind Latin America’s tech boom.” 
She quoted one South American entrepreneur saying, “When you go to China, you see what’s going to happen in Latin America in five more years. Today, we look at China. We look at Meituan, at Alibaba and Tencent, to see what we can do in the future.”
To get there, Latin American economies will depend on Chinese technology, Chinese software, Chinese e-commerce, Chinese venture capital and, of course, the Chinese market. 
America’s intelligence agencies worry that China will use its dominance in 5G networks to steal data. That probably is true, but far more damaging to America’s position in the world is the prospect that the most productive countries of the Global South will be hard-wired into the Chinese economy.
Chinese domination of the Global South would leave America poorer and weaker than it wants to be, in a position comparable to Britain’s after the dissolution of its empire. 
As Leon Trotsky once put it: You may not be interested in war, but war is interested in you. 
The same applies to industrial policy.
The adoption of a Meiji-style model by a country of a billion and a half people has driven American companies out of most capital-intensive manufacturing industries. 
I do not think that the United States should copy the Asian model, but we have our own precedents for an industrial policy of sorts: the great mobilization of American industry in World War II, the Apollo program, and the Strategic Defense Initiative. 
When the Russians beat us into space with Sputnik in 1957, the Eisenhower administration responded with federal support for higher education in STEM. 
Today only 7 percent of American undergraduates choose engineering as a major, compared with 33 percent in China.
We could also, in theory, unite with Japan, which has more foreign assets than China, and offer an alternative to China’s Belt and Road Initiative “ecosystem.” 
China is arrogant and predatory in its dealings with prospective economic clients. 
We could do better.
The trouble is that we have trouble admitting to ourselves that China might best us. 
We’ve told ourselves for years that the Chinese don’t invent but only steal technology, and that a state-directed system can’t possibly compete with our free enterprise model. 
The West chronically underestimates Asians. 
The Russians couldn’t believe that Japan could stand up to their battle-tested armed forces in 1905, when Japan crushed the Russians on land and sea at Port Arthur. 
In his new biography of Winston Churchill, Andrew Robert reports that months before Japan took the British citadel of Singapore in 1942, Churchill “had privately predicted to the American journalist John Gunther that in the event of war the Japanese would ‘fold up like the Italians’ because they were ‘the wops of the Far East.’ 
Once again, recourse to racial stereotyping had led him badly to underestimate a determined foe. Churchill effectively admitted that he had been wrong when on 15 February 1942 he said in a broadcast, ‘No one must underrate any more the gravity and efficiency of the Japanese war machine. Whether in the air or upon the sea, or man to man on land, they have already proved themselves to be formidable, deadly, and, I am sorry to say, barbarous antagonists.’”
It’s time to stop underestimating China.

mardi 28 novembre 2017

Nation of Thieves: Chinese Ministry of State Security Behind APT3

This is the first time researchers have been able to attribute a threat actor group with a high degree of confidence to the Ministry of State Security.
By Insikt Group

Key Takeaways
  • APT3 is the first threat actor group that has been attributed with a high degree of confidence directly to the Chinese Ministry of State Security (MSS).
  • On May 9, a mysterious group called “intrusiontruth” attributed APT3 to a company, Guangzhou Boyu Information Technology Company, based in Guangzhou, China.
  • Recorded Future’s open source research and analysis has corroborated the company, also known as Boyusec, is working on behalf of the Chinese Ministry of State Security.
  • Customers should re-examine any intrusion activity known or suspected to be APT3 and all activity from associated malware families as well as re-evaluate security controls and policies.

Introduction

On May 9, a mysterious group calling itself “intrusiontruth” identified a contractor for the Chinese Ministry of State Security (MSS) as the group behind the APT3 cyber intrusions.

Recorded Future timeline of APT3 victims.


Screenshot of a blog post from “intrusiontruth in APT3.”

“Intrusiontruth” documented historic connections between domains used by an APT3 tool called Pirpi and two shareholders in a Chinese information security company named Guangzhou Boyu Information Technology Company, Ltd (also known as Boyusec).

Registration information for a domain linked to the malware Pirpi. The details show the domain was registered to Dong Hao and Boyusec.

APT3 has traditionally targeted a wide-range of companies and technologies, likely to fulfill intelligence collection requirements on behalf of the MSS (see research below).
Recorded Future has been closely following APT3 and has discovered additional information corroborating that the MSS is responsible for the intrusion activity conducted by the group.

Recorded Future Intel Card for APT3.

Background
APT3 (also known as UPS, Gothic Panda, and TG-011) is a sophisticated threat group that has been active since at least 2010
APT3 utilizes a broad range of tools and techniques including spearphishing attacks, zero-day exploits, and numerous unique and publicly available remote access tools (RAT). 
Victims of APT3 intrusions include companies in the defense, telecommunications, transportation, and advanced technology sectors — as well as government departments and bureaus in Hong Kong, the U.S., and several other countries.

Analysis
On Boyusec’s website, the company explicitly identifies two organizations that it cooperatively partners with, Huawei Technologies and the Guangdong Information Technology Security Evaluation Center (or Guangdong ITSEC).

Screenshot of Boyusec’s website where Huawei and Guangdong ITSEC are identified as collaborative partners.

In November 2016, the Washington Free Beacon reported that a Pentagon internal intelligence report had exposed a product that Boyusec and Huawei were jointly producing. 
According to the Pentagon’s report, the two companies were working together to produce security products containing a backdoor, that would allow Chinese intelligence “to capture data and control computer and telecommunications equipment.” 
The article quotes government officials and analysts stating that Boyusec and the MSS are “closely connected,” and that Boyusec appears to be a cover company for the MSS.

Boyusec is located in Room 1103 of the Huapu Square West Tower in Guangzhou, China.

Boyusec’s work with its other “cooperative partner,” Guangdong ITSEC, has been less well-documented. 
As will be laid out below, Recorded Future’s research has concluded that Guangdong ITSEC is subordinate to an MSS-run organization called China Information Technology Evaluation Center (CNITSEC) and that Boyusec has been working with Guangdong ITSEC on a joint active defense lab since 2014.
Guangdong ITSEC is one in a nation-wide network of security evaluation centers certified and administered by CNITSEC. 
According to Chinese state-run media, Guangdong ITSEC became the sixteenth nationwide branch of CNITSEC in May 2011. 
Guangdong ITSEC’s site also lists itself as CNITSEC’s Guangdong Office on its header.
According to academic research published in China and Cybersecurity: Espionage, Strategy, and Politics in the Digital Domain, CNITSEC is run by the MSS and houses much of the intelligence service’s technical cyber expertise. 
CNITSEC is used by the MSS to “conduct vulnerability testing and software reliability assessments.” Per a 2009 U.S. State Department cable, it is believed China may also use vulnerabilities derived from CNITSEC’s activities in intelligence operations. 
CNITSEC’s Director, Wu Shizhong, even self-identifies as MSS, including for his work as a deputy head of China’s National Information Security Standards Committee as recently as January 2016.
Recorded Future research identified several job advertisements on Chinese-language job sites such as jobs.zhaopin.com, jobui.com, and kanzhun.com since 2015, Boyusec revealed a collaboratively established joint active defense lab (referred to as an ADUL) with Guangdong ITSEC in 2014. Boyusec stated that the mission of the joint lab was to develop risk-based security technology and to provide users with innovative network defense capabilities.


Job posting where Boyusec highlights the joint lab with Guangdong ITSEC. The translated text is, “In 2014, Guangzhou Boyu Information Technology Company and Guangdong ITSEC cooperated closely to establish a joint active defense lab (ADUL).”

Conclusion

The lifecycle of APT3 is emblematic of how the MSS conducts operations in both the human and cyber domains. 
Many of these elements, especially at the provincial and local levels, include organizations with valid public missions to act as a cover for MSS intelligence operations. 
Some of these organizations include think tanks such as CICIR, while others include provincial-level governments and local offices.
In the case of APT3 and Boyusec, this MSS operational concept serves as a model for understanding the cyber activity and lifecycle:
  • While Boyusec has a website, an online presence, and a stated “information security services” mission, it cites only two partners, Huawei and Guangdong ITSEC.
  • Intrusiontruth and the Washington Free Beacon have linked Boyusec to supporting and engaging in cyber activity on behalf of the Chinese intelligence services.
  • Recorded Future’s open source research has revealed that Boyusec’s other partner is a field office for a branch of the MSS. Boyusec and Guangdong ITSEC have been documented working collaboratively together since at least 2014.
  • Academic research spanning decades documents an MSS operational model that utilizes organizations, seemingly without an intelligence mission, at all levels of the state to serve as cover for MSS intelligence operations.
  • According to its website, Boyusec has only two collaborative partners, one of which (Huawei) it is working with to support Chinese intelligence services, the other, Guangdong ITSEC, which is actually a field site for a branch of the MSS.

Graphic displaying the relationship between the MSS and APT3.

Impact
The implications are clear and expansive. 
Recorded Future’s research leads us to attribute APT3 to the Chinese Ministry of State Security and Boyusec with a high degree of confidence. 
Boyusec has a documented history of producing malicious technology and working with the Chinese intelligence services.
APT3 is the first threat actor group that has been attributed with a high degree of confidence directly to the MSS. 
Companies in sectors that have been victimized by APT3 now must adjust their strategies to defend against the resources and technology of the Chinese government. 
In this real-life David versus Goliath situation, customers need both smart security controls and policy, as well as actionable and strategic threat intelligence.
APT3 is not just another cyber threat group engaging in malicious cyber activity; research indicates that Boyusec is an asset of the MSS and their activities support China’s political, economic, diplomatic, and military goals.
The MSS derives intelligence collection requirements from state and party leadership, many of which are defined broadly every five years in official government directives called Five Year Plans. 
Many APT3 victims have fallen into sectors highlighted by the most recent Five Year Plan, including green/alternative energy, defense-related science and technology, biomedical, and aerospace.

mardi 19 septembre 2017

Chinese Fifth Column

Australian university's research being used for China's military purposes
By Anders Furze and Louisa Lim

Li Keqiang (centre right) attends a signing ceremony with Australian prime minister Malcolm Turnbull at the Great Hall of the People in Beijing on 14 April 2016. 

Aworld-first collaboration between the University of New South Wales and the Chinese government, celebrated as a $100m innovation partnership, opens a Pandora’s box of strategic and commercial risks for Australia.
These include the loss of sensitive technology with military capability, an unhealthy reliance on Chinese capital and vulnerability to Beijing’s influence in Australia’s stretched research and technology sector.
The UNSW Torch Innovation precinct, the first outside China, was unveiled last year with Malcolm Turnbull present at the signing ceremony in Beijing’s Great Hall of the People, alongside the Chinese premier, Li Keqiang.
Since 1988 the Torch program has brought businesses together with universities and researchers inside China to create high-tech startups. 
The Chinese government says it has accounted for 11% of the country’s GDP. 
This $100m deal included an initial $30m from eight Chinese companies to support Australian research.
Since then 29 Chinese partners and one Indian one – Adani Solar, a subsidiary of the resources giant – have signed on to the UNSW Torch project. 
They include at least seven firms working in industries with dual use military potential such as aerospace, GPS navigation, underwater cameras and nanotechnology
The research is not funded directly by the Chinese government but by the companies themselves.
One of the companies participating in the scheme is Huawei Technologies, the Chinese firm banned from participating in Australia’s national broadband network in 2013 on security grounds, based on the advice of Asio – the Australian national security agency. 
Earlier this year, it was reported that Nick Warner, the Australian Secret Intelligence Service’s director general warned the Solomon Islands against using Huawei to connect its under-sea cable.
On its Torch website designed to draw in potential investors, the university highlights research with explicitly military applications such as unmanned military vehicles.
Richard Suttmeier, an American expert on China’s science policy and emeritus professor at the University of Oregon, raised US concerns that Beijing’s aggressive decades-long technology acquisition drive was allowing China to quietly supersede other countries in certain fields.
On the UNSW cooperation he said: “One can’t help wondering about a Faustian bargain quality to the program. Increasingly China is able to dangle very, very attractive incentives for cooperation. International partners can reap benefits in the short run but may lose out in the longer run if they lack farsighted strategies.”
Clive Hamilton, professor of public ethics at Charles Sturt University, said: “I think the Torch program will make UNSW a client university of the People’s Republic of China in its science and technology areas, and more broadly because PRC and its agencies will have a huge amount of sway over university decision-making.”
Rory Medcalf, the head of the Australian National University’s national security college, has expressed concern that research with potential for military use could bypass existing controls.
UNSW and HCCL joint laboratory on the university’s Sydney campus. The Torch program will make UNSW a client university of the People’s Republic of China in its science and technology areas.

“The fundamental question to ask is if there is [a] prospect of technology discoveries being shared that could potentially give China a military advantage in the region over, for example, US and its allies, and therefore potentially Australia.
“This is not necessarily about issues of war or conflict, which nobody wants. But it’s about issues like surveillance, detection, submarine activity; areas where our militaries are, to be honest, competing with one another day to day.”

Academic Quislings
Brian Boyle, UNSW’s deputy vice-chancellor (enterprise), championed the Torch project as “delivering a return on investment for Australia through our outstanding and competitive research base”.
The UNSW website hosts Torch-branded “research capability statements” that showcase the university’s research strengths to potential Chinese investors. 
At least three trumpet specific military applications, including “impact and blast-resistant construction materials” developed at the Australian Defence Force Academy.
Another project concerning high-speed, high-precision self-driving vehicles listed a potential application as being “unmanned military vehicles”.
Asked why UNSW was touting military research to potential Chinese investors, Boyle said they were for “general purpose use”. 
When asked why they were on the Torch website, he replied, “That’s our key customer base at the moment.”
“We follow the rules,” he added.
UNSW has been explicit in its motivations for seeking alternatives to Australian government funding. “We didn’t want to keep going back, cap in hand, to Canberra asking for more,” Ian Jacobs, its vice chancellor, wrote in an in an article for the Australian newspaper last year. 
“Instead, we went to China.”
In a separate opinion piece, for the Australian Financial Review, Jacobs wrote: “To join China’s innovation train, we need to move quickly and take on a degree of risk.”
Boyle said: “We believe that in taking these financial and technological risks we are performing the best service to Australian society.”
The university has also been upfront about the central role played by China’s Ministry of Science and Technology in the Torch enterprise. 
Chinese officials have handpicked the first group of companies participating in the scheme. 
The university offers Chinese companies looking to invest in the precinct rent-free office space and tuition scholarships for employees to undertake PhDs.

Chinese mole
The flagship project under Torch is a $20m collaboration between UNSW engineer Sean Li and Hangzhou Cables, which helped fund a $10m laboratory on the university’s Randwick campus, as well as a second collaborative lab in Hangzhou alongside the company’s production facilities where prototypes of the new graphene electricity transmission cables can be produced faster than in Australia. 
It took just three months to open the lab after the negotiations were finalised.
For Li, who joined UNSW 13 years ago, this collaboration marks a huge positive shift in university culture. 
“Now we are doing something to convert fundamental research to practical application,” he said, describing how he has filed nine patents in the past two years.
“This is a big change for myself, and for the university. That’s why the Torch precinct is a very, very rapid development.”
The partners have set up a joint venture, with UNSW taking a 20% stake to Hangzhou Cable’s 80%, and royalties shared equally between the two sides. 
Li confirmed that the new technology had been subject to checks under defence trade control legislation.
The 150 Torch precincts inside China play a key role in Beijing’s full-throttle mission to become a technology power. 
Its ambition – articulated under the banner “Made In China 2025” – is to have 70% of the country’s manufacturing supply chain fed by Chinese companies by 2025. 
China’s broader science policy, described as “technonationalism”, feeds its voracious appetite for cutting-edge technologies.
Promoting its Torch collaboration, the university declares its potential to play a powerful role in China’s development. 
“The rise of a great power needs more. It needs UNSW,” is the sign-off line in the university’s official Torch promotional video.
Jacobs has also explicitly linked Torch with the “Made in China 2025” policy, and China’s desire to become a world technology and science powerhouse by 2049. 
“To get there will require not only an immense national effort by China but also strong and enduring international collaborations,” he told a gala event last year. 
“That’s where we come in.”
One vocal supporter is John Saunders of the Linden Group, infrastructure specialists with close Chinese ties, who believes such schemes should receive more support. 
“I think the UNSW needs to broaden this. I think it needs much bigger commitment from federal government, and I certainly think it can be – not replicated – but can become a model elsewhere in Australia.”
Turnbull declined to comment on the Torch concerns, instead referring to a statement from the Department of Education and Training: “The Australian government is supportive of innovative ideas, which grow Australian society and develop our reputation as a partner of choice internationally.”
UNSW is not the only Australian institution wooing Chinese Torch officials. 
In May, a 20-strong Torch delegation from China visited Griffith University’s Gold Coast campus as part of an exploratory tour of south-east Queensland. 
That came two months after Queensland minister Kate Jones met Torch representatives in China to discuss promoting the Gold Coast “health and knowledge precinct” as a future Torch project.
Nor is it the only university wooing Chinese money. 
The University of Technology Sydney (UTS) has launched a centre for advanced science and technology research, funded by the state-owned China Electronics Group Corporation (CETC), a deal worth $20m over five years
Meanwhile, the University of Melbourne and RMIT are opening an incubation space providing Chinese funding of $80m in partnership with the City of Melbourne and the Australian China Association of Scientists and Entrepreneurs.
In the rush to cash in on Chinese funding, Australian institutions have failed to recognise the potential risks.
“On one hand, the universities have been forced into a position where they’re just out busking for money,” says Stephen Fitzgerald, the first Australian ambassador to China in the early 1970s. 
“On the other hand we have a government that seems to be incapable of taking a serious, considered, long-term, strategic view of our relations with China.”
Peter Jennings, executive director of the Australian Strategic Policy Institute, said. “Universities have never met a dollar they didn’t like … [They] have been frankly a bit wilfully blind to the implications of getting too financially dependent on China.”
In the rush to cash in on Chinese funding, Australian institutions have failed to recognise the potential risks.

Australian kowtow
The UNSW Torch promotional video trumpets the university’s role in supporting the rise of a “great power”. 
Boyle said UNSW’s mission was to have global impact. 
“If by having a global impact one supports the development of another country as well as the development of Australia, I think that’s well within Australia’s defence mandate to do that.”
A central concern of many experts is the potential military application of technologies being developed in partnership with Chinese companies. 
They caution that emerging technologies are often so complicated that scientists can’t forecast how their work will be used, including whether it might have so-called “dual use” civilian/military applications. 
The monitoring of the development and use of cutting-edge technologies is a particularly thorny issue, given the level of specialisation required to understand the implications of such research, and the complexities of attempting to control constantly evolving technologies.
“These are highlighting some of the real challenges of the 21st century, when what is military research and what is civilian research don’t really have meaningful distinctions,” says Dr Margaret Kosal, from the Sam Nunn school of international affairs at Georgia Institute of Technology, who conducts research on potential proliferation threats of nanotechnology.
Medcalf said: “The problem is with some of these technologies, potential for dual use may be there but we won’t know the full extent of the dual use or the full extent of the risk until after the technologies have been shared. In other words, having an export control and licensing arrangement, as we’ve done in the 20th century, for military and dual use technologies, will be too late.”
The mood in Washington has recently shifted towards fear that China’s unabashed focus on innovation, combined with its traditional disregard for intellectual property protection, will inexorably lead to Beijing superseding the US as the world’s leading technology power.
Suttmeier, who briefed President Barack Obama’s council of advisers on science and technology, said: “I think the US has woken up to the sophistication of Chinese technology development strategies, and to the overall thrust of Chinese industrial policies which lie behind a lot of these questions.”
Attempts to contact the Chinese embassy in Canberra and the Ministry of Science and Technology in Beijing for comment did not yield a response.
Plans for phase two of the Torch precinct include the redevelopment of 100,000 square metres at UNSW’s Randwick campus, a project which Yuan Wang, the Torch project manager, said would require capital investment in the order of $1bn. 
She said potential future areas of joint research could include artificial intelligence and telecommunications.

Some of the companies collaborating with UNSW Torch project
  • Nanjing Sunport Power Corp
  • Fuzhou Danlaw Xicheng Electronic Technology Company (China)
  • Shenzhen Kohodo Sunshine Renewable Energy Company
  • IPower Innovation Technology/ShenZhen Smart Power Company
  • FCJ/Zhejiang Hangdian Graphene Tech Company
  • Beijing Origin Water Technology Company
  • CEC Energy
  • Suzhou Londerful Nanotechnology Company
  • LERRI Solar Technology (Taizhou)
  • Huawei Technologies (China)
  • Australian Wetouch Technology
  • Qingdao Robotfish Marine Technology
  • O&C Electric Technique Company
  • Jiangsu Leadmicro Nano-Equipment Technology 
  • South Navigation
  • Beijing Etechwin Electric Company
  • SolarWorld Innovations
  • Tongwei Solar
  • Ming Jing Singapore Holdings 
  • Phono Solar Technology Company
  • Pou Chen Corporation 
  • Double Medical 
  • Qingdao National Laboratory for Marine Science and Technology
  • Tianjin Sungene Biotech Company
  • Beijing Engineering Research Center 
  • Shandong Tongda Marine Science and Technology Company
  • Easthigh
  • Wind Power
  • Adani Solar
  • Yixing Environmental Science and Technology Park

jeudi 27 avril 2017

Chinese Fifth Column: Wolves In Tech Robes

Huawei Is Focus of Widening U.S. Investigation
By Paul Mozur
A Huawei booth at the Mobile World Congress in Barcelona, Spain, in February. The widening inquiry in the United States puts Huawei in an awkward position at a moment when sanctions have taken on new import. 

HONG KONG — As one of the world’s biggest sellers of smartphones and the back-end equipment that makes cellular networks run, Huawei Technologies has become one of the major symbols of China’s global technology ambitions.
But as it continues its rise, its business with some countries has fallen under growing scrutiny from investigators in the United States.
American officials are widening their investigation into whether Huawei broke American trade controls on Cuba, Iran, Sudan and Syria, according to an administrative subpoena sent to Huawei and reviewed by The New York Times. 
The previously unreported subpoena was issued in December by the United States Treasury Department’s Office of Foreign Assets Control, which oversees compliance with a number of American sanctions programs.
The Treasury’s inquiry follows a subpoena sent to Huawei this summer from the United States Department of Commerce, which carries out sanctions and also oversees exports of technology that can have military as well as civilian uses.
As an administrative subpoena, the Treasury document does not indicate that the Chinese company is part of a criminal investigation.
Still, the widening inquiry puts Huawei in an awkward position at a moment when sanctions have taken on new import. 
The Trump administration has been working to push China to cut back its trade, and in turn economic support, for North Korea, amid rising tensions over the North’s nuclear and missile programs. 
The growing investigation also comes after Huawei’s smaller domestic rival, ZTE, in March pleaded guilty to breaking sanctions and was fined $1.19 billion.
It is not clear why the Treasury Department became involved with the Huawei investigation. 
But its subpoena suggests Huawei might violate American embargoes that broadly restrict the export of American goods to countries like Iran and Syria.
“The most likely thing happening here is that Commerce figured out there was more to this than dual-use commodities, and they decided to notify Treasury,” said Matthew Brazil, a former United States commercial officer in Beijing and founder of the Silicon Valley security firm Madeira Consulting.
By its own admission, Huawei has struggled with corporate governance.
In a rare 2015 media appearance, Ren Zhengfei, Huawei’s founder, said that 4,000 to 5,000 employees had admitted to various improprieties as part of a “confess for leniency” program the company set up in 2014.
“The biggest enemy we’ve run into isn’t other people,” he said at the time
“It’s ourselves.”
A Treasury spokeswoman declined to comment on whether it was conducting an investigation. 
A Commerce Department spokesman also declined to comment.
Huawei plays an important strategic role for China. 
The company is often a part of Chinese overseas trade delegations and investment deals in emerging markets like South America and Africa. 
As a major spender on research and development, it is also a crucial part of Chinese industrial policies aimed at building up domestic technological capabilities.
It has also turned itself into an increasingly recognized smartphone brand. 
In the fourth quarter of 2016, Huawei was the third-largest smartphone maker in the world, with a global market share of about 10 percent.
The subpoena, which was sent to Huawei’s Texas offices in the Dallas suburb of Plano, called for the company to describe technology and services provided to Cuba, Iran, Sudan and Syria over the past five years. 
It also called for the identity of individuals who played a part in those transactions. 
North Korea, which was named in the Commerce Department subpoena issued last year, was not named in the Treasury Department subpoena.
The scrutiny of Huawei shows the increased importance both the United States and China are putting on the technology industry. 
Earlier this year a Pentagon report distributed at the top levels of the Trump administration indicated Chinese flows of investment into American start-ups were a new cause for concern.
The American authorities have jurisdiction over the trade of companies like Huawei and ZTE when those companies sell equipment made by or featuring components from American companies. 
If Huawei is deemed to have violated American laws, it could have its access to American electronic components cut off. 
Given the company’s size — it is one of the two largest cellular phone equipment makers in the world — that could have an effect on the expansion of mobile networks around the globe.
When the Department of Commerce first announced its investigation into ZTE, it released a document in which ZTE executives mapped out a plan for how to get around American export controls. 
The document said the strategy came from a company that ZTE labeled with the code name F7, which The New York Times reported closely resembled Huawei.
Earlier this month 10 members of Congress sent a letter to the Commerce Department demanding that F7 be publicly identified and fully investigated.
“We strongly support holding F7 accountable should the government conclude that unlawful behavior occurred,” read a part of the letter.