Affichage des articles dont le libellé est USS Hopper. Afficher tous les articles
Affichage des articles dont le libellé est USS Hopper. Afficher tous les articles

mercredi 21 février 2018

Paper tiger: U.S. “innocent passages” in South China Sea

By Timothy Saviola, Nathan Swire 

The USS Hopper in November 2017 during a photo exercise in the Arabian Gulf. 

The United States drew significant criticism from China for its latest freedom of navigation operation (FONOP) in the South China Sea. 
In the days following the USS Hopper’s transit through the 12-nautical-mile zone around the Scarborough Shoal, editorials in China’s People’s Daily warned that the action was “reckless” and that “China must strengthen and speed up the building of its abilities” in the islands. 
The Global Times, another state-owned paper, noted that as China’s power grows, it is better able “to send more naval vessels as a response and can take steps like militarizing islands.” 
China’s actions have matched its words. 
It recently deployed advanced Su-35 and J-20 fighter aircraft to patrol the South China Sea and is upgrading the civil communications infrastructure on the islands it occupies. 
The Philippines-based Inquirer recently released a cache of new high resolution photos taken in late 2017 detailing the rapid addition of military infrastructure.
A U.S. official described the Hopper’s action as “innocent passage” rather than a FONOP, though “the message was the same.” 
Under the United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea Articles 17–19, all nations have the right of “innocent passage” to continuously and expeditiously traverse other nations’ territorial seas. Though both China and the Philippines claim the Shoals, this reference to the Hopper’s activity as innocent passage seemed to implicitly accede that the shoals are entitled to a territorial sea: Warships need only declare innocent passage to traverse territorial seas, as opposed to the high seas. 
In the 2016 South China Sea arbitration, the International Tribunal for the Law of the Sea ruled that the shoals were not an island but a rock and therefore does not create a territorial sea or other maritime zones on its own.
The Philippines may be making it more difficult for other nations to protect freedom of navigation in the South China Sea by minimizing their claims to Scarborough Shoal and other features. 
The Philippine government has appeared to largely ignore China’s reclamation and militarization efforts during recent meetings: The two countries recently pledged cooperation on joint exploration for oil and gas in the region without touching on construction work or sovereignty in the South China Sea. 
However, the Philippine military recently deployed a TC-90 turboprop aircraft, donated by Japan, to monitor its exclusive economic zone and protect its maritime domain in the South China Sea.
Other major maritime powers have supported the United States’ position on freedom of navigation. 
In March, Britain plans to send a Royal Navy Type 23 frigate, the HMS Sutherland, on a transit through the South China Sea. 

British Defense Secretary Gavin Williamson

Speaking on a recent trip to Australia, British Defense Secretary Gavin Williamson noted that the United Kingdom “absolutely support(s) the U.S. approach” to FONOPS. 
The Royal Navy has left open whether the ship will sail within 12 nautical miles of any of the contested features—thus entering the contested territorial waters—or will simply pass through the sea in uncontested international waters. 
But Williamson noted that the “navy has a right” to sail through the South China Sea. 
The Global Timepublished an editorial dismissing the effort as an attempt by Britain to maintain its naval influence.
The U.S. Department of Defense chronicles these FONOPs in its Annual Freedom of Navigation Report for Fiscal Year 2017, describing the United States’ challenges to what it views as “Excessive Maritime Claims.” 
Activities in 2017 were similar to the scope of challenges in previous years.
The annual report identifies the geographic scope of FONOPs as well as the rights that the United States is asserting.

East China Sea

Natural gas condensate, an ultra-light oil, has spread into the waters of the East China Sea following the collision last month of the Iranian-owned tanker Sanchi with a cargo ship. 
The oil is endangering fisheries in hundreds of square miles of surrounding waters. 
China has taken the lead in dealing with the cleanup. 
Chinese firefighters attempted to extinguish the flames on the ship, but they were unable to rescue any of the 32 crew members from the oil tanker. 
Beijing has come under criticism for the slowness of its response to its disaster and for initial communications that seemed to understate the seriousness of the spill, which is now estimated at 111,000 metric tons, the largest oil spill since 1991.
The environmental effects on the surrounding waters, which include fisheries utilized by both China and Japan, could be severe and long-lasting. 
Oil slicks totaling up to 128 square miles were sighted in regions that include spawning beds for numerous sea creatures, as well as migration routes for marine mammals such as whales. 
The regions affected by the oil spills include both China’s and Japan’s exclusive economic zones. 
The Chinese government has responded by banning fishing in affected regions, while Japan has set up a special coordination unit in the prime minister’s office to deal with the oil spill, including investigating oil that has washed up on the shores of the Japanese Amami-Oshima islands. 
The type of natural gas condensate that has leaked from the Sanchi is highly toxic, but it does not coalesce into highly visible clumps like crude oil, making the extent of contamination hard to measure.
Whether the damage to the East China Sea’s marine ecosystem will have any effect on the maritime disputes in the region remains to be seen.

Robot Wars

On Feb. 10, China began construction on the Wanshan Marine Test Field in the city of Zhuhai in southern China. 
According to the government-controlled China Internet Information Center, the test field will be used as a research facility for unmanned ship technology. 
The approximately 300-square-mile facility will be the largest of its kind in the world and will be run as a joint program between the Zhuhzai government, the China Classification Society, the Wuhan University of Technology, and Oceanalpha, a company focused on developing unmanned surface vessels.
This is not China’s first foray into unmanned vessels. 
Over the past few months, the Chinese government has promoted the success of several of such vessels with military or law enforcement applications. 
These include the Tianxing-1which China claims is the world’s fastest unmanned vessel, with a maximum speed of over 57 miles per hour—as well as the Huster-68, which successfully executed a patrol around the Songmushan Reservoir. 
The website of Shenzhen Huazhong University, which developed the Huster-68, states that the patrol vessel would aid China’s ability to manage water resources and achieve its ambitions of becoming a blue-water navy (according to a translation from the South China Morning Post). 
Wuhan University has been running a research program into the development of maritime drones since 2012.
These developments come as other navies around the world are developing their own maritime drones. 
In 2016, the British Royal Navy conducted “Unmanned Warrior” off the coast of Scotland and Wales, a mass demonstration of aerial, surface, and underwater maritime autonomous vessels. 
The U.S. Navy, meanwhile, has recently established its first Unmanned Undersea Vehicle Squadron, UUVRON 1, which will oversee existing vehicles and test new ones.

The United States

Adm. Harry Harris, commander of U.S. Pacific Command, has been nominated to be U.S. Ambassador to Australia. 
In testimony to the House Armed Services Committee, Harris took a hard line against China’s actions in the South China Sea—which he oversaw when leading Pacific Command—saying that China’s aggression in the region is “coordinated, methodical, and strategic, using their military and economic power to erode the free and open international order.”

Analysis and Commentary

In the National Interest, Gordon Chang criticizes as self-defeating the U.S. description of the transit near Scarborough Shoal as “innocent passage,” because it seems to be implying that China is the rightful sovereign of the shoal—even though the shoal itself is contested and the South China Sea arbitration found it did not confer a territorial sea.
Peter Jennings of the Australian Strategic Policy Institute applauds the pick of Harris as ambassador to Australia, saying “[t]he posting sends the clearest possible signal that the US is intent on strengthening its Asian alliances.”
In Japan Forward, Ryozo Kato, former Japanese Ambassador to the U.S., suggests that Japan should reopen the debate into whether it should pursue nuclear weapons in an age of continuous threat from North Korean missiles.

mardi 23 janvier 2018

Chinese Aggressions


As U.S. goes quiet on close naval patrols, China speaks out
By Greg Torode, Philip Wen

HONG KONG/BEIJING -- While the Pentagon plays down patrols close to Chinese-controlled reefs and islands in the South China Sea, Beijing is sounding the alarm about them, seeking to justify what experts say will be an even greater presence in the disputed region.

An aerial photo taken though a glass window of a Philippine military plane shows the alleged on-going land reclamation by China on Mischief Reef in the Spratly Islands in the South China Sea, west of Palawan, Philippines, May 11, 2015. 

Chinese officials publicized the latest U.S. “freedom of navigation patrol”, protesting the deployment last week of the destroyer USS Hopper to within 12 nautical miles of Scarborough Shoal, an atoll west of the Philippines which Beijing disputes with Manila.
It was the second time in recent months that confirmation of a patrol came from Beijing, not Washington, which had previously announced or leaked details.
Bonnie Glaser, a security expert at Washington’s Center for Strategic and International Studies, said while the administration of U.S. President Donald Trump had a policy of keeping the patrols regular but low key, China was willing to publicly exploit them to further their military ends.
“It is difficult to conclude otherwise,” she said. 
“Even as it pushes ahead with these (patrols), I don’t think the Trump administration has really come to terms with what it will tolerate from China in the South China Sea, and what it simply won’t accept, and Beijing seems to grasp this.”
In official statements, Chinese foreign ministry official Lu Kang said China would take “necessary measures to firmly safeguard its sovereignty” in the resource-rich sea.
Some regional diplomats and security analysts believe that will involve increased Chinese deployments and the quicker militarization of China’s expanded facilities across the Spratlys archipelago.
While U.S. officials did not target China in their comments, couching freedom-of-navigation patrols as a “routine” assertions of international law, Beijing was quick to cast Washington as the provocateur.
The Communist Party’s official People’s Daily newspaper on Monday accused the U.S. of upsetting recent peace and co-operation and “wantonly provoking trouble”, saying China had must now strengthen its presence in the strategic waterway.

CONSTRUCTION AND MILITARIZATION

In recent years, China has built up several reefs and islets into large-scale airstrips and bases as it seeks to assert and enforce its claims to much of the sea, through which some $3 trillion in trade passes annually. 
The Philippines, Vietnam, Malaysia and Brunei hold rival claims.
Chinese coastguard and People’s Liberation Army navy ships patrol vast swathes of the South China Sea, routinely shadowing U.S. and other international naval deployments, regional naval officers say.
Zhang Baohui, a mainland security analyst at Hong Kong’s Lingnan University, told Reuters he believed Beijing was rattled by Trump’s sharpening Asia strategy and they might be tempted to react in the South China Sea, even after months of relative calm.
“We can expect the Chinese to push ahead with militarization as retaliation,” he said.
A new U.S. national defense strategy unveiled last week stressed the need to counter the rising authoritarian powers of China and Russia, outlining a need to better support allies and newer partners against coercion.
While most analysts and regional envoys believe China remains keen to avoid an actual conflict with the significantly more powerful U.S. navy in the South China Sea, it is working to close the gap.
China has added bunkers, hangars and advanced radars on its new runways in the Spratlys, although it has not fully equipped them with the advanced surface-to-air and anti-ship missiles they use to protect the Paracels grouping further north.
Similarly, Beijing has yet to land jet fighters in the Spratlys -- test flights some experts are expecting this year.

POTENTIAL FLASHPOINT

The latest patrol was at least the fifth such patrol under the Trump administration and the first to Scarborough -- one of the more contentious features in the region.
Scarborough, once a U.S. bombing range, was blockaded by the Chinese in 2012, prompting the Philippines to launch its successful legal case in the Hague against China’s excessive territorial claims.
China allowed Filipino fishermen back to Scarborough’s rich waters last year, but it remains a potential flashpoint as both sides claim sovereignty and China maintains a steady presence of ships nearby.
While experts and regional envoys expect China to ramp up operations from the Spratlys, none expect it to build on Scarborough -- something widely believed to be a red line that would provoke the United States, given its long-standing security treaty with the Philippines.
Shi Yinhong, who heads the Center for American Studies at Beijing’s Renmin University, said China had “lived with” U.S. patrols for several years but the key facts on the ground remained in China’s favor and broader tensions had “improved remarkably”.
“These islands, especially those with reclaimed land and military capability already deployed, they’re still in Chinese hands,” Shi, who has advised the Chinese government on diplomacy, told Reuters.
“I don’t think Trump has the stomach and the guts to change this fundamental status quo.”

Chinese Aggressions

Japan Sees Red Over China’s Submarine Deployment
By Timothy Saviola, Nathan Swire 

On Jan. 11, the Japanese Ministry of Defense announced that two vessels, a Chinese 4,000-ton Jiangkai-II class frigate and a submarine of unknown origins, were sighted near the territorial waters surrounding Japan's Senkaku Islands. 
The Japanese government later identified the submarine as a Shang-class nuclear attack submarine, after it raised the Chinese flag in international waters. 
This is the first time China has deployed a submarine to the area. 
Specifically, the submarine was sighted in the contiguous zone of the islands—the area between 12 and 24 nautical miles from shore.
Japan formally protested China’s actions, with Defense Minister Itsunori Onodera calling it an “act that unilaterally raises tensions.” 
Japanese officials also reiterated that they are committed to improving relations with China, despite what they consider China’s actions hampering the relationship. 
Japan’s actions included directly summoning the Chinese ambassador to Japan, Cheng Yonghua, to discuss the issue.
In turn, Chinese officials claimed they had the right to enter the waters around the islands because the islands fall under Chinese ownership. 
A pro-China paid editorial in the Washington Post the day after the incident also cited that China had been safeguarding its territorial sovereignty.
The islands were uninhabited and unowned prior to 1895, when Japan annexed them into its territory. 
Japan has maintained administrative control of the islands since the end of the Sino-Japanese war later that year.
The appearance of the Chinese frigate and submarine follows the incursion of four Chinese Coast Guard vessels into the waters surrounding the islands. 
Since Japan chose to nationalize the islands in 2012, China has increased “routine” patrols of maritime law enforcement ships, as well as scrambling military flights to the surrounding seas. 
It was not until June 2016, however, that China first deployed a naval vessel to the Senkauku Island’s contiguous zone, in that case a Jiankai-I class frigate. 
 A deployment of a fleet of fishing and coastguard vessels to the region followed soon after
The deployment of a Chinese submarine represents a further escalation from these previous patrols. China’s decision to send a submarine to the area around the islands could therefore represent the same kind of “salami slicing” it has been using in the South China Sea to assert its authority, gradually ramping up its level of interference without taking any steps so far beyond precedent that they would force a response.
China’s actions take place against the backdrop of the two country’s agreement last month to create a new crisis-management hotline to de-escalate conflicts in the region. 
However, Japan made clear during the negotiations that the hotline would apply only to issues outside its territorial waters, so the Senkaku Islands themselves are excluded. 
Previous efforts to create this hotline had been frozen after Japan nationalized the islands, and because Japan has continued to insist that the hotline not apply to the islands.
Beyond its maritime movements, China has continued to accelerate its naval development to bolster its power in the South China Sea. 
The country has launched a new underwater surveillance network to aid its submarines in navigation and targeting. 
The project was led by the South China Sea Institute of Oceanology, but has recently been handed over to the Navy for military use. 
The network covers the South China Sea, as well as the western Pacific and Indian oceans. 
The program may undercut the United States’ “asymmetric advantage” in submarine operations due to its expertise in ocean surveillance.
China also recently began construction of its third aircraft carrier, according to sources close to China’s People’s Liberation Army. 
When completed, the carrier will provide China with increased power projection due to its catapult launch system and larger size than existing carriers. 
Sea trials for China’s second aircraft carrier are expected to begin in February as part of its qualification process, but the carrier is not likely to enter service before the end of 2018.

In Other News…
United States





The United States continued its freedom of navigation operations (FONOPS) in the South China Sea this week. 
In remarks on Jan. 20, Chinese foreign ministry spokesman Lu Kang announced that the USS Hopper, a U.S. missile destroyer, sailed within 12 nautical miles of the Scarborough Shoal on Jan. 17. 
Lu said “China is strongly dissatisfied with [the incident] and will take necessary measures to firmly safeguard its sovereignty.” 
The disputed reef is claimed by China and the Philippines. 
Philippines Presidential spokesman Harry Roque Jr. commented that the Philippines did “not wish to be part of a U.S.-China intramural,” and Defense Secretary Delfin Lorenzana downplayed the FONOP as not a concern.
U.S. officials confirmed the patrol, and noted that it was conducted under the regime of “innocent passage” under which warships have the legal right to quickly pass through a country’s 12 nautical mile territorial sea even without the coastal country’s permission. 
The last U.S. Navy FONOP, near the Paracel Islands, was revealed last October.

Japan-Australia
Australian Prime Minister Malcolm Turnbull visited Japan this week, and met his counterpart Shinzo Abe to discuss a visiting forces agreement
The proposed deal would make it easier to conduct joint military exercises by providing a more certain legal framework for hosting military personnel and equipment. 
Japan has a similar agreement in place with the United States. 
The two prime ministers agreed to accelerate the negotiations and complete the agreement "as early as feasible.”
Any defense agreement or increased cooperation is predicted to inflame tensions with China, which is likely to view such action as a provocation aimed at countering its rising influence. 
Japan and Australia have concluded similar agreements in previous years as the countries’ security strategies have converged around friction in the South China Sea and Korean peninsula.

Vietnam

Vietnam has invited India to increase its investment in the oil and gas sector in the South China Sea. India’s Oil and Natural Gas Corporation has been active since 1988 in developing wells in Vietnam’s maritime claims. 
Vietnam’s exploration activities often cause diplomatic difficulties because of the region’s overlapping claims. 
 In his Jan. 11 press conference, Lu stated his country’s opposition to the comments and use of bilateral relations as Vietnam’s excuse “to infringe upon China's legitimate rights and interests in the South China Sea and impair regional peace and stability.”
Vietnam’s building program in the South China Sea has also continued throughout 2017 as one counterweight to China’s land reclamation program. 
Vietnam has also recently held defense talks with its former colonial power France. 
France sees Vietnam as an important partner in the region due to the countries’ historical ties, and Vietnam believes engagement with France can provide it with more influence on the U.N. Security Council powers.

Analysis and Commentary: Year in Review

Recent commentary has emphasized the relative lack of engagement from Washington on the South China Sea throughout 2017. 
Writing in the Asia Times, Xuan Loc Doan reviews the Trump administration’s light-touch foreign policy approach to the South China Sea, and how U.S. opposition to China’s building projects has taken a back seat to other issues. 
The Post’s Emily Rauhala writes that though “Trump has given no clear signs that he plans to make the South China Sea a priority in 2018,” potential Chinese actions may bring the dispute back to the foreground. 
Looking ahead, Steven Stashwick in The Diplomat highlights several U.S.-China military trends to watch in 2018, including development of hypersonic weapons, focus on submarine capabilities, and new strategies for littoral combat operations.
China’s posture has also changed in the last year. 
Tom Mitchell and John Reed in the Financial Times chronicle Xi’s effort to seize the “strategic opportunity” created by the U.S. pullback. 
China has focused on reinforcing existing land reclamation in the South China Sea rather than in developing new reefs, and has expanded investment projects in countries like the Philippines to diffuse tensions over the maritime conflict.
In a recent “Centner for Strategic and International Studies” podcast, Zack Cooper and Bonnie Glaser spoke with Asia Maritime Transparency Initiative Director Gregory Poling on the outlook for the South China Sea in 2018, including China’s strategic goals for the region and how the United States could increase its engagement in the region.