By Douglas Bulloch
Over the course of this year, as Donald Trump has unsettled himself into the U.S. Presidency, one relatively clear policy area that has emerged is the slow ratchet of pressure on China.
Incendiary rhetoric from the campaign abated for a time – after a congenial meeting at Mar-a-lago in March – but clearly Trump had intended China to take away inferences from that meeting that China duly, and predictably, ignored.
It may be the Trump team fully expected this outcome, and that the current round of twitter bridling was also long planned.
Either way it matters little.
The several areas of dispute where Chinese and U.S. interests overlap are all now in the spotlight.
Consequently, the U.S. has recently announced – and conducted – more regular FONOPS missions in the South China Sea, a significant arms deal with Taiwan, and the newly elected dovish President of South Korea has now authorised a more extended THAAD deployment after briefly flirting with de-escalation.
Consequently, the U.S. has recently announced – and conducted – more regular FONOPS missions in the South China Sea, a significant arms deal with Taiwan, and the newly elected dovish President of South Korea has now authorised a more extended THAAD deployment after briefly flirting with de-escalation.
Furthermore, although the U.S. secured some advances on trade with China which have not yet been reversed, they have made little secret of their disappointment now that further progress has stalled.
All the talk in Washington at the moment is of further action against China on the question of technology transfers and IP protection.
Diplomatic Shape Shifting
Attempting to get all this in perspective has led some to conclude that the U.S. is struggling to retain influence in the region, as China's Belt and Road Initiative dominates the attentions of investors, particularly in the wake of Trump's abandonment of the Trans Pacific Partnership (TPP).
Diplomatic Shape Shifting
Attempting to get all this in perspective has led some to conclude that the U.S. is struggling to retain influence in the region, as China's Belt and Road Initiative dominates the attentions of investors, particularly in the wake of Trump's abandonment of the Trans Pacific Partnership (TPP).
This interpretation is reinforced by the lack of success the U.S. has so far had in pushing back against Chinese expansionism in the South China Sea and its failure to stop North Korea's missile programme.
China's reactions to U.S. pressure, however, characterised by deflection over North Korea, naval cooperation with Russia, and open displays of military readiness, are not providing any comfort for those regional states who might be persuaded to think again about the strength of their relationship with the U.S.
China's reactions to U.S. pressure, however, characterised by deflection over North Korea, naval cooperation with Russia, and open displays of military readiness, are not providing any comfort for those regional states who might be persuaded to think again about the strength of their relationship with the U.S.
Indeed, countries that are not historically close to the U.S. have recently been the focus of China's more assertive posture.
In the South China Sea, a Vietnamese decision to commence appraisal drilling for gas in contested waters was reversed after overt threats of Chinese military intervention.
In the South China Sea, a Vietnamese decision to commence appraisal drilling for gas in contested waters was reversed after overt threats of Chinese military intervention.
Now a remote Himalayan valley is hosting a sharp stand-off that has newspapers in India considering the prospect of war.
And to the North, Mongolia has seen the election of a new President who makes no secret of his hostility to China.
What happened to China's peaceful rise to regional hegemon?
What happened to the cooperative spirit of the BRICS?
What does it all mean for the Belt and Road Initiative?
There are many detailed conclusions that might be drawn about each question, but right now South Korea's response to North Korea's missile development is a work in progress, Japan is on the move strategically, and India is holding firm over Doklam, so until things settle down much will remain unclear.
There are many detailed conclusions that might be drawn about each question, but right now South Korea's response to North Korea's missile development is a work in progress, Japan is on the move strategically, and India is holding firm over Doklam, so until things settle down much will remain unclear.
What is clear, however, is that there is an ongoing reassessment taking place across the region, with clear strategic realignments taking place, but it is not all going China's way.
While the focus right now is on North Korea, it is also the case that this particular problem has long been moving in the same direction.
While the focus right now is on North Korea, it is also the case that this particular problem has long been moving in the same direction.
Trump has failed to prevent North Korea developing their capabilities so far, but China is clearly feeling the heat and may yet act more decisively against their erstwhile allies.
In other areas there are real changes.
Japan, South Korea and Taiwan all remain firmly in the U.S. orbit, now Vietnam and India are making explicit overtures for U.S. support.
After years of friendly exchanges with the Obama administration, Vietnam has this week announced the visit of a U.S. aircraft carrier scheduled for next year.
India, on the other hand, has seen Narendra Modi visit the White House for an unexpectedly friendly exchange, amid murmurings about 'freedom of navigation' – code for the possibility of naval engagement in the South China Sea – while bluntly refusing to concede to China's increasingly belligerent demands over Doklam.
At a broader level, India and Japan have long been growing closer, cementing an India/Japan initiative called the Asia Africa Growth Corridor, which shows some similarities to China's Belt and Road Initiative.
India, on the other hand, has seen Narendra Modi visit the White House for an unexpectedly friendly exchange, amid murmurings about 'freedom of navigation' – code for the possibility of naval engagement in the South China Sea – while bluntly refusing to concede to China's increasingly belligerent demands over Doklam.
At a broader level, India and Japan have long been growing closer, cementing an India/Japan initiative called the Asia Africa Growth Corridor, which shows some similarities to China's Belt and Road Initiative.
Then behind all this, the strategic support of the U.S. for such a development would suddenly see China facing a rather different world than they were expecting.
Indeed, they even went so far as to condemn India's alliance with Japan, linking it to their own unwillingness to support India's bid permanent member status in the UNSC.
As the U.S. retreats, so the need for the U.S. advances.
After all these months of diplomatic manoeuvring, it is difficult to escape the conclusion that the mere prospect of U.S. withdrawal, however distant, has focussed attention on what a China led regional order might look like.
As the U.S. retreats, so the need for the U.S. advances.
After all these months of diplomatic manoeuvring, it is difficult to escape the conclusion that the mere prospect of U.S. withdrawal, however distant, has focussed attention on what a China led regional order might look like.
In particular, that multitude of territorial claims that China makes on almost all of its neighbours now looks less like a historical detail, and more like a growing problem, a problem to which the most obvious answer happens to be a stronger relationship with the U.S.
While the focus of the world's attention over recent months has been the U.S., therefore, it is also worth considering how the world is changing for other aspirant powers.
While the focus of the world's attention over recent months has been the U.S., therefore, it is also worth considering how the world is changing for other aspirant powers.
Where China publicly claims to oppose North Korea becoming a nuclear power, it more certainly opposes the deployment of THAAD in South Korea, and it has failed on both counts.
It has stretched its arms towards ASEAN, but instead of successful diplomatic persuasion has resorted to tin-eared military threats to prevent a unified rejection of their South China Sea grab.
With the U.S. it faces more pressure on a trade relationship the economy depends upon, and with India – a fellow BRICS country – they are issuing daily threats against them.
Hardly the most auspicious backdrop to the forthcoming 19th Party Congress.
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