Two Chinas Policy

"The U.S. should jettison the ambiguous one China mantra, ramp up its official engagement with Taiwan, ultimately restoring full diplomatic recognition." -- John Bolton

By ANDREW BROWNE

Trump’s phone conversation on Friday with Taiwan’s Tsai Ing-wen broke decades of diplomatic shenanigan

TAIPEI—Donald Trump took the call. 

The voice on the other end of the line was Taiwan’s president congratulating him. 

They chatted for a few minutes about economic matters and security—the normal business of politics. 

Why all the fuss?
After all, China didn’t object too strenuously, directing its displeasure primarily toward Taiwan for what it called a “petty trick.” 

That’s far from the explosion Beijing’s past behavior may have indicated for such a breach of protocol: No president has spoken to a Taiwan leader since Washington cut formal diplomatic ties with Taipei and recognized the People’s Republic in 1979.
Yet the future of U.S.-China relations, and the stability of East Asia, depends in large part on what Mr. Trump meant by the exchange.
Some pro-China hands in Washington think it was devoid of meaning—a sign of incompetence. 

"He blundered into the call, oblivious to the potential risks of challenging a delicate status quo that has largely kept the peace across the Taiwan Strait since Chiang Kai-shek and his defeated Kuomintang fled to the island in 1949 after years of Chinese civil war."
This precarious balance relies on the U.S. and other countries accepting an elaborate fallacy, one that Beijing insists upon: that Taiwan is part of “one China,” not the independent country it so clearly has become. 

U.S. presidents have traditionally played along with this; declining calls from Taiwan leaders is part of the charade.
Mr. Trump’s call with President Tsai Ing-wen, however, seems to have been anything but an accident. It was planned in advance after several of his senior aides and proxies visited Taipei.
His advisers are clear about their goals: an end to all the tip-toeing around Beijing’s sensitivities, and unambiguous U.S. support for Taiwan, backed up by enhanced military cooperation. 

They want America to deal with Taiwan on its own terms, not Beijing’s.
The island would revert to its Cold War role as an “unsinkable aircraft carrier” to contain China.
Writing earlier this year in The Wall Street Journal, John Bolton, the former U.N. ambassador who is in the frame for a senior job in the Trump White House, suggested that the U.S. should play the “Taiwan card” in response to aggressive Chinese moves in the South China Sea and East China Sea, “jettisoning the ambiguous ‘one China’ mantra.” 

If China doesn’t back down, the U.S. should ramp up its official engagement with Taiwan, “ultimately restoring full diplomatic recognition.”
For China, Taiwan is a “core interest”; nothing is more important. 

Beijing’s restrained response to the call could reflect its concern not to provoke Mr. Trump into going along this path, which would likely precipitate a meltdown in U.S.-China relations.
With his politically "incorrect" phone call, though, Mr. Trump seems to be threatening a move in precisely that direction. 

In doing so, he would be reversing a long history of U.S. administrations sacrificing Taiwan’s interests in exchange for fancy benefits with Beijing.
That trade-off has looked increasingly questionable as Beijing challenges the U.S. for dominance in East Asia, and closes its markets to U.S. tech companies. 

On the trade side, Mr. Trump has already pledged punitive tariffs on Chinese exports to the U.S.
Yet a sudden shift in Washington’s approach to cross-Straits relations could leave Taiwan even more vulnerable. 

Beijing has never dropped its threat to grab Taiwan by force. 

It is now trying to strong-arm Ms. Tsai into stating her support for “one China.”
She refuses, but nevertheless tolerates the muddled status quo in the interests of friendly ties with Beijing.
Having barged into the most sensitive area of U.S.-China relations, Mr. Trump must now expect Beijing to test his resolve. 

How would he respond as president to a provocation, perhaps a military one, aimed at Taiwan? 

If he backs down, he will have damaged his credibility with both sides, along with friends and allies in the region.
Nonetheless, “one China” is increasingly anachronistic. 

After nearly seven decades, it is realistic for Taiwan to demand a more secure basis for its existence than a make-believe political arrangement that won’t permit presidential telephone calls, high-level visits or other normal exchanges between friendly countries.
A policy reset is long overdue, both in Beijing, which needs to come up with an approach to Taiwan that accommodates the reality that it is a flourishing democracy—with no desire to come under Beijing’s authoritarian sway—and in Washington.