lundi 12 juin 2017

The Necessary War

A scholar-analyst makes a historical case for a U.S.-China war. 
By Albert R. Hunt

The wisdom of war

Before settling in for pleasurable summer books, read Graham Allison's "Destined for War: Can American and China escape Thucydides's Trap?"
It starts with the Athenian historian's chronicle of the conflict between Sparta and Athens in the fifth century B.C. as a way to tackle the larger question of whether war can be averted when an aggressive rising nation threatens a dominant power. 
Allison, a renowned Harvard University scholar and national security expert, studied 16 such cases over the past 500 years; in 12 there was war.
For three-quarters of a century, the U.S. has been the dominant world power. 
China is now challenging that hegemony economically, politically and militarily. 
Both countries, with vastly different political systems, histories and values, believe in their own exceptionalism.
The two nations, Allison argues, are "currently on a collision course for war."
He's been sweeping in and out of government, serving five Republican and Democratic administrations from Washington and his perch at Harvard
He's a first-class academic with the instincts of a first-rate politician. 
He brings to the "Thucydides Trap" an impressive sweep of history and geopolitical and military knowledge. 
Unlike some academics, he writes interestingly.
Allison analyzes why so many rising powers ended up in wars with established ones, and why some didn't. 
The best contemporary examples are the German rise that led to World War I contrasted with the confrontation between the U.S. and the Soviet Union, which was kept from escalating into hot war for more than four decades.
In the early part of the 20th century, the U.K. was threatened by an emerging Germany, which had been unified decades before by Bismarck, and which was blowing past Britain economically and moving up on its naval dominance. 
The political leaders in the U.K., Allison writes, were beset by anxieties and Germany emboldened by ambition. 
Mutual mistrust, an arms race and World War I followed.
After World War II, facing the menacing challenge from the Soviet Union, the U.S. fashioned the policy of containment, starting with the extraordinary Marshall Plan to rebuild war-ravaged allies and adversaries. 
With smart diplomats and presidents, from John F. Kennedy's handling of the Cuban missile crisis through Ronald Reagan's engagement with Mikhail Gorbachev, war was averted before the Soviet Union collapsed.
The rise of China offers a classic Thucydides trap. 
In 1980, China's economy was only a tenth the size of the U.S. economy. 
By 2040, Allison reckons, it could be three times larger. 
China considers itself the most important power in Asia, irrespective of U.S. commitments and alliances with allies in the region. 
With Donald Trump presiding over a White House hostile to international institutions, Xi Jinping has at least a claim on the title of premier global leader.
Allison depicts plausible scenarios of how conflicts between these two superpowers could break out: disputes over Taiwan or the South China Sea, or an accidental provocation by a third party -- it was the assassination of an Austrian archduke by a Serbian terrorist that triggered World War I -- or, less likely, a quarrel related to economic competition.
The most dangerous threat lurks in the Korean peninsula, where North Korea has nuclear warheads and is trying to develop the missile technology to hit San Francisco. 
What happens if the Pyongyang regime collapses and its strongman, Kim Jong-un is eliminated?
In March, Xi explained the nuances of the Korean situation to Trump, whose White House had warned that "if China is not going to solve North Korea, we will."
If that's a military threat, consider: An assault on North Korea would be answered by missile attacks against nearby Seoul that could kill as many as a million people. 
Imagine that followed by an invasion of the north by the U.S. and South Korea to prevent more carnage. 
Would China sit still for a unified Korean peninsula allied with the U.S.? 
The answer was no in 1950, to General Douglas MacArthur's shock, when it was much less powerful, confident and ambitious.
Allison isn't a pessimist. 
He argues that with skillful statecraft and political sensitivity these two superpowers can avoid war.
Xi is a ruthless autocrat, but a smart one with China's customary patience.
In the U.S., by contrast, the current commander-in-chief shows little interest in history and is irrational, insecure and impulsive.

World War III Casualties
2016 PopulationKilledSurvivors
CHINA1 373 541 2781 057 119 68977%316 421 589
UNITED STATES323 995 52819 089 7836%304 905 745
EUROPEAN UNION513 949 445371 356 95872%142 592 487
RUSSIA142 355 41530 924 81622%111 430 599
INDIA1 266 883 5981 158 499 17491%108 384 424
PAKISTAN201 995 540175 747 47387%26 248 067
JAPAN126 702 133114 241 88990%12 460 244
VIETNAM95 261 02184 340 68889%10 920 333
PHILIPPINES102 624 20992 732 90290%9 891 307
KOREA, NORTH25 115 31121 141 05084%3 974 261
KOREA, SOUTH50 924 17247 636 30294%3 287 870
TAIWAN23 464 78722 278 49095%1 186 297
4 246 812 4373 195 109 21475%1 051 703 223

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