Born to Spy: The Chinese and Sino-American Massive Threat

Scientists With Links to China Are Stealing Biomedical Research

Nearly 200 investigations are underway at major academic centers. Researchers of Chinese descent are usual suspects.
By Gina Kolata

The M.D. Anderson Cancer Center in Houston. Administrators have investigated five faculty members on suspicions that they stole intellectual property or violated funding rules.

The Sino-American scientist at M.D. Anderson Cancer Center in Houston was hardly discreet. 

“Here is the bones and meet of what you want,” he wrote in a misspelled email to researchers in China.
Attached was a confidential research proposal, according to administrators at the center. 

The scientist had access to the document only because he had been asked to review it for the National Institutes of Health — and the center had examined his email because federal officials had asked them to investigate him.
The N.I.H. and the F.B.I. have begun a vast effort to root out scientists who are stealing biomedical research for China from institutions across the United States.

Almost all of the incidents they uncovered and that are under investigation involve scientists of Chinese descent, including naturalized American citizens, stealing for China.
Seventy-one institutions, including many of the most prestigious medical schools in the United States, are now investigating 180 individual cases involving theft of intellectual property. 

The cases began after the N.I.H., prompted by information provided by the F.B.I., sent 18,000 letters last year urging administrators who oversee government grants to be vigilant.
So far, the N.I.H. has referred 24 cases in which there may be evidence of criminal activity to the inspector general’s office of the Department of Health and Human Services, which may turn over the cases for criminal prosecution. 

“It seems to be hitting every discipline in biomedical research,” said Dr. Michael Lauer, deputy director for extramural research at the N.I.H.
China is exploiting the openness of the American scientific system to engage in wholesale economic espionage. 

The scale of the dragnet has sent a tremor through the ranks of suspected Sino-American and Chinese biomedical researchers.
“You could take a dart board with medical colleges with significant research programs and, as far as I can tell, you’d have a 50-50 chance of hitting a school with an active case,” said Dr. Ross McKinney Jr., chief scientific officer of the Association of American Medical Colleges.
The theft involves not military secrets, but scientific ideas, designs, devices, data and methods that may lead to profitable new treatments or diagnostic tools.
Some researchers under investigation have obtained patents in China on work funded by the United States government and owned by American institutions, the N.I.H. said. 

Others are suspected of setting up labs in China that secretly duplicated American research, according to government officials and university administrators.
The N.I.H. has not named most of the scientists under investigation, citing due process, and neither have most of the institutions involved. 

“As with any personnel matter, we typically do not share names or details of affected individuals,” said Brette Peyton, a spokeswoman at M.D. Anderson.
But roughly a dozen Chinese scientists are known to have resigned or been fired from universities and research centers across the United States so far. 

Some have declined to discuss the allegations against them; others have denied any wrongdoing.
In several cases, Chinese scientists supported by the N.I.H. or other federal agencies are accused of accepting funding from the Chinese government in violation of N.I.H. rules. 

Some have said that they "did not know" the arrangements had to be disclosed or were forbidden.

“How would you feel if you were a U.S. scientist sending your best idea to the government in a grant application, and someone ended up doing your project in China?” said Dr. Ross McKinney, chief scientific officer at the Association of American Medical Colleges.

In August, Feng Tao, 48, a chemist at the University of Kansas known as Franklin, was indicted on four counts of fraud for failing to disclose a full-time appointment at a Chinese university while receiving federal funds.
His lawyer, Peter R. Zeidenberg, declined to comment on Tao’s case but suggested that prosecutors were targeting academics nationwide who had made "simple" mistakes.
“Professors, they get their summers off,” he said in an interview.
“Oftentimes they will take appointments in China for the summer. They don’t believe they have to report that.”

The investigations have left Chinese and Sino-American academics feeling “that they are at risk,” said Frank Wu, a former president of the Committee of 100, an organization of pro-Beijing Sino-American scientists.
Wu and other critics said the cases recalled the government’s investigation of Wen Ho Lee, a scientist at the Los Alamos National Laboratory who was accused in 1999 of stealing nuclear warhead plans for China and incarcerated for months.
He pleaded guilty to a single felony count of "mishandling" secrets.

The Justice Department changed its rules in 2016, giving greater oversight over these national security cases to prosecutors in Washington.

Dr. Lauer and other officials said the investigations into biomedical research have uncovered clear evidence of wrongdoing.
In one case at M.D. Anderson, a Chinese scientist who had packed a suitcase with computer hard drives containing research data was stopped at the airport on the way to China, Dr. Lauer and officials at the center said.
Overall, they argued, the cases paint a disturbing picture of economic espionage in which the Chinese government has been taking advantage of a biomedical research system in the United States built on trust and the free exchange of ideas.
“How would you feel if you were a U.S. scientist sending your best idea to the government in a grant application, and someone ended up doing your project in China?” Dr. McKinney asked.
‘This was something we had never seen.’

The F.B.I. director Christopher Wray appearing before the Senate Judiciary Committee on July 23.

Concern at the N.I.H. about the theft of biomedical research stretches back at least to June 2016, when the F.B.I. contacted N.I.H. officials with unusual questions about the American scientific research system.
How did peer review happen? 

What sort of controls were in place? 

“They needed to know how our system worked as compared to, say, national defense,” Dr. Lauer said.
The F.B.I. declined to discuss ongoing investigations, including why it initiated so many and how targets were selected. 

But Christopher Wray, director of the F.B.I., told the Senate Judiciary Committee in July that China is using “nontraditional collectors” of intelligence, and is attempting to “steal their way up the economic ladder at our expense.”
The F.B.I.’s national field office for commercial counterespionage, in Houston, asked administrators from Texas academic and medical centers to attend classified meetings in the summer of 2018 to discuss evidence of intellectual property theft. 

The administrators were given emergency security clearances and told to sign nondisclosure agreements.
Then, acting on information from the F.B.I. and other sources, the N.I.H. in late August 2018 began sending letters to medical centers nationwide asking administrators to investigate individual scientists.
“This was something we had never seen,” Dr. Lauer said. 

“It took us a while to grasp the seriousness of the problem.”
Some of the first inklings of trouble were discovered by administrators at M.D. Anderson, a prominent cancer research and treatment center. 

Between August 2018 and January 2019, five letters arrived at the center from the N.I.H. asking administrators to investigate the activities of five Chinese faculty members.
Dr. Peter Pisters, president of the cancer center, said he and his colleagues reviewed faculty emails, and they turned up disturbing evidence.
Among the redacted emails provided to The New York Times was one by a Chinese scientist planning to whisk proprietary test materials to colleagues in China. 

“I should be able to bring the whole sets of primers to you (if I can figure out how to get a dozen tubes of frozen DNA onto an airplane),” he wrote.

Chinese moles: Li Xiao-Jiang, right, and Li Shihua in Guangzhou, China. They were employed at Emory University in Atlanta for more than 20 years.

The redacted M.D. Anderson emails also suggest that a Chinese scientist at the medical center sent data and research to the Chinese government in exchange for a $75,000 one-year “appointment” under the Thousand Talents Program, which Beijing established a decade ago to recruit scientists to Chinese universities.
Researchers are legally obligated to disclose such payments to the N.I.H. and to their academic institutions, and the scientist had not done so, according to an internal report on the investigation.
Still another Chinese scientist at M.D. Anderson had forwarded a confidential research proposal to a contact in China, writing, “Attached please find an application about mitochondrial DNA mutation in tumor development. Please keep it to yourself.”
Administrators at M.D. Anderson said three of the Chinese scientists had resigned and one had retired. 

The fifth case involved a scientist whose transgressions may not be serious enough to be fired.
Xifeng Wu, who left M.D. Anderson and is now dean of the School of Public Health at Zhejiang University in China, declined to comment on the circumstances of her resignation. 

“I would like to focus on my research,” she said.
M.D. Anderson is not the only institution wrestling with Chinese scientific misconduct.
Last month, two married scientists, Yu Zhou, 49, and Li Chen, 46, who had worked at Nationwide Children’s Hospital in Columbus, Ohio, for a decade, were indicted on charges that they stole technology developed at the hospital and used it to apply for Chinese patents and set up biotech companies in China and the United States.
In May, two scientists at Emory University in Atlanta, Li Xiao-Jiang and Li Shihua, were fired after administrators discovered that Li Xiao-Jiang had received funding from China’s Thousand Talents Program.
The couple had worked there for more than two decades, researching Huntington’s disease. University administrators declined to provide further information.

In July, Kang Zhang, the former chief of eye genetics at the University of California, San Diego, resigned after local journalists disclosed his involvement with a biotech firm in China that relies on research he had performed at the university.
Zhang, also a member of the Thousand Talents Program, did not tell the university about his role. 

Dr. Michael Lauer, deputy director for extramural research at the National Institutes of Health in Bethesda, Md. “We know there are companies formed in China for which we funded the research,” he said.

What is coming to light, Dr. Lauer said, is “a tapestry of incidents.”
Start-up companies in China were founded on scientific and medical technology that the N.I.H. developed with taxpayer money. 

“We know there are companies formed in China for which we funded the research,” Dr. Lauer said.
Scientists of Chinese descent also secretly received patents in China for research conducted in the United States, according to Dr. Lauer, and researchers in the Thousand Talents Program signed contracts that require them to provide the Chinese government with confidential results obtained in the United States or other lab discoveries.
“If the N.I.H. funded it, it should be available to U.S. taxpayers,” said Dr. McKinney, of the Association of American Medical Colleges. 

“But if a project is also funded in China, it is moving intellectual property to China.”

Chinese and Sino-American Massive Threat

The National Institutes of Health in Bethesda, Md. 

Federal and academic officials stress that they are not targeting Chinese researchers on the basis of their ethnicity. 

But the F.B.I.’s silence regarding how so many investigations began has exacerbated concern that the government’s efforts to uncover economic espionage may tar all Chinese and Sino-American scientists.

With the Trump administration imposing tariffs intended to punish violations of intellectual property rights, Wu sees a sharp reversal in attitudes about China and the Chinese.

“I am getting calls and emails constantly now from ethnic Chinese — even those who are U.S. citizens — who feel suspected,” he said. 

To Dr. Lauer, the charges of racism are unfounded. 

“Not all the foreign influence cases involve China,” he said. 

“But the vast majority do.”
The real question, he added, is how to preserve the open exchange of scientific ideas in the face of growing security concerns. 

At M.D. Anderson, administrators are tightening controls to make data less freely available.
People can no longer use personal laptops on the wireless network. 

The center has barred the use of flash drives and disabled USB ports. 

And all of its employees’ computers can now be monitored remotely.
The N.I.H. is clamping down, too. 

It recommends that reviewers of grant applications have limited ability to download or print them. Those traveling to certain regions should use loaner computers, it says, and academic institutions should be alert to frequent Chinese travel by scientists, or frequent publishing with colleagues outside the United States.
The National Science Foundation has commissioned an independent scientific advisory group to recommend ways of balancing openness and security, and warned scientists it funds that they are prohibited from participating in programs like China’s Thousand Talents Program.
The F.B.I. has given research institutions tools to scan emails for keywords in Mandarin that might tip off administrators to breaches, according to Dr. McKinney.
“The effects this will have on long-term, trusting relationships are hard for us to face,” he said. 

“We just are not used to systematic cheating.”