China Encroaches on India’s Sphere of Influence

An autocrat in the Maldives tests New Delhi’s resolve.
By Sadanand Dhume

Maldivian police stand guard near the opposition party’s headquarters in Male after President Abdulla Yameen declared a state of emergency, Feb. 6. 

Is India still top dog in its neighborhood? 

This is the question raised by a political crisis in the Maldives, an Indian Ocean island chain known for its luxury beach resorts. 

Unless New Delhi swiftly restores democracy, it risks looking ineffectual in the face of Chinese inroads into India’s traditional zone of influence.
The crisis began earlier this month, when President Abdulla Yameen’s government declared a state of emergency and arrested two Supreme Court judges as well as a long-serving former president who is Mr. Yameen’s half-brother. 

The arrests followed a Supreme Court ruling that declared the terrorism conviction of exiled former President Mohamed Nasheed unconstitutional and ordered the release of eight other jailed opposition lawmakers.
Major democracies reacted to Mr. Yameen’s actions with dismay. 

The State Department said the U.S. was “troubled and disappointed” by the declaration of emergency. India’s Foreign Ministry announced that New Delhi was “disturbed.” 

The United Kingdom, from which the Maldives gained independence in 1965, said it was “gravely concerned.”
By contrast, China urged the international community to “play a constructive role on the basis of respecting the sovereignty of the Maldives.” 

Translation: Mr. Yameen should be allowed to snuff out constitutional checks without fear of foreign intervention. 

The People’s Liberation Army reinforced this message last week by posting on social media photos of training exercises in the Indian Ocean.
The Maldives has a population of 400,000 people, about as many as Staten Island, N.Y., or the south Mumbai neighborhood of Byculla. 

The country has come to symbolize a broader tussle between the world’s two most populous nations, China and India. 

For India it represents a stark challenge: Beijing’s growing influence in countries where New Delhi has traditionally loomed large.
In Nepal, K.P. Oli, a veteran communist leader with links to China, took over as prime minister last week. 

In Bangladesh, China has rolled out $24 billion in loans, mostly for infrastructure projects, dwarfing India’s more modest forays into checkbook diplomacy.
In the tiny Himalayan kingdom of Bhutan, arguably India’s closest ally, Beijing is lobbying to establish full diplomatic relations. 

Last year Indian and Chinese troops were involved in a 10-week standoff on territory claimed by both Bhutan and China, and regarded by India as strategically vital. 

It ended when the Chinese agreed to halt construction of a road to which India objected, and both countries pulled back troops.
Nowhere in the region is China’s dramatically enlarged presence more visible than in Sri Lanka, the teardrop-shaped island that dangles off the southern tip of India. 

In Colombo, hulking cranes rise above a $1.4 billion port expansion and new commercial and residential development built by a Chinese firm on reclaimed land. 

Company officials say the development could turn Colombo into a commercial hub midway between the thriving entrepôts of Singapore and Dubai.
A 45-minute helicopter ride south of Colombo—over dense forests, manicured tea plantations, herds of wild elephants, and $2,000-a-night resorts—is China’s most controversial project in the region. 

In the sleepy town of Hambantota, China has built an airport with an 11,500-foot runway capable of landing an Airbus A380, as well as a modern seaport able to dock oil tankers. 

Both are largely unused.
Unable to pay back the money it borrowed to build the port, last year Sri Lanka handed it to China on a 99-year-lease. 

Both the Colombo Port project and Hambantota are part of China’s ambitious One Belt, One Road initiative.
In an interview in Colombo earlier this month, Sri Lankan Prime Minister Ranil Wickremesinghe flatly stated that his country will not allow the Chinese to use the port for military purposes. 

But U.S. and Indian officials say that is a possibility.
This regional backdrop raises the stakes for India in the Maldives. 

Should Mr. Yameen continue to flout the Supreme Court order, it will send a signal across the region and beyond that even the smallest nations can, with China’s backing, thumb their noses at New Delhi without consequence.
In a phone interview from Colombo, former Maldivian President Nasheed says he’s concerned that expensive Chinese infrastructure projects amount to a potential “land grab” that is “hollowing out” his country’s sovereignty. 

He also worries that under Mr. Yameen the Maldives has allowed Islamic State to make inroads into the Muslim-majority country.
Mr. Nasheed stops short of explicitly calling for an Indian military intervention to restore democracy. (Thirty years ago, India sent troops to ward off mercenaries who attempted to depose the then-president.) 

Nonetheless, when asked what New Delhi should do to ensure Mr. Yameen respects the Supreme Court decision that sparked the current crisis, he leaves ajar the door to intervention: “How they impress this upon him, I’m sure countries have the imagination and the tools to do that.”

The former president may have to pick his words carefully, but for India the choice is clear. 

If it wants to retain credibility as South Asia’s leading power, it cannot allow the Maldives to turn into an authoritarian Chinese vassal. 

This means keeping all options on the table, including using military force if necessary.