Chinese fifth column: Sam Dastyari told to resign from Senate positions after China revelation

Bill Shorten confirms senator will step down over ‘mischaracterisation’ of comments he made supporting Beijing’s stance on the South China Sea
By Katharine Murphy 

Chinese fifth column in Australia

Australia’s Labor leader, Bill Shorten, has instructed his strife-prone senator Sam Dastyari to resign from his Senate positions in an attempt to minimise the political fallout from the senator’s dealings with Chinese figures.

Shorten released a statement early on Thursday confirming that Dastyari would step down from his Senate roles, which include a deputy whip and committee positions, because he had demonstrated a lack of judgment.
“It is not a decision I took lightly,” Shorten said. 

“I told Senator Dastyari that his mischaracterisation of how he came to make comments contradicting Labor policy made his position untenable.
“I also told him that while I accept his word that he never had, nor disclosed, any classified information, his handling of these matters showed a lack of judgment.”
Thursday’s development is a second strike for Dastyari. 

Shorten took the same action more than a year ago.
Dastyari resigned from frontbench positions last September when it was revealed that he had supported China’s aggressive posture in the South China Sea during a press conference flanked by Huang Xiangmo – a Sydney-based Chinese businessman who had, controversially, picked up one of his legal bills.
Over the past 24 hours, it has been revealed that Dastyari met privately with Huang and tipped him off that his phone was tapped by security agencies.
A recording subsequently emerged of the press conference in which Dastyari quite clearly contradicted Labor’s official position on the dispute in the South China Sea.
“The Chinese integrity of its borders is a matter for China, and the role that Australia should be playing as a friend is to know that we think several thousand years of history, thousands of years of history, when it is and isn’t our place to be involved,” Dastyari said in the recording.
While Dastyari had previously attempted to characterise his remarks as “silly” and “naive”, the remarks at the press conference were clearly expressed, and at odds with the official Labor policy position, which backed the Australian government’s stance supporting an international ruling against China in the permanent court of arbitration in The Hague.
In standing Dastyari down, Shorten said he was confident the accident-prone senator would “learn from this experience”.
Turnbull government ministers weren’t so confident. 

The defence minister, Marise Payne, pointed out that Dastyari had been through precisely this cycle before.
The prime minister, Malcolm Turnbull, declared that Dastyari’s position was untenable, and said he must resign from the Senate. 

“Sam Dastyari should get out of the Senate, full stop. That’s his duty”.
The attorney general, George Brandis, inferred on Wednesday that Dastyari was engaged in counter-surveillance activity, but on Thursday he said he wasn’t implying the behaviour was treasonous.
“I’m not saying it’s treason. What I’m saying is that Dastyari’s position on the basis of what we know is completely untenable,” the attorney general said.

Sam Dastyari : traitor or/and Beijing's running dog?

“We know Sam Dastyari took deliberate steps to undermine or subvert what he believed might be an intelligence investigation. We find this out 24 hours ago.”
Brandis said Dastyari had called a press conference “confined it to Chinese-language media … for the deliberate purpose of undermining the Labor party’s policy in relation to China”.
He pointed out that the senator’s comments at the press conference were a clear contradiction of Labor’s policy, articulated at the time by the shadow defence minister, Stephen Conroy.
While Dastyari said Australia’s stance on China’s territorial interests in the South China Sea should be hands off, Conroy said Labor should send a message against aggression by conducting freedom of navigation exercises in the South China Sea.
“What is a politician, by the way, doing holding a press conference at the behest of his major donor, who is almost literally pulling the strings,” Brandis said Thursday.

“And then we also know that on several occasions subsequently he lied about what he had said about the press conference. Rather that a few mumbled words, we now know these were deliberate, scripted, concerted remarks and their … purpose was to send a message through the Chinese media that were a Labor government to have been elected, its foreign policy in relation to China would be at variance from what had been announced by the Labor shadow minister, Senator Conroy.”
Later, in the Senate, Brandis said many senators had been felled in the rolling citizenship debacle over recent months “for a technical reason, unbeknownst to them, they were deemed to owe allegiance or acknowledgement to a foreign sovereign”.
“And meanwhile, sitting in the Senate in a senior position in the Labor party, there sat Senator Dastyari, who evidently ... by his conduct, was actually under a foreign influence – actually under a foreign influence, but he kept quiet, he stayed mum, he maintained his position, until his position was exposed by the media in the last 24 hours or so and now he has been forced to resign. Again.”
A clearly emotional Dastyari told the Senate on Thursday morning he was a proud Australian and he found “the inferences that I’m anything but a patriotic Australian deeply hurtful”.

His Chinese Master's Voice

The senator said he had never been given any advice by a security agency, and if he had been given advice, he would “follow it to the letter”.
“I want to be absolutely clear, I could not be a prouder Australian,” he said. 

“My family was lucky enough to leave a war-torn Iran to start a new life in this amazing land. I find the inferences that I’m anything but a patriotic Australian deeply hurtful.”
He acknowledged he had done the wrong thing by holding a press conference and departing from Labor’s position on the South China Sea. 

“The price I paid for that was high but appropriate.”
Dastyari said he had been “shocked” by the press conference audio because “it did not match my recollection of events”.
He said his intention was to go on working for the people of New South Wales.

America Just Backed Down Against China Again

When China complained about a plan for the Navy to make port calls in Taiwan, Congress listened.
BY JULIAN G. KU 

Three Taiwanese submarines at the Tsoying navy base in Kaohsiung, southern Taiwan, on Jan. 18. 
In June, the Senate Armed Services Committee passed an amendment to the fiscal year 2018 National Defense Authorization Act (NDAA) that would require U.S. Navy warships to conduct port calls in Taiwan — that is, to regularly dock, contrary to current practice, at Taiwanese ports for extended visits. 

The Chinese government quickly indicated its opposition: The amendment drew “solemn representations” from the ministry of foreign affairs, which denounced the U.S. government’s “erroneous actions on Taiwan-related issues.”
I have previously written about how, as a matter of law, Congress almost certainly lacks the constitutional authority to require the president to send the U.S. Navy on port calls to particular countries. 

But on merit, such port calls are a good idea since they would reassure Taiwan of the U.S. commitment to its security while placing China, which claims Taiwan is part of its own sovereign territory, on the defensive. 

A U.S. aircraft carrier visiting a Taiwanese port for an extended visit would be a tangible demonstration of the U.S. Navy’s commitment to maintaining a presence in and around Taiwan in the face of growing Chinese naval strength.
So there was plenty of reason to support a House version of the 2018 NDAA that would have simply required the secretary of defense to submit a report by fall 2018 on the feasibility of such Taiwan port calls. 

Such a provision is perfectly constitutional and would send a useful signal to China that the United States takes Taiwan port calls seriously.
But China’s opposition may have led to Congress further dilute the already watered-down House version of the “port calls” language. 

The Senate recently passed a final version of the 2018 NDAA that no longer requires a report but merely expresses the “sense of Congress” that the U.S. should “consider the advisability and feasibility of reestablishing port of call exchanges between the United States navy and the Taiwan navy.” 

A sense-of-Congress statement is not nothing, but it represents a substantial climb-down from mandating port calls or requiring the Pentagon to report on a plan for them.
Port calls in Taiwan are not going to make or break U.S.-Taiwan policy. 

But it’s notable that Chinese government opposition may have convinced Congress to back off its more aggressive support for this idea; it should remind us of the difficulty of managing foreign policy from the legislative branch. 

As I observed earlier this year, Congress has usefully intervened on Taiwan policy with several bills, including the Taiwan Travel Act and the Taiwan Security Act. 

But given Congress’s many legislative priorities, these bills are likely to languish in committee. 

The NDAA, by contrast, must pass every year to authorize military operations, which is why it is so disappointing the more aggressive port call provisions were removed.
On the other hand, just as Congress backs off its effort to manage Taiwan policy and push port calls, the Trump administration’s China team may finally be coming together behind the idea. 

After all, the individual most responsible for promoting the idea of U.S. Navy port calls in Taiwan, Randall Schriver, is likely to soon be confirmed to the position of assistant secretary of defense for Asia-Pacific affairs. 

In prepared answers to policy questions at his confirmation hearing in November, Schriver reiterated his support for port calls in Taiwan, even though the Pentagon has been neutral on this issue so far:
Since we reserve for ourselves the right to define our own One China Policy, commencing U.S. ship visits to Taiwan and vice versa can be included. 

The benefits of U.S. port calls to Taiwan would fall into the traditional justification for port calls to any other friendly country in the world — rest and relaxation for the sailors (which aids in recruitment and retention); minor repair and maintenance; port familiarization to assist in planning for a known contingency; and to support our political goals of supporting Taiwan and deterring China. 

If there are alternate views in the Department of Defense, I look forward to learning more about the counter arguments.
We will see whether Schriver’s views prevail within the U.S. government, where the pro-China State Department is likely to provide an opposing view in deference to what are likely to be vigorous Chinese government protests. 

But the baton on port calls, and Taiwan policy as a whole, is probably being handed over to the executive branch. 

For those of us outside the administration, whether such port calls happen will be an interesting signal of Schriver’s influence in shaping U.S.-China policy — and the ultimate direction of that policy in the Trump administration.

Chinese Peril

China has a plan to rule the world
By David Ignatius

The Chinese dictator and the American moron.

The friendly words exchanged between Trump and Xi Jinping this month softened the edge of a Chinese economic and military buildup that a recent study commissioned by the Pentagon described as “perhaps the most ambitious grand strategy undertaken by a single nation-state in modern times.”
At the Beijing summit on Nov. 9, Xi repeated his usual congenial injunction for “win-win cooperation,” and Trump responded in kind, calling Xi “a very special man.”

Trump also complained about the Chinese trade surplus, but the visit was mostly a serenade to Sino-American cooperation.
What caught my ear was Xi’s hint of China’s big ambitions in his toast that night. 

He quoted a Chinese proverb that “no distance, not even remote mountains and vast oceans, can ever prevent people with perseverance from reaching their destination.” 

Xi then cited an adage from Benjamin Franklin: “He who can have patience, can have what he will.” 

That’s an apt summary of China’s quiet but relentless pursuit of becoming a global superpower.
China’s rise has been so rapid that it’s easy to miss how fast Beijing has expanded its ability to project power. 

The mesmerizing go-slow style of the pre-Xi years, summarized in the Chinese slogan “hide and bide,” has been replaced by what U.S. analysts now see as an open power play.
Trump’s “America first” strategy has facilitated China’s buildup, unintentionally. 

The administration’s rhetoric on fair trade has been strong, but the actual gains have been modest. Meanwhile, Trump has shredded the Trans-Pacific Partnership and stepped back from other U.S.-led alliances — opening the way for China’s new network of global institutions, including the “One Belt, One Road” (OBOR) plan for Eurasian trade and the Asian Infrastructure Investment Bank to finance Chinese-led projects.
The scope of China’s challenge to the American-led order is described in two unpublished and unclassified studies commissioned by the Air Force.
One study argues that China’s Eurasian reach is beyond that of the 1947 Marshall Plan, which cemented American power in postwar Europe. 

The report estimates that the OBOR framework would provide up to $1 trillion in Chinese support for more than 64 countries, while the Marshall Plan provided about $150 billion in current dollars, mostly to six countries. 

The report describes OBOR as “a program of unprecedented size and scope with the strategic intent of constructing a Chinese-led regional order in Eurasia.”
China is building the infrastructure of power. 

The study describes, for example, how Beijing is financing a string of ports in the Indian Ocean region, including in Sri Lanka, Malaysia, Pakistan, Burma, Djibouti, Kenya and the United Arab Emirates. 

The proposed investment is nearly $250 billion.
China has also invested $13.6 billion in Greece, buying control of the port of Piraeus and big shares of Greek utilities and fiber-optics companies. 

“Greece serves as a strategic beachhead for China into Europe,” notes the report.
The Asian infrastructure bank, meanwhile, has approved $16 billion in projects in 10 countries, including long-standing U.S. allies such as Egypt, India and Oman. 

And the Chinese are building rail lines to Europe and every part of Asia, allowing them to bypass U.S.-controlled sea lanes. 

China already has 40 rail routes to nine European countries.
American dominance has been built partly on the primacy of our scientific and technological laboratories, which have drawn the best and brightest from around the world. 

But the Chinese are challenging here, too. 

China is building at least 50 joint-venture science and technology labs with OBOR countries and plans over the next five years to train up to 5,000 foreign scientists, engineers and managers, the study notes.
As foreign scientists pull back from some U.S. labs because of visa and government-grant worries, the Chinese are doubling down. 

According to the second Air Force study, China surpasses the United States in annual patent applications, is now No. 2 in peer-reviewed research articles and in 2014 awarded more than twice as many degrees in science, technology, engineering and math.
China is mobilizing its best tech talent for this global empire. 

China Telecom plans to lay a 150,000-kilometer fiber-optic network covering 48 African nations. IZP, a big-data company, plans to expand soon to 120 countries. 

BeiDou, a government agency, is building a GPS-like satellite navigation system for all Eurasia.
There’s an eerie sense in today’s world that China is racing to capture the commanding heights of technology and trade. 

Meanwhile, under the banner of “America first,” the Trump administration is protecting coal-mining jobs and questioning climate science.
Sorry, friends, but this is how empires rise and fall.

Iron Lady: Hillary Clinton hits China on human rights and South China Sea

“The path to legitimacy and leadership runs through responsible cooperation, not through secret military build-ups on contested islands or bullying smaller neighbors”
By Jessica Meyers


Hillary Clinton, shown in April at the Women in the World Summit in New York, spoke Tuesday by teleconference to a economics and policy conference in Beijing.

Hillary Clinton spoke to the Chinese audience as if she were giving a presidential address.
The former White House contender delivered a pointed, forceful attack Tuesday aimed at Trump and Xi Jinping, with whom the U.S. leader claims a unique chemistry. 

Her remarks — which ranged from human rights to climate change — were striking in their divergence from Trump’s, who visited China only weeks earlier.
This administration “came in and retreated from diplomacy,” she said via teleconference to a packed economics and policy conference in Beijing. 

While under Xi, “we are seeing an unprecedented consolidation of power. That does trigger anxiety about a more assertive Beijing and worries from your neighbors as well as the United States.”
The former secretary of State’s hour-long appearance included a keynote speech and questions. 

It comes less than a month after Xi feted Trump at the Forbidden City in a “state-visit plus” heavy on pageantry and short on evident breakthroughs.
Trump, who pulled off an upset over Clinton in 2016, has berated the Communist nation for unbalanced trade deals and treating North Korea too gently. 

He promised “tremendous things” for the two nations after the trip, but provided few concrete details. Trump did not call out China for its human rights abuses or extensive claims in the South China Sea.
Clinton, seated in a white armchair with a backdrop of bookshelves, ticked them off like a list.
“The path to legitimacy and leadership runs through responsible cooperation, not through secret military build-ups on contested islands or bullying smaller neighbors,” Clinton said, in reference to China’s efforts to build artificial islands in waters its neighbors also claim.
Clinton has traversed the U.S. in recent months picking apart the presidential race and autographing copies of her third memoir, “What Happened.” 

In it, she faults herself — and a great many other people — for her loss.
In her speech Tuesday, she made multiple mentions of her book and Russia’s attempt to sway the election, although her comments focused most on the precarious nature of Sino-U.S. ties. 

The relationship, she said, “is at a crossroads.”
Clinton echoed several similar themes to Trump’s, including ensuring fair trade practices and doing more to curb North Korea’s nuclear ambitions. 

She urged the U.S. and China to pursue negotiations with the isolated state, instead of resorting to “bluster” and “taunts.” (Trump’s nickname for North Korean leader Kim Jong Un is “Rocket Man.” Kim has labeled Trump a “mentally deranged U.S. dotard.”)
“Beijing should remember that inaction is a choice,” Clinton said.
Trump’s 13-day visit to Asia in early November sought to deepen assistance in dealing with North Korea, while convincing skeptical allies of America’s commitment to the region and reworking trade deals.
“You’re a very special man,” he told Xi at a briefing with reporters, where they did not take questions.
Clinton last visited Beijing officially in 2012 as the Obama administration’s top diplomat. 

But the former New York senator, two-time White House hopeful, and previous first lady has a history with China.
It began in 1995 when, as first lady, she gave a forceful speech at the Fourth World Conference on Women in Beijing. 

She declared “women’s rights are human rights,” and, without mentioning China, criticized forced abortions, mistreatment towards girls, and females sterilized against their will.
Chinese officials considered it an inappropriate swipe at the country’s treatment of women and its one-child policy. 

Human rights advocates embraced her bluntness. 

A New York Times editorial said it may have been “her finest moment in public life.”
Clinton reminded the audience of those remarks on Tuesday, and called it “one of the most memorable experiences of my life.”
She also referenced her decision to assist Chen Guangcheng, a blind civil rights lawyer who escaped house arrest and fled to the U.S. Embassy in Beijing seeking asylum. 

The move coincided with Clinton’s visit in 2012, sparking a diplomatic crisis. 

Chen was eventually allowed to leave the country.
Clinton helped launch strategic talks between the two countries, but Chinese blamed her for pushing policies in the Asia-Pacific they viewed as an attempt to contain China.
A year after Clinton became secretary of State in 2009, she told a security conference in Hanoi that the U.S. had a vital interest in ensuring ships could sail freely on the South China Sea. 

China’s Foreign Ministry decried her comments as “an attack on China.”
In 2015, Clinton called Xi “shameless” for allowing the imprisonment of five feminists while he hosted a United Nations meeting on women’s rights. 

The Global Times, a state-run newspaper, labeled her a “rabble rouser” and accused her of “ignominious shenanigans.”
The paper compared Clinton to “demagogue Donald Trump.” 

At least some Chinese, it appeared, preferred the bureaucrat they didn’t like to the businessman they couldn’t predict.
But Chinese officials and businesses are now listening to the person who made it into White House, said Wang Huiyao, president of the Center for China and Globalization, a Beijing think tank.
“What she said may not have a big impact in China,” he said. 

“Chinese companies really care what the [current] administration thinks. … The business interest in China and the U.S. is still huge and that, fundamentally, is the biggest common denominator.”
Tuesday’s event was hosted by Caijing, a well-known business magazine that tends to draw big names to its annual conference. 

Former President Bill Clinton gave the keynote three years ago, when his wife was still weighing a second presidential run.
“I was the candidate of reality,” she said, in response to a final question on Tuesday. 

“It just wasn’t as entertaining as the reality TV candidate.”

Lethal Threat: The Quantum Gap with China

China has ramped up its investment in developing quantum technologies, but few understand the impacts of losing this modern-day space race.
BY THOMAS E. RICKS

China has ramped up its investment in developing quantum technologies, but few understand the impacts of losing this modern-day space race.
Seventy-five years ago, the United States and imperial Japanese navies (IJN) faced off at the Battle of Midway, an engagement that would prove decisive in determining the outcome of World War II in the Pacific. 

The U.S. navy (USN) had devoted tremendous intelligence resources to detecting when and where such a battle might occur. 

They had long known that the IJN’s primary strategic objective was to lure the USN into a decisive fight. 

The IJN planned a surprise attack. 

Why then did the USN take such a risk?
The USN knew it had two critical advantages despite being outgunned and likely years behind in naval readiness than their Japanese counterparts. 

First, it had broken its adversary’s codes and unlocked access to all of imperial Japan’s communications. 

They knew precisely when and where an attack would take place. 

Second, the USN had outclassed its adversary’s fighting platforms with two new and revolutionary technologies, radar and sonar. 

Therefore, not only did the USN know precisely when and where to place its forces to counter the IJN punch, but it also maintained better situational awareness throughout the fight. 

Had the United States not recognized the strategic importance these technologies would play throughout the war it may have cost it victory at Midway and many other points along the way.

U.S. navy aircraft on the deck of the USS Enterprise on the first day of the Battle of Midway. 

How does the Battle of Midway relate to the ongoing race to develop quantum technologies? Quantum technologies are those that make use of some of the properties of quantum mechanics. Features such as quantum entanglement, quantum superposition, and quantum tunneling can be applied in new forms of computation, sensing, and cryptography. 

Many are convinced that whoever masters this esoteric field will gain a similar dominance both in codebreaking and advanced sensors. 

These advantages will tip scales both in the ongoing cyber war being carried out daily over the global internet and in future state-on-state combat.
Given these risks, China’s recent announcement of a $10 billion, four million square foot national quantum laboratory in Hefei should raise alarms. 

Having already demonstrated a head-start in a handful of quantum technology applications — such as its launch of the Micius satellite, the first satellite-to-ground quantum network, and China’s claimed engineering of a quantum radar capable of detecting current stealth technologies — China has proven it wants to maintain its advantage. 

These achievements combined with the massive investment by the Chinese government in quantum research should be a wake-up call to policy-makers and military leaders alike.
China’s increased spending and demonstrated advances in developing quantum technologies will enable advantages both commercially, and militarily, for a handful of reasons. 

The most concerning advantage relates to codebreaking. 

Today, communication networks pass digital information over public infrastructures, such as fiber optic pathways and wireless airwaves, using encryption to prevent eavesdroppers from reading the content of the message traffic. 

The only thing stopping eavesdroppers from decrypting this traffic is the mathematical complexity of doing so. 

Quantum computers will have the ability to crack these codes in far less time than today’s most advanced conventional computers. 

Furthermore, as quantum computers make linear gains in computational power, they will exponentially decrease the time it takes to break current means of encryption.
Conversely, just as quantum technologies can be used to decrypt traditional security measures, it also can protect information in sophisticated new quantum communication channels. 

One of the more pervasive concerns of relying on public infrastructure to communicate sensitive information comes from eavesdroppers. 

Man-in-the-middle attacks allow eavesdroppers to place sensors along public communication pathways to copy all data passing through these channels and attempt to decrypt it either in real-time or later through brute-force. 

Today, traditional networks have no reliable means to detect when these types of listening apparatus are emplaced. 

Quantum technologies, by design, detect changes at the smallest of scales. 

The extreme sensitivity of quantum technologies enables them to detect anomalies such as when an eavesdropper attempts to copy or siphon off data. 

China has already tested a 2,000km long quantum communication pathway from Beijing to Shanghai that employs this powerful new means of detecting man-in-the-middle eavesdroppers. 

They have already begun to defend their most sensitive networks.
If we return to the lessons learned from the Battle of Midway, the USN realized early on that having better sensors meant providing military leaders better situational awareness in tactical engagements. 

The rise of quantum technologies that enhance sensing will also dramatically change the landscape of military technologies in coming years. 

Quantum metrology technologies enable measurements of minute changes such as gravity upon subatomic particles and other characteristic changes that occur at atomic scales. 

Developments in this arena will have profound effects on a variety of sensors. 

China claims that it has already created a new form of quantum radar capable of defeating the electromagnetic stealth technologies employed in the $1 trillion F-35 program. 

This would render much of the strategic investments sunk into this platform tragically outdated and call into question the future viability of this already controversial program. 

The announced quantum information sciences laboratory in Hefei would also focus on the development of quantum metrology and appears set to build upon China’s early claims regarding quantum radar successes.
China has demonstrated it wishes to maintain its first mover advantage in this field. 

Given this, what should policy-makers, military leaders, and commercial decision-makers do? 

Just as previous world leaders have made calls for increased scientific spending to bolster national security interests, leaders today must recognize the changing threat landscape imposed by quantum technologies and put some skin in the game. 

To produce a profound increase in opportunities in this field someone must provide incentives for the next generation of researchers and developers. 

The free market may not be enough. 

Recently the U.S. House Science Committee voiced concerns that the United States was falling behind countries such as China that are ramping up research and development in this area.
As policymakers consider what technologies will give their societies and militaries distinct advantages — it is evident quantum technologies should be near the top of their list. 

The value proposition is clear. 

Quantum technologies enable better access to, and protection of, quality information. 

Policy and decision makers live and die by intelligence. 

Just as nations trembled at the prospect of another country owning the ultimate high ground — space — so too should they worry about who dominates the development and application of quantum technologies. 

Today, China has the high ground in quantum technologies.

Rogue Nation: Beijing Hinders Free Speech Abroad

Through a campaign of fear and intimidation, Beijing is hindering free speech in the United States and in other Western countries.
China Digital Times

At The New York Times, Wang Dan, a former leader of the 1989 Tiananmen Square protests, looks at the growing reach of Chinese censors on American college campuses as Beijing attempts to export its political control beyond its borders. 

Chinese international students studying in the U.S. were discouraged from attending Wang’s forums on Chinese politics due to fear of reprisal.
[…O]ver the past three months, my efforts on American campuses have been stymied. 

The Chinese Communist Party is extending its surveillance of critics abroad, reaching into Western academic communities and silencing visiting Chinese students. 

Through a campaign of fear and intimidation, Beijing is hindering free speech in the United States and in other Western countries.
The Chinese government, and people sympathetic to it, encourage like-minded Chinese students and scholars in the West to report on Chinese students who participate in politically sensitive activities — like my salons, but also other public forums and protests against Beijing. 

Members of the China Students and Scholars Association, which has chapters at many American universities, maintain ties with the Chinese consulates and keep tabs on “unpatriotic” people and activities on campuses. 

Agents or sympathizers of the Chinese government show up at public events videotaping and snapping pictures of speakers, participants and organizers.
Chinese students who are seen with political dissidents like me or dare to publicly challenge Chinese government policies can be put on a blacklist. 

Their families in China can be threatened or punished.
When these students return to China, members of the public security bureau may “invite” them to “tea,” where they are interrogated and sometimes threatened. 

Their passport may not be renewed. 

One student told me that during one of his home visits to China he was pressured to spy on others in the United States. [Source]
Australia has also recently been confronted with Chinese government influence on its academic and publishing sectors. 

Publisher Allen & Unwin announced plans to postpone the release of Clive Hamilton’s book on Chinese influence in Australia for fear of possible legal action from Beijing. 

The book’s delay has sparked widespread criticism as the country grapples with its economic dependence on China and the consequent growth of Beijing’s interference in its domestic affairs. From Jacqueline Williams at The New York Times:
The decision this month to delay the book, “Silent Invasion: How China Is Turning Australia into a Puppet State,” has set off a national uproar, highlighting the tensions between Australia’s growing economic dependence on China and its fears of falling under the political control of the rising Asian superpower.
Critics have drawn parallels to decisions this year by high-profile academic publishers in Europe to withhold articles from readers in China that might anger the Communist Party.
But the case has struck a particularly sensitive nerve in Australia, where the book’s delay is the latest in a series of incidents that have raised concerns about what many here see as the threat from China to freedom of expression. [Source]
Allen & Unwin is not the only major Western publisher that has succumbed to pressure from Beijing to censor material critical of China. 

The book’s delay is the latest in a series of incidents that have raised concerns about Chinese attack on freedom of expression. 

Last month, scientific publishing company Springer Nature caved in to Chinese government request and blocked hundreds of articles on its Chinese website that touched on sensitive political topics. 

In August, Cambridge University Press withheld more than 300 articles from the Chinese website of China Quarterly, before reversing the decision in response to widespread criticism.
In Ghana, artist Bright Tetteh Ackwerh has published a series of cartoons criticizing Chinese influence in the country. 

He has continued to use art to speak out against controversial Chinese government activities in the country despite protests from Beijing. 

Kwasi Gyamfi Asiedu at Quartz reports:
In the image, Xi Jinping is pouring a sludge of brown water from a Ming dynasty vase into bowls held by Ghana’s president and the minister of natural resource. 

Next to Xi, China’s ambassador to Ghana happily clutches a gold bar.
The Chinese embassy was reportedly infuriated by the cartoon and issued a complaint to the Ghanaian government on media coverage of the arrests of several Chinese miners involved in illegal mining, which is known locally as “galamsey”. 

While Ghanaian miners were also arrested, much of the public’s focus has been on the Chinese. Ghana is the second largest gold producer in Africa after South Africa.
[…A]ckwerh, who cites Chinese dissident artist Ai Weiwei as one of his inspirations, wasn’t done. 

In August, he published another cartoon titled “Occupation,” where the presidents of Ghana, Nigeria and Senegal are arguing over a plate of jollof rice. 

It’s reference to the so-called jollof wars, a mostly fun debate between West African countries over who makes the best version of the dish.
[…] “I hope my example has given other artists the courage to also contribute to this and things like this. 

There are things we have the power to do that even governments can’t,” he said. [Source]
Meanwhile, more direct efforts to gain support for the Communist Party abroad have been stymied. 

A group of visiting Chinese scholars at the University of California, Davis disbanded a Chinese Communist Party branch that they set up at the university after realizing they may have violated U.S. laws. 

Nectar Gan and Zhuang Pinghui at South China Morning Post report:
Mu Xingsen, secretary of the party branch, confirmed its establishment when contacted by the South China Morning Post on Sunday but said it had already been dissolved.
“It is because we have later learned that this [establishing a party branch] does not comply with the local laws,” Mu said. 

“Of course we should respect the local laws when we’re here.”
The US Foreign Agents Registration Act (FARA) requires all individuals and groups acting under the direction or control of a foreign government or political party to register with the Department of Justice in advance and regularly report their activities.
[…] The branch, which planned to meet every two weeks, had tasked its members with promoting the organisation to their colleagues or neighbours who were coming to the US, it said, and to absorb party members into the organisation. [Source]

Nation of Thieves: Chinese Ministry of State Security Behind APT3

This is the first time researchers have been able to attribute a threat actor group with a high degree of confidence to the Ministry of State Security.
By Insikt Group

Key Takeaways

• APT3 is the first threat actor group that has been attributed with a high degree of confidence directly to the Chinese Ministry of State Security (MSS).
• On May 9, a mysterious group called “intrusiontruth” attributed APT3 to a company, Guangzhou Boyu Information Technology Company, based in Guangzhou, China.
• Recorded Future’s open source research and analysis has corroborated the company, also known as Boyusec, is working on behalf of the Chinese Ministry of State Security.
• Customers should re-examine any intrusion activity known or suspected to be APT3 and all activity from associated malware families as well as re-evaluate security controls and policies.

Introduction
On May 9, a mysterious group calling itself “intrusiontruth” identified a contractor for the Chinese Ministry of State Security (MSS) as the group behind the APT3 cyber intrusions.

Recorded Future timeline of APT3 victims.


Screenshot of a blog post from “intrusiontruth in APT3.”

“Intrusiontruth” documented historic connections between domains used by an APT3 tool called Pirpi and two shareholders in a Chinese information security company named Guangzhou Boyu Information Technology Company, Ltd (also known as Boyusec).

Registration information for a domain linked to the malware Pirpi. The details show the domain was registered to Dong Hao and Boyusec.

APT3 has traditionally targeted a wide-range of companies and technologies, likely to fulfill intelligence collection requirements on behalf of the MSS (see research below).

Recorded Future has been closely following APT3 and has discovered additional information corroborating that the MSS is responsible for the intrusion activity conducted by the group.

Recorded Future Intel Card for APT3.

Background
APT3 (also known as UPS, Gothic Panda, and TG-011) is a sophisticated threat group that has been active since at least 2010. 

APT3 utilizes a broad range of tools and techniques including spearphishing attacks, zero-day exploits, and numerous unique and publicly available remote access tools (RAT). 

Victims of APT3 intrusions include companies in the defense, telecommunications, transportation, and advanced technology sectors — as well as government departments and bureaus in Hong Kong, the U.S., and several other countries.

Analysis
On Boyusec’s website, the company explicitly identifies two organizations that it cooperatively partners with, Huawei Technologies and the Guangdong Information Technology Security Evaluation Center (or Guangdong ITSEC).

Screenshot of Boyusec’s website where Huawei and Guangdong ITSEC are identified as collaborative partners.

In November 2016, the Washington Free Beacon reported that a Pentagon internal intelligence report had exposed a product that Boyusec and Huawei were jointly producing. 

According to the Pentagon’s report, the two companies were working together to produce security products containing a backdoor, that would allow Chinese intelligence “to capture data and control computer and telecommunications equipment.” 

The article quotes government officials and analysts stating that Boyusec and the MSS are “closely connected,” and that Boyusec appears to be a cover company for the MSS.

Boyusec is located in Room 1103 of the Huapu Square West Tower in Guangzhou, China.

Boyusec’s work with its other “cooperative partner,” Guangdong ITSEC, has been less well-documented. 

As will be laid out below, Recorded Future’s research has concluded that Guangdong ITSEC is subordinate to an MSS-run organization called China Information Technology Evaluation Center (CNITSEC) and that Boyusec has been working with Guangdong ITSEC on a joint active defense lab since 2014.
Guangdong ITSEC is one in a nation-wide network of security evaluation centers certified and administered by CNITSEC. 

According to Chinese state-run media, Guangdong ITSEC became the sixteenth nationwide branch of CNITSEC in May 2011. 

Guangdong ITSEC’s site also lists itself as CNITSEC’s Guangdong Office on its header.
According to academic research published in China and Cybersecurity: Espionage, Strategy, and Politics in the Digital Domain, CNITSEC is run by the MSS and houses much of the intelligence service’s technical cyber expertise. 

CNITSEC is used by the MSS to “conduct vulnerability testing and software reliability assessments.” Per a 2009 U.S. State Department cable, it is believed China may also use vulnerabilities derived from CNITSEC’s activities in intelligence operations. 

CNITSEC’s Director, Wu Shizhong, even self-identifies as MSS, including for his work as a deputy head of China’s National Information Security Standards Committee as recently as January 2016.
Recorded Future research identified several job advertisements on Chinese-language job sites such as jobs.zhaopin.com, jobui.com, and kanzhun.com since 2015, Boyusec revealed a collaboratively established joint active defense lab (referred to as an ADUL) with Guangdong ITSEC in 2014. Boyusec stated that the mission of the joint lab was to develop risk-based security technology and to provide users with innovative network defense capabilities.


Job posting where Boyusec highlights the joint lab with Guangdong ITSEC. The translated text is, “In 2014, Guangzhou Boyu Information Technology Company and Guangdong ITSEC cooperated closely to establish a joint active defense lab (ADUL).”

Conclusion
The lifecycle of APT3 is emblematic of how the MSS conducts operations in both the human and cyber domains. 

According to scholars of Chinese intelligence, the MSS is composed of national, provincial, and local elements. 

Many of these elements, especially at the provincial and local levels, include organizations with valid public missions to act as a cover for MSS intelligence operations. 

Some of these organizations include think tanks such as CICIR, while others include provincial-level governments and local offices.
In the case of APT3 and Boyusec, this MSS operational concept serves as a model for understanding the cyber activity and lifecycle:

• While Boyusec has a website, an online presence, and a stated “information security services” mission, it cites only two partners, Huawei and Guangdong ITSEC.
• Intrusiontruth and the Washington Free Beacon have linked Boyusec to supporting and engaging in cyber activity on behalf of the Chinese intelligence services.
• Recorded Future’s open source research has revealed that Boyusec’s other partner is a field office for a branch of the MSS. Boyusec and Guangdong ITSEC have been documented working collaboratively together since at least 2014.
• Academic research spanning decades documents an MSS operational model that utilizes organizations, seemingly without an intelligence mission, at all levels of the state to serve as cover for MSS intelligence operations.
• According to its website, Boyusec has only two collaborative partners, one of which (Huawei) it is working with to support Chinese intelligence services, the other, Guangdong ITSEC, which is actually a field site for a branch of the MSS.

Graphic displaying the relationship between the MSS and APT3.

Impact
The implications are clear and expansive. 

Recorded Future’s research leads us to attribute APT3 to the Chinese Ministry of State Security and Boyusec with a high degree of confidence. 

Boyusec has a documented history of producing malicious technology and working with the Chinese intelligence services.
APT3 is the first threat actor group that has been attributed with a high degree of confidence directly to the MSS. 

Companies in sectors that have been victimized by APT3 now must adjust their strategies to defend against the resources and technology of the Chinese government. 

In this real-life David versus Goliath situation, customers need both smart security controls and policy, as well as actionable and strategic threat intelligence.
APT3 is not just another cyber threat group engaging in malicious cyber activity; research indicates that Boyusec is an asset of the MSS and their activities support China’s political, economic, diplomatic, and military goals.
The MSS derives intelligence collection requirements from state and party leadership, many of which are defined broadly every five years in official government directives called Five Year Plans. 

Many APT3 victims have fallen into sectors highlighted by the most recent Five Year Plan, including green/alternative energy, defense-related science and technology, biomedical, and aerospace.

Nation of Thieves

US charges 3 Chinese nationals with hacking, stealing intellectual property from companies
By Evan Perez

The Justice Department on Monday unsealed an indictment against three Chinese nationals in connection with cyberhacks and the theft of intellectual property of three companies, according to US officials briefed on the investigation.
But the Trump administration is stopping short of publicly confronting the Chinese government about its role in the breach. 

The hacks occurred during both the Obama and Trump administrations.
The charges being brought in Pittsburgh allege that the hackers stole intellectual property from several companies, including Trimble, a maker of navigation systems; Siemens, a German technology company with major operations in the US; and Moody's Analytics.
The three charged in the Pittsburgh case are presumed to live in China and are either employed or associated with Guangzhou Bo Yu Information Technology Co., known as Boyusec, court documents say. 

US intelligence and private cybersecurity experts say Boyusec works as a contractor for the Chinese ministry of state security, that nation's version of the National Security Agency. 

The court documents unsealed Monday don't mention the Chinese state links.
US investigators have concluded that the three charged by the US attorney in Pittsburgh were working for a Chinese intelligence contractor, the sources briefed on the investigation say. 

But missing from court documents filed in the case is any explicit mention that the thefts were state-sponsored.
A 2015 deal between then-President Barack Obama and Xi Jinping prohibits the US and China from stealing intellectual property for the purpose of giving advantage to domestic companies.
In recent months US intelligence agencies have concluded that China is breaking the agreement.

But there's debate among intelligence officials about whether there's sufficient evidence to publicly reveal the Chinese government's role in the infractions, these people say.
Obama administration officials had touted the Obama-Xi agreement, as well as 2014 Justice Department charges against members of the Chinese People's Liberation Army for commercial espionage, for "reducing" some of the Chinese cyberactivity against companies in the US.
But the 2015 Obama-Xi deal was met with skepticism inside the US agencies whose job it is to guard against Chinese cyberactivity targeting US companies. 

Some now say there was only a brief drop in the number of cyberspying incidents, if at all.
In the waning months of the Obama administration, intelligence officials briefed senior White House officials on information showing that the Chinese cyberattacks were back to levels previously seen, sources familiar with the matter told CNN. 

Early in the Trump administration, US intelligence officials briefed senior officials, including the President and vice president, as well as advisers Jared Kushner and Steve Bannon.

Chinese Curse

France’s butter crisis shows China is struggling to melt hearts on the world stage
By Luisa Tam

“Don’t take our butter,” a French friend told me jokingly last week at breakfast.
I am visiting Normandy, one of two historically famous butter-producing regions in France; the other is Brittany.
China has been blamed for France’s butter shortage, with the average retail price of the spread going up by at least 35 per cent so far this year – in the country with the highest per capita rate of butter consumption.
I’m feeling the crisis first-hand as my host no longer serves butter lavishly along with bread. 

Now I only get foil-wrapped mini portions.
With insufficient European dairy production, worsened by some unscrupulous producers hoarding supply, as well as growing Chinese demand, the butter shortage in France is not expected to end any time soon.
China seems to get blamed for many things.
Not only is it accused of depleting the global supply of all types of products – including butter – goods and even luxury items, it is also blamed for exporting droves of loud, rude and brash tourists.

China may be a mega economic and political power, but its soft power doesn’t seem to grow in parallel with its increasing hard power. 

Money and political brawn has not helped China buy love on the world stage.
The fundamental issue here is China has a serious image problem overseas that cannot be resolved by exporting a few cute pandas. 

The solution lies in its citizens gripped by wanderlust.
As a regular visitor to the small town of Avranches in Normandy that has a population of around 9,000 – about a quarter of the population in Taikoo Shing, a middle-class residential complex in the eastern part of Hong Kong – I have found myself becoming an unlikely unofficial ambassador of Hong Kong and China, due to my presence as, possibly, the only Chinese visitor here.

As a result, I have become quite self-aware of what I say and do because different cultures have different customs and Chinese parents often try to instill in their children yup heung chui juk which is the Cantonese equivalent to “When in Rome”.
We all know that “manners maketh man”, which means our mannerisms and characteristics make us who we are and people often judge us by our conduct because without these standards, we would lose our civility. 

But we also need to understand that good manners and etiquette take time to develop and require lots of practice and reinforcement.

Self-awareness, like good manners, comes with time. 

One of the main reasons mainland Chinese tourists behave the way they do is because they lack self-awareness. 

They don’t understand how other people perceive their behaviour because they are not used to dealing with people from outside their country for an extended period of time.

Our fellow Hong Kong citizens didn’t turn into well-behaved tourists overnight. 

It has taken them decades. 

Enemy of the Press

The time I was turned away from China
By Jon Russell 

Earlier today, November 26 2017, I was turned away from immigration at Shanghai’s Hongqiao airport by Chinese officials.
Alongside a number of other visitors, I had been waiting in line to take advantage of the city’s 144-hour ‘transit’ visa, which allows travelers with an onward flight to stay in Shanghai without needing to secure a visa before they travel.
The transit visa is issued on arrival if a visitor is not returning to the destination from which they arrived. 

For example, someone arriving from Hong Kong qualifies for the visa so long as their onward destination is outside of China but not Hong Kong. 

I flew in from Hong Kong and my exit ticket to Bangkok was booked for early afternoon on November 29, putting me comfortably inside the 144-hour limit.
As someone who has lived in Asia for nearly a decade, I’ve become accustomed to visas and the fact that, even when there’s another option, getting one before you travel is the best approach. 

In the case of China, however, I’ve long given up on the prospects of doing so.
Even though TechCrunch’s reporting aims to highlight promising startups and the role of tech in this modern and connected world, my status as a journalist in Thailand — where I live and hold an annual visa as a registered member of the media — has made getting a legitimate pre-travel visa for China impossible. 

The fact that I am from the UK — which doesn’t have 10-year visa options like the U.S. — means that one route taken by some reporters, who are able to get decade-long business visas, is not open to me.
Last summer, for example, I visited the Chinese embassy in Bangkok to start the process for a visa for our next TechCrunch China event in Beijing that November. 

Ultimately, I was told I was welcome to apply but that I would require a range of paperwork in addition to the usual documents, including approval from the municipal government of Shanghai and the mayor of Shanghai.
In order to make progress, I had a member of the embassy staff explain the requirements in Mandarin over the phone to an employee at TechCrunch’s partner company in China. 

I was later told by our partner that what was required was unclear and likely impossible to deliver on.
China, you see, will never reject your visa. 

Instead, an insurmountable wall is erected to prevent you from ever applying in the first place.
That’s where the appeal of the transit visa comes in. 

You simply book your flights to ensure you won’t overstay, then turn up.
Since 2015, I have used the transit visa system on six occasions. 

Even then, I’ve been nervous. 

Each time, I watched other travelers processed quickly after showing their documents, while I was kept waiting — one time for more than an hour as my bag ended up in lost property — as immigration officials looked over a computer screen (presumably showing my details) and summoned their seniors. 

Eventually, after waiting on the sidelines and watching travelers flow through with success, I’d be told I had been let in.
Travelers pass through immigration in Shanghai while I wait

Not this time
This time however, starting at around 5:30 pm, the wait was noticeably longer than usual. 

A senior official returned after around 45 minutes, telling me I was to board a plane to return to Hong Kong.
I was permitted to stay for 24 hours under the shorter transit visa option, but my request to stay for three days — and not utilize the full 144-hour visa — would not be allowed.
The reason, as it was explained to me, was that in 2015 I had broken Chinese law when I failed to present myself to authorities in Beijing when I had visited and stayed at an Airbnb residence on two different trips. 

Unbeknownst to me at the time — and something that was not communicated by Airbnb — foreigners are required to register at a local police station, but in most cases the hotels where they stay handle this.
Therefore anyone using Airbnb, or staying with friends, must voluntarily visit the city’s police station and register. 

As anyone who has ever spent time in China and doesn’t speak the language will know, that’s challenging. 

But it is the law. Even still, I was surprised. 

I used the very same transit visa on my last trip to Shanghai in June, and again in November of last year when I visited Beijing. 

This year, I was granted a visa on arrival (which is not a transit visa) to visit Shenzhen in June without trouble.
The immigration officers explained to me that a new law that had come into effect in recent months meant I was unable to exercise the longer transit visa. 

My previous visits were not subject to that, I was told. 

The officials denied my request for details about this new law.
The two incidents that they cited — from the first half 2015 — did indeed happen. 

However, it wasn’t until I was leaving Beijing Airport on the second trip that I was made aware of my "crime". 

Two burly immigration officials pulled me to the side of the immigration queue and took my passport. 

They then berated me in Mandarin and summoned an English-speaking officer.
After some delay and an explanation of the police registration requirement, I was instructed to give information about my host. 

I provided her telephone number and name as requested. 

The officers made me sign a piece of paper that was written in Mandarin and, after I expressed concern that I would miss my flight, I was allowed to leave and get an exit stamp in my passport.
I made my flight, just, but the incident made an impact. 

Aware that Airbnb operated in a legal grey area in China at the time and concerned I might have put my host in hot water, I decided to stop using the service in China and contact her to ensure all was okay.
My host, who is Chinese, told me that she did indeed receive a call from the police who asked to know the nature of our relationship, including how long had she known me. 

She told them I had booked the room online. 

She provided a fake address, likely due to the same cautions I held, and the matter was seemingly closed.
I spoke to her after I left Shanghai yesterday and she recalled that her experience with me was “super weird.” 

As an Airbnb host for four years who has welcomed more than 100 guests, she said she had never had any problem like it with anyone else. 

She repeated her belief that I didn’t actually need a visa for short stay.

Back to Hong Kong
Back to the situation in Shanghai this weekend, faced with the prospect of being denied entry, I tried my best to calmly explain that I was only made aware of my rule-breaking the second time. 

Since then, I explained, I had made a point of only staying in hotels as I didn’t want to break rules. Plus, most importantly, I had since returned to China, been permitted entry, and complied with the requirement each time.
My plea fell on deaf ears, however. 

Perhaps angry at my efforts to argue my cause, I was informed that the senior officer had decided to remove my option for a 24-hour visa. 

I was told to travel immediately, I would not be admitted — period. 

I need to leave now, they said. 

The plane I had taken in from Hong Kong had been turned around and was ready to leave; this was the flight I was to be on.
The reason I was in Shanghai was our latest TechCrunch China event which runs for two days. 

This meant I would miss all of it.
Compounding my misery, Hong Kong Airlines, which I used to fly into Shanghai, then informed me I’d need to buy a ticket to leave, although I later ‘struck a deal’ to go back for free.
Exit agreed, I was then accompanied by a very tall security officer, who took my passport and escorted me and the airline representatives to collect my luggage and arrange my seat on the next flight at the Hong Kong Airlines desk.
I asked if I could take a photo with my chaperone to mark the occasion, but was told no.

“Have a happy journey” — ground staff, airline staff and the immigration officer arrange my ticket back to Hong Kong

Ticket secured, I was escorted back through checkin and onto the plane — it was truly whirlwind — all while my passport was in the possession of my large minder. 

At the plane, it was briefly returned to me, but I was told that I had been given a seat on the condition that my passport was turned over to the Hong Kong Airlines crew, who would return it to me when we landed.
Options exhausted, I reluctantly agreed and, after holding the flight up significantly through my situation, I walked through a plane of disgruntled passengers glaring at me — the cause of their 90-minute delay — to take my seat in the corner at the rear of the plane.
One airline attendant had apparently heard what had happened to me and offered an apology.
“This is the Mainland, sir.”

Why the trouble?
I’ve heard stories of senior people at major global media companies being given transit visas on the condition that they remain inside the airport, and other such restrictions on political reporters, but I didn’t ever think I — a technology blogger — would join the club.
It’s hard to speculate on Chinese policy with any certainty. 

One thing I do know is that Chinese immigration have been aware that I am a “journalist” since I was given a tourist visa in 2015.
At the time, the official who granted me the visa told me that, even though I had applied for a three-month, multiple-entry visa, he would only give me a one-week visa. 

These are ‘special’ since they are not even among the options for travelers. 

His main concern was that I might write stories while on Chinese soil and, since he didn’t entirely understand what TechCrunch did, he wanted to err on the side of caution.
My experience this week shows that the level of caution has been raised significantly. 

I neither write investigative stories about the Chinese government, nor do I cover politics. 

But I am someone who is viewed as a member of the media. 

While in the past, there was some tolerance to us passing through, China has decided to get tighter still.
The fact that the 19th Congress has just taken place, thus making politics more intense right now, may be a factor.
Some might suggest that stories I’ve written on censorship in China may be a reason, but I’ve been covering thorny topics for some time, and it hasn’t ever prevented my entry into China.
It’s hugely disappointing for me because I always enjoy my short trips to China. 

It’s a great chance to see a different kind of innovation to the U.S., one that isn’t as well-understood or even reported on as the U.S.. 

Then there’s the opportunity to talk to young startups, huge $500 billion giants like Tencent, and those with designs on influencing Asia and other parts of the world. 

I’ve lost count of the number of events, company launches, and other story opportunities that I’ve had to pass on due to visa concerns.
Our objective is to shine light on these topics for our readers, but unfortunately the Chinese government is making that hard to do.

China told to back off: China hits roadblocks in Central Europe

Tough competition laws and investment from the bloc slow Beijing’s infrastructure push.
By LILI BAYER

China's Trojan horse Viktor Orbán

BUDAPEST — China’s seduce-and-divide strategy in Central Europe is getting a reality check.
For years, Beijing has promoted heavy investments and a particular diplomatic format — called 16+1 — to build its influence with a cross-section of 16 Central and Eastern European countries, some that belong to the EU or NATO, some to neither. 

Chinese Premier Li Keqiang and Hungary’s Prime Minister Viktor Orbán on Monday open the sixth China-Central and Eastern Europe summit in Budapest.
This push has set off alarm bells in Brussels, in particular about Beijing’s activities in the Balkans. But it is now also running into regulatory, financial and political hurdles, highlighting possible limits to Beijing’s economic and diplomatic influence in Europe.
China’s “One Belt, One Road” program has pumped money into infrastructure, logistics and transportation networks to allow Chinese products easier access to European markets. 

Chinese officials estimate that the country has invested over $8 billion (€6.7 billion) in Central and Eastern Europe. 

This region of some 120 million is relatively new and unknown to the Chinese, but trade is growing: Last year bilateral trade between China and Central and Eastern European countries was up 11 percent from 2011.
As much as Beijing envisioned 16 Central and Eastern European countries as a cohesive entity that could work together to implement joint projects, in practice they have different priorities and operate under different legal regimes. 

The EU members among them are less welcoming to Chinese investment.

For Hungary, the host of this week’s summit and the country that absorbs the most Chinese investment in Central and Eastern Europe, Beijing is a source not only of capital but of political leverage that could play to Orbán’s advantage as his government’s relationship with EU institutions become more tense.
“As a country that cooperates with the EU, China — if it notices us, because there’s the problem of size, the problem of the difference in our sizes — can quite confidently say that they have an interest in Hungary being strong in the European Union,” Orbán said in July in his annual speech at Băile Tuşnad (Tusnádfürdő), Romania.
But China faces significant challenges as it tries to push through its plans in the region.
“Chinese investment in EU members of the 16+1 has remained limited,” said Tamás Matura, an assistant professor at the Budapest-based Corvinus University. 

“Some countries have not received any new major Chinese investors in the last five years.”
China has had more success in Western Balkan countries like Serbia, Montenegro and Bosnia and Herzegovina, “where EU funds are not available and EU regulations are not applicable,” he said.
Western Balkan leaders have warmly welcomed Chinese economic initiatives and worked to build friendly ties with Beijing. 

In Serbia, the region’s largest beneficiary of Chinese investment, China has bought factories and provided funding for roads, bridges, energy projects and railways.
“There are no problems in our economic and political relations, we are always on the same side, and when China has something to say, we are always on the side of China,” Serbian President Aleksandar Vučić said in May.
China’s flagship project in the region is the planned Belgrade-Budapest high-speed rail link, with construction work on the Serbian stretch expected due to begin this week. 

The modernized railway would enable Chinese goods coming through Greek ports to quickly move from Serbia into the EU.
Currently, the journey between the Serbian and Hungarian capitals by rail takes eight hours. 

The planned railway would allow passengers and cargo to travel up to 200 kilometers per hour, cutting travel time to less than three hours.
Progress on the project has been slow. 

The Export-Import Bank of China is expected to lend about 85 percent of the funds for the €2.4 billion-project, and an agreement between China and Hungary over the railway raised concerns within the European Commission earlier this year that the planned tender process may not be in compliance with EU rules.
“The EU welcomes investment — whether domestic or foreign — as long as it is compatible with EU law,” the EU Delegation to China said in a statement in February regarding the Belgrade-Budapest railway project.
“It is standard practice for the Commission’s services to assess the compliance of major public contracts with EU law. Against that backdrop, a dialogue with the Hungarian authorities, at technical level, is ongoing in order to seek some clarifications,” the delegation wrote.

Analysts say China is also likely to face challenges when attempting to implement projects in other Central and East European states that are members of the EU.
The bloc’s newer members are not only bound by EU competition rules, but also receive significant infrastructure funding from the bloc.
China’s interest in the Baltic states “focuses on transportation and logistics,” with Latvia hoping to offer its ports and railway network to help Chinese goods reach Scandinavian markets, said Una Aleksandra Bērziņa-Čerenkova, who heads of the New Silk Road program at the Latvian Institute of International Affairs.
Nevertheless, she said, “under the current situation and the availability of the EU funds it is difficult to see a viable project that could require Chinese loans.”
“We cannot guarantee Chinese companies would win tenders” due to EU rules, she added.
Despite the hurdles, for some leaders in the region, China is still seen in some respects as a friendlier negotiating partner than Brussels.
“It has become increasingly offensive that a few developed countries have been continuously lecturing most of the world on human rights, democracy, development and the market economy,” Orbán said during a television appearance in May. 

“Everyone has had enough of this; and of these the Chinese are the strongest.”

Chinese bike share graveyard a monument to industry's arrogance

Future of dockless bicycles under a cloud amid concerns there are too many bikes and not enough demand
By Benjamin Haas

Thousands of share bikes laid to rest in the south-eastern Chinese city of Xiamen.

At first glance the photos vaguely resemble a painting. 

On closer inspection it might be a giant sculpture or some other art project. 

But in reality it is a mangled pile of bicycles covering an area roughly the size of a football pitch, and so high that cranes are needed to reach the top; cast-offs from the boom and bust of China’s bike sharing industry.
Just two days after China’s number three bike sharing company went bankrupt, a photographer in the south-eastern city of Xiamen captured a bicycle graveyard where thousands have been laid to rest. The pile clearly contains thousands of bikes from each of the top three companies, Mobike, Ofo and the now-defunct Bluegogo.

Anger as Chinese bike sharing firm shuts up office with riders' deposits

Once hailed as “Uber for bikes”, China’s cycle hire startups allowed users to unlock GPS-enabled bikes with their smartphone, and drop them off anywhere without the need to park it at a dock.
Bluegogo’s bankruptcy last week sparked questions about the future of dockless bike sharing in China, amid concerns there are too many bikes and insufficient demand. 

In an open letter apologising for his missteps, Bluegogo’s chief executive said he had been “filled with arrogance”.

A share bicycle graveyard viewed from the air in Xiamen, south-east China. 

Customers are charged just pennies per 30 minute ride, but competing companies have flooded cities with bikes to ensure cycles are always available. 

The top two firms have each raised more than $1bn (£750m) in funding.
Shanghai currently has 1.5m shared bikes on the streets, and despite its population being three times greater than London, that number far outstrips the 11,000 Santander Cycles peppered throughout the UK capital.

A mechanic from bike share company Ofo stands amongst damaged bicycles needing repair in Beijing. 

The large number of cycles on Chinese streets have led to scenes of clogged sidewalks no longer fit for pedestrians and piles of mangled bikes that have been illegally parked.
But the scene in Xiamen appears to be one of the largest amalgamations of discarded bicycles, with trucks unloading bikes from around the city.

A hero reborn: ‘China’s Tolkien’ aims to conquer western readers

The world’s most popular kung fu fantasy series is finally set to become a UK bestseller
By Vanessa Thorpe

The Legends of the Condor Heroes series follows young soldier Guo Jing, depicted in a Chinese TV adaptation.

Guo Jing, a young soldier among the massed ranks of Genghis Khan’s invading army and son of a murdered warrior, may soon become as familiar a questing literary figure as Frodo Baggins from Tolkien’s Lord of the Rings, or Jon Snow from Game of Thrones. 

In fact, this Chinese fighting hero is already part of phenomenon that can match both of those epics in size. 

For the books of Guo Jing’s creator, the author known as Jin Yong, have already sold more than 300m copies.
The world’s biggest kung fu fantasy writer, Jin Yong enjoys huge popularity in the Chinese-speaking world. 

In the west, however, his name is barely known, largely due to the complexity of the world he has created and the puzzle that has posed for translators.
Now, for the first time, the beginning of his extraordinarily popular series, Legends of the Condor Heroes, has been translated into English for a mainstream readership. 

It is a task that has already defeated several translators, yet Anna Holmwood, 32, from Edinburgh has managed it – or at least the first volume. 

Her British publisher, MacLehose Press, plans a 12-volume series, with Holmwood’s first volume, A Hero Born, due out in February.

 

Louis Cha Leung-yung aka Jin Yong.

Agent Peter Buckman, who sold the rights to the series to the publisher, came across the works almost by chance as he searched the internet for “bestselling authors”. 

“Jin Yong was in the top 10, though I’d never heard of him; nor did I read Chinese,” he said this weekend.
Comparisons with Tolkien or George RR Martin might sound overblown, but in China, Hong Kong, Vietnam and Taiwan, Jin Yong’s works are classics, loved like fairytales or national legends.
“These books are read by so many Chinese people when they are teenagers, and the work really stays in their heads,” Holmwood told the Observer. 

“So, of course, I felt a great weight of responsibility in translating them – and even more as publication draws near.”
Set in China in 1200, A Hero Born tells of an empire close to collapse. 

Under attack from the Jurchen Jin dynasty, the future of the entire Chinese population rests in the hands of a few lone martial arts exponents. 

A novel in the wuxia, or fighting hero, tradition, it was written under the pen name Jin Yong by Chinese journalist, Louis Cha Leung-yung. 

A founding editor of the Hong Kong daily newspaper Ming Pao, in the 1950s he put together a set of stories charting the progress of a young martial arts fighter during the Song dynasty and serialised them. 

The plots were fictional but the historical background was real.
They became the biggest Chinese publishing hit of the last century. 

Cha, who is now 93 and lives in seclusion, created a vast imaginary world over 15 novels, which spawned films, games, comics and television shows.

 

Legends of the Condor Heroes by Jin Yong, translated by Anna Holmwood.

Buckman bought the rights and sold them on to a British publisher after meeting Holmwood and discovering how little of the series was available in English. 

“Anna did a sample chapter of the first of the Condor Heroes books and I sent it out to various publishers. My old friend Christopher MacLehose, who specialises in translated masterpieces, had discovered from a Chinese friend how Jin Yong’s work was like Simenon’s is to the French or Tolstoy’s to the Russians – a part of the common culture, with one generation of readers passing on their enthusiasm to the next,” he said.
Although there have been academic translations published over a decade ago, including an edition of The Deer and the Cauldron translated by John Minford, attempts to tackle the wider work have been abandoned. 

Holmwood, who studied Chinese at Oxford University, first discovered the book in Taipei and later moved to Hangzhou, in east China, while she worked on her translation.
Fellow translators are now being drafted in to help with the task, but the challenge facing all of them is to faithfully represent the kung fu moves along with the Chinese philosophies and religions that are all woven through the plot. 

Even the fighting skill of the warrior in A Hero Born, for instance, which literally translate as “the 18 palm attacks to defeat dragons”, is in fact derived from a Taoist classic ascribed to Lao Tzu, dating from 2,500 years ago, and has a strong philosophical element in addition to movement.
“I am of the belief that a lot of readers like a bit of a challenge as they go along,” said Holmwood, who now lives in Malmö, Sweden, with her Taiwanese husband and son. 

"That is why fans of Lord of the Rings try to learn Elvish. So I don’t explain everything, although I have written a very short prologue to introduce some of the elements of the story.”