lundi 31 octobre 2016

Poisoning the World

Contaminated food from China now entering the U.S. under the 'organic' label
By J. D. Heyes

The Chinese food production industry is the world's least-regulated and most corrupt, as has repeatedly been proven time and again. 
Now, it appears, there is no trusting anything that comes from China marked "organic."
Natural Health 365 reports that several foods within the country are so contaminated that Chinese citizens don't trust them. 
What's more, the countries that import these tainted foods are putting their citizens at risk.
U.S. Customs personnel often turn away food shipments from China because they contain unsavory additives and drug residues, are mislabeled, or are just generally filthy. 
Some Chinese food exporters have responded by labeling their products "organic," though they are far from it.
There are several factors at play which make Chinese claims of organic unreliable. 
First, environmental pollution from unrestrained and unregulated industrial growth has so polluted soil and waterways with toxic heavy metals that nothing grown in them is safe, much less organic. Also, there is so much fraudulent labeling and rampant corruption within the government and manufacturing sectors that it's not smart to trust what is put on packaging.
In fact, farmers in China use water that is replete with heavy metals, Natural Health 365 noted in a separate report. 
In addition, water used for irrigation also contains organic and inorganic substances and pollutants. Chinese "organic" food is so contaminated that a person could get ill just by handling some of it.
'Dirty water' is all there is
The report noted further: "This is reality – all of China's grains, vegetables and fruits are irrigated with untreated industrial wastewater. The Yellow River, which is considered unusable, supports major food producing areas in the northeast provinces."
Chinese farmers won't even eat the food they produce.
That's because it's clear that China's water pollution issues are so pronounced that it threatens the country's entire food supply.
Chinese farmers have said there is no available water for crops except "dirty water." 
As part of the country's industrial prowess, it is also one of the largest producers (and consumers) of fertilizers and pesticides, Water Politics reported.
The site noted further that as China's industrial might grows, so too does the level of contaminants in the country's water supply. 
Lakes, rivers, streams and falling water tables are becoming more polluted by the year.
In addition to man-made pollutants, animals produce about 90 percent of the organic pollutants and half of the nitrogen in China's water, say experts at the Chinese Academy for Environmental Planning. 
There are times when water is so polluted it turns black – yet it is still used to irrigate crops, and of course, that affects so-called organic farming operations as well.
These nine foods are particularly vulnerable to becoming tainted, Natural Health 365 noted:
  1. Fish: Some 80 percent of the tilapia sold in the U.S. come from fish farms in China, as well as half the cod. Water pollution in China is a horrible problem, so any fish grown there are suspect.
  2. Chicken: Poultry produced in China is very often plagued with illnesses like avian flu.
  3. Apples and apple juice: Only recently has the U.S. moved to allow the importation of Chinese apples, though American producers grow plenty for the country and the world.
  4. Rice: Though this is a staple in China and much of the rice in the U.S. comes from there, some of it has been found to be made of plastic, resin and potato.
  5. Mushrooms: Some 34 percent of processed mushrooms come from China.
  6. Salt: Some salt produced in China for industrial uses has made its way to American dinner tables.
  7. Black pepper: One Chinese vendor was trying to pass off mud flakes as pepper.
  8. Green peas: Phony peas have been found in China made of soy, green dye and other questionable substances.
  9. Garlic: About one-third of all garlic in the U.S. comes from China.
Shop wisely.

Facing the China menace

The trade imbalance and a military showdown in the South China Sea loom large
By Peter Morici

The new president will face immediate challenges — the war against ISIS, fixing Obamacare and boosting sluggish growth — but the economic and geopolitical challenges posed by an increasingly assertive China are perhaps the most vexing and far reaching for the American economy and global leadership.
Over the last three decades, China has accomplished hyper growth by supplying western consumers with inexpensive products and attracting western investment to participate in the export boom and sell to its growing middle class. 
Accomplishing all this, it has hardly played fairly according to the established norms of global trade.
According to Hillary Clinton, China subsidizes exports, manipulates its currency and more to the detriment of American workers. 
She promises to appoint a special trade prosecutor to enforce U.S. rights under international agreements.
Donald Trump would slap on 45 percent tariff on Chinese imports to force renegotiation of those agreements to get a better deal for Americans.
If they are serious, it’s about time.
The $320 billion annual deficit on trade in goods and services with China slashes demand for American-made products, curtails funding for U.S.-based R&D, kills millions of jobs and depresses wages, and is a principal cause of the blight in communities like Reading, Pennsylvania and Hickory, North Carolina.
Just as menacing, the trillions in cumulative trade surpluses China has amassed are financing a dramatic pivot in its industrial, military and foreign policies that threatens security in the Pacific and America’s prosperity and standing with allies around the globe.
As wages rise in Chinese coastal manufacturing centers, jobs move further west in China and elsewhere in Southeast Asia causing major social disruptions. 
For example, the population of Dongguan, a major manufacturing center near Hong Kong, has fallen from 12 to 7 million over the last decade.
To buffer job losses and limit political unrest, Beijing is pursuing a two-pronged strategy.
It is imposing tougher restrictions on foreign investment, which further depresses the value of the yuan, ladling on more subsidies for basic manufacturing, tightening administration restrictions on imports and consolidating state owned enterprises to enhance their monopoly power.
Simultaneously, it is encouraging more technology-intensive activities that strike at the heart of American and European competitiveness through lavish subsidies for startups, acquisitions of U.S. and European businesses, and toughened regulation of American and other foreign technology companies operating in China
Consequently, many products and components used by its basic assembly and fabrication operations, once sourced in the United States and Europe, are now made in China.
Most of those tactics either violate WTO rules or are decidedly asymmetrical. 
For example, the United States, Germany and European nations generally permit Chinese to purchase companies outright, whereas western investors must offer a Chinese joint-venture partner at least a 50 percent stake when investing in the Middle Kingdom.
While Chinese technology still lags western capabilities in many areas both complex and mundane, such as rice cookers, it has managed to leap ahead in some fields — for example, satellite technology for encrypted communications.
The cash earned from its huge trade surpluses is financing a massive build-up in naval and air power, militarization of the South China Sea, and about 20 port facilities the Chinese navy can access in Asia, Africa, the Middle East and Europe. 
It has established an Asian Infrastructure Investment Bank, and China is plowing billions of dollars into economies in Asia and Africa through transportation projects and direct investment.
Obama has been hesitant to take the advice of U.S. defense leaders in challenging China’s artificial island and militarization of the vital South China Sea, and the combination of Chinese muscle and billions in new investment has persuaded longtime U.S. ally, the Philippines, to realign with China.
The latter substantially undermines the U.S. strategy of resolving the sovereignty disputes in the South China Sea and securing the sea lanes from Chinese control by relying on the recent U.N. tribunal ruling denying Beijing’s claims and through U.S. military and diplomatic cooperation with regional allies.
The South China Sea has huge sea-bed mineral deposits and is a vital passage for some $5 trillion annually of international shipping. 
Open access has been secured by the U.S. Navy in cooperation with regional allies since World War II, and the stability of that framework is vital not merely to global commerce but also U.S. credibility with strategic allies in the Middle East and Europe.
The new president must prepare for a diplomatic and military showdown in the Pacific and confront Beijing on the massive trade imbalance that finances Chinese mercantilism and adventurism.
American prosperity and security depend on it.

E.U. Outspokenness

EU commissioner Guenther Oettinger described visiting Chinese as 'nine men, one party, and no democracy'
By Samuel Osborne
Outspoken Guenther Oettinger, European Commissioner for Digital Economy and Society.

Speaking to businessmen in Hamburg last week, Guenther Oettinger used the term "Schlitzaugen" ("slit eyes") to describe visiting Chinese businessmen, Reuters reports.
He said the congregation consisted of "nine men, one party, and no democracy".
"All of them in suits, single-breasted, dark blue jackets," he added. 
"All of them had their hair combed from left to right, with black shoe polish on their hair."
In an interview with German newspaper Die Welt, Mr Oettinger defended his comments. "You have to see the broader context in which I made my remarks. In my speech, I wanted to warn Germany of too much self-confidence."
Mr Oettinger has previously expressed doubts over whether the UK will leave the EU, saying he would not "place any major bets on Brexit".
Mr Oettinger accepted the Brexit referendum vote was "binding" but told German newspaper Bild: "It is possible that public opinion will tip if the economic situation in the wake of the Brexit vote worsens. In any case, I wouldn't place any major bets on Brexit."

Malaysia's Najib Razak in China, as 1MDB scandal, South China Sea dispute loom over talks

By Nyshka Chandran

Malaysian Prime Minister Najib Razak heads to China this week for a state visit that could further skew Southeast Asian geopolitics in Beijing's favor, a week after Philippine leader Rodrigo Duterte initiated a similar shift.
Najib and a contingent of business executives will be on the mainland from October 31 to November 6, where "many new agreements and understandings" are on the agenda, the PM said in a statement.

Malaysia's Prime Minister Najib Razak (L) shakes hands with China's President Xi Jinping during the Asia-Pacific Economic Cooperation meeting on November 11, 2014

But while the South China Sea and the 1MDB corruption scandal—topics impacting the international relations of both economies—aren't officially on the docket, they will indirectly influence each leader's rhetoric.
Najib is expected to focus on boosting Chinese funds into his country, paying particular attention to new technologies and infrastructure.
"Trade and investment is crucial at a time when Najib needs a further boost in the Malaysian economy so as to enhance his performance legitimacy to govern the country," Dr Mustafa Izzuddin, fellow at ISEAS-Yusof Ishak Institute, a Singapore-based think tank, pointed out.
"A sustainable growing economy, especially in 2017, will be a critical factor as to when Najib will hold the elections [due in 2018] and for Najib bolstering the chances of his coalition returning to government."
For the past two years, Najib has been embroiled in an international scandal around billions siphoned from state development fund 1Malaysia Development Bhd (1MDB), a situation that has tarnished his international reputation and triggered widespread calls at home and abroad for his resignation.
The blow to Najib's legitimacy has meant he's had fewer visits with Western leaders, resulting in lower foreign direct investment from the West, so China's friendship means a great deal, James Chin, director of the Asia Institute at the University of Tasmania, explained.
In return for funds, meanwhile, Beijing could gain a strategic ally in the thorny South China Sea problem.
Chinese leaders are upping the ante in the fight over rights to the resource-rich marine area by widening the mainland's network of supporters in Southeast Asia, Izzuddin said. 
Manila, a major player in the South China Sea dispute, recently realigned itself with the world's second-largest economy, with Rodrigo Duterte announcing a separation from China's foremost rival, Washington, last week.
"China regards Malaysia as an important player in the Association of Southeast Asian Nations (ASEAN) bloc, and a claimant that Beijing believes it can have a more reasonable dialogue to address and resolve the South China Sea dispute, notwithstanding Malaysia's own shifting and ambiguous stance," Izzuddin explained.
"China knows Najib needs it more than the other way around, so Beijing will give him the five-star treatment to signal to the rest of the world that they have Malaysia in their pocket," Chin added.
Moreover, Beijing could use its own involvement in the 1MDB affair to sweeten the relationship. Because Chinese money helped save 1MDB from insolvency, Beijing will use its leverage on the issue carefully to keep Najib on China's side, said Chin.
In November, China General Nuclear Power Corp. said it would pay $2.3 billion in cash and take on an unspecified amount of debt for a group of power plants from debt-ridden 1MDB. 
The following month, China Railway Construction Corp agreed to buy a 60 percent stake in a 1MDB property project called Bandar Malaysia for $1.7 billion in a joint venture with Malaysian Iskandar Waterfront Holdings.
"Chinese leaders are aware that the U.S. [a key ally of Malaysia] have already pressed Najib. Taking the opposite position of non-interference is more likely to benefit China, as it will draw Malaysia under Najib closer, economically and strategically," noted Izzuddin.

A delicate trade-off

Like The Philippines, Vietnam and Taiwan, Malaysia claims a dozen of islands in the disputed South China Sea but unlike its peers, Najib's administration has stayed largely silent on the mainland's aggressive expansion in the area.
Manila under its previous leadership launched a legal case in The Hague to support its assertions, Vietnam has installed rocket launchers on its five bases in the area and even Taiwan, whose voice is often drowned out by Beijing, "ruled out the possibility of any active cooperation with China" on the issue, the American Chamber of Commerce in Taipei said in a report last month.
Kuala Lumpur's response, on the other hand, has been muted.
According to Reuters, Najib's government ignored reports of Malaysian fishermen being bullied by men aboard Chinese Coast Guard vessels last year. 
"When the Chinese entered Indonesia's waters, they were immediately chased out. When the Chinese vessels entered our waters, nothing was done," an unnamed Malaysian minister told Reuters in June.
In March, Minister Shahidan Kassim said that about 100 Chinese registered vessels were detected in the Luconia Shoals, one of the largest reefs in the South China Sea. 
But a few days later, then-defense minister Hishammuddin Hussein refuted those claims, in an indication of the government's policy confusion.
Strategists agreed that Najib was unlikely to press Beijing on the matter for fear of angering his country's largest trade partner. 
But Najib's silence on the South China Sea could then be used as fodder by angry Malaysians seeking the PM's exit over the 1MDB episode.
"One interesting question to come out of this is how ardent Malays feel about being in hock to China," William Case, professor at City University Hong Kong, remarked in an email.

Paper Tiger

America's “Innocent Passage” Did More Harm Than Good
By James Holmes

Unambitious. 
That’s the proper adjective for USS Decatur’s “freedom of navigation” cruise near the Paracel Islands last week. 
Released last year, the Pentagon’s Asia-Pacific Maritime Security Strategy lists “safeguarding freedom of the seas” first among U.S. strategic priorities for the region, followed by “deterring conflict and coercion” and “promoting adherence to international law and standards.” 
The Maritime Security Strategy is a fine document on the whole, and there’s no quarreling with its to-do list. 
The document also presents observers a yardstick to judge Decatur’s exploits in the South China Sea.
The yardstick tells a sobering tale: on balance the operation advanced none of the Pentagon’s self-professed strategic aims. 
It challenged one minor Chinese infraction—Beijing’s demand that foreign ships request permission before transiting waters China regards as its own—while letting China’s major affronts to freedom of the seas stand. 
Indeed, by seeming to acquiesce in the notion that the transit was an “innocent passage” through Chinese-claimed waters, the operation may have actually vindicated Beijing’s lawlessness. 
That’s no way to promote adherence to international law and standards, let alone deter conflict or coercion.
Let’s review the legal dimension, then examine how misconceived operations ripple through U.S. alliances in the Indo-Pacific. 
Legalities first. 
The Aegis destroyer traversed waters that China deems part of its “territorial sea,” offshore waters subject to Chinese sovereignty. 
But a simple transit like Decatur’s does nothing to dispute Beijing’s assertion that it makes the rules regulating shipping in the South China Sea—including the Paracels. 
Indeed, the law of the sea explicitly permitsforeign vessels to pass through a coastal state’s territorial sea provided that’s all they do—pass through.
That’s why the doctrine is known as innocent passage
A vessel undertaking an innocent passage must refrain from all manner of routine military activities. It may not operate aircraft from its decks, conduct underwater surveys, or do anything else that might be construed as impeaching the coastal state’s security. 
Decatur evidently desisted from all of these activities—and thus comported itself as though it were executing an innocent passage through China’s rightful territorial waters.
What does acting as though China’s claims are legitimate prove? 
Not much. 
The voyage did nothing to dispute Beijing’s effort to fence off the Paracels within “baselines” sketched around the archipelago’s perimeter and proclaim sovereignty—physical control backed by force—over the waters within. 
To reply to that claim, Decatur should have made the transit while carrying out every activity Beijing purports to forbid—sending helicopters aloft, probing the depths with sonar, and on and on. 
What China proscribes, in other words, friends of freedom of the sea must do.
Fail to contest excesses and you consent to them by default.
Now, it is true that Decatur’s crew didn’t request Chinese permission before making the crossing. 
The destroyer’s matter-of-fact approach flouted China’s demand that foreign ships request permission before transiting its territorial sea. (For that matter, China insists that skippers ask permission before essaying “any military acts” in its offshore “exclusive economic zone,” the expanded sea belt where the coastal state has exclusive rights to harvest natural resources from the water and seafloor. Apart from the right to extract resources, the coastal state has no special say-so over what happens in the EEZ. The EEZ and the waters beyond comprise the “high seas,” a “commons” that belongs to everyone and no one.)
In effect, then, USS Decatur and the U.S. Navy were quibbling over a trivial rule China wants to enforce rather than denying that China has any right to make such rules.
One suspects Lieutenant Stephen Decatur, the destroyer’s namesake, would shake his head in bafflement. 
Decatur was among the most venturesome seafarers in U.S. naval annals, and not someone to blanch at jabbing coastal-state rulers who entertained grandiose pretensions. 
In 1804, Decatur brought the ketch USS Intrepid under the guns of Tripoli—and risked being blasted to splinters—to burn the captured sail frigate USS Philadelphia before the pasha put her to work raiding U.S. merchantmen. 
Afterward Lord Horatio Nelson—himself no slouch at nautical derring-do—reportedly acclaimed Decatur and Intrepid sailors for pulling off the “most bold and daring act of the age.”
High praise indeed! 
In fact, Decatur furnishes a north star to guide U.S. Navy exploits on behalf of maritime liberty.
Now consider alliance relations. 
The softly, softly approach underwriting Decatur’s cruise might mollify China, although you would never know it from the Chinese spokesmen huffing and puffing afterward about “illegal” and “provocative” U.S. actions. 
But circumspection in a good cause—the cause of freedom of the seas—does little to inspire fellow seafaring states to run risks of their own. 
Quite the reverse.
Consider what some of America’s closest allies have done in recent months. 
Last month the uniformed chief of the Japan Maritime Self-Defense Force distanced Tokyo from the South China Sea disputes, ruling out joint freedom-of-navigation patrols alongside the U.S. Navy. The Australian government has evidently gone wobbly as well. 
Foreign Minister Julie Bishop has declared that the Royal Australian Navy doesn’t conduct freedom-of-navigation demonstrations within 12 nautical miles of Chinese-claimed islands—the outer limit of the territorial sea. 
Nor does Canberra do much to challenge Beijing’s pretensions elsewhere in the South China Sea.
And don’t get me started on Philippine president Rodrigo Duterte, a statesman who could play a character from a Stephen King novel in his post-presidential career. 
The president takes to its utmost extreme the “realist” logic that weak powers should “bandwagon” with nearby “hegemons”—ingratiating themselves with domineering powers like China to protect themselves from those domineering powers and, with any luck, advance their parochial interests in the bargain. 
Around the same time Decatur was transiting near the Paracels, Duterte gave a fiery speech in Beijing announcing the Philippines’ “separation” from the U.S.-Philippine alliance while professing fealty to China.
Take Duterte as a symptom—not the cause—of the malaise afflicting U.S.-Philippine relations. 
One doubts he would make such a break with the Philippines’ longstanding patron were he confident in America’s staying power in Southeast Asia, and in the durability of its commitment to the archipelagic state’s defense. 
Emboldening prospective foes while disheartening allies and friends is doubtful strategy. 
And yet that’s what happens when a superpower declares ambitious strategic aims in a document like the Asia-Pacific Maritime Security Strategy yet pursues these aims incoherently and halfheartedly.
In short, Washington has made itself look like an inconstant steward of the global commons. 
In the future the U.S. Navy must challenge what needs to be challenged—reassuring allies and friends that America remains strong and resolute. 
And as naval leaders draw up operations and strategy, they should ask themselves:
What would Decatur do?

dimanche 30 octobre 2016

The Land at Stake Is in Australia, but the Focus Is on China

By MICHELLE INNIS

Herding cattle in Queensland, Australia. A recent poll found 87 percent of citizens were against foreigners owning Australian farms and 59 percent did not approve of Chinese investment. 

SYDNEY — Gina Rinehart is very rich — and very Australian.
The mining magnate’s ancestors immigrated to the country’s hardscrabble western reaches in the 1830s. 
A mountain range there is named after her family. 
In public she sometimes adopts a characteristically Australian distaste for pretension — what one historian called the country’s “democracy of manners” — such as the time she climbed onto the back of a flatbed truck with a bullhorn to excoriate a mining tax.
On Friday Ms. Rinehart added further to her local bona fides as she became the sole remaining bidder for iconic Australian grazing land bigger than Portugal. 
But her apparent victory will probably add to unease among some Australian leaders over a major foreign buyer: Her partners in the bid are from China.
Australia already depends heavily on China’s vast appetite for its rocks, milk and meat. 
Now it is soaking up billions of dollars’ worth of investment from China, with the total reaching $11.1 billion last year, according to KPMG, the consulting firm. 
That has led to worries among members of the public that Chinese investors are buying up significant parts of the Australian economy and driving up already hefty home prices.
While critics of that stance say fears of China buying crucial Australian assets are largely unfounded, some Australian leaders have begun to act.
The Australian government in August blocked a joint bid by a Chinese and a Hong Kong company for Ausgrid, an electricity company and one of Australia’s largest infrastructure assets, with Scott Morrison, Australia’s treasurer, saying such a deal would be “contrary to the national interest.” Instead the government approved giving majority control of Ausgrid to two Australian pension funds in a $12.3 billion lease deal that valued the company at less than what the earlier bidders had offered.
The government also weathered the furor caused when the local authorities leased part of the port in the Australian city of Darwin to a Chinese company. 
United States Marines rotate through Darwin for joint military exercises as part of the Obama administration’s pivot toward the region.
Steve Ciobo, the trade minister, said in September that the government would consider updating its foreign investment guidelines so Australians could be sure that proposed investments were “good for the country.” 
Mike Smith, the former chief executive of Australia & New Zealand Banking Group, a major lender, went further. 
On Monday, he said Australia should make a list of “no-go assets.”
On Friday, four big Australian landowners withdrew a joint offer to buy S. Kidman & Company, which controls more than 38,600 square miles of land, after a group led by Ms. Rinehart topped their offer with a $294 million bid on Thursday.
Before their retreat, the landowners criticized Ms. Rinehart’s bid as not Australian enough. 
While Ms. Rinehart controls the group bidding for Kidman, the Chinese property company Shanghai CRED owns a one-third stake.
The bid from the landowners did not rely on “getting money out of the People’s Republic of China,” said Sterling Buntine, one of the landowners, in comments that came days before his group bowed out. 
Instead, he told lawmakers, it “will see Kidman 100 percent Australian-owned.”
The Kidman properties account for 2.5 percent of Australia’s farmland and include a pastoral lease across a weapons range classified as sensitive by the Australian government.
The Rinehart group’s bid excludes the areas abutting the weapons range.

The mining magnate Gina Rinehart in 2015. A group led by Ms. Rinehart bid $294 million to buy S. Kidman & Company, owners of more than 38,600 square miles of land. 

Mr. Morrison, the treasurer, had already rejected bids for Kidman from two Chinese companies. When Ms. Rinehart emerged with her Chinese partner, Mr. Buntine and his fellow cattle ranchers quickly countered.
“My father carted cattle for Kidman for many years,” Mr. Buntine said. 
Other consortium members, the Oldfield family and the Brinkworths, were cattlemen on Kidman properties or drovers. 
Malcolm Harris, the fourth member, runs cattle farms in Western Australia and the Northern Territory.
Ms. Rinehart’s camp dismissed the idea that the presence of a Chinese partner would take valuable Australian land out of the hands of locals.
“You don’t get much more Australian than fourth-generation Australian Gina Rinehart,” said Garry Korte, the chief executive of Hancock Prospecting, Ms. Rinehart’s investment vehicle.
Shanghai CRED did not respond to requests for comment.
Ms. Rinehart, who is well known in Australia for her strong conservative political views and legal fights with other members of her family, has stressed her connections to the Kidman properties. 
Her grandfather, she says, ran several businesses with the properties’ late owner, Sidney Kidman. “They respected each other and were friends,” she said.
In a poll before national elections, which were held on July 2, the Lowy Institute, an independent research center, found that 87 percent of Australians were against foreigners owning Australian farms and that 59 percent did not approve of Chinese investment.
“Most Australians have little or no direct connection with Kidman,” said Simon Venus, a lawyer acting for the landowners. 
“But culturally, it is very significant. There’s a romantic nostalgia around the properties.”
So far Chinese investors hold only modest amounts of Australian land. 
Investors from the United Kingdom are the largest foreign holders, with 27.5 million hectares, followed by those from the United States, according to Australian trade officials. 
Investors from China ranked fifth, holding 1.5 million hectares.
Critics of the growing anti-China stance from some politicians say it amounts to pandering. 
Indeed, many Australians believe homeownership is out of their reach because Chinese investors are pushing prices higher.
“The process for the sale of big-ticket assets is utterly politicized,” said Jeffrey Wilson of the Asia Research Center at Murdoch University in Perth.
But the government is grappling with rising discontent among junior and independent lawmakers who are uneasy about foreign investment. 
Two lawmakers, Nick Xenophon, a senator from South Australia, and Bob Katter, a lower-house lawmaker from Queensland, said on Monday that the government should stiffen the rules governing the entry of foreign buyers.
Mr. Xenophon said he supported foreign investment but was considering pressing for new laws that would give tax breaks to Australian pension funds to help them buy Australian assets. 
“It means profits stay here, jobs are created here,” he said.

Checking Manila’s Pivot to China

Duterte is attacking a pillar of America’s military posture in the Western Pacific.
By DAVID FEITH

Another week, another foreign trip, another Rodrigo Duterte crisis: Fresh from visiting Beijing and announcing an ominous but vague “separation” from the United States, the Philippine president this week visited Tokyo and got specific: U.S. troops should be out of the Philippines within two years. 
A U.S. ally is now attacking a pillar of America’s military posture in the Western Pacific.
Before almost any Americans had heard of Mr. Duterte, in 2014, his predecessor signed a deal to cement cooperation with the U.S. against China’s drive to dominate the South China Sea, Asia’s central waterway. 
The agreement invited the U.S. to rotate troops and materiel through Philippine bases while boosting train-and-equip programs for Philippine troops.
“Well, forget it,” Mr. Duterte says of the deal now. 
“I don’t want to see any military man of any other nation except the Filipino,” he declared Tuesday, characteristically overlooking the Chinese forces illegally occupying Philippine territory at Scarborough Shoal and the Spratly Islands.
Here’s an Asian pivot worthy of the name: Rarely has any country reoriented its foreign policy so dramatically and so quickly. 
Manila’s friends in the U.S. are confused and questioning: Is the alliance lost? 
Is Mr. Duterte’s gambit an indictment of Washington’s own underwhelming pivot to Asia? 
The answers carry lessons for the next U.S. president.
It’s true that the celebrated U.S. pivot, intended to deter China and reassure friends like the Philippines, has mostly amounted to better U.S. attendance at confabs like the East Asia Summit; important but limited openings to new partners Vietnam and India; and modest new U.S. military deployments to Singapore, Australia and (yes) the Philippines. 
The U.S. has undercut these gains by slashing defense budgets, embracing strategic retrenchment, letting Iraq and Syria burn, and so far failing to complete the trans-Pacific trade deal marketed as the pivot’s key element.
It’s also true that the U.S. failed to stop Beijing’s seizure of Scarborough Shoal from the Philippines in 2012, its most aggressive maritime move. 
When Chinese fishermen and armed coast-guard ships evicted Philippine boats from the area, U.S. diplomats brokered a deal for both sides to withdraw—then stood by as Manila honored the deal and Beijing didn’t. 
This hurt trust in the U.S. and whetted Beijing’s appetite. 
As Ely Ratner, now a White House official, wrote in 2013: “Chinese officials and pundits began speaking of a ‘Scarborough Model’ for exerting regional influence.”
China soon built militarized artificial islands off the Philippine coast, with no effective pushback from Washington. 
“America would never die for us,” Duterte charged last year, two months before announcing his presidential bid. 
“If America cared, it would have sent its aircraft carriers and missile frigates the moment China started reclaiming land in contested territory, but no such thing happened.”
Yet would a stronger U.S. pivot have kept Duterte onside? 
Unlikely.
The 71-year-old was fiercely anti-American long before the fall of Scarborough Shoal. 
Until this year he was mayor of Davao, in the restive southern province of Mindanao, where he opposed U.S. forces invited by national leaders to fight al Qaeda-linked Abu Sayyaf terrorists. 
He barred U.S. drones from Davao, boasted of his “hatred” for the U.S. after a local hotel bombing he blames on the FBI, and refused the job of Philippine defense secretary in 2006 rather than work with Uncle Sam.
A former student and admirer of Jose Maria Sison, exiled founder of the Communist Party of the Philippines, Duterte considers the U.S. a former colonial overlord trying to keep his country under foot. 
He resents U.S. criticism of the extrajudicial killings involved in his signature crackdown on drugs—it’s why he called Barack Obama a “son of a whore”—and at their first meeting he reportedly confronted Obama with a photograph of Filipinos slain by U.S. forces a century ago.
So the U.S. is dealing with a proud ideological foe. 
Whether he’ll cause irreparable harm to a 65-year-old alliance, though, remains uncertain.
Voters elected Duterte mostly to fight crime and raise incomes, not to spurn the U.S. for China. 
The Philippines is the world’s most pro-American country, according to Pew: 92% of Filipinos last year viewed the U.S. favorably; only 82% of Americans view their own country favorably.
This is thanks to cultural and linguistic ties dating to the colonial era, the large and successful Filipino community in the U.S., and America’s standing as the Philippines’ second-largest trade partner behind Japan—all in addition to its liberation of the islands in World War II and its more recent contributions of military and humanitarian aid. 
China by contrast is viewed with suspicion, identified as it is with unpopular business elites and bullying in the South China Sea.
Hence the mounting pushback against Duterte—not only from political rivals but from the likes of former President Fidel Ramos, a respected elder statesman and former Duterte ally with close ties to the military, and Antonio Carpio, a Supreme Court justice who warned that undermining Philippine sovereignty at Scarborough Shoal would be an impeachable offense.
The U.S. can help as its Philippine friends try to check Duterte. 
For one, it can show that China isn’t the only country with strategic dollars to spend. 
As much as the Philippine military values U.S. training and equipment, U.S. aid fell from 2010 to 2015. 
The U.S. started to fix that last year with its Maritime Security Initiative, but Congress can do far more.
Mr. Obama and his successor meanwhile must show that the presidential transition won’t distract from U.S. commitments in Asia. 
The impression of U.S. strategic drift might not have created Duterte, but it gives him room to run. 
He’ll have less if the next U.S. president enters office pledging significant increases in defense spending. 
Adversaries in Beijing and Moscow know to read U.S. budget tables, and so do leaders in Manila weighing how hard to fight for a U.S. alliance on the ropes.

Enough is enough: Germany gets tough on Chinese takeovers

By Michelle FITZPATRICK

Economy Minister Sigmar Gabriel
Germany's economy ministry says it has withdrawn its approval for Chinese Grand Chip Investment's 670-million-euro purchase of Aixtron, citing security concerns
Alarmed by a raft of Chinese takeovers, Germany is putting the brakes on the Asian giant's shopping spree as it sends out the message that not everything is for sale.
The more assertive noises coming out of Berlin are likely to dominate Economy Minister Sigmar Gabriel's trip to China in the coming days, putting to the test the oft-vaunted "special relationship" between the top export powers.
Germans have watched with unease as Chinese enterprises have swallowed up a record number of homegrown tech companies this year, sparking fears of German knowhow and intellectual property being sold off to the highest bidder.
The wave of acquisitions has also stoked grumbles over China's easy access to the country's open markets, often through state-backed companies, while foreign investors there face tight restrictions.
"Germans seem to be growing more and more sceptical about China, and consequently more willing to pursue a tougher approach to Beijing," said analyst Hans Kundnani from the German Marshall Fund.
In the clearest sign yet that Berlin could be squaring up for a battle, the German economy ministry this week said it was taking a closer look at two planned Chinese takeovers -- effectively stalling both deals.
The moves have not gone unnoticed in Beijing and Gabriel will likely face some prickly questions when he leads a 60-strong business delegation on a five-day trip to China and Hong Kong from Tuesday.
Germany's first punch came last Monday when the ministry said it had withdrawn its approval for Grand Chip Investment's 670-million-euro ($730-million) purchase of chip equipment maker Aixtron, citing security concerns.
German daily Handelsblatt said the surprise reversal came after US intelligence services warned that Aixtron products could be used for military purposes.
The deal is now back under review, a process that could last three months.
Days later, the economy ministry said it was also reviewing the mooted sale of German firm Osram's general lighting unit to a Chinese buyer.
So far there has been little official reaction from Beijing.
But a bylined commentary carried by the official Xinhua news agency was scathing, accusing Germany of "protectionist moves" that called into question "Berlin's sincerity in securing an open and transparent investment climate".
"It is time for Berlin to let go of its delusional "China threat" paranoia," it added.

- Call for EU action -
Chinese firms spent over 11 billion euros on German companies between January and October, a new record, according to accountancy firm EY.
Included in that is the 4.6-billion-euro purchase of leading robot maker Kuka by Chinese appliance giant Midea, a deal that sparked particular alarm and which Gabriel had sought to thwart.
Gabriel, also Germany's vice-chancellor, has since drawn up a list of proposals to give European Union governments greater powers to block takeovers by non-EU firms in strategic industries.
Crucially there has been no word yet on whether Chancellor Angela Merkel -- who has championed close economic ties with Beijing -- approves of the idea.
But Gabriel is likely to get a sympathetic hearing from at least some European peers.
The new British government recently delayed the controversial Hinkley Point nuclear project over concerns about China's involvement, before eventually giving it the go-ahead.
In Brussels, an in-depth EU antitrust probe is holding up state-owned ChemChina's proposed mammoth takeover of Swiss seed maker Syngenta.

- Level playing field -

Observers, however, say Germany is not about to close the door on China, one of its most important trade partners.
Rather, the latest manoeuvres should be seen as part of a growing debate about how "to get a level playing field" with China, Kundnani told AFP.
Gabriel himself told reporters this week foreign investment with China could not be "a one-way street".
"We would like reciprocity," he said.
Foreign investors have long complained of the obstacles to doing business in China, such as the requirement to team up with local partners, while some sectors are completely off-limits.

China's Dirty Money

U.S., EU Say 'No' To China Buying The World
By Gordon G. Chang

Regulators on both sides of the Atlantic, acting as if on cue, are moving to block acquisitions of local businesses by Chinese companies.
Berlin, long open to Beijing’s investments, has just retracted its clearance of the $729 million purchase of chipmaker Aixtron by Fujian Grand Chip Investment Fund.
The move came just days before Berlin proposed EU rules giving member states the authority to stop Chinese takeovers in strategic sectors, especially when the potential acquirers are state entities. “We need to have the powers to really investigate deals when it is clear that they are driven by industrial policy or to enable technology transfers,” said Deputy Economics Minister Matthias Machnig.
Current German law permits the government to stop acquisitions of only defense companies, IT security firms, and businesses handling state documents.
German officials are not the only group worried. 
China’s largest foreign acquisition looks like it might run aground in Brussels. 
EU antitrust regulators have started a review of China National Chemical Corp.’s bid to buy Syngenta, the Swiss agribusiness giant, for $44 billion.
Even not counting the Aixtron and Syngenta deals, European regulators have blocked almost $40 billion in Chinese takeovers of businesses since the middle of 2015 according to Grisons Peak, an investment bank.
The blocking of acquisitions comes after a wave of Chinese investment. 
Grisons Peak puts the highpoint of China’s purchases at $95.6 billion in the first quarter of this year. Since then, takeovers have trended down, with just $49.4 billion in Q2 and $46.1 billion in Q3.
In the U.S., this month it was reported that, due to concerns raised by the Committee on Foreign Investment in the United States, Blackstone Group called off the sale of Hotel del Coronado to China’s mysterious Anbang Insurance Group.
CFIUS, as the Federal interagency body is known, was also thought to be responsible for the killing of the sale of the lighting-components business of Royal Philips NV to a Chinese group led by GO Scale Capital for $2.8 billion in January.
So far, the U.S. has welcomed Chinese capital. 
As the Rhodium Group has reported, Chinese entities invested $18.4 billion in the U.S. in the first half of 2016, almost three times the $6.4 billion in the same period a year earlier and more than that invested all last year.
That upward trend—Rhodium calls it “tripling down on America”—may not last long. 
Ali Meyer of the Washington Free Beacon, the online news site, reports that the U.S.-China Economic and Security Review Commission, in its next annual report, will recommend that Congress give CFIUS the authority “to bar Chinese state-owned enterprises from acquiring or otherwise gaining effective control of U.S. companies.”
“The Chinese Communist Party continues to use state-owned enterprises as the primary economic tool for advancing and achieving its national security objectives,” notes the “final draft” of the Commission’s report. 
“There is therefore an inherently high risk that whenever a state-owned enterprise acquires or gains effective control of a U.S. company, it will use the technology, intelligence, and market power it gains in the service of the Chinese state, to the detriment of U.S. national security.”
There are many reasons for the concern in the EU and America over Chinese investment, but a common theme, as Commission member Larry Wortzel notes, is fairness. 
“There is no reciprocity,” he told the Free Beacon. 
“While Chinese companies can buy U.S. or Western companies, American and other Western companies are barred from buying key sector state-owned enterprises, if not all state-owned enterprises.”
And in Berlin the business community, which is skeptical of new curbs on Chinese investment, has expressed the same general concern. 
“The European economy must be allowed to do in China what the Chinese are allowed to do in Europe,” said Ulrich Grillo, head of BDI, a German industry association, to the Financial Times.
For decades, Washington, Brussels, and other capitals have not insisted on fair treatment for their companies, largely because of the lure of the Chinese market, but now that market is showing signs of softness in most segments.
Perhaps the best proof of the softness in China is the rush by Chinese entities to buy foreign assets. Although some acquisitions by state and private enterprises seem to be at the direction of the state, many deals are evidently not.
Last year, net capital outflow could have been as much as the $1 trillion reported by Bloomberg. Beijing has tried to staunch the outbound flow with drastic measures, but this year the outflow could be close to that staggering figure.
The outflow will undoubtedly pick up as the renminbi continues its decline.
So far this year, the Chinese currency is down 4.4% against the greenback. 
The yuan will almost certainly weaken further when American interest rates go up, as Fed Chair Janet Yellen signaled in September, and as the Chinese central bank decreases support.
The fall of the renminbi tells us the Chinese people have lost confidence in their economy and society. 
A study just released by Hurun Report states over 60% of China’s rich plan to invest in overseas residences in the next three years.

China tries to 'divide and rule' Taiwan by befriending pro-Beijing towns

By J.R. Wu | TAIPEI

Taiwan's landmark building Taipei 101 is seen during sunset in Taipei, Taiwan April 19, 2016. 
China is embarking on a divide-and-rule campaign on self-ruled Taiwan, offering to boost tourism to pro-Beijing towns and counties while giving the new pro-independence government the cold shoulder, government officials and politicians say.
Whether Beijing's promises materialize remains to be seen, but the political rift is pressing Taiwan's ruling Democratic Progressive Party (DPP) to come up with measures of its own to counter an alarming decline in mainland tourists.
Eight Taiwanese local government officials, mainly representing counties controlled by the China-friendly opposition Nationalist Party KMT, were promised greater tourism and agricultural ties when they met China's top Taiwan policymaker in Beijing last month.
And this week, Xi Jinping is scheduled to meet Nationalist Party chairwoman Hung Hsiu-chu when she visits Beijing during an annual party-to-party gathering about economic and cultural ties.
In contrast, Beijing has withheld official communication with the government of DPP leader and President Tsai Ing-wen, until it agrees to recognize the "one-China" policy.
"The Chinese government has put political conditions relevant to Taiwan surrendering our sovereignty and our right to determine our own future on the outflow of tourists to Taiwan and that's what makes this a very politically complicated issue," said Hsiao Bi-khim, a DPP lawmaker for Hualien, on Taiwan's east coast.
Hsiao and the Hualien county chief, an ex-Nationalist who went to Beijing last month, do not see eye to eye on tourism development.
"We have to condemn this divide-and-conquer strategy and also individual politicians who seek to play into the Chinese divide-and-conquer strategy," Hsiao said.

The Two Chinas
China says Taiwan is part of one China, ruled by Beijing. 
It regards the island as a renegade province, to be united by force if necessary, and ties have become strained since Tsai took office in May.
The previous Nationalist administration agreed to recognize the "1992 consensus", which states that there is only one China, with each side having its own interpretation of what that means.
The eight officials who went to Beijing came home to a storm of criticism for being lackeys to Beijing's one-China policy.
One of them, Liu Tseng-ying, chief of Matsu, a group of small islets off China's Fujian province but held by Taiwan, told Chinese officials that he wanted more Chinese to visit Taiwan's smallest county.
"I said I hoped Chinese tourists can increase to 40 percent of the total," Liu told Reuters.
China's Taiwan Affairs Office head Zhang Zhijun agreed to expand trade and travel specifically between China's Fujian province and Matsu and Kinmen. 
Both Taiwan-controlled islands lie closer to China than Taiwan.
Group tourists from mainland China, which Beijing can effectively control via state-run Chinese travel agencies, fell 71 percent year-on-year from October 1-18, Taiwan data showed, coinciding with China's National Day holiday, a Golden Week for travel for Chinese.
The sector was also hit by a bus fire in Taiwan in July that killed 24 mainland tourists. 
The driver, among the victims, had poured petrol inside the bus and locked its emergency exits before setting it alight, prosecutors said.
The severity of the decline in tourism led to a major protest in September and prompted the government to pledge T$30 billion ($960 million) in loans to the industry and work on attracting tourists from other Asian countries.

vendredi 28 octobre 2016

China's Soft Power

China 'fake sanitary pads' scam sparks health concerns
By Kerry Allen
Over 10 million fake sanitary towels have been seized in southeast China

The discovery of a huge "fake sanitary towel" operation in southeast China has prompted fears about the possible impact on women's health.
Police in Nanchang, Jiangxi Province, say they have arrested two suspects believed to have produced millions of the fakes in dirty facilities.
The fakes are thought to have gone on sale across China since 2013.
Chinese authorities have warned against buying discounted products, saying there could be serious health risks.
The Nanchang Public Security Bureau says it seized fake sanitary towels with a resale value of more than 40m yuan ($5.9m; £4.8m) in a factory with no disinfection facilities.
The fakes were then sold in supermarkets under the trademarks of leading Chinese brands such as ABC or Whisper, the Nanchang News reported.
It is not yet clear whether they were distributed internationally.
Consumers have been urged to check the packaging before buying because the colouring of the fake products is reportedly slightly darker.
This Weibo post by People's Daily received over 14,000 comments

#SanitaryNapkins

The scandal was one of the biggest talking points in Chinese social media on Thursday.
Tens of thousands of Sina Weibo microblog users posted under the hashtags #Over10MillionFakeSanitaryTowels and #SanitaryNapkins.
Some social media users have called for the "evil" suspects to be given the death penalty.
"Why would someone want to hurt me at my most vulnerable?" asked social media user Sdanler.
Another social media user, zhou6665, said someone she knew bought fake sanitary towels and suffered a urinary tract infection followed by inflammation.
Others warned that women in rural China could be especially at risk, as they have less access to information and are more reliant on cut-price products.

EU asks for WTO panel in challenge to Chinese raw material duties

By Julia Fioretti

BRUSSELS -- The European Union on Wednesday asked the World Trade Organization (WTO) to set up a dispute settlement panel to examine restrictions on Chinese exports of 12 raw materials which it says give an unfair advantage to Chinese producers.
The EU said China's export duties and export quotas on the raw materials -- antimony, chromium, cobalt, copper, ferronickel, graphite, indium, lead, magnesia, talc, tantalum, and tin -- appeared to be "part of a continuing troubling industrial policy aimed at providing substantial competitive advantages for Chinese producers at the expense of producers and consumers in the EU and across the world".
The bloc had requested consultations with China in July to try to resolve the dispute, but they were unsuccessful.
The WTO will consider the EU's request for a dispute settlement panel on Nov. 8, the EU said.
"The EU regrets China's unwillingness to bring its legislation concerning the export of raw materials in line with its WTO commitments and is therefore once again challenging China's export regime," it said in a statement.
The EU said some of the rare materials in question are among the 20 raw materials that critical to Europe's economy.
China's position as a leading global producer of these raw materials means its export restrictions give it the ability to affect global supply and pricing, the EU said.

China's Creativity

When China Wants Better Air Readings, Cotton Does the Trick
By EDWARD WONG and VANESSA PIAO

Heavy smog engulfing the northern Chinese city of Xi’an in 2013.

The scheme was simple: Stuff cotton into air-monitoring equipment so that the air being read would be filtered and seem cleaner.
The people doing this to produce better — but false — air-quality readings in Xi’an, the provincial capital of Shaanxi, got away with it for months, until inspectors noticed irregularities in the data.
An investigation resulted in the head of the air-monitoring station in the city’s Chang’an district and several members of his staff being caught, according to a report by Chinese Business View, a newspaper in Shaanxi. 
Five people have been detained, including He Limin, chief of the Chang’an branch of the Xi’an Environmental Protection Bureau.
The report was widely reprinted online and discussed by internet users this week in China, and it raised questions about the accuracy of air-quality data gathered in scores of cities across the country. In January 2013, China began releasing real-time air-quality data from 74 cities and 496 air-monitoring stations. 
Since then, many more cities have been added to the system, overseen by the Ministry of Environmental Protection.
Citizens are focused on readings of PM 2.5, a fine particulate matter that is considered especially harmful because it penetrates deep into lung tissue and enters the bloodstream.
Analysts of the data say the vast majority of Chinese cities fail to meet air-quality standards.
In June 2015, the Ministry of Environmental Protection said it had uncovered seven cases of falsified air-quality data.
The plot in Xi’an began when the station moved in February. 
At the time, the station chief, Li Sen, used the move to secretly copy the key to the station and a password for the station’s computer. 
Shortly after that, station employees sneaked into the station multiple times and stuffed cotton into the sensors, “resulting in abnormal data and affecting the normal operation of the national air-quality automatic monitoring system,” according to Chinese Business View.
The report said that station employees deleted surveillance camera video in March to ensure that inspectors would not see their actions.
As of Friday afternoon, neither the Xi’an Environmental Protection Bureau nor the Ministry of Environmental Protection had responded to faxed requests for comment sent this week.
Dong Liansai, a climate and energy campaigner at Greenpeace East Asia, released a statement on Tuesday saying that the news “should serve as a warning to officials around the country that the central government is serious about punishing environmental abuses.”
Xi’an is in northern China, a part of the country often afflicted by poor air quality because of the prevalence of industrial coal burning. 
To the east of Xi’an, Hebei Province has some of the most polluted cities in the country. 
In December, Beijing issued a red alert, because of what it called dire levels of smog. 
It was the first time Beijing had done that since the alert system was announced.
In northern China, urban residents brace in winter for the onset of an “airpocalypse,” a term that designates a particularly bad spate of toxic air days. 
One of the worst ones took place in January 2013. 
That spell of bad air was so intense that it prompted an increased consciousness of smog and its health consequences among many Chinese, and the government allowed the state news media to publish many more articles on the nation’s air-quality problems.
In February 2015, Chai Jing, a former journalist for China Central Television, the state network, posted online an independent documentary on air pollution, “Under the Dome.” 
The documentary drew hundreds of millions of views in four days and became a rallying point for those worried about toxic air, but censors forced Chinese websites to take the film down
Since then, Ms. Chai has not spoken publicly or made any public appearances.

China's overseas takeover spree meets growing resistance

Associated Press

HONG KONG – Corporate China's global shopping binge barreled on this week with more multibillion dollar deals, but Beijing is starting to discover that there are limits to what its money can buy.
In recent days German and European Union officials have moved to tighten up scrutiny or even block high-profile acquisitions in the latest sign of growing opposition to Chinese purchases of companies in key industries due to national security or competition concerns.
Swiss chemical giant Syngenta said Tuesday that EU regulators examining its proposed $43 billion takeover by state-owned ChemChina have "recently requested a large amount of additional information," which will drag the approval process out into the first quarter of next year.
At about the same time, the German government withdrew clearance for a Chinese company to buy semiconductor equipment maker Aixtron in a $670 million deal over unspecified security-related concerns — a decision that threatens to complicate German Economy Minister Sigmar Gabriel's trade visit to China next week.
"The surge in Chinese acquisitions of high-tech companies certainly has policymakers on high alert, especially in Germany," said Bjorn Conrad, vice president of research at the Mercator Institute for China Studies in Berlin, which tracks China's overseas investment. 
"That is because China is not playing by the rules."
He said some of the deals reflect a political strategy in which state-owned Chinese companies, spurred by an aggressive outbound industrial policy, unfairly exploit Europe's open markets to gobble up companies with core technologies to speed the country's technological advance.
European policymakers "are not naive when it comes to government-driven acquisitions. They will apply a much higher level of scrutiny in the future," Conrad said.
Chinese companies have invested nearly $200 billion so far this year in overseas firms, almost double the amount for all of 2015, according to Dealogic. 
The transactions have included a German robot maker, a Finnish video game company and an American appliance maker.
Just this week, HNA Group paid $6.5 billion for a 25 percent stake in the Hilton hotel chain, after one of its units earlier this year bought Carlson Hotels, operator of the Radisson and Country Inns & Suites brands. 
Meanwhile, Beijing-based China Oceanwide Holdings Group agreed to buy U.S. insurer Genworth Financial for $2.7 billion.
However, about $40 billion in proposed Chinese purchases has been cancelled since the start of 2015, reflecting resistance to such deals, according to Dealogic.
In Australia, the government blocked a Chinese group from leasing a Sydney electricity grid in an unusual turnaround, citing classified national security reasons. 
The deal involving state-owned State Grid Corp. and Hong Kong-based Cheung Kong Infrastructure group would have earned the government more than 10 billion Australian dollars (then-$7.6 billion).
The August decision was unusual in that the government had initially invited the companies to bid and only rejected them at the last minute on general security concerns unrelated to any specific country, said Hans Hendrischke, a professor at the University of Sydney Business School who specializes in Chinese investment in Australia.
However, "overall, certainly, I think the political outcome is clearly that the perception is created as if all of these are somehow directed against Chinese acquisitions of assets in foreign countries."
The concerns mirror those in the U.S.
Last month, 16 lawmakers wrote to the Government Accountability Office calling for a review of the Committee on Foreign Investment in the U.S., a federal inter-agency panel also known as CFIUS, saying it should be updated or expanded to keep pace with the surge of foreign acquisitions in strategically important sectors.
Specifically, the letter said the committee's powers might need to be widened in light of Chinese conglomerate Dalian Wanda's recent purchases of U.S. theater chains and the Hollywood studio Legendary Entertainment, citing fears about Beijing's censorship and propaganda efforts.
Tighter scrutiny by CFIUS or the prospect of it has already thwarted some high-tech deals.
State-owned Tsinghua Unisplendour in February scrapped a plan to buy a 15 percent stake in disk drive maker Western Digital, which would have made it the biggest shareholder, after the committee decided to investigate the $3.8 billion investment on national security grounds. 
A month earlier, electronics giant Philips aborted the sale of a majority stake in its LED components and auto lighting business to Chinese investor GO Scale Capital.

An Exiled Editor Traces the Roots of Democratic Thought in China

Xi Jinping wants to revive the personality cult and dictatorship of that era, so he’s particularly unwilling for people to reflect on the Cultural Revolution.
By LUO SILING

Hu Ping, seated, speaking at Peking University in 1980. He rejects the idea that democracy is a foreign concept in China and therefore inappropriate.

Hu Ping is the editor of the pro-democracy journal Beijing Spring, based in New York. 
But in 1975, he was 28 and living in the southwestern Chinese city of Chengdu, a recently returned “educated youth” who had been sent down to labor in the countryside during the Cultural Revolution.
While waiting to be assigned to a new workplace, he wrote an essay that would become a classic of modern Chinese liberalism. 
The essay, “On Freedom of Speech,” could at first be circulated only through handwritten posters on the city’s streets. 
In 1979 it appeared in the underground magazine Fertile Soil, and it went on to influence a generation of democracy advocates.
Mr. Hu was admitted to Peking University in 1978 and in 1980 was elected as a delegate to the local people’s congress. 
In 1987, he began doctoral studies at Harvard, then moved to New York a year later to serve as chairman of an organization supporting China’s burgeoning democracy movement. 
The Chinese government canceled his passport, consigning him to exile.
In his new book — “Why Did Mao Zedong Launch the Cultural Revolution?,” published in Taiwan by Asian Culture — Mr. Hu argues that contemporary Chinese concepts of democracy and freedom are not imports from the West, but a response to political oppression at home and a growing appreciation of the need for restraints on state power. 
In an interview, Mr. Hu discussed how the Cultural Revolution shaped his thinking, the unexpected course of Xi Jinping’s career and why he rejects assertions that democracy is a foreign concept and therefore inappropriate for China.

How did the Cultural Revolution shape your political thinking?

My generation was imbued with official ideology from childhood. 
As a supporter of communist theory and the communist system, I enthusiastically participated in the Cultural Revolution at first. 
But I became very disillusioned by the extreme brutality that emerged during the movement, especially because the vast majority of victims were targeted merely for expressing alternative views. I myself was denounced more than once because I had different views stemming from my disgust at the persecution of people for speech crimes. 
This led me to gradually form a concept of freedom of expression.
Later I went to the United States and read Harvard Prof. Judith N. Shklar’s essay “The Liberalism of Fear.” 
Professor Sklar pointed out that modern Western liberalism arose from a revulsion against religious and political persecution and led to an insistence on protecting human rights and limiting political power.

“Why Did Mao Zedong Launch the Cultural Revolution?”

The Chinese rediscovery of liberalism was based on a very similar experience. 
The Cultural Revolution gave rise to a widespread and deep-seated horror that led a few people to formulate an explicit concept of freedom and gave the majority the desire and basis to accept this concept. 
Even quite a few Communist leaders developed an appreciation for freedom because of their personal suffering.

For example?
One example is Xi Jinping’s father, Xi Zhongxun, who was purged in a literary inquisition in the 1960s but re-emerged after Mao died [in 1976]. 
While serving as vice chairman of the Standing Committee of the National People’s Congress, Xi Zhongxun proposed drafting a “law protecting alternative views.” 
He said the history of the Chinese Communist Party demonstrated the disastrous consequences of suppressing dissident opinions.
The prevailing view at that time was that it was wrong to treat “opposing the party and opposing socialism” as a crime because there was no clear standard for what constituted opposition, and any alternative political viewpoint should be tolerated. 
Xi Zhongxun probably had never read John Locke, John Stuart Mill, Isaiah Berlin or Friedrich Hayek
His concept of tolerance and freedom arose mainly from personal experience, especially the horrors of Mao’s Cultural Revolution, and his reflections on that experience.

How would you compare the liberalism of the 1980s with political thought after the suppression of the 1989 Tiananmen movement?
The failure of the 1989 democracy movement made ordinary people negative or indifferent toward politics, and cynicism ran wild. 
This created a strange phenomenon: The concept of liberalism spread much wider than before 1989 but carried far less power. 
In the years since 1989, although there have been quite a few liberal scholars, dissidents and rights defense lawyers making heroic efforts to practice and promote the concept of freedom — beginning with the concept of freedom of speech — harsh political suppression and an indifferent social climate have prevented a breakthrough and made it very difficult to build up the kind of social mobilization that existed in the 1980s.

Hu Ping, the editor of Beijing Spring, in New York in 2013. “I enthusiastically participated in the Cultural Revolution at first,” he said. “But I became very disillusioned by the extreme brutality that emerged during the movement.” 

With political reform now stalled or even in retreat, some people in China are worried about a recurrence of the Cultural Revolution. Why has Xi Jingping declined to follow the example of his father in promoting democratic change and instead concentrated power even further?
The Cultural Revolution in its strictest sense can never occur again. 
The fact that people are worried about its recurrence reflects how Xi Jinping has strengthened dictatorial rule, suppressed civil society and tightened controls over expression. 
In the past, many people thought that Xi Jinping might have inherited his father’s open-mindedness, little imagining that once he took power, his manner and actions would make him more like Mao’s grandson than Xi Zhongxun’s son. 
Xi Zhongxun proposed drafting a “law to protect alternative views,” whereas Xi Jinping has banned “improper discussion” [of central party policies].
Many people once believed that economic development and the growth of a middle class in China would be accompanied by progress in human rights. 
But by the logic of the Chinese government, economic development was built on the suppression of human rights, so how can it now abandon this suppression?
In other words, the Chinese government thinks: “We’ve only done so well because we’ve been so bad. If we hadn’t been so bad, things wouldn’t be so good.”

Your generation’s experience of the Cultural Revolution fostered the emergence of politically liberal ideas in China. Could remembrance of the Cultural Revolution contribute to the development of liberalism and political change today?
A sensitive topic such as the Cultural Revolution should become less sensitive with the passage of time, and the authorities should be expected to gradually relax restrictions on discussion of the Cultural Revolution. 
But the reality is just the opposite: The authorities are controlling discussion of the Cultural Revolution even more harshly than they did 10 or 20 years ago. 
Xi Jinping wants to revive the personality cult and dictatorship of that era, so he’s particularly unwilling for people to reflect on the Cultural Revolution.
Half a century has passed since the Cultural Revolution was set in motion, and the “young militants” of that time are entering their twilight years. 
As the authorities continue to suppress discussion of the Cultural Revolution, the average person, especially the young, has only the vaguest impression of that time. 
Throw in the events and changes China has experienced in recent decades, and the collective experience of the Cultural Revolution has become less of a force for promoting China’s liberalization. 
Even so, we have to keep at it.
It is a lack of freedom that allows us to understand what freedom is. 
It is in ourselves that we discover why people have been willing to risk so much for freedom. 
Taking a further step toward joint action, we discover that we are not alone and that our voices can resonate far and wide. 
We don’t start out believing that an unseen force guarantees freedom’s victory, but we fight for it all the same.

jeudi 27 octobre 2016

America’s Dangerous ‘China Fantasy’

Economic development, trade and investment have yielded greater political repression and a more closed political system.
By JAMES MANN
Wang Qiaoling, left, and Li Wenzu with photos of their husbands, human rights lawyers in China who have been detained since July 2015.

Throughout the 1990s and early 2000s, American business executives and political leaders of both parties repeatedly put forward what I label the “China fantasy”: the view that trade, foreign investment and increasing prosperity would lead to political liberalization in the world’s most populous country.
“Trade freely with China, and time is on our side,” said President George W. Bush
He was merely echoing his Democratic predecessor, Bill Clinton, who called the opening of China’s political system “inevitable, just as inevitably the Berlin Wall fell.”
To say the least, things in China haven’t turned out that way.
Over the past few years, the Chinese regime has become ever less tolerant of political dissent — to such an extent that, these days, American leaders have become far more reluctant to make claims about China’s political future or the impact on it of trade and investment. 
The “China fantasy” got the dynamics precisely wrong: Economic development, trade and investment have yielded greater political repression and a more closed political system.
This amounts to a new China paradigm: an intensely internationalized yet also intensely repressive one-party state. 
China provides the model that other authoritarian regimes, from Russia to Turkey to Egypt, seek to replicate. 
As a result, the United States will find itself struggling with this new China paradigm again and again in the coming years.
In using the word “repression,” I am talking about organized political activity, not private speech. Visitors to China are sometimes surprised to find that cabdrivers, tour guides or old friends may speak to them with candor, even about political subjects. 
However, what such people can’t do is to form an organization independent of the Chinese Communist Party or take independent action to try to change anything.
Indeed, over the past two years the Chinese government has been moving in new ways against people and institutions that might, even indirectly, provide support for independent political activity. 
It has tightened the rules for nongovernmental organizations. 
More recently, it has been arresting Chinese lawyers. 
It has also been staging televised confessions, a practice reminiscent of Stalin’s show trials.
Why is it that trade and investment have led to a Chinese regime that represses dissent more than it did five, 10 or 20 years ago? 
The answer, put simply, is that the regime thinks it needs to do so, can do so and has fewer outside constraints inhibiting it from doing so.
First, it needs to because as the economy develops and grows more complex, Chinese citizens are having new grievances of the sort that would otherwise lead to organized political activity. Environmental problems have multiplied. 
Consumers worry about product safety (tainted milk, for example) and accidents (like train wrecks). And at least to educated Chinese, internet censorship can be an annoyance, if not an insult.
Second, China’s security apparatus has a much greater capacity to repress dissent than it did in the past.
Technology gives it greater capacity to control both physical space (the streets) and cyberspace (the internet).
Finally, the world’s increased commercial involvement with China over the past two decades has made foreign leaders more reluctant to do anything in response to Chinese crackdowns, lest the Chinese regime retaliate. 
This is in large part a problem of perception: In fact, the Chinese regime cares about its standing in the world and would seek to avoid international condemnation if world leaders took stronger stands and worked together.
Almost forgotten now is that in the 1990s, the United States, possessing far greater economic leverage in dealing with China than it has today, threatened trade restrictions if Beijing did not improve the human rights climate.
After intense debate, the Clinton administration eventually backed away from threats to limit trade with China.
The aftermath of that debate was disastrous. 
American leaders overreacted by deciding to avoid any further strong actions in support of human rights in China. 
Instead, they offered the “China fantasy”: the idea that change would come inevitably.
At one point, giving voice to the optimism and the false assumptions about how trade would liberalize China, Clinton told China’s president, Jiang Zemin, at a Washington news conference, “You’re on the wrong side of history.”
History, however, is rendering its own judgment — that America’s confidence in the political impact of trade with China was woefully misplaced.
Looking forward, we are obliged to deal with a China capable of moving endlessly from one crackdown to another, no longer interrupted by the occasional easings or “Beijing Springs” of the past.
It will be a different China, in which educated, middle-class people may be less loyal, but their views also less influential.
What we can do is to keep expressing as forcefully as possible the values of political freedom and the right to dissent.
Democratic governments around the world need to collaborate more often in condemning Chinese repression — not just in private meetings but in public as well. 
We should also find new ways to single out and penalize individual Chinese officials involved in repression. 
Why should there be a one-way street in which Chinese leaders send their own children to America’s best schools, while locking up lawyers at home?
The Chinese regime is not going to open up because of our trade with it.
The “China fantasy” amounted to both a conceptual failure and a strategic blunder. 
The next president will need to start out afresh.

How a Chinese company bought access to admissions officers at top U.S. colleges

Dipont helped Chinese students cheat on their college applications. The company also has spent widely to get its clients in front of schools such as Vanderbilt University, Wellesley College, Tulane University and the University of Virginia.
By Steve Stecklow, Renee Dudley, James Pomfret and Alexandra Harney

NEW YORK/SHANGHAI – A major Chinese education company has paid thousands of dollars in perks or cash to admissions officers at top U.S. universities to "help" students apply to American schools.
And according to eight former employees of Shanghai-based Dipont Education Management Group, the company’s services didn’t end there.
Six told Reuters that Dipont employees wrote application essays for students
Another said she altered recommendation letters that teachers had written for students. 
One student was given access to his high school transcript and erased bad grades, one of the former employees said.
Dipont denies the allegations of application fraud but boasts of its special relationship with some 20 U.S. colleges, which include Vanderbilt University, Wellesley College, Tulane University and the University of Virginia. 
Their admissions officers have visited China since 2014, personally advising Dipont students at an annual summer program on how to successfully apply to U.S. colleges.
Just once a year, current admissions officers become your exclusive consultants,” an ad from Dipont tells prospective clients. 
The same ad features a Wellesley student crediting the Dipont program for her early acceptance.
Dipont and an affiliated charity picked up travel expenses for admissions officers attending the program. 
Some officers have received cash as well – sometimes dispensed in $100 bills, according to emails Reuters reviewed.
Given the prevalence of application fraud in China, the arrangement troubles Philip G. Altbach, founding director of the Center for International Higher Education at Boston College.
“Shame on the admissions people from these top schools who are doing this,” Altbach said.
Dipont’s success in gaining access to leading American colleges underscores how people on both sides of the Pacific are hungry to capitalize on Chinese students’ desire to study in the United States.
Hundreds of thousands of Chinese students are enrolled in U.S. institutions. 
And hundreds of companies in China have sprung up to cater to these students, charging large sums for services that sometimes include help in cheating on standardized tests and falsifying applications.
Some greedy American colleges have tried to boost revenue by hiring brokers to recruit international students, who tend to pay full tuition. 
In Dipont’s case, money goes the other way: A Chinese business is persuading highly selective colleges to counsel clients who are clamoring for admission to top schools.
Dipont’s founder and chief executive, Benson Zhang, said in an interview that “many of the schools, students and overseas colleges consider us one of the most "ethical" companies in China,” with stringent guidelines for employees.
“If there had been such a case, it had not been reported to me,” Zhang said of the reports of application fraud. 
“But I guarantee you, if such a complaint comes to my attention, I will deal with it with severity.” 
He added: “One or two aberrant employees who violate the rules do not indicate company-wide fraud.”
Zhang is also giving $750,000 to a University of Southern California research center that’s creating a program to combat fraud among Chinese applicants to American colleges.
The donation is controversial, too.
Zhang made his contribution to USC through a New York non-profit, the Council for American Culture and Education Inc, or CACE. 
The organization was set up for Dipont by two U.S. consultants in 2009 as the company began seeking contacts in American academia. 
Dipont this year began using CACE to pay some of the admissions officers who attend Dipont’s summer programs.
But CACE hasn’t disclosed its ties with Dipont in U.S. and New York State tax filings. 
That omission could threaten CACE’s tax-exempt status, according to Marcus Owens, former head of the non-profit organizations division of the Internal Revenue Service.
Informed of CACE’s ties to Dipont, the New York Attorney General’s office said it would review the charity. 
A review could lead to a formal investigation if the attorney general finds evidence the charity violated New York law.
A former Dipont employee tried to warn elite schools about the company. 
In 2014, Bruce Hammond emailed officials at USC and 10 other American colleges after a group of them traveled at Dipont’s expense to Beijing to discuss the USC project to fight application fraud. The warning was sent to schools including the Massachusetts Institute of Technology, Stanford University, Columbia University and Duke University.
“As I write, images of your recent meeting in Beijing with Dipont leaders and selected school officials are circulating throughout China,” Hammond wrote. 
The company “is one of the primary architects of the system of fraud and misinformation that pervades the application process to U.S. institutions.”
The USC center said it has been looking into Hammond’s claims about Dipont but defended the company as a “reliable and valuable partner.”

$4,500 “HONORARIUM”

Dipont’s eight-day admissions workshops take place each July in Shanghai. 
Hundreds of Chinese students pay the company so they can hear U.S. admissions officers discuss what schools seek in applications, learn to write an effective personal essay and possibly land an interview. 
Dipont touts the access to the big-name participating colleges in its marketing material.
In the past three summers, the American admissions officers were given a choice of perks: either business-class airfare, or economy-class travel plus a cash “honorarium.” 
The past two summers, payments were $4,500 per attendee. 
Last year, the admissions officers were paid in cash, usually in $100 bills.
Dipont consultant Robert Clagett, a former dean of admissions at Middlebury College, has been recruiting American admissions officers for the summer programs since 2014. 
He said that about a quarter to a third of them took the economy flight plus cash honorarium and the rest accepted business-class airfare. 
He declined to provide a breakdown by school.
Six colleges – Carleton College, Hamilton College, Lafayette College, Rensselaer Polytechnic Institute, Tulane University and the University of Vermont – confirmed that admissions officers have accepted honoraria for attending the Dipont workshops.
Admissions officers from Vanderbilt University, Wellesley College, Pomona College and Colgate University confirmed accepting plane tickets for attending the Dipont workshops.
So did officials from the University of Virginia, Indiana University and the University of California, Berkeley.
Also among the attendees in recent years, according to Clagett, were admissions officers from Claremont McKenna College; Colorado College; Davidson College; Syracuse University; Texas Christian University; and Wesleyan University. 
Those schools either declined to comment or didn’t respond to requests for comment.
Altbach, who heads the Boston College higher-education research center, said the officers acted improperly by accepting cash or expense reimbursement from a company seeking to place clients in elite colleges. 
The arrangement is all the more troubling because of the widespread application fraud in China, he said.
“I think getting in bed with the company is problematic no matter how they're being paid,” whether in cash or travel expenses, “because this company is basically a recruitment agency on steroids,” Altbach said. 
Dipont denies that it acts as an agent.

-----------------------------------
$100 bills: Dipont’s pitch to colleges


Dipont consultant Robert Clagett, former dean of admissions at Middlebury College, has recruited U.S. admissions officers to attend the company’s summer workshops in China since 2014. 
The following are excerpts from emails he sent attendees.

Date: July 9, 2015
From: Bob Clagett
Subject: Final Pre-Departure Message??
“For those of you who have chosen to accept the honorarium, this is paid to you in cash (typically in $100 bills) at the end of the program … it is far easier for Dipont to pay you in cash, and that is their strong preference.”

Date: July 13, 2016
From: Bob Clagett
Subject: Two Important Matters
“... Last summer, for example, it became almost impossible for Dipont to secure enough USD cash to pay everyone their honoraria. 
Instead, you will be paid either by wire transfer or check directly by CACE, the non-profit arm of Dipont in the US. … 
I realize that this may be unwelcome news to some of you who have received cash payments in the past, but this is the best (and legal) means of making these disbursements.”
-----------------------------------------

Some colleges have steered clear. 
Daniel Grayson, a former admissions officer at Tufts University, says he was invited to the 2014 workshop by Dipont consultant Clagett. 
Dipont offered him a $6,000 stipend plus airfare and accommodation as remuneration for participating, Grayson said, “and I responded with concerns about Dipont’s reputation and ethical practices and declined the invitation.”
Participating colleges say the arrangements are appropriate and that Dipont students received no special consideration.
Douglas Christiansen, Vanderbilt’s dean of admissions, said one of his admissions officers accepted airfare and expenses to attend a summer workshop but drew a line at taking cash. 
That would have been improper, because the officer was on the job for Vanderbilt, said Christiansen, who is also chair of the trustees of the College Board, owner of the SAT college entrance exam. 
The SAT has been subject to widespread cheating in China.
Asked about the allegations of application fraud at Dipont, Christiansen said: “It is critical to note that one of the points of the workshop was to communicate the importance of submitting authentic application materials.”
Seth Allen is dean of admissions and financial aid at Pomona College, which has a $2 billion endowment. 
He said he accepted business-class airfare and expenses in 2015 from Dipont. 
“We have a limited number of resources to recruit international students,” Allen said.
U.S. admissions officers are allowed to accept travel expenses when visiting American high schools, according to Louis Hirsh, chair of the admissions practices committee of the National Association for College Admission Counseling. 
They are barred from offering or accepting cash in placing or recruiting American students. 
But the profession’s code does not address a company offering cash or reimbursing expenses for counseling international students, Hirsh said.
Dipont’s advertisements promise students an edge in the admissions game. 
An ad in Chinese for last year’s summer camp included a plug from a Wellesley student. 
She attributed her successful application to meeting a Wellesley admissions officer at the summer program. 
“I was ultimately accepted early by Wellesley, and the camp played a crucial role in that,” she is quoted as saying.


Wellesley confirmed that an admissions officer interviewed a Dipont student at the program. 
The student was accepted and now attends the college. 
Joy St. John, Wellesley’s dean of admission, said the employee didn’t accept a cash payment, because “we’re doing work that’s related to our profession,” but did accept business-class airfare.
St. John compared the transaction to accepting travel expense reimbursement from U.S. high schools that invite Wellesley to provide general admissions counseling. 
Such payments are permitted, according to Hirsh. 
St. John added that Wellesley decided last year not to participate in Dipont workshops because the company’s marketers filmed a Wellesley admissions officer without permission.
Dipont founder Zhang, the son of farmers, studied electrical engineering in college and earned a scholarship to do graduate work in Australia in the 1980s. 
The Tiananmen crackdown of 1989 stranded him abroad, and he says he had to drop his studies to earn a living. 
He launched Dipont as an emigration and visa consulting firm for Chinese students.
Today, Dipont is a major provider of services to Chinese applying to foreign universities. 
It operates a network of international programs in Chinese high schools with about 2,000 graduates each year. 
It also offers tutoring for the SAT, college counseling and other “enrichment” services. 
College counseling alone can cost up to about $32,500 a student. 
Dipont’s total annual revenue is about $30 million, according to Zhang.

The two Americans who set up CACE, the charity Dipont now uses to pay admissions officers, told Reuters they were employed at the time by Dipont as consultants. 
They said they created CACE to help the Chinese company gain access to elite U.S. colleges.
“We have felt that having our own non-profit gives us a certain credibility,” said Stephen Gessner, a former CACE director and ex-president of the school board of Shelter Island, New York. 
“It helped us to recruit colleges.”
Gessner said he and Thomas Benson, the other American consultant, turned over control of CACE to Dipont three or four years ago. 
Dipont says CACE is independent. 
All of CACE’s five directors are Dipont employees or consultants, including CEO Zhang, according to a December 2014 board meeting agenda seen by Reuters.

“VERIFIABLE CREDENTIALS”
One of Dipont’s projects is to assist and provide funding to USC’s Center for Enrollment Research, Policy, and Practice. 
The center is running a nascent program to create “verifiable credentials” for Chinese applicants to U.S. colleges. 
The program, known as the Admission Credentials and Counseling System, aims to build a way to verify transcripts and other documents from Chinese high school students, according to Jerome Lucido, the center’s executive director.
Lucido said that USC and at least 10 other schools have participated in exploratory meetings for the initiative, including Stanford, MIT, Duke and Columbia. 
The gatherings included a Dipont-subsidized trip to Beijing two years ago attended by eight schools. CACE covered the expenses for several meetings in the United States, Lucido said.

ACADEMIC ACCESS: Dipont’s marketing pitch to students [view here]

The credentials idea was proposed as a fraud-busting measure by a Dipont employee, Lucido said. 
He confirmed that Zhang has paid two of three installments on a $750,000 gift to the center via CACE. 
The gift, he said, “was carefully vetted through USC and found to be fully appropriate.”
Lucido responded to the 2014 warning email from ex-Dipont employee Bruce Hammond by seeking more details on the cheating allegations. 
Hammond replied, the email traffic shows, but didn’t offer specifics.
Dipont is “a reliable and valuable partner,” Lucido said in an interview. 
In a later email to Reuters, Lucido wrote, “My thinking is that you have statements from people that do not constitute actual evidence.”
MIT, Duke and Columbia had no comment.
Richard Shaw, Stanford’s dean of admission, said Dipont paid his costs to attend a three-day meeting in China to discuss the initiative, including business-class airfare. 
“I’m not going to pay $25,000 to cover the cost to go to Beijing,” he said.
Told of the former Dipont employees’ fraud allegations, Shaw said the members of the initiative were trying to establish a “secure system in which a number of American universities would work with Chinese partners” and have “something where we can trust the transcripts.”
The project is now on hold, Shaw said, because of the allegations Reuters has documented. 
“Our intentions were to bring a system that combats exactly what you’re describing,” he said.
Sarah K. Lee, who worked at Dipont as director of college counseling from 2010 to 2012, said she visited a Dipont counseling office in Chengdu in 2010.
“It was 60 people printing out essays. The counselors, not the students, were typing them,” she said. “I asked them directly: ‘Do you write these essays for these kids?’ They’d say, ‘We have to do whatever our boss tells us or we lose our job.’” 
Lee said she witnessed similar practices at Dipont offices in Beijing and other cities.
“ENDEMIC”: Obio Ntia, former Dipont manager, said application fraud was rife. 

Obio Ntia, a former Dipont manager who helped oversee counselors, said he saw similar activity.
“Counselors went ahead and did everything for the student,” including writing their application essays, he said. 
He said he tried to train Dipont guidance counselors to help students come up with their own essay ideas, but struggled.
Some students were honest and diligent, Ntia said, but “there were shortcuts all around. It was so endemic that you felt like there’s nothing you could do about it.”
An American guidance counselor who worked at a Dipont high school in Shenzhen in the 2014-2015 school year said her supervisor ordered her to rewrite teacher recommendations. 
I made up anecdotes about the students,” said the woman, who spoke on condition of anonymity.
A Chinese guidance counselor, who worked at a Dipont high school from 2011 to 2013, said her supervisors instructed her to write essays for weak students. 
She said she was directed to give a student with poor grades a copy of his high school transcript. 
That student later admitted to removing the bad grades from the transcript, but a manager told her not to alert a U.S. college that had accepted him, she said.
Hammond, the former employee who alerted the USC consortium to Dipont, declined to comment on his warning letter. 
He worked for Dipont in 2010 as director of college counseling. 
Dipont charged some students tens of thousands of dollars, he wrote. 
And tying the Dipont name to the brands of elite colleges was central to its business model.
“Dipont is able to charge these fees,” he wrote, “in part by creating the perception that they have special connections with admissions officers at leading U.S. institutions.”


Chinese-backed charity may be violating U.S. laws, tax specialists say
By Steve Stecklow, Renee Dudley and James Pomfret

A New York educational charity affiliated with a Chinese company may have violated rules governing tax-exempt organizations in the United States, tax specialists say.
The Council for American Culture and Education Inc was set up in 2009 on behalf of Chinese for-profit school operator Dipont Education Management Group, according to the two consultants who created the charity. 
Thomas Benson and Stephen Gessner later ceded control of CACE to Dipont, according to Gessner.
Dipont says CACE is independent. 
On a December 2014 board meeting agenda seen by Reuters, Dipont founder Zhang and three other Dipont employees are listed as directors on CACE’s five-member board. 
The fifth member listed is a Dipont consultant.
Dipont’s close ties to CACE should have been disclosed in CACE’s tax filings, said Marcus Owens, former director of the tax-exempt organizations division of the Internal Revenue Service. 
That’s because the private Chinese company is benefiting from the charity’s activities. 
The only reference to Dipont in CACE’s application for tax-exempt status is a note that the two organizations collaborated on a college admissions seminar in China in 2009.
Bruce R. Hopkins, a law professor at the University of Kansas, said the relationship should have been fully disclosed. 
“Being so closely tied to a for-profit and functioning to benefit it in so many ways – that could be a problem for them,” said Hopkins. 
“The consequences could be that they lose their tax-exempt status.”



Owens also questioned the way in which Dipont founder Benson Zhang gave money to a research center at the University of Southern California.
Zhang told Reuters he used CACE to make a $750,000 personal donation to USC because it is difficult to transfer money out of China. 
“I paid back the money to CACE from my personal accounts later,” he said.
New York prohibits charities incorporated in the state – such as CACE – from lending to board members, Owens said. 
It makes no difference whether Zhang reimbursed the charity, he added.
Owens said $750,000 “is a considerable amount of money. That alone should attract the attention of the (New York) attorney general and it should also attract the attention of the IRS.”
Reuters outlined its findings about CACE’s activities to the New York Attorney General’s office. 
A spokesman for the attorney general said: “We will be reviewing the organization.” 
Reviews don’t necessarily lead to formal investigations. 
An IRS spokesman declined to comment.
Another potential problem, said Owens, is the list of board members and officers that CACE has disclosed to tax authorities. 
Two people listed in federal tax returns as an officer or director of CACE say they don’t hold those positions.
David Joiner, a former Dipont employee, told Reuters he left the company shortly after the charity was set up in 2009 and has had nothing to do with CACE since. 
But he was listed on its federal tax filings as its treasurer from 2010 through 2014, the most recent year disclosures are available.
“They have been using my name without my permission,” he said.
Jeff Zhu, CACE’s chief executive and a Dipont vice president, said the failure to remove Joiner’s name was probably “a clerical error.”
CACE’s 2014 federal tax return also lists as a board member Robert Clagett, a Dipont consultant and former admissions dean at Middlebury College. 
Clagett told Reuters he didn’t know he was on CACE’s board.
Owens, the former IRS executive, said falsely listing people as board members and officers may be viewed by the IRS as part of a pattern of behavior that could jeopardize CACE’s tax-exempt status.
“It raises fiduciary duty questions for the board,” he said, “not to mention confusing the IRS.”