"Italy joining China’s Belt and Road project is geopolitically unwise", former prime minister says

Italy’s government provoked controversy as it joined China’s Belt and Road Initiative, becoming the first EU and Group of 7 country to do so.
By Natasha Turak

Ex-Italian PM: Important to pay attention to Belt and Road initiative
Italy’s former prime minister doesn’t approve of the current government’s newly inked partnership with China, calling the decision “unwise” during a conversation with CNBC Monday.
“Politically, geopolitically, I deem (it) really unwise from the Italian government to take such a decision without coordination with the European Union and our allies,” Paolo Gentiloni, who served as prime minister from 2016 to 2018, told CNBC’s “Squawk Box Europe.”
“Europe is showing its divisions toward China, and this is not something that will strengthen our position even on trade.”
The Italian government stirred up fresh controversy over the weekend as it officially agreed to join China’s massive Belt and Road Initiative (BRI), becoming the first EU and Group of 7 country to do so.
Chinese dictator Xi Jinping’s visit to Rome saw a total of 29 deals signed, altogether worth 2.5 billion euros ($2.8 billion). 

They were focused on agricultural, finance and energy sectors, and opened up new access to the Chinese market for major Italian energy and engineering firms.
Gentiloni, who himself visited China in 2017 to discuss the Belt and Road initiative with Beijing’s leadership, echoed the analyses of many observers who described the deals signed as largely symbolic and not an economic paradigm shift for Italy.
“The agreements signed in Italy are not so relevant from an economic point of view,” he said.
“We will not change the mood of our economy with these agreements, and my guess is that perhaps we will not even change the balance of trade between Italy and China, which is unfortunately a balance of deficit on the Italian side.”
But politically, he stressed, “I am worried that we are not showing EU unity, and for this reason I think that the MOU (memorandum of understanding) that was signed from the Italian government was not a wise decision.”
Gentiloni is a founding member of Italy’s Democratic party, whose stances are largely described as a social democratic, center-left and Europeanist. 

Italy is currently led by a euroskeptic coalition whose largest parties are the anti-establishment Five-Star Movement and the right-wing Lega party.

‘Italy is not an African country’
Western critics warn of Chinese debt traps and describe the initiative as a ploy to expand geopolitical and strategic influence, while Beijing pursues links to Europe and Africa via South Asia and the Middle East to expedite and increase the export of Chinese goods.
German foreign minister Heiko Maas criticized Italy’s decision on Sunday, telling local media: “If some countries believe that they can do clever business with the Chinese, then they will be surprised when they wake up and find themselves dependent.”
Still, in defense of his country, Gentiloni dismissed concerns that Italy would become economically beholden to China in the way that some African and South Asian nations have.
“Italy is not an African country … We will not have a Chinese invasion after these agreements,” he said, pointing out that Italy has less Chinese inward investment than the U.K. or Germany.
“We have to be very cautious especially in issues connected to security, telecommunications, but I don’t think these agreements economically will change much in the framework we have.”
Indeed, Italy is not an African country — it has a higher debt-to-GDP ratio and far lower growth than most countries on the African continent. 

Its economy dipped into recession at the end of last year, and the deadly collapse of its Genoa Bridge last August cast a stark spotlight on its dire need for infrastructure investment.

China and 5G: Avoiding ‘dangerous situations
Gentiloni stressed caution toward China when it comes to sensitive sectors like telecommunications, an issue dominating headlines recently amid the U.S. government’s global campaign against Chinese telecoms giant Huawei. 

Washington says Huawei’s role in building 5G internet infrastructure around the world is a security threat and will allow the Chinese government to spy on users, a claim Beijing rejects.
“I think we have to be very cautious and careful, exactly in this subject,” the former prime minister said.
“Strategic infrastructure and telecommunication infrastructure, and this means now 5G ... We have a very modern infrastructure for mobile phones in our country, we don’t particularly need foreign investment, and in any case we have a law — the golden power law — that allows the Italian government to avoid any form of control in our telecoms infrastructure.”
Italy’s “golden power” legislation refers to state powers designed to protect strategic industries, which it says it plans to extend to 5G technologies. 

This would entail requiring Italian companies in both the private and public sectors to declare to the government any 5G technology purchased from non-European countries.
“I hope that the new government will use these means, these tools, to avoid dangerous situations,” he added.

Chinese Peril

China's Media Interference Is Going Global

BY AMY GUNIA / HONG KONG 

China is actively attempting to influence the global media to deter criticism and spread propaganda, according to a new report released by Reporters Without Borders (RSF) on Monday.
The report, China’s Pursuit of a New World Media Order says Beijing is using a variety of strategies including ramping up international broadcasting, undertaking extensive advertising campaigns, and infiltrating foreign media outlets to spread its world view.
“You can see that what is at stake is not only the Chinese authorities trying to spread their own propaganda…what is at stake is journalism as we know it,” Cédric Alviani, East Asia Bureau Director of RSF told TIME.
According to the report, the Chinese government is investing as much as $1.3 billion annually to increase the global presence of Chinese media. 

With this investment, Chinese state-run television and radio shows have been able drastically expanded their international reach in recent years. 

China Global Television Network is televised in 140 countries and China Radio International is broadcast in 65 languages.
The government is also spending significant sums to promote Chinese views by placing paid advertorials in Western media publications. 

Alviani said in an era where news media is struggling with profitability, media outlets have been tempted by advertising dollars. 

China has paid up to $250,000 to place ads in leading international publications.
“If you’re a subscriber to big media you trust the contents they provide to you, you implicitly trust the content they provide, it’s quite dangerous,” Alviani told TIME. 

“In the long run they have to make a decision, do they want to keep their credibility? Or do they want to carry Chinese propaganda?”
The report says China is also attempting to control foreign media outlets by buying stakes in them. 

Chinese ownership leads self-censorship, and journalists have been fired for writing about the country critically.
A columnist for South Africa’s Independent Online, of which Chinese investors held a 20% stake, had his column cancelled in Sept. 2018, hours after a column about China’s persecution of ethnic minorities was published.
In addition to buying stakes in media outlets, Beijing has influenced foreign media by inviting journalists, especially from developing countries, to China for training. 

The report mentions one example where 22 journalists from Zambia were invited to visit China for specially-designed event called the 2018 Zambia Media Think Tank Seminar.
By inviting journalists on lavish, all-expense-paid trips to attend seminars in China, Beijing wins many of them over and secures favourable coverage.
Lack of press freedom in China is well-documented, with the country ranking 176 out of 180 countries in RSF’s 2018 World Press Freedom Index, but the report documents several cases of China is using the same tactics used to silence dissent at home to repress journalists overseas. 

China is “employing blackmail, intimidation and harassment on a massive scale,” says RSF.
“Chinese ambassadors extend their role outside of the regular diplomatic roles, they denigrate journalists anytime they write something that does not meet Chinese propaganda,” Alviani told TIME.
Despite China’s far-reaching influence into global media organizations, RSF hopes that journalists will work to document Chinese interference.
“It’s very likely that what we show in this report is only the tip of the iceberg. The purpose of the report is to stir interest for journalists so they’ll pay attention to the extent of Chinese influence in their regions,” Alviani said.

Sino-American War

China's Plan to Sink the U.S. Navy

By Lyle J. Goldstein

Whether or not we accept Gu’s interpretations of history and his critiques of current diplomacy on both sides of the Pacific, we can all at least agree that it is profoundly positive that scholars at China’s most prestigious universities are poring over this history in painstaking detail to gain insights into how and why great powers can unwittingly blunder into catastrophic wars.

At a minimum, this tendency should inspire new interest in China’s proposed “new-type great power relations” 新型大国关系—a concept rejected some time ago by the Washington foreign policy establishment.
(This first appeared several years ago.)
Grave tensions in Russo-Turkish relations serve as a timely reminder that great power tensions can spiral downward all too rapidly. 

The escalation spiral in the Black Sea region has echoes in East Asia, of course, where Beijing and Washington have been attempting to manage intensifying great-power competition for the last two decades.
More than a few scholars have pointed out the importance of analogies in structuring elite perceptions concerning evolving rivalries. 

With the centenary of the First World War, a new research agenda has blossomed with bountiful comparisons between 1914 and the present era . 

Keeping the upcoming hundredth anniversary of the Jutland battle—the largest single naval engagement of World War I—close in mind, this edition of Dragon Eye will explore a Chinese analysis of the pre–World War I Anglo-German rivalry, and in particular the role of Berlin’s “big navy” buildup in sparking the bloodletting.
The author, Gu Quan from Peking University, of the article published in a mid-2015 edition of Asia-Pacific Security and Maritime Research 亚太安全与海洋研究 entitled “Prejudice, Distrust and Sea Power: Discussing the Reversal and Influence of Pre-WWI Anglo-German Relations” suggests numerous times at the outset that the historical lessons may well be applicable to contemporary U.S.-China relations. 

But he is somewhat reticent about making explicit and detailed comparisons. 

Rather, as is quite frequently the case in Chinese academic writing, certain threads are perhaps intentionally left untied, so that it is up to the reader to draw their own conclusions. 

Still, one plausible reading of this article is that it represents an impressively candid and rather dark appraisal of Beijing’s present foreign policy direction. 

However, a complete understanding of the paper’s argument illustrates the author’s appreciation that it is the complex intermingling of mounting “strategic prejudice” 战略偏见 on both sides of the Pacific that makes U.S.-China relations ever more precarious.
To be sure, the singular focus in the paper on Germany’s prewar naval buildup as the most severe irritant in the relationship most likely bespeaks a critique of the urgent striving increasingly evident in China’s shipyards over the last decade. 

In a seeming echo of recent Chinese strategic assessments , the author notes that the German Admiral Alfred von Tirpitz had bemoaned his country’s historical “neglect of sea power”. 

Berlin’s big navy project reflected a turn away from the more cautious policies of Bismarck toward a new “daring” approach that might employ the threat of force or “blackmail” for the purpose of “yielding diplomatic victories,” that would also pay dividends in German domestic politics. 

Thus, Tirpitz’s grand fleet is interpreted in this Chinese rendering as the key enabler for Berlin’s new Weltpolitik.
Gu demonstrates ample familiarity with the dynamics of the Anglo-German rivalry.
The Chinese scholar relates how the naval arms race accelerated dangerously after Germany embarked on building its own Dreadnought-class battleship in 1908–9.
At that point, London was forced to rely more on the “quantity” than the “quality” of its vessels to outpace Berlin’s fleet development.
A closely related strategic rebalance led the Royal Navy to enhance naval partnerships, not just with France, but with the United States and Japan as well, in order to ensure its quantitative superiority in home waters.
England also pursued naval organizational reform and combat planning.
All these measures caused Germany’s naval development to be “hard-pressed,” and “confronting the daily increasing threat posed by the British Navy, the German Navy diligently surmounted every kind of difficulty…”
Still, Gu maintains that Germany’s crash naval building program was built on a variety of bogus premises, including especially “blind optimism”.
Then, there was the mistaken belief in Berlin that France, Russia and Britain would never really succeed in cooperating.
According to Gu, the Kaiser and other German leaders deluded themselves with grand naval visions, believing that “landing a big fish requires a long line” and, further, that “time was on their side.”
On the other hand, this Chinese scholar does not place all the blame on Berlin, but sees London as also culpable for “strategic prejudice.”
Gu observes that, to London’s credit, its approach to Berlin, at least initially, was not simply “meeting force with force”, and even had elements of trying “to convert an enemy to a friend”.
Yet the “German threat theory” gradually gained adherents in Britain, nourished by thinkers like Eyre Crowe, the British diplomat discussed in some detail in the conclusion of Henry Kissinger’s tome On China . 
Underlining the importance of this analogy, by the way, is the interesting revelation from a citation in Gu’s article that the Crowe Memorandum has been translated into Mandarin by Guangxi Normal University and was published two years ago.
In 1909, writes Gu, London developed an acute case of “naval panic” as the Anglo-German rivalry became a “contest of life and death”
In this atmosphere, London not only took measures to strengthen the fleet, but energetically reinforced its alliance with France and Russia.
However, Gu suggests that London went wrong in that it ceased to consider Germany’s actual intentions, and started to push its “Entente policy” as an end in itself rather than a means to an end. Moreover, Gu notes that the Royal Navy’s hypothetical role in a European great power military struggle was thought to include either blockading or bottling up the German fleet, thus limiting Britain’s exposure and constituting a form of “low-cost” military intervention.
Obviously, that line of thinking proved gravely inaccurate.
Ultimately, this appraisal faults Britain for placing its alliances above all else and thus taking a myopic “one-size-fits-all” approach to great power diplomacy.
While the Chinese author does not take the next step and directly compare the historical policies elaborated above to contemporary diplomacy as practiced by Washington or Beijing within their nascent rivalry, some historical echoes are obvious.
Perhaps U.S. leaders have fallen into a kind of spiral of “naval panic,” within which intensifying alliance diplomacy seems the only option, but that carries definite (if somewhat veiled) risks of escalation and entrapment?
Even more likely, it seems logical that the piece is primarily intended as a critique of Beijing’s own readily apparent “big navy” strategy in support of Weltpolitik with Chinese characteristics.

War in the South China Sea

Marines just seized a small island in the Pacific as training for a looming China fight

By Ryan Pickrell

Lance Cpl. Chris Pedroza, a rifleman with Alpha Company, Battalion Landing Team, 1st Battalion, 4th Marines, the "China Marines," firing an M240G medium machine gun during low-light live-fire machine-gun training at Anderson Air Force Base in Guam on March 11. 

Everything that is old may indeed be new again.
During World War II, U.S. Marines moved from island to island, famously fighting bloody battles against entrenched Japanese forces determined to dominate the Pacific. 

Now, as a potential conflict with China looms, the Marine Corps is dusting off this island-hopping strategy.
Last week, U.S. Marines from the 31st Marine Expeditionary Unit led a series of simulated small island assaults in Japan, the Corps announced Thursday.

Marines with Charlie Company, Battalion Landing Team, 1st Battalion, 4th Marines, during a live-fire range as part of the 31st Marine Expeditionary Unit's simulated Expeditionary Advanced Base Operations at Camp Schwab in Okinawa, Japan, on March 13.

The 31st MEU, supported by elements of the 3rd Marine Division, 3rd Marine Logistics Group and 1st Marine Aircraft Wing, members of the Air Force 353rd Special Operations Group, and Army soldiers with 1st Battalion, 1st Special Forces Group, practiced seizing Ie Shima Island.
After the Marines seized the island's airfield, U.S. troops quickly established a Forward Arming and Refueling Point. 

Additional force assets, such as Marine Corps F-35B Lightning II Joint Strike Fighters and C-130J Super Hercules transport aircraft, then moved in to deliver extra firepower.
Rocket artillery units brought in aboard the C-130Js carried out simulated long-range precision fire missions while the stealth fighters conducted expeditionary strikes with precision guided munitions.
"This entire mission profile simulated the process of securing advanced footholds for follow-on forces to conduct further military operations, with rapid redeployment," the Corps said in a statement. The exercise was part of the Corps' ongoing efforts to refine the Expeditionary Advanced Base Operations concept, which is the modern version of the WWII-era island-hopping strategy.

A Marine with Charlie Company, Battalion Landing Team, 1st Battalion, 4th Marines, bounding toward a defensive position during a live-fire range as part of the 31st Marine Expeditionary Unit's simulated Expeditionary Advanced Base Operations at Camp Schwab.

"It is critical for us to be able to project power in the context of China, and one of the traditional missions of the Marine Corps is seizing advanced bases," Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff Marine Corps Gen. Joseph Dunford told the Senate Armed Services Committee last week. 

"If you look at the island chains and so forth in the Pacific as platforms from which we can project power, that would be a historical mission for the Marine Corps and one that is very relevant in a China scenario."
As the National Defense Strategy makes clear, the U.S. military is facing greater challenges from near-peer threats in an age of renewed great power competition with rival powers. 

In the Pacific, China is establishing military outposts on occupied islands in the South China Sea while pursuing power projection capabilities designed to extend its reach beyond the first island chain.
With the U.S. and Chinese militaries operating in close proximity, often with conflicting objectives, there have been confrontations. 

A close U.S. ally recently expressed concern that the two powers might one day find themselves in a shooting war in the South China Sea.

Marines with Charlie Company, Battalion Landing Team, 1st Battalion, 4th Marines, engaging targets while assaulting a defensive position during a live-fire range as part of the 31st Marine Expeditionary Unit's simulated Expeditionary Advanced Base Operations at Camp Schwab.

"We continue to seek areas to cooperate with China where we can, but where we can't we're prepared to certainly protect both U.S. and allied interest in the region," Director of the Joint Staff Lt. Gen. Kenneth McKenzie said at the Pentagon last May.
"The United States military has had a lot of experience in the Western Pacific taking down small islands," he said when asked if the U.S. has the ability to blow apart China's outposts in the South China Sea. 

"We had a lot of experience in the Second World War taking down small islands that are isolated, so that's a core competency of the U.S. military that we've done before."
It's just a "historical fact," he explained.

China's State Terrorism

Masood Azhar Is China’s Favorite Terrorist
BY MICHAEL KUGELMAN

Indian Muslims hold a scratched photo of Masood Azhar as they shout slogans against Pakistan during a protest in Mumbai on Feb. 15. 

On March 13, China placed a “technical hold” on a resolution calling on the United Nations Security Council to designate Masood Azhar, the leader of the Pakistani militant group Jaish-e-Mohammed (JeM), as a terrorist. 

Beijing’s intervention effectively torpedoed the measure. 

This marked the fourth time that China has prevented Azhar, who enjoys long-standing ties to the Pakistani security establishment, from being officially designated a terrorist by the United Nations.
There had been good reason to believe that this time might be different, and that Beijing would step back and let the resolution get approved. 

The fact that the fourth time wasn’t the charm speaks volumes about how deep the partnership between China and Pakistan still runs, and how far Beijing is willing to go to defend its “iron brother.”
So important is the China-Pakistan partnership that Beijing was willing to stick its neck out in support of a key terrorist asset of the Pakistani state who garners little sympathy outside Pakistan. 

At home, Beijing has sent hundreds of thousands of innocent Chinese Muslims to detention centers under the guise of counterterrorism, but it has bent over backwards to protect an actual Islamist terrorist abroad.
The move came even though global pressure has intensified on Pakistan to crack down harder on India-focused terrorists on its soil. 

The trigger was a February 14 attack on Indian security forces, claimed by JeM, in the Indian-administered part of Kashmir. 

The assault, which killed more than 40 paramilitary troops, was the deadliest attack on Indian security forces, and in Kashmir on the whole, in years. 

Nearly 50 countries, including all five permanent members of the U.N. Security Council (even China), issued statements condemning the tragedy, and many called on Pakistan to crack down on JeM. 

Soon after the attack, the United States, with support from fellow Security Council members France and the United Kingdom, proposed the resolution. 

The Trump administration, according to Indian press accounts, tried to convince Beijing to support it.
And yet China defied all the pressure and refused.
That’s especially strange given that the Belt and Road Initiative (BRI) gives Beijing a major incentive to take a stronger stand on terror in South Asia. 

Despite mounting financing concerns, Beijing continues to build the mammoth transport corridor that the BRI, now a much more expansive project, was originally conceived as, and South Asia figures prominently in its plans. 

Two key pathways—the China-Central Asia-West Asia Economic Corridor and the China-Pakistan Economic Corridor (CPEC)—pass directly through the region.
The BRI needs stability to succeed, and terror groups like JeM are inherently destabilizing. 

While most JeM attacks have been carried out in the Indian-administered portion of Kashmir, where the BRI doesn’t have a footprint, the group has previously been implicated in at least one attack in Pakistan. 

According to the U.S. government and independent analysts, it has also maintained a presence in Afghanistan. 

Additionally, JeM has ties to al Qaeda.
But Beijing refused to sanction the leader of one of South Asia’s most destabilizing entities. 

This is striking, given that Beijing frequently uses the rhetoric of terror to demonize and delegitimize lesser threats, especially the Uighurs. 

Some years back, as Richard Bernstein recently described in The Atlantic, Beijing went so far as to convince the United States to detain 22 Uighurs—none of whom had any apparent links to terror—in Guantánamo Bay. 

And yet when it comes to Masood Azhar, who heads a potent terror group linked to al Qaeda with regional reach, China all but legitimized a terrorist by refusing to have him officially designated as such.
Perhaps the biggest reason to have believed China would let Azhar be designated a terrorist is that it would have been a low-risk move for Beijing. 

Pakistan’s close friendship with and deep dependence on China—which increased after the United States suspended its security assistance to Pakistan last year—means Islamabad would have been in no position to express displeasure, much less retaliate. 

So there would have been no deleterious consequences for bilateral relations. 

In fact, allowing the resolution to pass would have benefited Beijing: It would have brought China some international goodwill at a moment when its global image has been marred by its cruel and repressive policies toward the Uighur community.
In effect, Beijing declined to make a relatively cost-free move that could have helped advance its interests in South Asia and given a much-needed boost to its reputation. 

It’s a decision that can largely be attributed to the strength of the China-Pakistan relationship.
This partnership, motivated by shared rivalry with India, isn’t as ironclad as the heady official rhetoric (“sweeter than honey,” “higher than the Himalayas”) might suggest. 

But it’s still warmer, deeper, and more strategically vital than just about any other bilateral relationship in Asia.
And yet Beijing’s decision to block Azhar’s designation should be read not only as a show of support for Pakistan, but also as an effort to reaffirm China’s continued commitment to the country—at a moment when Islamabad may fear Beijing is wobbling.
Over the last year, as the U.S.-India defense partnership continued to gain speed, Beijing sought a rapprochement of sorts with New Delhi. 

In March 2018, amid efforts to move beyond their tense standoff on the Doklam Plateau in the summer of 2017, Chinese Foreign Minister Wang Yi made a strong pitch to end confrontation and initiate conciliation. 

“The Chinese dragon and Indian elephant must not fight each other but dance with each other,” Wang declared in a press conference.
Then, in April 2018, Indian Prime Minister Narendra Modi and Chinese dictator Xi Jinping held an informal summit in Wuhan, China, that led to a commitment to cooperate on joint training programs for Afghan diplomats. 

Later that year, there was talk, mainly from the Chinese side, of potential India-China cooperation on connectivity projects in Afghanistan—and even in Pakistan.
Perhaps not coincidentally, Beijing has declined to defend Pakistan in global forums on several occasions over the past year.
In February 2018, it refused to oppose a measure at the Financial Action Task Force to put Pakistan on its so-called gray list for failing to curb terrorist financing.
In July, Beijing signed on to a public statement issued by the Heart of Asia initiative (a 14-nation collective focused on promoting stability in Afghanistan) that condemned JeM and Lashkar-e-Taiba (LeT)—another major Pakistan-based, India-focused terror group—by name.
This came less than a year after China did the same with a statement issued at a BRICS summit.
And then came the recent India-Pakistan crisis, when India and Pakistan launched air strikes on each other’s soil and brought the subcontinent to the brink of war.
Beijing was quiet throughout the crisis and never expressed public support for Islamabad.
Instead, it called for restraint.
In reality, Pakistan shouldn’t need reminding that China is still on its side.
The India-China rivalry remains strong and fraught, and it’s destined to deepen in the coming years as the two Asian giants ramp up competition for markets, mineral resources, and influence.
And a bitter territorial dispute—the cause of a 1962 war—remains unresolved.
Still, signaling is important in international relations, and Beijing’s obstructionism at the U.N. sent a strong message.
To be sure, other factors may have prompted China’s move as well.
With Pakistan facing mounting debt to Beijing from CPEC, and with several Belt and Road countries having backed out of projects over the past year due to financing concerns, Beijing may have wanted to make a gesture of goodwill to get Islamabad to shake off any emerging discontent over CPEC. Additionally, Beijing may have wanted to offer a sop to Pakistan to preclude any chance of Islamabad calling China out for its Uighur policy.
While Pakistan, like every other government of a Muslim-majority country (except Turkey), has maintained a deafening silence on the matter, one can’t rule out the possibility, however remote, of Prime Minister Imran Khan—a bold leader with a populist streak—speaking out at some point.
If Khan doesn’t take it up, the opposition may.
All this said, one gets the impression that Beijing didn’t block Azhar’s listing with glee, and that it did so somewhat grudgingly.
The official Chinese justification for its technical hold—it needed more time to think the matter through—suggests a level of indecision.
Also, on March 17, Luo Zhaohui, China’s ambassador to India, struck a conciliatory tone, saying, “We understand India’s concerns and are optimistic this matter will be resolved.”
At the very least, Beijing appears to be trying to soften the blow of the move for Indian audiences, indicating a desire not to antagonize New Delhi.
As for New Delhi, it has handled this whole episode quite well.
Even amid shrill calls from some hawkish quarters for retaliation—including a social media campaign to boycott Chinese goods—India has reacted quite calmly.
The government released a fairly anodyne statement that spoke of being “disappointed by this outcome” and vowed to “continue to pursue all available avenues to ensure that terrorist leaders who are involved in heinous attacks on our citizens are brought to justice.”
This was the right move.
At the end of the day, China’s move doesn’t amount to much.
It’s symbolic at best.
Had Azhar been sanctioned, he would have faced an assets freeze, an arms embargo, and a travel ban. However, according to multiple Indian media reports as well as Pakistan’s own foreign minister, Azhar is very ill and hardly likely to move about.
However, based on past precedent, even if we assume Azhar is still actively driving JeM’s operations and strategy, listing him would have had a minimal impact—especially in the context of Pakistan. Hafiz Saeed, the leader of LeT, was listed in December 2008 (a move China did not prevent) just days after his group carried out the Mumbai terror attacks.
Over the past decade, Saeed has largely lived unencumbered and led the life of a law-abiding thought leader: He has moved about freely, delivered fiery public lectures, and given media interviews.
This year, he even filed (unsuccessfully) a formal request for his U.N. terror designation to be repealed.
Ultimately, India wants to be seen as a responsible rising power.
Rather than fixating on the symbolic pass China gave to an infirm militant, New Delhi is better off tapping into the growing resolve within the international community to combat Pakistan-based terrorism, and working multilaterally in other forums to curb a threat that is of great global concern.

Tech Quisling

Dunford to meet with Google for debate on Chinese ties
By Aaron Mehta 

It is safe to say that the Pentagon and Google are very different places. But that gap could harm U.S. national security. 

WASHINGTON — For the second time in a week, the Pentagon’s top uniformed officer has taken a shot at Google, warning that the tech company’s investments in China are doing long-term damage to America’s security.
But Gen. Joseph Dunford, chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, said he also plans to meet with the tech giant to debate about its roles and responsibilities as a commercial enterprise versus how much the firm owes to America as its home nation.
“In my judgment, Google assisting the Chinese military in advancing technologically is not in U.S. national interests, so it’s a debate we have to have,” Dunford said at a Thursday event hosted by the Atlantic Council.
His comments followed up on statements made in a Senate hearing last week, where he said Google was benefiting the Chinese military by its operations in the communist nation. 

Asked to follow up on those conversations Thursday, the chairman expressed the belief that no company can do work in China without it being siphoned off.
“If a company does business in China, they are automatically going to be required to have a cell of the Communist Party in that company,” he said. 

“And that is going to lead to that intellectual property from that company finding its way to the Chinese military. It is a distinction without a difference between the Chinese Communist Party, the government and the Chinese military.”
“Ventures to help develop artificial intelligence in China are going to do two things. They are going to help an authoritarian government to assert control [over] its own population. Again, our country exists for the individual. China exists for the Chinese communist party,” he continued.
“The second thing it’s going to do is it’s going to enable the Chinese military to take advantage of the technology that is developed in the United States. Why is it developed in the United States? Why is Silicon Valley in the United States? Because of our system of government in enabling of individual ideas to bubble up and advance the world, whether it’s medically, education, artificial intelligence, you name it.”

Dunford added that he has plans to meet with Google executives in the near future, likely next week.
“I just think we need to have a debate about that. We ought not to think that it is just about business when we do business in China,” he said. 

“This is about us looking at the second- and third-order effects of our business ventures in China, the Chinese form of government, and the impact it’s going to have on the United States’ ability to maintain a competitive military advantage and all that goes into it.
“I’m happy to have that debate. This is not about me and Google.”
The issue Dunford identifies is indeed wider than Google, with China a prime target for just about every major American industrial concern. 

His comments also come from a situation where members of the tech and defense communities appear to often talk past each other and regard the other with suspicion.
That said, Google is an easy target inside the Pentagon. 

Not only did parts of the company revolt against working on the department’s Project Maven last year, leading to Google’s exit entirely from the program, but the company has opened a major AI center in China — despite statements from Eric Schmidt, then the head of parent company Alphabet, that the U.S. and China are in an AI arms race.
“In the case of Google they were highlighted because they have an artificial intelligence venture in China. I think it is a reasonable assertion, even in an open venue like this, to assert the benefit of that venture for artificial intelligence for China, one of many ventures of our companies that are there, indirectly benefits the Chinese military and creates a challenge for us to [maintain] a competitive advantage,” Dunford said.
It’s not just AI where China’s influence on the commercial sector is butting up against the Pentagon’s interests.
Asked about the potential risks of a Chinese-built 5G network, Dunford called it a “critical national security issue” that needs to be addressed not just in the U.S. but with allied nations.
“Our relationships rely on trust, and that trust, in part, is the assurance that the data that we exchange, the intelligence we share, the information we share can be done in a way where it’s not compromised. And the issue of 5G addresses both potential vulnerabilities in our systems due to how reliant we will be on 5G for the internet of things, our combat systems, but also exchanging information with our allies and partners,” he said.
"So we very much believe that any future capability along the lines of 5G has to be trusted, and we’re concerned that we’re moving in the direction where if we don’t get out in front in that regard we won’t be able to trust 5G and will be at a competitive disadvantage,” the chairman concluded. 

“I think American industry needs to step out and dominate 5G because it will be in our national interest to do so.”

Chinese Barbarity

Kachin women from Myanmar raped until they get pregnant in China

By Emma Graham-Harrison

Refugees in Myitkyina, Kachin state, northern Myanmar. 

Burmese and Chinese authorities are turning a blind eye to a growing trade in women from Myanmar’s Kachin minority, who are taken across the border, sold as wives to Chinese men and raped until they become pregnant.
Some of the women are allowed to return home after they have given birth, but are forced to leave their children, according to an investigation by Human Rights Watch, titled Give Us a Baby and We’ll Let You Go.
One survivor said: “I gave birth, and after one year the Chinese men gave me a choice of what to do. I got permission to go back home, but not with the baby.”
China is grappling with a severe gender imbalance; the percentage of the population who are women has fallen every year since 1987. 

Researchers estimate that factors including sex-selective abortion, infanticide and neglect of female babies mean that there are 30 to 40 million “missing women” in China, who should be alive today but aren’t.
That means millions of men are now unable to find a wife, and there has been a rise in trafficking across the borders of neighbouring, poorer nations.
Many of the Kachin women are trafficked out of Myanmar by their relatives, friends or people they trust; in one case a woman was betrayed by someone from her bible study class. 

They are often promised jobs across the border in China, and discover only after they cross over that they have been sold into sexual slavery.
“My broker was my auntie, she persuaded me,” a woman who was trafficked aged 17 or 18 told Human Rights Watch. 

Over three years, HRW spoke to nearly 40 victims who had escaped, or been allowed to leave but without their children, many still struggling to deal with the emotional impact.
All came from, and had returned to, Myanmar’s northern Kachin state or neighbouring Shan state, where the ethnic Kachin have been fighting the government for decades. 

A 17-year ceasefire ended in 2011, and the renewed conflict has displaced more than 100,000 people and left many struggling to survive.
With men taking part in the fighting, women often become the only breadwinners for the families, and with jobs badly paid and hard to find, many feel that they have no choice but to pursue work in China where wages are higher even for illegal migrants.
“Myanmar and Chinese authorities are looking away while unscrupulous traffickers are selling Kachin women and girls into captivity and unspeakable abuse,” said Heather Barr, women’s rights co-director at Human Rights Watch.
“The dearth [of work or legal] protections have made these women easy prey for traffickers, who have little reason to fear law enforcement on either side of the border.”
Myanmar’s government reported 226 cases of trafficking in 2017, but experts told Human Rights Watch they believe that the real number is much higher.
There are few incentives for trafficked women or their relatives to seek official help.

Families seeking police aid to track missing daughters, sisters and wives were turned away in Myanmar, or were asked for money, HRW found.
Many of the areas where the women are trafficked from are controlled not by authorities in the capital, Yangon, but by the opposition Kachin Independence Organisation, so the government has no record of what is happening there.
In China, when some survivors tried to seek help from security forces, they were jailed for immigration violations not supported as crime victims.
Those who were repatriated were often simply dumped at the border, stranded far from their community, the report found. 

And if they do make it back, they face social stigma, and little chance of getting justice, even if they tried to seek it.
“When Myanmar authorities did make arrests, they usually targeted only the initial brokers in Myanmar and not the rest of the networks in China,” the report found. 

“Police in China never arrested people that knowingly bought trafficked ‘brides’ and abused them.”