Paper Dragon

China threatens foreign ships and planes daily in the South China Sea, but no one is yielding any ground

• Warnings directed at the Philippines are much more menacing than those directed at the US military, meaning that China is purposefully calibrating its responses to intimidate smaller, weaker claimant states.
• Both the armed forces of the Philippines and the US military continue their operations as planned, disregarding Chinese threats and warnings.

By Ryan Pickrell

China is threatening foreign ships and planes operating in the South China Sea on a "daily" basis, according to the chief of the Armed Forces of the Philippines.
"It's a daily occurrence," General Carlito Galvez Jr. told the press Monday, the Inquirer reported. "Our pilots just reply, 'We are just doing our routine flight on our jurisdiction and territory.'"
The office of the president of the Philippines praised its country's pilots for disregarding Chinese warnings and threats, which can be particularly aggressive.
"Philippine military aircraft, I'm warning you again: Leave immediately or you will bear responsibility for all the consequences," a disgruntled Chinese voice shouted over the radio as a Philippine military plane flew over the hotly contested South China Sea recently, according to a BBC report.
The Chinese also challenge the US military. 

Last Friday, the Chinese military radioed a US Navy P-8A Poseidon reconnaissance plane six times as it flew past Chinese strongholds in the Spratly Islands. 

"Leave immediately and keep out to avoid any misunderstanding," the voice on the radio directed.
A US Navy pilot called the radio queries "routine," adding that "it really has no effect on any operations or anything we do."
Chinese radio responses to US and Philippine military aircraft overflights can be heard in the following video clip, a piece of the BBC report that was tweeted out this past weekend: The tone of the radio query directed at the US aircraft is noticeably softer than that of the call aimed at the Philippine plane. 

Nonetheless, the US military had some strong words for China, which is rapidly expanding its military presence in the South China Sea through the deployment of jamming technology, anti-ship cruise missiles, surface-to-air missiles, and other defense equipment intended to tighten China's grip on the territories.
And it's not just planes. 

China also issues warnings to foreign ships, especially when the US Navy decides to conduct a freedom-of-navigation operation in the area.
China's vast claims to the South China Sea were discredited by an international arbitration tribunal two years ago, but Beijing rejected the ruling as well as the authority of the tribunal.

Paper Dragon: Just How Good Is China's Military?

Fact: China lost the last war it fought... in 1979. 

By Harry J. Kazianis


While America’s ideas for negating A2/AD are important, Washington must move to the next level of operational and strategic planning. 

The United States must begin to develop a comprehensive strategy to deal with A2/AD, and specifically Chinese A2/AD, and move past vague and often-contradictory operational concepts. 

At the same time, considering the alliances and strategic partnerships Washington holds throughout the Asia-Pacific and wider Indo-Pacific, allies must be consulted as such a strategy is developed. While marketing slogans like a “pivot” or “rebalance” sound good on paper or in the headlines, a strategy must be adopted that continues America’s military edge in the Asia-Pacific for years to come.
China’s military is growing in terms of raw power and basic power projection. 

Many of Beijing’s defense investments over the last two decades are aimed at limiting Washington’s ability to intervene in areas that China describes as being of “core interest.” 

But just how much should Washington worry about it? 

A good question, for sure. 

The answer, however, is as not as black and white as many might want it to be. 

And just how much should America prepare to duel with such anti-access/area-denial (A2/AD) forces in the future?
Let’s start with the obvious: While various A2/AD combat scenarios can paint a decidedly bleak picture for America and its allies in Asia in the event of a conflict with China, there are a number of reasons such a war will never come to pass in the first place. 

While large trade flows have not stopped conflicts in the past, with U.S.-Chinese bilateral trade now valued at over $550 billion and growing, this vital statistic would likely be an important factor in both sides’ strategic calculus on a path towards some sort of large-scale kinetic conflict. 

However, as history has shown us, the rise of a new regional great power with the potential to wield hegemonic dominance can spark a security competition, even war. 

This is one of the key reasons nations in the Asia-Pacific have looked to Washington to provide a hedge or a “buffer” against a rapidly rising China.
One must also consider the simple fact that there have been many so-called “revolutions” in military affairs dating back to the beginning of human history. 

While China’s version of the A2/AD strategy boasts weapons that have headline-grabbing names, like “carrier-killer,” and are certainly cause for concern, one must look back to the past at how other nations have worked to negate potential changes in how wars are conducted and how new technologies impact modern warfare. 

One example is China’s DF-21D, the “carrier-killer” itself. 

The U.S. Navy has faced challenges to its dominance of the global commons at various times in the past. 

How will America deal with such a challenge this time around? 

In analyzing the DF-21D, what many consider the most potent A2/AD challenge facing U.S. and allied forces today, such tests have been met before, according to one source, and will be addressed yet again :
While a major advance in military capability, it is not the first “game changing” weapon system mitigated or countered by the U.S. Navy. 

The naval mine, the self-propelled torpedo, the submarine, the airplane and the cruise missile all presented the same potentially lethal threat to surface warships. 

While naval leaders should respect the power of this weapon system, there is no reason to endow it with supernatural abilities or allow it to unilaterally limit operational thinking. 

As in the past, the inevitable march of technology will find an effective countermeasure or mitigating technique for this system and the DF-21D will just be another threat in a constellation of dangers inherent in the pursuit of war at sea.
To expand this line of thinking to the whole of A2/AD (and specifically Chinese A2/AD), the ideas inherent in such a strategy—limiting the ability of your enemy’s freedom of movement or, in an even broader sense, looking for weaknesses—are certainly rooted in past strategic and military thought. 

In fact, many other nations have used anti-access or area-denial–type strategies—the USSR and Imperial Japan are two often-cited examples. 

Strategic thinkers from competing nations are constantly looking for ways to negate and minimize the impact of new technologies, strategies and weapons systems. 

A2/AD, at its core, is part of a long line of past and present potentially disruptive military strategies that planners from around the world will now seek to improve on, mimic and defeat.
All in all, Washington must take a balanced approach towards China’s A2/AD challenge—not overhyping the threat, but certainly not underappreciating the challenge, either. 

In the very near future (some would argue even today), American strategists must now factor in the challenges presented by an increasingly robust Chinese military that holds growing capabilities to effectively deny large sections of the Pacific Ocean to U.S. forces. 

American defense experts are already at work recognizing the challenge and are developing the tools to negate such a scenario. 

Washington clearly realizes A2/AD weapons and strategies are diffusing around the globe, putting American and allied forces in danger, unless they evolve or adapt. 

This is why work towards the Third Offset strategy and the successor to ASB, JAM-GC, are of vital importance.
While America’s ideas for negating A2/AD are important, Washington must move to the next level of operational and strategic planning. 

The United States must begin to develop a comprehensive strategy to deal with A2/AD, and specifically Chinese A2/AD, and move past vague and often-contradictory operational concepts. 

At the same time, considering the alliances and strategic partnerships Washington holds throughout the Asia-Pacific and wider Indo-Pacific, allies must be consulted as such a strategy is developed. While marketing slogans like a “pivot” or “rebalance” sound good on paper or in the headlines, a strategy must be adopted that continues America’s military edge in the Asia-Pacific for years to come.

Paper Dragon

CHINA’S MILITARY HAS ‘PEACE DISEASE’ AFTER DECADES WITHOUT WAR
BY JASON LEMON 

China’s military is sick with “peace disease” after decades without war, the country’s military newspaper has claimed.
In an effort to combat the “disease,” the Chinese People’s Liberation Army (PLA) has stepped up its efforts to improve battle readiness. 

Xi Jinping has also ordered the military to take steps to ensure soldiers are combat ready and have the required skills they need to fight, South China Morning Post reported. 

Instead of focusing on numbers, Xi has instituted reforms emphasizing better training for troops.
“Peace disease has been a common symptom in our military for decades,” the People’s Liberation Army Daily wrote in an editorial, SCMP reported. 

“If we do not make up our mind to eliminate those evils, we must pay a heavy cost in the event of a war.”
Members of a military honor guard prepare for a welcome ceremony for Kazakhstan’s President Nursultan Nazarbayev, outside the Great Hall of the People, in Beijing, on June 7. In an effort to combat the “peace disease,” the Chinese People’s Liberation Army has stepped up its efforts to improve battle readiness.

Although China boasts the world's largest standing military, with more than 2.1 million active-duty service people, the country’s last offensive took place in the late 1970s in Vietnam. 

As a result, military leaders and the Chinese president are afraid troops have grown complacent and less capable. 

Xi aims to transform his nation’s military into a world-class fighting force within the next 30 years.
“We can only stop a war when we are able to fight,” the PLA newspaper wrote. 

“Let the army get back on the right track, concentrating on combat-ready training.”
Speaking to South China Morning Post, retired PLA Colonel Yue Gang pointed to corruption, as well as avoiding responsibilities, as the major problems plaguing the Chinese armed forces.
“Apart from corruption, job omission is the next key symptom of ‘peace disease’ in the Chinese military that should be cured,” Yue said, pointing out that the government is working to address both issues.
The army publication also warned that China currently faces greater security threats and unprecedented global concerns. 

Currently, China continues to flex its muscles in the disputed waters of the South China Sea, raising tensions with multiple Asian neighbors. 

Beijing has also moved to open foreign military outposts, such as a military hub in the African country Djibouti.
Members of China’s military honor guard march during a welcome ceremony for Kazakhstan’s President Nursultan Nazarbayev, outside the Great Hall of the People, in Beijing, on June 7.

As tensions increase with the U.S. over trade, China has also continued to improve ties with Russia. Chinese State Councilor and Defense Minister General Wei Fenghe met with the visiting Colonel General Oleg Salyukov, commander-in-chief of the Russian Land Forces, in Beijing on Tuesday, telling him that their two nations will “jointly deal with threats and challenges.” 

Last month, Xi also awarded Russian dictator Vladimir Putin a friendship medal, calling the Moscow leader his “best, most intimate friend.”
Despite China's might, the U.S military is widely seen to be the most powerful in the world. 

The U.S. Armed Forces currently have more than 1.3 million active duty personnel, and an annual budget of $610 billion, compared to China’s $216 billion. 

Unlike China’s military, the U.S. forces definitely do not suffer from “peace disease.” 

In recent years, U.S. troops have been involved in conflicts in Iraq, Afghanistan, Pakistan, Libya, Syria, Yemen and Somalia.

Orwellian Nonsense: Don’t Fear China’s Boycott Threats

If history is any guide, the latest dispute over Taiwan will fizzle.
By Adam Minter
It’ll be fine. 

The Chinese government has given the world's airlines until July 25 to recognize Taiwan as part of China. 

So far, Delta Air Lines Inc. and American Airlines Group Inc. are among the very last holdouts. According to Bloomberg News, if the companies don't comply, China could "prompt travelers from the mainland to boycott American airlines."
The airlines are understandably concerned about this threat, given that China is a key growth market. But the fears are overblown: Chinese consumer boycotts have historically been short-lived and relatively painless, and there's little reason to believe that this one will turn out any differently.
The airlines are caught up in a long-running dispute. 

China regards Taiwan as a wayward province, and its self-image and geopolitical vision are deeply connected to reunifying the two territories. 

Pressuring foreign companies to refer to Taiwan as part of China -- on tickets, website drop-down menus and so forth -- is a means of advancing its foreign policy.
But like shoppers anywhere, China's consumers tend to be value-oriented more than anything else, and surveys indicate that while patriotism plays a role their purchasing decisions, quality, brand and price are typically far more important.
Hence a decade's worth of short, over-hyped Chinese boycotts.
The first notable one occurred in April 2008, after a Tibetan activist attempted to seize the Olympic torch as it was paraded through Paris. 

In Shanghai and other cities, protesters surrounded stores owned by French supermarket chain Carrefour SA as part of a general boycott. 

Keeping up that effort proved challenging, though, especially in China's summer heat. 

And before long, Chinese had turned their attention to other matters -- like the Olympics. 

Less than three months after the closing ceremonies, Carrefour announced 10 new store openings in booming south China. 

Shoppers flocked to them.
Similarly, after a territorial dispute with Japan erupted into violent protests across the mainland in August 2012, a boycott caused Mazda Motor Corp.'s sales to decline by 36 percent. 

But that drop, too, was short-lived. 

By November, sales were recovering (even as China faced its worst auto-market growth in a decade) and by April Japanese car exports were up by more than three-and-a-half times over their October low. (Post-boycott discounts likely helped.)
Protests targeted at specific corporate missteps also typically fizzle. 

Last year, footage of passenger David Dao -- who is partly of Chinese descent -- being beaten and dragged off a United Express flight in Chicago received tens of millions of views per hour in China, sparking calls for boycotts and widespread speculation that the airline's reputation would be permanently damaged among Chinese consumers. 

Despite the fury, United remains the largest foreign operator between China and North America.
Where company boycotts have been more successful, they've usually coincided with bigger problems. 

For example, when South Korea agreed to host an American antimissile system in 2017, a resulting protest appeared to put a big dent in Korean car sales in China. 

But that decline had actually begun before the protest, partly due to stiffening local competition and a poor mix of models on offer for the Chinese market. 

China's enthusiasm for other South Korean products -- such as soap operas and cosmetics -- continued unabated.
For similar reasons, Chinese passengers are unlikely to sustain a boycott of U.S. airlines. 

The government has long restricted domestic competition on the most popular routes to North America. 

And customers looking for choice, convenience and seamless transfers to U.S. cities will naturally turn to American carriers to provide them -- however they refer to Taiwan. 

Few fliers are going to choose Air China over Delta if Delta's prices and travel times are superior.
Of course, even a brief boycott can inflict damage. 

And the airlines can't dismiss this controversy entirely; China could also impose measures such as air-traffic control delays and intensified inspections. 

But like their counterparts everywhere else, Chinese consumers are far more interested in whether a product meets a need and a budget -- and far less on whether it was made by a rival.