Affichage des articles dont le libellé est 'one China' policy. Afficher tous les articles
Affichage des articles dont le libellé est 'one China' policy. Afficher tous les articles

jeudi 23 février 2017

China Policy: Trump is a Paper Buffoon

The lesson China will take away is that Donald Trump’s threats are not to be taken seriously.
BY MICHAEL H. FUCHS

Trump is probably the world's most stupid leader

Donald Trump spent a lot of time during the campaign criticizing China, and promising to get tough on China if elected president. 
In just his first few weeks in office, however, Trump has proved to be a paper tiger with China, making himself look weak in the eyes of Chinese leaders, which, in turn, will embolden China’s own assertive behavior.
During the campaign, Trump consistently lashed out at China, making the case that the United States didn’t know how to deal with China. 
Bad trade deals were a prime focus for Trump, who said, “the money they’ve drained out of the United States has rebuilt China.” 
When it comes to the United States’ handling of North Korea and the South China Sea, Trump claimed that “China’s toying with us.”
But as president, Trump doesn’t know how to deal with China
During the transition period, Trump took a shot across China’s bow by questioning the One China policy — the premise that Taiwan is a part of China, which had undergirded U.S.-China relations since the 1970s — and by taking a call from Taiwan’s president. 
Trump justified his stance on Taiwan by saying that he did not see why the United States had to be “bound by the ‘One China’ policy unless we make a deal with China having to do with other things.” Some likewise spun his actions as a strategic ploy to shake things up and gain leverage with China on other issues, such as trade.
As Trump began the usual series of initial calls with leaders from around the world, according to The New York Times, “administration officials concluded that Xi would only take a call if Mr. Trump publicly committed to upholding the 44-year old policy.”
And so, merely three weeks after his inauguration, Trump reaffirmed the One China policy in a phone call with Xi Jinping. 
In other words, Trump’s first act as president with respect to China policy was to fold in his own first bluff with China. 
And despite Trump’s claims to know how to negotiate with China, he has gotten nothing in return for backing down on his previous One China statements.
The messages that China will take away from this event are clear and not good for U.S. interests: An irresponsible U.S. president backed away from a threat with nothing to show for it. 
Even the official White House readout of the phone call between Trump and Xi admitted that Trump had to give in: “President Trump agreed, at the request of President Xi, to honor our ‘One China’ policy.”
The lesson China will take away is that Donald Trump’s threats are not to be taken seriously.
This incident would be bad enough of a start by itself. 
But Trump decided in his first week in office to unilaterally weaken the U.S. position with China by withdrawing from the Trans-Pacific Partnership, or TPP. 
The goal of TPP was to provide the United States advantageous trade relationships with key Asian partners in a region where China’s trade relationships were expanding rapidly.
If Trump really wanted to get tough with China on trade, he would have pushed to improve the TPP to advance America’s economic position in the region and give himself more leverage in trade talks with China. 
By simply canceling U.S. participation in the TPP, Mr. Trump gave China a gift, and again got nothing in return.
The ramifications of these initial stumbles could be significant. 
Not only will China believe that the new U.S. president can be pushed around, but China will also believe that it can get away with being more assertive in bullying its neighbors. 
Likewise, U.S. allies and partners in Asia will have less confidence that the new administration can be relied upon to stand up to China, sapping U.S. credibility in the region.
From North Korea to the South China Sea, trade issues to cyber-security, there is no shortage of thorny challenges in the U.S.-China relationship that may require the new U.S. administration to get tough. 
Handing away U.S. leverage in the relationship with China is not the right way to get started.

samedi 11 février 2017

Paper Tiger Trump

Trump surrenders to China on Taiwan, gets nothing in return, looks weak
By Brooklynbadboy
Résultat de recherche d'images pour "clownish Trump"
China knows'Trump isn't strong. 
He's weak.
Trump decided to make a lot of noise, but in the end chose to maintain the status quo, significantly weakening himself in the eyes of the Chinese:
By backing down in a telephone call with China’s president on his promise to review the status of Taiwan, Trump may have averted a confrontation with America’s most powerful rival.
But in doing so, he handed China a victory and sullied his reputation with its leader, Xi Jinping, as a tough negotiator who ought to be feared.
“Trump lost his first fight with Xi and he will be looked at as a paper tiger,” said Shi Yinhong, a professor of international relations at Renmin University of China, in Beijing, and an adviser to China’s State Council. 
“This will be interpreted in China as a great success, achieved by Xi’s approach of dealing with him.”
There's more: China now feels they'll be able to move forward aggressively into further reaches of the Pacific because of Trump's scrapping of TPP and instead engaging in a series of bilateral negotiations. 
This strategy means the White House and State Department will be consumed with one at a time trade agreements while China gets one big comprehensive one:
Canada and China are joining a mid-March summit hosted by Chile on how to advance trade in Asia-Pacific now that Donald Trump has pulled the United States out of the Trans-Pacific Partnership and ceded leadership in the region.
It’s the first effort to move beyond the rubble of the TPP deal – dead since Washington’s exit – and offers a possible way for Beijing to take the lead on influencing how trade should deepen between the West and Asia
Chilean officials say they have invited all 12 countries that participated in the TPP talks as well as South Korea and China, which did not.

That will include Australia, Japan and Mexico among others. 
I suppose Trump could, in theory, conclude individual trade agreements with these countries simultaneously or in some order. 
But why should they? 
Nothing in it for them as the status quo is just fine. 
Besides, China has already showed them how to deal with Trump: ignore him, wait, dangle the promise of flattery, he will surrender.
American leadership was damaged by Mr. Trump staking out a position and then stepping back, said Hugh White, a professor of strategic studies at the Australian National University and the author of “The China Choice,” a book that argues that the United States should share power in the Pacific region with China.
“The Chinese will see him as weak,” Mr. White said of Mr. Trump. 
“He has reinforced the impression in Beijing that Trump is not serious about managing the U.S.-China relationship.”

jeudi 15 décembre 2016

Analysts See Trump Comments on One China as Part of Bigger Game

By William Ide and Joyce Huang

Combination of three 2016 file photos showing Taiwan's President Tsai Ing-wen, left, U.S. President Donald Trump, center, and Xi Jinping.

BEIJING — President Donald Trump’s suggestion that the United States doesn’t necessarily need to be bound by a “One China” policy, which was key to the establishment of diplomatic ties between Washington and Beijing, has the Chinese leadership on edge and some wondering whether a rethink is on the horizon regarding relations with Taiwan.
Analysts say a Trump presidency could see ties with democratically ruled Taiwan enhanced, but doubt there will be a serious departure from the policy, noting the wide range of areas where the world’s two biggest economies cooperate and how much they need each other. 
What it does suggest, they say, is that a bigger game is afoot.
Trump told Chris Wallace on Fox News Sunday: “I don’t know why we have to be bound by a One China policy unless we make a deal with China having to do with other things, including trade.”

One China rethink
When the United States established ties with China in 1979, it cut diplomatic relations with Taiwan, recognizing the communist-led People’s Republic of China as the sole government of China, or “one China.”

President Nixon sits between Chinese Premier Chou En-lai and Chiang Ching, wife of Chairman Mao Tse-tung, at a cultural show in the Great Hall of the People, Feb. 22, 1972 in Peking as an interlude in the talks between the two countries leaders.
From Beijing’s perspective, “One China” means Taiwan is part of its own territory.
The United States acknowledges that position, but also maintains close cultural and commercial ties with Taipei. 
It also supplies Taiwan with military hardware and some have long felt that ties should be enhanced.
Trump’s recent phone call with Taiwan President Tsai Ing-wen, a first by any president since Washington switched ties to Beijing, and now remarks about the “One China” policy — which has been a centerpiece of relations for decades -- has some feeling that just might happen.
Taiwan's President Tsai Ing-wen speaks with U.S. President-elect Donald Trump through a speaker phone in Taipei, Taiwan. 

“I don’t think that he will overturn the ‘One China’ policy completely, and only recognize Taiwan and not the People’s Republic of China, but it is possible that he will elevate relations with Taiwan,” said Zhang Lifan, a Chinese historian and commentator in Beijing.
Jean-Pierre Cabestan, a political scientist at Hong Kong Baptist University, said there are those in the United States who would like to make relations with Taiwan more transparent and more like “state to state relations.”
“Of course the Chinese will not be happy, but I think it is a way of telling the Chinese, the ‘One China’ policy that the Chinese adhere shouldn’t be taken for granted,” he said. 
“There are a number of things that were decided for convenience in the 1970s and in the 80s, which may be revisited today because the reality on the ground is very different.”
The United States and China established ties at a time when both Taipei and Beijing were under authoritarian rule. 
Since then, however, Taiwan has become one of Asia’s most vibrant democracies. 
And the political paths of both are diverging, not converging.
A man rides a scooter near containers at Keelung port, northern Taiwan, Oct. 30, 2015.
Still, just how many politicians in the United States might support a complete overhaul is unclear, Cabestan adds, as the policy has long enjoyed bipartisan support.
Tseng Chien-yuan, an associate professor at Chung Hua University in Taiwan, said it seems that Trump is treating the “One China” policy more like a political bargaining chip.
"I think he [Trump] will have to adjust his policies in accordance with China's reactions and look after the U.S.'s best interest,” Tseng said.

No good option
Zhang said that when Trump spoke with Taiwan’s president it was like he was starting to take bets, but now with his remarks about “one China” and trade, he has clearly put his cards on the table.
Trump’s comments have sparked a strong backlash from Beijing, with the foreign ministry voicing its “serious concern” and state media suggesting that if he did dump the policy as president, China could sell weapons to “forces hostile to the U.S.” 
The remarks have also whipped up concern from foreign affairs "experts" in the United States and abroad because Beijing sees the policy as the “political bedrock of Sino-U.S.” relations.
Zhang calls the move very strategic.
Terry Branstad, the governor of Iowa, speaks to reporters at Trump Tower after a meeting with Donald Trump. Branstad would later be named the United States ambassador to China. 

“He is not president yet and speaking as president-elect he can say what he wants,” Zhang said. Making the comments now gives China some time to be angry and to contemplate its options as well as the costs associated with its choices.
China has never renounced the use of force to take Taiwan and fulfill its claim that the self-ruled island is part of its territory, but Zhang said there are few good options for China’s communist leaders.
"If war should break out in the Taiwan Strait, there will be two consequences. 
One consequence is that the Chinese Communist Party wins a unified country,” but isolates itself from the world because of the conflict. 
“And two is that it is defeated and a new China is born,” one that is no longer ruled by the communist party.

Paramilitary policemen march at the Tiananmen Sqaure before the fourth plenary meeting of the National People's Congress (NPC) at the Great Hall of the People in Beijing, March 14, 2013.
Analysts note that while there may be a tendency from military and party hardliners in China to call for a tough response, Chinese officials and state media have so far focused more on the economic measures China could use in response and a refusal to cooperate on a wide-range of issues from Iran to North Korea.
Regardless of whether it is Washington or Beijing, in a globalized world and economy, there are few options that don’t cut both ways.
Taiwan is also watching all of this closely to make sure its interests are looked after. 
There are concerns in Taiwan that Trump’s approach could do more harm than good. 
But that really depends on how it all plays out, said Chung Hua University’s Tseng.
“If closer economic cooperation between the U.S. and Taiwan can be forged, a Trump presidency will help Taiwan break away from China’s military and economic containment,” Tseng said.

Nixon in reverse
Richard Nixon's visit to China in 1972 spearheaded the beginning of what led to the switch in ties from Taiwan to China. 
At the time, one key reason for establishing relations with Beijing, analysts note, was to counter Russia. 
Now that may be happening again, but in reverse.
Mao Zedong shake hands with Richard Nixon after their meeting in Beijing 22 February 1972 during the U.S. President's official visit in China.

“The Trump administration is trying to start with China as a way of maybe putting more pressure on China, isolate China from more countries, from key partners like Russia, bringing back Russia,” said Hong Kong Baptist University’s Cabestan.
He added that while there are many uncertainties, what is clear is that Trump is prepared to play hardball with China on both trade and strategic issues.
“There is a whole game at play here, which is unfolding,” he said.
On the campaign trail, president Trump sent clear signals that he wants to improve ties with Russia. On Tuesday, he appointed ExxonMobil Chairman and Chief Executive Officer Rex Tillerson as his Secretary of State. 
Tillerson is friendly with Russian President Vladimir Putin.
Russian Prime Minister Vladimir Putin, right, shakes hands with Rex W. Tillerson, chairman and chief executive officer of Exxon Mobil Corporation at their meeting in the Novo-Ogaryovo residence outside Moscow, Monday, April 16, 2012. 

mercredi 14 décembre 2016

How Trump Could Feasibly Move Away From the 'One China' Policy

The “one China” policy is outdated. What would a change actually look like?
By Joseph A. Bosco

U.S. President Donald Trump told Fox News Sunday that the United States need not “be bound by a ‘one China’ policy unless we make a deal with China having to do with other things, including trade.”
Just a week after shocking the foreign policy establishment by accepting a congratulatory call from Taiwan’s President Tsai Ing-wen, the remarks deepened fears that the new U.S. president will unravel the 37-year arrangement between Beijing and Washington.
The ambiguous formulation, which allowed the United States and China to harbor different understandings of how Taiwan’s future would be determined, provided a mutually face-saving framework for the establishment of formal diplomatic relations.
China hands in and out of government shudder at the thought that President Trump would even consider disrupting that delicate diplomatic modus vivendi.
Even those more favorably disposed toward Taiwan — particularly the Taiwanese themselves — express alarm that the democracy’s future could be treated by an American administration as a mere bargaining chip in a Sino-American grand bargain.
For more than 20 years, U.S. policy has proclaimed Taiwan’s future to be an existential matter for the Taiwanese people to decide.
Before either set of critics lets its angst run too far ahead of reality, it is worth recognizing that the status quo is unsustainable.
The people of Taiwan want and deserve greater international respect and participation, while China, in the name of “reunification,” increases its military threat to cut off the de facto independence and democratic achievements Taiwan already enjoys.
America’s ambiguous policy sits precariously between the two inexorable forces.
To get Beijing’s attention and ease Taiwan’s (and our allies’) concerns, the declared starting point for any negotiation should be this: Any changes in America’s outmoded “one China policy” will be in the direction not of China’s even more outmoded “one China principle” but toward a new, more realistic policy of “one China, one Taiwan.”
Some important underlying principles should guide the negotiations that could lead to a new bilateral — or trilateral — deal.
First, Washington’s one China policy is not the same as Beijing’s one China principle.
Their respective positions were laid out in the 1972 Shanghai Communique signed by President Richard Nixon and Premier Zhou En-lai.
The one China principle Beijing declared is that Taiwan is part of China, period.
Both Mao Zedong’s Communist dictatorship and Chiang Kai-shek’s anti-Communist dictatorship agreed on that, with each saying it should rule the one China.
The U.S. side said it would not challenge that shared position but did not state its own view on Taiwan’s eventual status, as long as it was determined peacefully.
That is America’s one China policy.
Unfortunately, under Chinese pressure, many scholars, journalists, and even former public officials have tended to meld the Chinese concept with the American title — which has pleased Beijing and disadvantaged the United States and Taiwan.
Second, the one China policy was flawed from the beginning and has become even more untenable over time.
When Washington stated it was agnostic on Taiwan’s future and left it to the two tyrannies to work things out peacefully, it did so in a curious way, saying “all Chinese on both sides of the Taiwan Strait” agreed on the one China goal.
That implied that the Chinese and Taiwanese people had somehow been consulted on the matter — which, of course, they had not been.
Since then, Taiwan’s evolved democracy has provided ample opportunity to determine the people’s will, and they have made clear in overwhelmingly numbers that they have no desire to be incorporated into a “one Communist China.”
So that premise of the Communique was and is non-existent.
In 2000, Bill Clinton made it an explicit part of America’s one China policy that Taiwan’s future “must be resolved peacefully and with the assent of the people of Taiwan.”
Starting with Nixon, every U.S. administration, including Jimmy Carter’s when he established diplomatic relations with Beijing, has emphasized Washington’s intention and expectation that Taiwan’s future will be decided peacefully.
Unfortunately, Mao, and every Chinese leader since, has proclaimed a “right” to use force to bring Taiwan under Beijing’s rule.
In 1995-1996, China demonstrated its ability and intention to do just that when it fired missiles toward Taiwan
(a) for sending its president to a Cornell reunion, and
(b) for conducting its first presidential election.
In both cases, the U.S. dispatched aircraft carriers to the region.
China has also deployed over 1,000 ballistic missiles targeting Taiwan, as well as anti-ship missiles and attack submarines to deter U.S. intervention.
In 2005, Beijing purported to provide a “legal” basis for its military threats by passing its Anti-Secession Law.
The ASL said China could use force against Taiwan not only if it declared independence but also if it simply took too long to accept Beijing’s rule.
Henry Kissinger reinforced China’s position by warning Taiwan in 2007 that China “would not wait forever.”
Xi Jinping said last year the Taiwan issue could not be passed to the next generation.
So, two fundamental premises of America’s one China policy have been ignored or violated: peaceful resolution and consent of the Taiwanese people. 
Lawyers interpreting the various legal and diplomatic documents governing U.S.-China relations could conclude that there has never been “a meeting of the minds” — a prerequisite for a formal agreement — and also, that conditions have dramatically changed over the ensuing decades.
Nixon acknowledged the latter point in his memoir, stating that Taiwan and China are now “permanently separated politically.”
On those grounds, theoretically, Washington could justifiably withdraw recognition of the Chinese government until it relinquishes the use of force against Taiwan, repeals the ASL, and removes its anti-Taiwan missiles.
The United States could also restore formal relations with Taiwan and reinstitute the Mutual Defense Treaty.
President Trump need not consider these drastic measures if Beijing will adopt more moderate policies of its own, not only on Taiwan, but on the South and East China Seas, and on trade and human rights — though in these other areas, Washington has separate appropriate responsive measures available.
Without itself severing relations, the United States could instead recognize Taiwan and adopt a one China, one Taiwan policy, placing on Beijing the burden for breaking U.S.-China ties. 
If China chose to incur the economic and other consequences and rupture relations, Washington could then invite Taipei to enter into a new defense treaty.
In the meantime, a range of other, lesser measures should certainly be explored — the Tsai-Trump phone call being a good start. 
Given the increasingly confrontational course China has adopted in recent years, the president is right to signal some fresh new thinking on U.S.-China relations.

mardi 13 décembre 2016

Two Chinas Policy

Five myths about ‘one China’
By John J. Tkacik 
One China, Two Chinas Illustration by Greg Groesch

President Donald Trump sparked a brushfire of commentary a few days ago when he took a congratulatory phone call from Taiwan’s president, Tsai Ing-wen, known officially in her home country as “the president of the Republic of China.”
Talking heads in the mainstream media chided Mr. Trump: Does he not know that the only “president of China” the United States officially recognizes is Xi Jinping, “president of the People’s Republic of China.” 
Had Mr. Trump violated Washington’s long-held “one-China policy”?
Well, no. 
A fun diplomatic fact is that the “one-China policy” is mostly myth, and the “un-myth” part doesn’t mean what “experts” think it means. 
Let’s explore more fun facts about the “one-China policy.”

Myth No. 1: The “one-China policy” means “Taiwan is part of China.”

The United States has never recognized Taiwan (or “Formosa,” as it used to be called) as part of “China.” 
It still doesn’t. 
On Dec. 16, 1978, Jimmy Carter formally derecognized the “Chinese” government in Taipei and recognized the Beijing regime. 
An accompanying U.S.-China communique phrased it carefully: “The U.S. side acknowledges the Chinese position that there is one China and Taiwan is part of China.” 
This diplomatic subtlety was explained in Senate hearings two months later by Deputy Secretary of State Warren Christopher: “[The U.S.] has acknowledged the Chinese position that Taiwan is part of China, but the United States has not itself agreed to this position.”
Fun fact: Because of post-World War II peace treaty complications, along with the Communist Chinese war against the United Nations in Korea, the United States refused to recognize that Taiwan was even part of the “Republic of China.” 
In 1982, President Ronald Reagan reassured Taiwan in policy known as the “Six Assurances,” “that the United States would not alter its position regarding sovereignty over Taiwan,” and that the “United States would not formally recognize China’s sovereignty over Taiwan.” 
Every administration since supported Reagan’s “Six Assurances.”

Myth No. 2: China and Taiwan agreed to “one China” in 1992.

Representatives from Taipei’s Nationalist regime and Beijing’s Communists met in Hong Kong in November 1992 and without written record, agreed that they could proceed with official business on a vague premise that there was “one China,” and each side could define “one China” as it wished. 
In August 1993, however, Beijing issued a formal white paper declaring Taiwan to be under the sovereignty of the People’s Republic, that ” ‘self-determination’ for Taiwan is out of the question,” and that Taiwan’s airspace was Chinese and, therefore, all foreign airlines needed Beijing’s permission to fly to Taiwan.
Three months later, Taipei issued its own statement that ” ‘China’ is not ‘the People’s Republic of China [PRC],’ nor is Taiwan a part or a province thereof. Accordingly... the ROC [Republic of China] and the PRC are two independent and mutually nonsubordinate sovereign nations.” 
Since then, the only “consensus” on “one China” between Taipei and Beijing has been that the word “China” is in the dictionary.

Myth No. 3: The United States has a “one-China policy.”
Frequently, U.S. officials invoke something called “one China,” the definition of which eludes their powers of articulation. 
In 2004, Assistant Secretary of State for East Asian affairs James Kelly invented the neologism “our one-China” policy in congressional testimony. 
He said, “The definition of ‘one China’ is something that we could go on for much too long for this event. In my testimony, I made the point [of] ‘our one China,’ and I didn’t really define it, and I’m not sure I very easily could define it. [But] I can tell you what it is not. It is not the ‘one-China policy’... that Beijing suggests.” 
Beyond that, the “one-China policy” only means that the U.S. recognizes one government of “China” at a time.

Myth No. 4: The U.S. never had a “two-Chinas policy.”
Although the United States always preferred the aspirational goal of “one China,” Washington chose to maintain ties with the Nationalist Chinese on Taiwan after the Communist Peking regime entered the Korean War, and supported Taiwan in the United Nations. 
The U.S. adopted a “two-Chinas” policy as it struggled to keep Taiwan from losing its U.N. seat.
Fun fact: Ultimately, in October 1971, the United States and its allies voted against China’s U.N. membership because the resolution would also expel Taiwan. 
The resolution passed over American objections. 
But the United States continued to maintain diplomatic missions in both Taipei and Beijing until 1979. 
This “two-Chinas” policy lasted from 1969 to 1979.

Myth No. 5: The United States does not recognize Taiwan’s independence.
The U.S. “does not support” Taiwan’s independence, except in law. 
When the United States derecognized Taipei in 1979, Congress passed the Taiwan Relations Act (22 USC 48, Sections 3301-3316), which states: “Whenever the laws of the United States refer or relate to foreign countries, nations, states, governments, or similar entities, such terms shall include and such laws shall apply with respect to Taiwan.” 
Congress also declared it U.S. policy (Section 3301(b)(6)) “to maintain the capacity of the United States to resist any resort to force or other forms of coercion that would jeopardize the security, or the social or economic system, of the people on Taiwan.”

lundi 12 décembre 2016

Two Chinas Policy

Trump hints US could end 'One China' policy
By MARK LANDLER

President Donald J. Trump before a rally last week in Cincinnati. 

WASHINGTON — President Donald J. Trump, defending his recent phone call with Taiwan’s president, asserted in an interview broadcast Sunday that the United States was not bound by the One China policy, the 44-year diplomatic understanding that underpins America’s relationship with its biggest rival.
Mr. Trump, speaking on Fox News, said he understood the principle of a single China that includes Taiwan, but declared, “I don’t know why we have to be bound by a One China policy unless we make a deal with China having to do with other things, including trade.”
“I mean, look,” he continued, “we’re being hurt very badly by China with devaluation; with taxing us heavy at the borders when we don’t tax them; with building a massive fortress in the middle of the South China Sea, which they shouldn’t be doing; and frankly, with not helping us at all with North Korea.”
Mr. Trump is not the first incoming Republican president to question the One China policy, but his suggestion that it could be used as a chip to correct Chinese behavior sets him apart.
Mr. Trump has been praised by some Republicans for taking a new look at China policy.
Not since 1972, when Richard M. Nixon and Mao Zedong enshrined the One China principle in the Shanghai Communiqué, has an American president so publicly and explicitly questioned the agreement, which resulted in the United States’ ending its diplomatic recognition of Taiwan in 1979.
The Chinese government issued no immediate response to Mr. Trump’s remarks.
But the comments are likely to reignite a debate that erupted nine days ago when he took a congratulatory phone call from President Tsai Ing-wen of Taiwan.
At first, Mr. Trump played down the implications of the call, saying he was just being polite.
Later, his aides said he was well aware of the diplomatic repercussions of speaking to Taiwan’s leader.
Lobbyists for Taiwan, including the law firm of former Senator Bob Dole of Kansas, spent months laying the groundwork for the call.
On Friday, China’s senior foreign policy official, Yang Jiechi, met with Lt. Gen. Michael T. Flynn, whom Mr. Trump has designated as his national security adviser, according to a person told about the meeting.
It was not clear what the two men had discussed.
Some Republican foreign policy experts — including John R. Bolton, who is believed to be a front-runner for the post of deputy secretary of state — have praised Mr. Trump for shaking up a decades-old diplomatic agreement.
As a candidate, Ronald Reagan criticized the decision to abrogate recognition of Taiwan; after his election, he invited a delegation from Taiwan to attend his inauguration, antagonizing Beijing.

President Tsai Ing-wen of Taiwan speaking on the phone with Mr. Trump this month at her office in Taipei, Taiwan.

In 1982, as president, Mr. Reagan pushed for the so-called Six Assurances, the fifth of which was a statement that the United States would not formally recognize Chinese sovereignty over Taiwan.
Still, he abided by the terms of the Shanghai Communiqué.
Mr. Trump did not appear worried about inflaming Beijing.
He repeated in the Fox News interview many of the criticisms he has made about China, particularly on trade and currency manipulation.
He also emphasized what he said was China’s unwillingness to help curb the nuclear ambitions of its neighbor North Korea — an issue that foreign policy experts believe could confront Mr. Trump as the first geopolitical crisis of his presidency.
The president said he would not tolerate having the Chinese government dictate whether he could take a call from the president of Taiwan. 
He reiterated that he had not placed the call, and described it as “a very short call saying, ‘Congratulations, sir, on the victory.’”
“Why should some other nation be able to say I can’t take a call?” Mr. Trump asked.
“I think it actually would’ve been very disrespectful, to be honest with you, not taking it.”
The Chinese government, which once viewed Mr. Trump favorably as an alternative to the hawkish Hillary Clinton, has struggled to respond to Mr. Trump’s unorthodox approach.
China’s foreign minister, Wang Yi, initially played down the significance of the phone call, calling it a “petty action by the Taiwan side” that he said would not upset the longstanding policy of One China.
But as Mr. Trump has repeated his campaign criticisms of China — and as his statements about Taiwan have rippled throughout the region — Beijing has noticeably hardened its tone.
It warned him last week, in a front-page editorial in the overseas edition of People’s Daily, that “creating troubles for the China-U.S. relationship is creating troubles for the U.S. itself.”

dimanche 11 décembre 2016

Two Chinas Policy

Trump says U.S. not necessarily bound by 'one China' policy
By Caren Bohan | WASHINGTON

U.S. President Donald Trump speaks at a 'Thank You USA' tour rally in Grand Rapids, Michigan, U.S. December 9, 2016.
President Tsai Ing-wen waves during National Day celebrations in Taipei, Taiwan, October 10, 2016.

U.S. President Donald Trump said the United States did not necessarily have to stick to its long-standing position that Taiwan is part of "one China," questioning nearly four decades of policy in a move likely to antagonize Beijing.
Trump's comments on Fox News Sunday came after he prompted a diplomatic protest from China over his decision to accept a telephone call on Dec. 2 from Taiwan's president.
"I fully understand the 'one China' policy, but I don't know why we have to be bound by a 'one China' policy unless we make a deal with China having to do with other things, including trade," Trump told Fox News.
Trump's call with President Tsai Ing-wen was the first such contact with Taiwan by a U.S. president since Jimmy Carter switched diplomatic recognition from Taiwan to China in 1979, acknowledging Taiwan as part of "one China."
Beijing considers Taiwan a renegade province and the subject is a sensitive one for China.
Chinese officials had no immediate reaction to Trump's remarks.
After Trump's phone conversation with Taiwan's president, the Obama administration said senior White House aides had spoken with Chinese officials to insist that Washington’s “one China” policy remained intact. 
The administration also warned that progress made in the U.S. relationship with China could be undermined by a “flaring up” of the Taiwan issue.
Following Trump's latest comments, a White House aide said the Obama administration had no reaction beyond its previously stated policy positions.
In the Fox interview, Trump criticized China over its currency policies, its activities in the South China Sea and its stance toward North Korea. 
He said it was not up to Beijing to decide whether he should take a call from Taiwan's leader.
"I don't want China dictating to me and this was a call put in to me," Trump said. 
"It was a very nice call. Short. And why should some other nation be able to say I can't take a call?"
"I think it actually would've been very disrespectful, to be honest with you, not taking it," Trump added.
Trump plans to nominate a long-standing friend of Beijing, Iowa Governor Terry Branstad, as the next U.S. ambassador to China.
However, Trump is considering John Bolton, a former Bush administration official who has urged a tougher line on Beijing, for a senior role at the U.S. State Department, according to a source familiar with the matter.
The source said Bolton was a leading candidate for the No. 2 job at the State Department.
In a Wall Street Journal article last January, Bolton said the next U.S. president should take bolder steps to halt China' military aggressiveness in the South and East China seas.
Bolton said Washington should consider using a "diplomatic ladder of escalation" that could start with receiving Taiwanese diplomats officially at the State Department and lead to restoring full diplomatic recognition.
In the Fox interview, Trump brought up a litany of complaints about China which he had emphasized during his presidential campaign.
"We're being hurt very badly by China with devaluation, with taxing us heavy at the borders when we don't tax them, with building a massive fortress in the middle of the South China Sea, which they shouldn't be doing, and frankly with not helping us at all with North Korea," Trump said. 
"You have North Korea. You have nuclear weapons and China could solve that problem and they're not helping us at all."
Economists, including those at the International Monetary Fund, have widely viewed China's efforts to prop up the yuan's value over the past year as evidence that Beijing is no longer keeping its currency artificially low to make Chinese exports cheap.
On Sunday, China's top diplomat, State Councilor Yang Jiechi was traveling to U.S. neighbor Mexico, according to the official news agency Xinhua, but Mexican officials could not offer details.
Mexico has been deepening ties with China, which is partly funding a multi-billion dollar wholesale mobile network while China Offshore Oil Corporation took two of the eight blocks of deep water oil fields offered in a historic auction this month.