Congressional Request For Proposal Solicits Expert Report on Chinese Weapons

By KRIS OSBORN

The U.S.-China Economic and Security Review Commission is requesting expert proposals to provide a one-time unclassified report on China’s development of advanced weapons.
The Request for Proposals seeks unclassified, open-source assessments of specific Chinese weapons systems and areas of ongoing technological inquiry.
Some detailed priority areas include:
1. Maneuverable re-entry vehicles, including hypersonic glide and supersonic combustion ramjet engine-powered vehicles;
2. Directed energy weapons, to include high power radiofrequency weapons, high energy lasers, and particle beam weapons, with effects ranging from satellite jamming to target damage;
3. Electromagnetic railguns;
4. Direct-ascent, co-orbital, and other anti-satellite weapons in addition to counterspace electronic warfare capabilities; and
5. Unmanned and artificial intelligence-equipped weapons.
The RFP also places a premium on the need for reports which detail the implications of China's advanced weaponry for the United States.
This includes an examination of potential U.S. countermeasures and areas of needed developmental emphasis, along with assessments of relative competitive advantages in key areas of weapons development.

Context: US-China Military Competition
The project seems unequivocally aimed at helping lawmakers and policy leaders better apprehend the fast-moving trajectory of China's military modernization and weapons development.
The request for a report comes amid a broader context of US concern about many areas of Chinese progress in developing next-generation weaponry.
Several examples among many include reports of China's testing of hypersonic weapons, a development which could dramatically change the threat calculus for aircraft carriers and other US surface warships, among other things.
China is known to have conducted several hypersonic weapons tests.
The US Air Force Chief Scientist, Geoffrey Zacharias, told Scout Warrior that the US is indeed seeking to accelerate its hypersonic weapons development program, at least in part, to exceed or keep pace with Chinese progress.
Zacharias explained the US approach as consisting of "stair-steps" including a planned progression from hypersonic propulsion to hypersonic weapons, hypersonic drones and ultimately hypersonic recoverable drones or air vehicles; he said the US envisions having hypersonic weapons by the mid 2020s, hypersonic drones by the 2030s -- and recoverable hypersonic drones by the 2040s.
In addition, China's well-documented anti-satellite, or ASAT, weapons tests have inspired international attention and influenced the Pentagon and US Air Force to accelerate strategies for satellite protection such as improving sensor resiliency, cyber hardening command and control and building in redundancy to improve prospects for functionality in the event of attack.
China's drone programs, cyber intrusions and indigenous aircraft carrier construction are also several factors among many likely driving Congressional interest in this kind of report.
China's rapid development of new destroyers, amphibs, stealth fighters and long-range weapons is quickly increasing its ability to threaten the United States and massively expand expeditionary military operations around the globe, according to several reports from teh US-China Economic and Security Review Commission in recent years.

2016 US-China Economic and Security Review Commission
The 2016 US-China Economic and Security Review Commission specifies China's growing provocations and global expeditionary exercises along with its fast-increasing ability to project worldwide military power.
As examples, the report catalogues a number of aggressive Chinese military or maritime militia encounters:
- In May 2016, two PLA Air Force fighters conducted an unsafe intercept of a U.S. EP-3 aircraft, causing the EP-3 to dive away to avoid a collision.
- In 2013, a PLA Navy ship crossed the U.S. guided missile cruiser Cowpens’ bow, causing the ship to alter course to avoid a collision.
- In 2009, the U.S. Navy ship Impeccable was harassed by maritime militia boats in the South China Sea.
- In 2001, a PLA Navy fighter collided with a U.S. Navy EP-3 reconnaissance aircraft over the South China Sea.
Additional instances of Chinese provocation in recent year include placement of surface-to-air-missiles and fighters in sensitive areas of the South China Sea, along with its announcement of an "Air exclusion zone."
 While the US military flew B-52 bombers through this declared zone in a demonstration of defiance, the move did demonstrate China's growing willingness to be aggressive.
In addition, Chinese "land reclamation" and territorial claims in the South China Sea prompted US "freedom of navigation exercises" to unambiguously thwart China's claims.

As part of a detailed effort to document China's growing influence as an expeditionary global power, the Congressional report highlights a range of Chinese deployments and worldwide exercises beyond their borders or more immediate regional influence.
From the report:
- 2012, China deployed its first UN peacekeeping combat forces to the UN Mission in South Sudan to provide security for PLA engineering and medical personnel.
- Indian Ocean far sea deployments: In early 2014, Chinese surface combatants carried out far sea training, during which they transited through the South China Sea, into the eastern Indian Ocean, and then sailed back to China through the Philippine Sea. During the 23-day deployment, the PLA Navy conducted training associated with antisubmarine warfare, air defense, electronic warfare, and expeditionary logistics.
- In addition to ongoing antipiracy operations in the Gulf of Aden, China dispatched an intelligence gathering ship to the Indian Ocean in 2012, and has deployed four classes of submarines (both nuclear and conventionally powered) to the Indian Ocean.
The 2016 report, coupled with the commissions detailed chapter on Chinese military modernization in a prior 2014 report, bring a sharpened focus upon the detail of Chinese ship, weapons and aircraft improvement and construction.
At the same time, despite these developments, the report does point out the China will need to sustain its current pace of military expansion for years to come in order to truly rival the US military's global reach.
"To support, sustain, and defend long range operations, the PLA must continue to develop or procure large amphibious ships, heavy lift aircraft, and logistical support capabilities, as well as continue to improve command and control capabilities," the report states.

Chinese Navy
While Chinese naval technology may still be substantially behind current U.S. platforms, the equation could change dramatically over the next several decades because the Chinese are reportedly working on a handful of high-tech next-generation ships, weapons and naval systems.
China has plans to grow its navy to 351 ships by 2020 as the Chinese continue to develop their military’s ability to strike global targets, according to the Congressional reports.
The 2014 U.S.-China Economic and Security Review Commission recommended to Congress that the U.S. Navy respond by building more ships and increase its presence in the Pacific region – a strategy the U.S. military has already started.
Opponents of this strategy point out that the U.S. has 11 aircraft carriers, the Chinese have one and China's one carrier still lacks an aircraft wing capable of operating off of a carrier deck.
However, the Chinese are already beginning construction on several of their own indigenous aircraft carriers. China currently has one carrier, the Ukranian-built Liaoning.
Looking to the future, the 2016 report says "future Chinese carriers are likely to be flat deck ships, like U.S. aircraft carriers, that utilize steam or magnetic catapults and would enable the PLA Navy to employ aircraft armed with heavier munitions intended for maritime strike or land attack missions. According to DOD, China could build several aircraft carriers in the next 15 years. China may ultimately produce five ships—for a total of six carriers—for the PLA Navy."
The commission also cites other platforms and weapons systems the Chinese are developing, which will likely change the strategic calculus regarding how U.S. carriers and surface ships might need to operate in the region.
These include the LUYANG III, a new class of Chinese destroyer slated to enter the fleet this year. These ships are being engineered with vertically-launched, long-range anti-ship cruise missiles, the commission said.
The new destroyer will carry an extended-range variant of the HHQ-9 surface-to-air missile, among other weapons, the report says.
As evidence of the impact of these destroyers, the report points out that these new multi-mission destroyers are likely to form the bulk of warship escorts for Chinese carriers -- in a manner similar to how the US Navy protects its carriers with destroyers in "carrier strike groups."
"These 8,000 ton destroyers (the LUYANG III) have phased-array radars and a long-range SAM [surface-to-air missile] system which provides the [navy] with its first credible area air-defense capability," the 2016 report states.
The Chinese are currently testing and developing a new, carrier-based fighter aircraft called the J-15.
Regarding amphibious assault ships, the Chinese are planning to add several more YUZHAO LPDs, amphibs which can carry 800 troops, four helicopters and up to 20 armored vehicles, the report said.
"The YUZHAO can carry up to four air cushion landing craft, four helicopters, armored vehicles, and troops for long-distance deployments, which DOD notes ‘‘provide[s] a . . . greater and more flexible capability for ‘far seas’ operations than the [PLA Navy’s] older landing ships.,’ according to the report.

The Chinese also have ambitious future plans for next-generation amphibious assault ships.
"China seeks to construct a class of amphibious assault ships larger than the YUZHAO class that would include a flight deck for conducting helicopter operations. China may produce four to six of these Type 081 ships with the capacity to transport 500 troops and configured for helicopter-based vertical assault," the report says.
Some observers have raised the question as to whether this new class of Chinese amphibs could rival the US Navy's emerging, high-tech America-Class amphibious assault ships.
The Chinese are also working on development of a new Type 055 cruiser equipped with land-attack missiles, lasers and rail-gun weapons, according to the review.
China’s surface fleet is also bolstered by production of at least 60 smaller, fast-moving HOUBEI-glass guided missile patrol boats and ongoing deliveries of JIANGDAO light frigates armed with naval guns, torpedoes and anti-ship cruise missiles.
The commission also says Chinese modernization plans call for a sharp increase in attack submarines and nuclear-armed submarines or SSBNs.
Chinese SSBNs are now able to patrol with nuclear-armed JL-2 missiles able to strike targets more than 4,500 nautical miles.
The Chinese are currently working on a new, modernized SSBN platform as well as a long-range missile, the JL-3, the commission says.
While the commission says the exact amount of Chinese military spending is difficult to identify, China’s projected defense spending for 2014 is cited at $131 billion, approximately 12.2 percent greater than 2013.
This figure is about one sixth of what the U.S. spends annually.
The Chinese defense budget has increased by double digits since 1989, the commission states, resulting in annual defense spending doubling since 2008, according to the report.
Some members of Congress, including the former House Armed Services Committee's Seapower and Projection Forces Subcommittee Chairman Rep. Randy Forbes, R-Va., advocated for both a larger U.S. Navy and a stronger U.S. posture toward China's behavior in the region.

Chinese Air Force
The U.S. Air Force’s technological air power superiority over China is rapidly diminishing in light of rapid Chinese modernization of fighter jets, missiles, air-to-air weapons, cargo planes and stealth aircraft, according to analysts, Pentagon officials and a Congressional review.
The 2014 U.S.-China Economic and Security Review Commission recommended that Congress appoint an outside panel of experts to assess the U.S.-Chinese military balance and make recommendations regarding U.S. military plans and budgets, among other things.Despite being released in 2014, the findings of the report -- if slightly dated -- offer a detailed and insightful window into Chinese Air Force technology, progress and development.
The Commission compiled its report based upon testimony, various reports and analytical assessments along with available open-source information.
An entire chapter is dedicated to Chinese military modernization.
The review states that the Chines People’s Liberation Army currently has approximately 2,200 operational aircraft, nearly 600 of which are considered modern.
“In the early 1990s, Beijing began a comprehensive modernization program to upgrade the PLA Air Force from a short-range, defensively oriented force with limited capabilities into a modern, multi-role force capable of projecting precision airpower beyond China’s borders, conducting air and missile defense and providing early warning,” the review writes.
Regarding stealth aircraft, the review mentions the recent flights of prototypes of the Chinese J-20 stealth fighter, calling the aircraft more advanced than any other air platform currently deployed in the Asia-Pacific region.
 The Chinese are also testing a smaller stealth fighter variant called the J-31 although its intended use is unclear, according to the report.
In 2014, China displayed the Shenyang J-31 stealth fighter at China’s Zhuhai Air show, according to various reports.
However, several analysts have made the point that it is not at all clear if the platform comes close to rivaling the technological capability of the U.S. F-35.
Nevertheless, the U.S. technological advantage in weaponry, air and naval platforms is rapidly decreasing, according to the review.
To illustrate this point, the review cites comments from an analyst who compared U.S.-Chinese fighter jets to one another roughly twenty years ago versus a similar comparison today.

The analyst said that in 1995 a high-tech U.S. F-15, F-16 or F/A-18 would be vastly superior to a Chinese J-6 aircraft.
However today -- China’s J-10 and J-11 fighter jet aircraft would be roughly equivalent in capability to an upgraded U.S. F-15, the review states.
Alongside their J-10 and J-11 fighters, the Chinese also own Russian-built Su-27s and Su-30s and are on the verge of buying the new Su-35 from Russia, the review states.
“The Su-35 is a versatile, highly capable aircraft that would offer significantly improved range and fuel capacity over China’s current fighters. The aircraft thus would strengthen China’s ability to conduct air superiority missions in the Taiwan Strait, East China Sea, and South China Sea as well as provide China with the opportunity to reverse engineer the fighter’s component parts, including its advanced radar and engines, for integration into China’s current and future indigenous fighters,” the review writes.
In addition to stealth technology, high-tech fighter aircraft and improved avionics, the Chinese have massively increased their ability with air-to-air missiles over the last 15-years, the review finds.
“All of China’s fighters in 2000, with the potential exception of a few modified Su-27s, were limited to within-visual-range missiles. China over the last 15 years also has acquired a number of sophisticated short and medium-range air-to-air missiles; precision-guided munitions including all-weather, satellite-guided bombs, anti-radiation missiles, and laser-guided bombs; and long-range, advanced air-launched land-attack cruise missiles and anti-ship cruise missiles,” the review says.

The review also points to the Y-20 aircraft, a new strategic airlifter now being tested by the Chinese which has three times the cargo-carrying capacity of the U.S. Air Force’s C-130.
Some of these new planes could be configured into tanker aircraft, allowing the Chinese to massively increase their reach and ability to project air power over longer distances.
At the moment, the Chinese do not have a sizeable or modern fleet of tankers, and many of their current aircraft are not engineered for aerial refueling, a scenario which limits their reach.
“Until the PLA Navy’s first carrier-based aviation wing becomes operational, China must use air refueling tankers to enable air operations at these distances from China. However, China’s current fleet of air refueling aircraft, which consists of only about 12 1950s-era H–6U tankers, is too small to support sustained, large-scale, long-distance air combat,” the review states.
The review also cites Russian media reports claiming that Russia has approved the sale of its new, next-generation S-400 surface-to-air-missile to China.
“Such a sale has been under negotiation since at least 2012. The S–400 would more than double the range of China’s air defenses from approximately 125 to 250 miles—enough to cover all of Taiwan, the Senkaku Islands, and parts of the South China Sea,” the review says.
The review also catalogues information related to China’s nuclear arsenal and long-range intercontinental ballistic missiles such as the existing DF-31 and DF-31A along with the now-in-development DF-41.
The Chinese are believed to already have a number of road-mobile ICBMs able to carry nuclear weapons.
The DF-41 is reported to have as many as 10 re-entry vehicles, analysts have said.

The Pace of Chinese Military Modernization is Getting Attention at the Pentagon and in Congress

A Congressional Report Catalogues Chinese Military Provocations and Estimates that China May Have 351 Ships by 2020
By KRIS OSBORN

China's rapid development of new destroyers, amphibs, stealth fighters and long-range weapons is quickly increasing its ability to threaten the United States and massively expand expeditionary military operations around the globe, according to a Congressional report.
A detailed report from Congressional experts, called the 2016 US-China Economic and Security Review Commission, specifies China's growing provocations and global expeditionary exercises along with its fast-increasing ability to project worldwide military power.
As examples, the report catalogues a number of aggressive Chinese military or maritime militia encounters:
- In May 2016, two PLA Air Force fighters conducted an unsafe intercept of a U.S. EP-3 aircraft, causing the EP-3 to dive away to avoid a collision.
- In 2013, a PLA Navy ship crossed the U.S. guided missile cruiser Cowpens’ bow, causing the ship to alter course to avoid a collision.
- In 2009, the U.S. Navy ship Impeccable was harassed by maritime militia boats in the South China Sea.
- In 2001, a PLA Navy fighter collided with a U.S. Navy EP-3 reconnaissance aircraft over the South China Sea.
Additional instances of Chinese provocation in recent year include placement of surface-to-air-missiles and fighters in sensitive areas of the South China Sea, along with its announcement of an "Air exclusion zone."  

While the US military flew B-52 bombers through this declared zone in a demonstration of defiance, the move did demonstrate China's growing willingness to be aggressive. 

In addition, Chinese "land reclamation" and territorial claims in the South China Sea, prompting US "freedom of navigation exercises" to unambiguously thwart China's claims. 

As part of a detailed effort to document China's growing influence as an expeditionary global power, the Congressional report highlights a range of Chinese deployments and worldwide exercises beyond their borders or more immediate regional influence. 

From the report:
- 2012, China deployed its first UN peacekeeping combat forces to the UN Mission in South Sudan to provide security for PLA engineering and medical personnel.
- Indian Ocean far sea deployments: In early 2014, Chinese surface combatants carried out far sea training, during which they transited through the South China Sea, into the eastern Indian Ocean, and then sailed back to China through the Philippine Sea. During the 23-day deployment, the PLA Navy conducted training associated with antisubmarine warfare, air defense, electronic warfare, and expeditionary logistics.
- In addition to ongoing antipiracy operations in the Gulf of Aden, China dispatched an intelligence gathering ship to the Indian Ocean in 2012, and has deployed four classes of submarines (both nuclear and conventionally powered) to the Indian Ocean.
The 2016 report, coupled with the commissions detailed chapter on Chinese military modernization in a prior 2014 report, bring a sharpened focus upon the detail of Chinese ship, weapons and aircraft improvement and construction.
At the same time, despite these developments, the report does point out the China will need to sustain its current pace of military expansion for years to come in order to truly rival the US military's global reach.
"To support, sustain, and defend long range operations, the PLA must continue to develop or procure large amphibious ships, heavy lift aircraft, and logistical support capabilities, as well as continue to improve command and control capabilities," the report states.

Chinese Navy
While Chinese naval technology may still be substantially behind current U.S. platforms, the equation could change dramatically over the next several decades because the Chinese are reportedly working on a handful of high-tech next-generation ships, weapons and naval systems.
China has plans to grow its navy to 351 ships by 2020 as the Chinese continue to develop their military’s ability to strike global targets, according to the Congressional reports.
The 2014 U.S.-China Economic and Security Review Commission recommended to Congress that the U.S. Navy respond by building more ships and increase its presence in the Pacific region – a strategy the U.S. military has already started.
Opponents of this strategy point out that the U.S. has 11 aircraft carriers, the Chinese have one and China's one carrier still lacks an aircraft wing capable of operating off of a carrier deck.
However, the Chinese are already beginning construction on several of their own indigenous aircraft carriers. China currently has one carrier, the Ukranian-built Liaoning.
Looking to the future, the 2016 report says "future Chinese carriers are likely to be flat deck ships, like U.S. aircraft carriers, that utilize steam or magnetic catapults and would enable the PLA Navy to employ aircraft armed with heavier munitions intended for maritime strike or land attack missions. According to DOD, China could build several aircraft carriers in the next 15 years. China may ultimately produce five ships—for a total of six carriers—for the PLA Navy."
The commission also cites other platforms and weapons systems the Chinese are developing, which will likely change the strategic calculus regarding how U.S. carriers and surface ships might need to operate in the region.
These include the LUYANG III, a new class of Chinese destroyer slated to enter the fleet this year. These ships are being engineered with vertically-launched, long-range anti-ship cruise missiles, the commission said. 

The new destroyer will carry an extended-range variant of the HHQ-9 surface-to-air missile, among other weapons, the report says.
As evidence of the impact of these destroyers, the report points out that these new multi-mission destroyers are likely to form the bulk of warship escorts for Chinese carriers - in a manner similar to how the US Navy protects its carriers with destroyers in "carrier strike groups."
"These 8,000 ton destroyers (the LUYANG III) have phased-array radars and a long-range SAM [surface-to-air missile] system which provides the [navy] with its first credible area air-defense capability," the 2016 report states.
The Chinese are currently testing and developing a new, carrier-based fighter aircraft called the J-15.
Regarding amphibious assault ships, the Chinese are planning to add several more YUZHAO LPDs, amphibs which can carry 800 troops, four helicopters and up to 20 armored vehicles, the report said.
"The YUZHAO can carry up to four air cushion landing craft, four helicopters, armored vehicles, and troops for long-distance deployments, which DOD notes ‘‘provide[s] a greater and more flexible capability for ‘far seas’ operations than the [PLA Navy’s] older landing shipss,’ according to the report.

The Chinese also have ambitious future plans for next-generation amphibious assault ships.
"China seeks to construct a class of amphibious assault ships larger than the YUZHAO class that would include a flight deck for conducting helicopter operations. China may produce four to six of these Type 081 ships with the capacity to transport 500 troops and configured for helicopter-based vertical assault," the report says. 

Some observers have raised the question as to whether this new class of Chinese amphibs could rival the US Navy's emerging, high-tech America-class amphibious assault ships.
The Chinese are also working on development of a new Type 055 cruiser equipped with land-attack missiles, lasers and rail-gun weapons, according to the review.
China’s surface fleet is also bolstered by production of at least 60 smaller, fast-moving HEBEI-glass guided missile patrol boats and ongoing deliveries of JIANGDAO light frigates armed with naval guns, torpedoes and anti-ship cruise missiles.
The commission also says Chinese modernization plans call for a sharp increase in attack submarines and nuclear-armed submarines or SSBNs. 

Chinese SSBNs are now able to patrol with nuclear-armed JL-2 missiles able to strike targets more than 4,500 nautical miles.
The Chinese are currently working on a new, modernized SSBN platform as well as a long-range missile, the JL-3, the commission says.
While the commission says the exact amount of Chinese military spending is difficult to identify, China’s projected defense spending for 2014 is cited at $131 billion, approximately 12.2 percent greater than 2013. 

This figure is about one sixth of what the U.S. spends annually.
The Chinese defense budget has increased by double digits since 1989, the commission states, resulting in annual defense spending doubling since 2008, according to the report.
Some members of Congress, including the former House Armed Services Committee's Seapower and Projection Forces Subcommittee Chairman Rep. Randy Forbes, R-Va., advocated for both a larger U.S. Navy and a stronger U.S. posture toward China's behavior in the region.

Chinese Air Force
The U.S. Air Force’s technological air power superiority over China is rapidly diminishing in light of rapid Chinese modernization of fighter jets, missiles, air-to-air weapons, cargo planes and stealth aircraft, according to analysts, Pentagon officials and a Congressional review.
The 2014 U.S.-China Economic and Security Review Commission recommended that Congress appoint an outside panel of experts to assess the U.S.-Chinese military balance and make recommendations regarding U.S. military plans and budgets, among other things.

Despite being released in 2014, the findings of the report -- if slightly dated -- offer a detailed and insightful window into Chinese Air Force technology, progress and development.
The Commission compiled its report based upon testimony, various reports and analytical assessments along with available open-source information. 

An entire chapter is dedicated to Chinese military modernization.
The review states that the Chines People’s Liberation Army currently has approximately 2,200 operational aircraft, nearly 600 of which are considered modern.
“In the early 1990s, Beijing began a comprehensive modernization program to upgrade the PLA Air Force from a short-range, defensively oriented force with limited capabilities into a modern, multi-role force capable of projecting precision airpower beyond China’s borders, conducting air and missile defense and providing early warning,” the review writes.
Regarding stealth aircraft, the review mentions the recent flights of prototypes of the Chinese J-20 stealth fighter, calling the aircraft more advanced than any other air platform currently deployed in the Asia-Pacific region. 

 The Chinese are also testing a smaller stealth fighter variant called the J-31 although its intended use is unclear, according to the report.
In 2014, China displayed the Shenyang J-31 stealth fighter at China’s Zuhai Air show, according to various reports. 

However, several analysts have made the point that it is not at all clear if the platform comes close to rivaling the technological capability of the U.S. F-35.
Nevertheless, the U.S. technological advantage in weaponry, air and naval platforms is rapidly decreasing, according to the review.
To illustrate this point, the review cites comments from an analyst who compared U.S.-Chinese fighter jets to one another roughly twenty years ago versus a similar comparison today.

The analyst said that in 1995 a high-tech U.S. F-15, F-16 or F/A-18 would be vastly superior to a Chinese J-6 aircraft. 

However today -- China’s J-10 and J-11 fighter jet aircraft would be roughly equivalent in capability to an upgraded U.S. F-15, the review states.
Alongside their J-10 and J-11 fighters, the Chinese also own Russian-built Su-27s and Su-30s and are on the verge of buying the new Su-35 from Russia, the review states.
“The Su-35 is a versatile, highly capable aircraft that would offer significantly improved range and fuel capacity over China’s current fighters. 

The aircraft thus would strengthen China’s ability to conduct air superiority missions in the Taiwan Strait, East China Sea, and South China Sea as well as provide China with the opportunity to reverse engineer the fighter’s component parts, including its advanced radar and engines, for integration into China’s current and future indigenous fighters,” the review writes.
In addition to stealth technology, high-tech fighter aircraft and improved avionics, the Chinese have massively increased their ability with air-to-air missiles over the last 15-years, the review finds.
“All of China’s fighters in 2000, with the potential exception of a few modified Su-27s, were limited to within-visual-range missiles. China over the last 15 years also has acquired a number of sophisticated short and medium-range air-to-air missiles; precision-guided munitions including all-weather, satellite-guided bombs, anti-radiation missiles, and laser-guided bombs; and long-range, advanced air-launched land-attack cruise missiles and anti-ship cruise missiles,” the review says.

The review also points to the Y-20 aircraft, a new strategic airlifter now being tested by the Chinese which has three times the cargo-carrying capacity of the U.S. Air Force’s C-130. 

 Some of these new planes could be configured into tanker aircraft, allowing the Chinese to massively increase their reach and ability to project air power over longer distances.
At the moment, the Chinese do not have a sizeable or modern fleet of tankers, and many of their current aircraft are not engineered for aerial refueling, a scenario which limits their reach.
“Until the PLA Navy’s first carrier-based aviation wing becomes operational, China must use air refueling tankers to enable air operations at these distances from China. 

However, China’s current fleet of air refueling aircraft, which consists of only about 12 1950s-era H–6U tankers, is too small to support sustained, large-scale, long-distance air combat,” the review states.
The review also cites Russian media reports claiming that Russia has approved the sale of its new, next-generation S-400 surface-to-air-missile to China.
“Such a sale has been under negotiation since at least 2012. The S–400 would more than double the range of China’s air defenses from approximately 125 to 250 miles—enough to cover all of Taiwan, the Senkaku Islands, and parts of the South China Sea,” the review says.
The review also catalogues information related to China’s nuclear arsenal and long-range intercontinental ballistic missiles such as the existing DF-31 and DF-31A along with the now-in-development DF-41.
The Chinese are believed to already have a number of road-mobile ICBMs able to carry nuclear weapons. 

The DF-41 is reported to have as many as 10 re-entry vehicles, analysts have said.

Sina Delenda Est

Donald Trump’s New Asia Strategy
By Harry J. Kazianis

To be honest, it was quite amusing to watch the American and in many respects, international media, go into total meltdown when US President Donald Trump took a simple phone call from the President of Taiwan, Tsai Ing-wen.
Vice President Mike Pence, using the word’s “President of Taiwan,” stating obvious reality, and creating another uproar in the process, gets to the heart of a foolish game of make-believe that the new administration could be itching to end.
Indeed, for many of us foreign policy professionals here in Washington who have bitterly commented on the Obama administration’s poorly resourced so-called “pivot” to the Asia-Pacific, this seemingly simple act was a clear sign of things to come — and was no surprise at all.
What President Trump must do now is offer up a much more expansive vision for America in the larger Indo-Pacific region while making the case to the American people why they must support such a vision.
When he does, another so-called “shocker” will reverberate the world over but will be something many China watchers have been begging for: a tougher line against Chinese aggression.

Long Overdue Shift:
A shift in policy toward Taiwan, and indeed the whole Asia-Pacific and larger Indo-Pacific region, has been something discussed in US foreign policy circles for almost a decade — even longer depending on what you base as your starting point.
The reason for such a shift is obvious.
To start, Beijing flipped from foe to friend thanks to Richard Nixon — a welcomed ally against the Soviet Union.
Furthermore, since the late 1970s, a largely bipartisan group of foreign policy intellectuals has pushed the idea of welcoming a "peacefully" rising China into the international community under the guise of what Robert Zellick famously termed becoming a “responsible stakeholder.”
The idea was to ensure China did not turn into an adversary by giving it an important place in the current international order, to prosper from it, and in many respects, help defend that prosperity for generations to come.
Beijing, it was thought at the time, if given a prominent place in the status-quo, would have little reason to fight against it.
And such a policy worked, for a time.
One can make a credible argument that Beijing did not challenge the international system, a system created largely by the United States and Western powers, for decades.
China’s economy integrated into the world financial system and Beijing became rich in the process. China now sports the second largest economy by measure of GDP (Number one if PPP is used), it has lifted hundreds of millions of its citizens out of poverty and its borders, for the most part, across all domains, are largely secure.
However, since the fall of the Soviet Union and accelerating over the last decade or so, the People’s Republic has grown weary of an international system it was not strong enough to shape at the end of World War II.
Chinese leaders, quick to cite a century of humiliation at the hands of western powers, now want to amend that system to have a greater say in Asia’s affairs, and indeed, become the dominant power, its traditional place in the Asia pecking order for centuries, before its humiliation.
As one famous Chinese academic, based in Beijing, told me recently: “You Americans actually thought we would continue to support an international system that we never had any input in creating? Especially in a time when you are in decline?”
And events in recent years only go to show the great lengths China will push to change Asia’s order to its liking. 
For example, Beijing’s actions over the last several years in the South China Sea — through which 80% of the natural resources it needs to power its economy passes — have sparked heated debate in America that China not only may have dangerous ambitions, but seeks to push America out of the Asia-Pacific entirely.
Such actions include: declaring a ‘nine-dash-line’ which acts like sovereign borders over the richest ocean-based trade route on the planet, building fake islands that are now being transformed into military bases and creatively using nonmilitary maritime assets to push outlandish territorial claims all the way to far away Indonesia’s Exclusive Economic Zone.

What Will Such a Shift Look Like?
So what will a Donald Trump policy for Asia look like?
If Trump takes the advice of his most experienced Asia hands, people like Peter Navarro, Michael Pillsbury, Randy Forbes and Forbes’ former deputy Alex Gray, Beijing will be in for a rough ride indeed.
As Executive Editor of The National Interest as well as Editor of The Diplomat, I have had what can be considered a front-row seat to what such thinkers have been saying for years.
First, the most obvious component to such a Trump strategy, as gleaned from the various writings of this distinguished group of Asia experts, is a greater emphasis on hard power and using such power to deter aggressive Chinese actions in the future.
Specifically, higher numbers and more sophisticated pieces of US military hardware would be transferred to the region.
Allowing this to happen would be an increase in US defense spending, with the end of sequestration.
Special focus would be on deploying assets that negate China’s fearsome anti-access/area-denial (A2/AD) strategy along with the much delayed public release of the Pentagon’s formal plans to push back against A2/AD, what was known in the past as Air-Sea Battle, now called JAM-GC.
Diplomacy would also be a big part of what has to be seen as a much more robust “pivot” under Trump.
Taiwan would be a big part of such a strategy, with relations being upgraded just under the level of full diplomatic recognition, an important sign of growing ties, but not enough to anger Beijing where kinetic conflict could be possible.
Vietnam should also see ties strengthened under the Trump administration, with possible US naval deployments to Cam Ranh Bay.
Economics, especially if the Trans-Pacific Partnership (TPP) is dead and buried, must play a big part in a newly crafted Trump Asia policy.
Bilateral trade deals must be cemented with all members of the TPP, with special emphasis on Japan, Vietnam, Taiwan and Australia.
A Congressional source, who agreed to speak on background, said he already saw hints that the new administration was working up plans for bilateral trade deals throughout Asia.
He explained: “The new administration realizes there is a certain cost to be paid in the Asia-Pacific now that TPP won’t happen. The goal now is to work with partners and allies in Asia to ensure trade links are expanded. There is already talk on Capitol Hill on how to move forward — and quickly after Trump takes the oath.”

The Biggest Challenge:
But such a strategy, a plan I would fully support, will always suffer from one big challenge that must be considered if such an action were to be implemented and be successful: will the American people support it?
If President Trump wants to push back on China, he must explain and sell his strategy, using important political capital along the way. 
He would need to demonstrate why this is a top national priority, any why ultimately Americans might be called to sacrifice their lives for it.
As one retired Chinese naval officer said to me quite recently: “Are you willing to die for your place in Asia? Are your sons and daughters willing to give their lives for Taiwan? Or rocks in the South China Sea? We are.”
There is also the issue of possibly going too far in pushing back against China — appearing too hawkish and creating tensions that could lead to conflict.
If such a strategy is not managed properly, or were to become too belligerent against Beijing, and considering the fact that both nations have large arsenals of nuclear weapons, the consequences could be profound.
Ultimately, the issues raised by China’s challenging the status-quo in Asia are a timeless problem: when a rising power seeks to undo the international system and perks of an established power and its allies and partners.
However, there is much more at stake than the simple primacy of the US in Asia.
If Beijing is simply allowed to tear asunder important norms like the concept of the global commons truly being borderless as well as continue to bully allies and partners throughout the region a dangerous precedent will be set that other nations will surely follow. 
And that is something no nation can allow to occur.

Passing a Chinese Maritime 'Trump Test'

If the past is any guide, China may test the new administration early on. Beijing's “maritime militia” could play an important part.
By Andrew S. Erickson

China’s Leninist leadership has rightly been termed the “high church of realpolitik.” 

Beijing’s leaders believe that even small changes in foreign leaders, correlation of forces, or the relative balance of power have important significance. 

If they appear in flux, China probes for opportunities. 

If meeting minimal or manageable resistance, it then pushes further to gain ground. 

Given the particular uncertainty concerning President Donald Trump’s outlook and policies, and Beijing’s indignation at his statements already regarding both mainland China and Taiwan, he may even face probing without the typical “grace period” arguably accorded his predecessors. 

How Trump handles such pressure will reverberate across the Asia-Pacific and around the world.
In recent years, China has tested each new American president. 

The past two faced an early challenge: George W. Bush with increasingly aggressive aircraft intercepts that triggered the April 2001 EP-3 crisis, Barack Obama with the March 2009 Impeccable incident. 

China appears to engineer tensions or activities to assess a president’s position in an area of its interest and to attempt to alter his decision-making to Beijing’s preferences. 

While motivations are hard to prove, Trump and his team must certainly prepare for the possibility that at some point Beijing—having never “forgotten” whatever statements and actions may accumulate despite its objections—will push back in a manner that effectively poses a test.
If the past is any guide, Chinese leaders may test the new administration early on. 

While a trial could take many forms, the last two presidential tests revolved around U.S. surveillance operations in international airspace and waters, to which Beijing continually objects. 

Given current Sino-American friction points, one possible scenario involves the South China Sea, U.S. Navy vessels, and China’s Maritime Militia. 

Such a “Trump Test” could involve China’s maritime militia harassing the operations of U.S. warships or surveillance ships in hope that he could be pressured to reduce such activities, thereby accommodating Chinese sovereignty promotion efforts. 

It might include not only direct tests of U.S. resolve, but also that of America’s regional allies and partners and its commitment toward them; particularly given uncertainty over how the Trump Administration intends to handle longstanding alliances and partnerships. 

China may see this as an opportunity to weaken the alliance system, which it opposes vehemently. 

Here the East and South China Seas are equally likely arenas, with Japan, Vietnam, and Indonesia among the leading potential targets. 

Either way, the Obama Administration’s failure to publicly acknowledge the asymmetric challenge of China’s Maritime Militia on its watch contributes to a looming disconnect in which Beijing and Washington or one of its allies or partners may (eventually) be headed for a tense encounter or incident at sea, without sufficient preparations for its effective management.
Beijing’s broader South China Sea strategy includes advancing disputed claims where it can, delaying resolution of issues it cannot yet settle in its favor, and coercing potential opponents while limiting escalation. 

Beijing’s longstanding opposition to key principles of international air-and-sea-related law and its growing assertiveness in the South China Sea make it view ‘unapproved’ American activities there as contravening vital interests. 

To implement that strategy with as little American resistance as possible, and thereby further its unresolved land feature and maritime sovereignty claims without escalating to major power war, it is employing not one but three major sea forces.
China’s Maritime Militia is its Third Sea Force of “blue hulls,” after its Navy of “gray hulls” and Coast Guard of “white hulls.” 

Increasingly, these forces operate together, with blue hulls operating forward and white and gray hulls backstopping them. 

Collectively, these are “gray zone” operations: conducted to alter the status quo, and employing coercion as necessary, but without resorting to war.
China’s irregular sea force is one of the most important—yet most under-considered—factors affecting U.S. security interests in the South China Sea. 

These Chinese “Little Blue Men” are roughly equivalent at sea to Putin’s “Little Green Men” on land.

Exposing Fiction before it Becomes Fact—Trump’s Gulliver Scenario:
In a range of South China Sea scenarios, military-controlled Maritime Militia would likely play a frontline role. 

Here’s a scenario that Washington must be well prepared for, well in advance: In Jonathan Swift’s novel Gulliver’s Travels, the tiny but tenacious Lilliputians trap and truss the far larger protagonist Lemuel Gulliver on the shore of their small Pacific island. 

In broadly analogous fashion, Beijing might seek to confuse, disrupt, or stymie a U.S. destroyer or defenseless special mission ship like USNS Effective by dispatching Maritime Militia forces to harass or obstruct it.
This could play out in a particularly dangerous way for regional stability and American interests. Even if the Obama Administration is able to complete its tenure without a major incident, its successor may well face a fast-breaking Maritime Militia-related challenge all-too-soon after coming into office with one of the least conventionally-prepared-and-understood national security teams in modern memory. 

China’s 44 increasingly aggressive intercepts leading up to the EP-3 incident, which occurred 77 days into George W. Bush’s term, as well as its handling of the ensuing crisis, were intended to test his intentions and persuade him to adopt a more conciliatory approach to China. 

The Beijing-instigated Impeccable incident, beginning just 44 days after Obama’s inauguration, was part of a concerted Chinese effort to test his mettle and see if he could be pushed to reduce lawful U.S. surveillance and reconnaissance operations in international waters and airspace. 

It immediately followed a smaller-scale incident, in which a Chinese government vessel and aircraft repeatedly harassed USNS Victorious in international waters of the Yellow Sea. 

This timing suggests a concerted, national effort at making a point to the new president. 

Fortunately, Obama passed that test.
On October 27, 2015, however, when USS Lassen sailed near artificially augmented Subi Reef, small commercial craft with the hallmarks of Maritime Militia vessels approached it in apparently premeditated fashion. 

Who knows what contingencies they might have been practicing for, or what footage they might have recorded for future propaganda?

History of Harm:
Leading elements of China’s Third Sea Force have already played frontline roles in manifold Chinese incidents and skirmishes with foreign maritime forces throughout the South China Sea. These include China’s:
• 1974 seizure of the western Paracels from Vietnam
• 2009 harassment of U.S. Navy surveillance ship Impeccable
• 2011 sabotage of two Vietnamese hydrographic vessels
• 2012 seizure of Scarborough Shoal from the Philippines, giving China a new operational model that it literally calls the “Scarborough Model”
• and 2014 repulsion of Vietnamese vessels from disputed waters surrounding its oil rig, including by ramming and sinking them.
In recent years, China has used its Maritime Militia against military and civilian ships and crews of its immediate neighbors and the United States—with no direct public response from any of them. There is an important reason for this lack of light on China’s Third Sea Force: despite a deluge of Chinese-language evidence of its development and activities, no U.S. government report or Washington-based executive branch official has publicly mentioned China’s Maritime Militia, at all. 

As a result, U.S. policy is under-informed, U.S. regional allies and partners are confused, and Beijing is emboldened.
But make no mistake. 

These are state-organized, -developed, and -controlled forces operating under a direct military chain of command. 

China’s most advanced Maritime Militia units—those entrusted with missions potentially requiring hazardous interaction with U.S. and other foreign forces—are in fact state actors reporting to, and directed by, China’s People’s Liberation Army (PLA) chain of command to conduct Chinese state-sponsored activities. 

Maritime Militia units have a military organizational structure. 

They are linked to the PLA (military) chain of command directly through People’s Armed Forces Departments (PAFDs), their direct managers for recruitment, planning, organization, training, and policy execution. 

At a “mandatory wicket” level, through which Maritime Militia communications and directives—such as mobilization and mission orders—must typically pass, PAFDs are staffed by active duty PLA personnel.
Official Chinese sources document unambiguously that leading Maritime Militia units are receiving military training directly from uniformed PLAN personnel while wearing their own Militia uniforms. 

Their vessels engage in exercises with PLAN and China Coast Guard vessels. 

To incentivize such risky state service, localities provide militia personnel with a “disability pension” of over $8,600 a year if they suffer harm in the line of duty—the same benefits other government employees receive. 

A knowledgeable individual has described to the author his experience aboard a Chinese Maritime Militia vessel. 

He observed major “T-bar” type reinforcements inside the hull, completely unnecessary for fishing but useful for ramming other vessels. 

Unlike on normal fishing vessels, with which the individual was intimately familiar, there was no sight or smell of anything fish-related. 

The personnel appeared extremely professional and specialized, with a military-style bearing quite different from that of normal fishermen.
Now China is generating a worrying new wave of the future in leading-edge Maritime Militia development. 

The Sansha Militia, headquartered on Woody Island in the Paracels, was established to be a professional paramilitary force first and foremost, with fishing a secondary mission at best. 

Sansha Maritime Militia members have been photographed loading crates labeled “light weapons” onto one of their newly delivered large vessels, several dozen of which boast water cannons, collision-absorbing rails, and reinforced hulls—features not common to normal fishing trawlers, but highly useful for aggressive spraying and ramming.

Some ships reportedly have a “weapons and equipment room” and an “ammunition store.”

A Test for Trump? Prevent China from ‘Gulliverizing’ an American Destroyer:
In light of abundant clear and present evidence, China’s Maritime Militia can only be as deceptive and plausibly deniable as we allow it to be—through our own silence and inaction. 

Before China is able to put the United States, or one of its regional allies or partners, in a misleading but precarious position of appearing to confront “innocent civilian” fishermen, American officials must publicly reveal the Third Sea Force’s true nature and deeds.
At stake is not only the very best of the current president’s vision and legacy, but also the situation that he leaves for his successor, and for American interests in the Asia-Pacific. 

It is deeply regrettable that the Obama Administration has known about China’s Maritime Militia for years yet has ignored it in public—despite concerted urging in Congressional testimony and elsewhere that it do so. 

The Administration’s apparent dismissal thus far of repeated recommendations that it at least mention China’s Maritime Militia by name to begin raising awareness can only have emboldened Beijing. 

To safeguard his Asia-Pacific legacy and to support America’s future in the region under his successor, Obama should finally direct his administration to address this vital issue while he is still in office.
The one U.S. official to discuss China’s Maritime Militia substantively in public, Pacific Fleet Commander Admiral Scott Swift, rightly recommends: “Let’s acknowledge that it’s there. Let’s acknowledge how it’s being command-and-controlled.” 

Much more is needed: Swift has attempted repeatedly to bring up the Maritime Militia with Chinese interlocutors, but—unsurprisingly—“can’t get anyone to acknowledge the veracity of who they are. 

I can’t get that conversation started.” 

To pierce the veil cloaking China’s Third Sea Force, Washington-based officials and public U.S. government publications such as the Pentagon’s China report must clarify that the U.S. government knows what is going on, has vetted the information, stands by the information and considers it important, and is willing to share it to ensure “mass enlightenment.” 

Such a whole-of-government approach is needed to clarify that Maritime Militia awareness is no mere Navy “hobby horse” but rather is essential to ensuring an international community based on international rules and norms that transcends might making right, and in which authoritarians such as Xi Jinping and Vladimir Putin cannot simply bully their neighborhood and treat it as their personal sphere of influence.
If this administration uses the opportunity it has now to go on the record and document publically the reality, the nature and the approach of China’s Maritime Militia, it can help to inform all the relevant stakeholders and the public, including China. 

Showing that Washington is wise to Beijing’s game will create a measure of deterrence, and could help to dissuade China from ever engaging in a Maritime Militia-based test. 

Even if China were to engineer such a test, it would still give the United States time to prepare organizationally, raising awareness within its fleets, readying government public-affairs officers, and informing the media and public. 

This way, when reporters and anchors at the various television and news networks who are not specialists in military issues spring into action, they will have had time to learn. 

At worst, they will be able to find clearly reliable information rapidly on the Internet. 

China’s Maritime Militia is only as deniable for China as U.S. officials allow it to be, and they can conclusively remove plausible deniability once and for all. 

This is a force that thrives in the shadows; the more it is exposed to sunlight, the less effective it will become.
If U.S. officials do their homework and act well in advance, they can portray the facts accurately, enjoy a powerful narrative in their favor, and deter Chinese poking and predations. 

But should they neglect their homework and wait for China to pose problems at a time and a place of its choosing, it could generate a dilemma with China dispatching a media disinformation campaign. 

This would be a potent example of Beijing wielding what Chinese strategists term the “three warfares” 三战: primarily public opinion warfare 舆论战, but also psychological warfare 心理战 and legal warfare 法律战. 

Absent adequate preparations and leadership, the result could be officials and citizens across America and Asia alike being misled, confused, or dispirited; and difficult real-time choices for a new President who has never before held public office.
Perhaps particularly important in this unusual presidential transition, allowing for a non-partisan approach that can span two different administrations will give a solid authority of U.S. government confirmation that will transcend personalities and politics—both volatile concerns of late. 

In the spirit of President George H. W. Bush’s thoughtful note to President Clinton, this offers a constructive stakeholder approach to passing the baton and leaving President Trump—upon whom American interests and regional stability increasingly depend—in the best possible position. Regardless of what leadership and stewardship Obama ultimately demonstrates in this regard, however, Trump and his team must prepare to pass their China test. 

If Obama fails to leave such a legacy, it will be all the more urgent for Trump and his coalescing administration to address this and related issues proactively.
Appointing experienced Asia-Pacific advisors with a track record of supporting a robust, enduring U.S. presence in the region is an essential foundation. 

One of the best choices Trump could make to underwrite strong U.S. Navy development, reassure allies, and discourage any Chinese adventurism would be appoint the highly capable Congressman J. Randy Forbes to serve as the next Secretary of the Navy—a move that would inspire an increasingly challenged service.
Regardless of who ends up initiating a long-overdue response to China’s potential gray zone challenge, American policy-makers must now do three things to avert a potential setback or crisis: 

(1) ‘call out’ China’s Maritime Militia officially in public, 

(2) share information with countries at risk, and 

(3) communicate clearly to Beijing that any ships ignoring repeated warnings by U.S. vessels to desist from disrupting or harassing them will be treated as military-controlled and handled accordingly.
The United States faces growing challenges in the South China Sea. 

China’s Maritime Militia is one of the simplest to begin to address: its plausible deniability is one of its greatest strengths, and it has many exploitable vulnerabilities. 

By informing the public of what China has done (and is capable of doing) and making clear that any such behavior will be met with a vigorous response, Washington can help to inoculate itself against a particularly trying crisis. 

American officials can quickly unmask China’s Third Sea Force by putting a clear U.S. government stamp of authority on already-available information before Beijing parlays ongoing ambiguity into presidential probing. 

But time is running out—Trump and his incoming administration may soon be tested. 

With the world watching as almost never before, failure would come at a terrible cost. 

To begin averting disaster, it’s time for change that American allies and China alike can believe in: proactive presidential leadership. 

The first step is simple: mention the Maritime Militia.