Sina Delenda Est

Defense Budget Shifts Military's Focus From Terrorism To China
By DAVID WELNA

Senate Armed Services Committee Chairman John McCain, R-Ariz., talks with reporters after the National Defense Authorization Act passed 93-1 at the U.S. Capitol in 2015.

It may seem counter-intuitive and head-scratchingly odd, but Congress nearly always approves defense spending bills before the armed services committees — which actually oversee the Pentagon — vote on how the money will be spent.
Not this year.
The John S. McCain National Defense Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 2019 was enacted this month well ahead of a still-pending budget bill.
It was also the earliest date on the legislative calendar that the NDAA has been sent to a president for his signature in more than two decades.
The bill sped through Congress as the nation's military continues waging war in Afghanistan, Syria, Yemen, Iraq, Niger, Libya, Somalia and an untold number of other global hot spots. 

All arise from what's been the Pentagon's main post-Sept. 11 focus: fighting terrorism.
But this new NDAA reflects Defense Secretary Jim Mattis' pivot away from those prolonged and inconclusive battles with insurgencies, to what he says should be the Pentagon's main concern: the United States' growing competition with the world's two other great powers, Russia and China.
Big majorities in the House and Senate approved the NDAA. 

Among the 10 senators who opposed its final passage were three Democrats — Kamala Harris of California, Elizabeth Warren of Massachusetts and Kirsten Gillibrand of New York — who are all considered potential contenders in the 2020 presidential race.
The $716 billion in spending authorized by the bill is $16 billion more than what Congress approved for fiscal year 2018. 

In real terms, this 2.23 percent increase amounts to a reduction in defense spending, given the 2.46 percent rise in inflation over the past year. (Exceeding that inflation rate was the bill's 2.6 percent raise for the uniformed military, the largest pay hike it's had since 2010.)

U.S. Secretary of Defense Jim Mattis.
Congress matched dollar-for-dollar what the Pentagon asked for. 

Yet, the NDAA mandates doing more with less. 

It calls for adding 15,600 troops to the country's 1. 3 million active duty forces, an expansion also sought by the Pentagon. 

It adds another aircraft carrier and two littoral combat ships that the Pentagon did not request. 

A total of 13 new ships for the U.S. Navy are authorized — exactly half as many new ships as Russia plans to build this year.
The Republican-controlled armed service committees backtracked and bowed to several significant policy changes the Trump administration sought during the merging of the House and Senate versions of the NDAA.

Turkey
Mattis convinced Congress to strip the Senate's tough talk on Turkey from the final version of the bill.
That version instructed him to draw up plans for suspending delivery of 100 F-35 Joint Strike Fighters ordered by Turkey as well as Turkey's participation in an international consortium producing the radar-evading warplane.
It was retaliation for the Turkish government's arrest and detention, following a failed coup attempt two years ago, of Andrew Brunson, an American Presbyterian minister; as well as this longtime NATO ally's intention to buy the Russian-made S-400 missile defense system.
Mattis wrote Congress in July asking that Turkey's access to the F-35s not be blocked. 

In its place is language from the House bill, which simply requires that Mattis submit a report "on the status of the United States relationship with the Republic of Turkey" by Oct. 31.

China
The White House prevailed in its quest to exclude from the NDAA language approved by the full Senate blocking the sale of American technology to Chinese telecommunications giant ZTE.
Such a trade restriction had already been imposed by the Trump administration, but it was lifted after Trump spoke with Chinese dictator Xi Jinping and tweeted that he was looking for a way to get ZTE back in business because "[t]oo many jobs in China [were] lost."
The final NDAA does nothing specific to restrict the sale of American technology to ZTE and Huawei, another Chinese telecommunications and video surveillance giant. 

But it does tighten overall U.S. national security reviews of American exports of sensitive technology by issuing stricter guidelines for the Committee on Foreign Investment in the U.S., or CFIUS.
The NDAA also bars the purchase or use by the federal government and its contractors of technology sold by ZTE and Huawei. 

That restriction would not, however, apply for sales to the general public.
There is also a ban in the bill on Pentagon spending for any Chinese language instruction provided by the Confucius Institute, which is operated by an entity associated with China's education ministry.

Russia
Mattis also prevailed in dissuading Congress from requiring enforcement of a 2017 sanctions law for countries that purchase Russian-made weapon systems or parts.
"Some nations who now actively seek a security relationship with the United States still rely on Russia for spare parts and other material," Mattis wrote, citing India and Vietnam as examples.

President Trump meets Putin in Helsinki in July.

Otherwise, the new NDAA carries a spate of policy measures likely to irritate Russia. 

They include:
— $6.3 billion for the European Deterrence Initiative, the largest U.S. infusion yet for this effort — started during the Obama administration — that's aimed at bolstering defenses in European nations near Russia.
— A requirement that Secretary Mattis send Congress by March 2019 a feasibility report on permanently stationing in Poland U.S. Army brigade combat teams that are currently cycling through nine-month rotations there. Russia maintains that the 1997 NATO-Russia Founding Act prohibits the establishment of permanent NATO bases in former Warsaw Pact nations, including Poland. NATO and the U.S. disagree, but have nonetheless held off establishing new bases in those countries during the 21 years since the act was signed.
— A directive that Treasury Secretary Steven Mnuchin brief Congress on all assets known to be held by Vladimir Putin, his "oligarch" associates and other high officials in Russia.
— A strengthening of a ban on funding anything that recognizes the sovereignty of Russia over Crimea.
— A labeling of Russia as a violator of the Chemical Weapons Convention, based on Russia's role in chemical attacks in Syria and Kremlin-linked assassination attempts in the United Kingdom.
— A requirement for certification that Trump has imposed sanctions on Russia for violations of the Intermediate-Range Nuclear Forces Treaty, as he had been directed to do in the 2018 NDAA; the bill also calls for the administration to submit plans to Congress for additional sanctions. A House provision was dropped that had called for considering INF treaty obligations nonbinding if Russia is not in compliance with the treaty.
— A ban on extending the New START nuclear arms limitation treaty (which expires in Feb. 2021) unless Congress receives a report from the administration on Russia's new strategic weapons determining whether Russia is in compliance with the treaty.
— Authorizes $65 million "for developing and producing a low-yield warhead to be mounted on a submarine-launched ballistic missile," according to a summary of the bill. Proponents say this would deter Russia from using tactical, lower-yield weapons; opponents say such weapons increase the likelihood of nuclear war.

Yemen
— Prohibits funds being spent on in-flight refueling of Saudi aircraft or members of the Saudi-led coalition conducting missions over Yemen, until the U.S. secretary of state certifies that Saudi Arabia and the United Arab Emirates are seeking a diplomatic resolution of the conflict in Yemen and respecting the humanitarian needs of that country's inhabitants.
— Requires that the Trump administration brief Congress on what the U.S. strategy is in Yemen.

U.S. Defense Secretary Jim Mattis, left, at the Demilitarized Zone in the border village of Panmunjom in Paju, South Korea in October 2017.

South Korea
— Bars funding for the reduction of U.S. troops stationed in South Korea below 22,000, unless the secretary of defense certifies such a draw-down is in the national security interest of the U.S., and both South Korea and Japan have been "appropriately consulted."

Syria
— Renews the Syria train-and-equip program, but limits any expenditure of funds until Trump submits to Congress the Syria strategy report mandated by the 2018 NDAA.

Afghanistan
— Extends the Afghanistan Security Forces Fund through the end of next year. This continues the effort to stand up the Afghan military and police forces, which has become the main focus of the U.S. in Afghanistan.
— Authorizes $25 million to promote recruitment, training and integration of women in the Afghan National Defense and Security Forces.
— Requires that the secretary of defense designate a senior civilian official focused on civilian casualties associated with U.S. military operations. That official would regularly inform Congress on civilian casualties and work to improve reporting on noncombatant casualties.

Guantanamo
— Renews congressional bans on transferring any of the 40 remaining detainees to U.S. prisons and on building facilities in the U.S. to hold them.
— Denies the $69 million requested by the Trump administration for building a new "high-value detainee complex." That would replace a top-secret structure there known as Camp Seven which currently holds 15 detainees.

Outer Space
— Establishes a U.S. Space Command as part of the U.S. Strategic Command, but does not authorize funds for creating the space force that Trump has directed the Pentagon to create.

Sina Delenda Est

China and the Binary Choice
by JIM TALENT

Late last week, President Trump met with Xi Jinping, the Chinese head of state and (more importantly) the head of the Politburo Standing Committee of the Chinese Communist Party. 
The two men no doubt discussed many issues, but the elephants in the room were the conflict in strategic visions between China and the United States, and the military facts on the ground that are empowering China’s regional strategy. 
China’s leaders want their country to reassume its historical role as the Middle Kingdom in Asia — as the hegemon of, at minimum, East Asia and its near seas. 
They want this for powerful strategic, economic, and nationalistic reasons, and also in order to ensure the stability of the Communist regime. 
There are of course no democratic institutions in China, and there aren’t going to be under the current regime. 
The Party is not going to give up power, but at the same time it knows that to support its legitimacy, it must deliver not only a better quality of life, but also the “China dream”: the idea of a resurgent China that once again is master of its strategic environment — the big dog that gets the benefits, to which other countries must defer, regardless of the nominal rules of international engagement. 
To that end, China has in the last six years asserted the rights of a sovereign throughout the region. 
It has declared an Air Defense Identification Zone in the East China Sea; flooded the Senkaku Islands, which Japan controls, with ships and planes; used its maritime militia and Coast Guard (which includes several well-armed ships, some of which are painted-over former naval frigates) to harass and attack the fishing vessels of other nations; deployed an oil rig in disputed waters; wrested control of Scarborough Shoal from the Philippines; and built military installations on several of its claimed artificial islands in the South China Sea — after having specifically promising not to militarize the islands. 
The United States wants what it has always wanted: a rules-based international order where countries relate to each other according to agreed-upon laws and norms rather than size and strength, and where everyone is free to move and trade on the same basis. 
The Trump administration has added certain elements to this mix — a more protectionist approach to trade negotiations, and somewhat greater insistence on enhanced allied contribution to defense — but it has not and will not change the broader strategic objectives of the United States. 
So the first elephant in the room is that the vital interests of the United States and China are fundamentally incompatible. 
Xi Jinping understands that; he knows that China cannot have what it wants unless it succeeds in disrupting America’s alliance relationships, detaching China’s neighbors from the United States, and reducing American influence and the effectiveness of its forces in the region. 
The regime he leads has been pursuing those goals over the last six years through systematically coercive tactics, relying on the enormous power that China has built over the last two decades. President Trump has only two choices. 
He can gradually surrender American interests and rights, or he can resolve to defend them. 
Beijing will not leave him any other option. 
And if he makes the latter choice, he must deal with the second elephant in the room: China’s fast-modernizing military, and the impact it is having on the strategic balance of power in the region. 
I have written before about the growth of China’s military power and the decline of American strength because of the defense cuts in recent years. 
Here is a graphic illustration, compiled from open sources, of how that shift in power is affecting the Pacific theater: 

China has become, at least regionally, a peer military competitor of the United States. 
It may or may not be the greatest global threat to America’s global interests, but it is beyond question the “pacing” threat: the primary factor against which the Pentagon must plan as it sizes and shapes American forces for the future. 
But no matter how much the Pentagon plans and maneuvers, it cannot restore the balance of power in the Pacific without a major increase in the defense budget — something on the order of $150 billion over the next two years. 
That cannot happen unless Congress removes the caps on defense spending that the Budget Control Act imposed five years ago; it is extremely unlikely that the Senate at least can be induced to do so unless the caps are also removed on non-defense discretionary spending. 
So we have reached an inflection point. 
The United States can either continue to suppress both defense and non-defense discretionary spending, or it can remove the caps, increase the short term deficit, and build up its military enough to defend its interests, not just in Asia, but in Europe and the Middle East, and against Islamic jihadism globally. 
Many choices in public policy are not binary. 
But this one is. 
President Trump has repeatedly said that his maxim for foreign policy is “peace through strength.” 
It was Reagan’s maxim too. 
But peace through strength only works if a nation actually is strong, and the first and most important index of national power is military power, particularly in the minds of authoritarians like Xi Jinping. Joseph Stalin was once warned that the pope did not approve of his oppression of Catholics in Russia. 
Stalin responded: “The pope? How many divisions has he got?” 
For my part, I believe the spending caps must come off. 
The major fiscal challenge facing the federal government isn’t the discretionary budget anyway; it’s the cost of the entitlement programs, which consume most of the federal budget. 
The Budget Control Act didn’t even address those programs. 
I liken America’s current situation to that of a family that is in a budget crisis because it is spending 60 percent of its income on shelter, and that decides to relieve the pressure by reducing the food budget — even though the children are already malnourished. 
A family in that situation urgently needs either to reduce its housing budget or get another job to increase the family’s income. 
But while it decides what to do, the children have to eat, even if the only way to feed them is to borrow money. 
It is time for Washington, on both sides of the aisle, to prioritize the defense of the United States, whatever the cost. 
The weaker America becomes, the greater the risk that it will face a choice even more unpalatable than the one it faces now: the choice between surrendering its rights, or making a stand against a purposeful adversary under circumstances where the United States is outnumbered, outgunned, and outranged. 
President Trump won’t have to make that choice immediately, but unless the facts on the ground change quickly, he may well have to make it before the end of his term. 
The net is closing now, on him and on us, and the man he hosted last week at Mar-a-Lago knows it.  

Chinese Peril

These 5 Countries Should Watch Out For China's Increased Military Budget
By Ralph Jennings

China announced over the weekend it would raise the defense budget 7%, a bump that the official media describe as modest compared to Western European and U.S. military spending. 

This year’s increase fails the 7.6% growth of 2016 and ranks as the lowest in a decade. 

The point is to defend Chinese sovereignty, rights and interests, defense insiders told Xinhua News Agency.
But 7% is still an increase. 

China already has the world’s third most powerful military after the United States and Russia, according to the database GlobalFirePower.com. 

The country can use its might as a deterrent in negotiations or as a disincentive for other countries considering actions that China opposes.
“China’s military is far larger than any other country in the region,” says Bonnie Glaser, senior adviser for Asia at the Center for Strategic and International Studies, a think tank in Washington. "Even if the budget increases at 7%, slightly less than last year, it is much higher than any other government in the region. Almost all of China's neighbors are uneasy about China's growing military power, especially those that have territorial disputes, either over land or water.”
These five countries should worry most about the increase over last year’s $138 billion Chinese defense budget:

1. Japan: The country with Asia’s most powerful military after China may need to pace the budget increase so it can monitor Chinese vessels and planes in the sea between them. 

China still resents Japan for its World War II-era invasion. 

Now they dispute sovereignty over the eight uninhabited Senkaku Islands in the shared East China Sea. Japan controls the islets now. 

China sends ships and plans that way to remind Japan it’s not the only claimant. 

Last week China flew 13 aircraft, including fighters and bombers, near Okinawa, prompting Japan to scramble its own fighters. 

That was just the latest such exchange. 

If China expands its navy and air force for more operations in the sea, Japan may need to boost its own.

2. Vietnam: China and Vietnam sort of reached frenemy status over the past half year, pausing deep historical distrust over land and maritime sovereignty to focus on economic matters. 

But the country that fought a border war in the 1970s and has clashed with China at sea multiple times since then can’t assume business deals will settle old scores. 

Vietnam maintains the ninth strongest armed forces in Asia today in part to hold its South China Sea maritime claims against any moves by China. 

It’s shopping around aggressively for new arms, says Carl Thayer, Vietnam scholar and emeritus professor of politics at The University of New South Wales in Australia. 

To name just two examples, it finished buying six Russian-made submarines in September, the same month Japan offered Vietnam a soft loan for six new coast guard patrol boats.

3. The Philippines: The Philippines started talking with China in October when Rodrigo Duterte visited Beijing. 

There’s talk of cooperation in a tract of the South China Sea that both claim. 

The Philippines previously felt violated enough to take China to a world arbitration court, and it won a ruling in July. 

Now Duterte, after a run of anti-American bluster, shows signs of getting along with new U.S. President Donald Trump and sustaining military cooperation enshrined by hard-set deals since 1951. If Duterte aggressively steps up protection of the maritime claim contested by China, he could turn to the powerful American military aid that his predecessors have enjoyed. 

But his country -- and Washington -- would need more of it to counter stronger Chinese forces or to be taken seriously if Manila and Beijing meet again for talks.

4. India. China and India, the second biggest Asian country by population, contest two pieces of land along their rugged land border. 

One is in the western Chinese region of Xinjiang, and the other Arunachal Pradesh, is under Indian control. 

Plenty of Indian troops are stationed near both, part of a military that ranks fourth strongest in the world. 

If China spends part of its 7% increase on border defense, India would need to follow up at its end to hold the one region and make a case for the other either on the ground or in bargaining rooms.

5. Taiwan. Taiwan is used to being the target of the People’s Liberation Army. 

China is believed to be aiming missiles at the island that’s about 160 km (99 miles) away and the two have at least half expected to fight since the 1940s. 

That’s when the Nationalists lost a civil war to China’s Communists and rebased in Taiwan. 

Taiwan has been self-ruled since then but China says the two fall under its own flag. 

China never renounced the use of military force to make the two sides unify. 

In December and January China sailed its aircraft carrier around Taiwan, naturally putting the Taiwan defense ministry on high alert. 

If the Chinese budget increase swings its way again, Taiwan might feel more pressure to boost its own military. 

Taiwan needs to keep strong as well in case the two sides sit down for talks again as they did from 2008 to 2015, a Western diplomat once said.

China still might be serious about peace or at least not challenging anyone else with the budget increase. 

Part of the bigger budget might help 300,000 troops transition from army to civilian life, if let go as planned in 2015, and raise living standards of those who remain in the service, says William Sharp, Honolulu-based author of Random Views of Asia from the Mid-Pacific. 

“Whether a country should be worried or not depends in part on how China plans to spend the 7% increase,” he says.