Two Chinas Policy

President Welcomes U.S. Officials as Tensions With China Escalate
By Chris Horton

From left, William Brent Christensen of the American Institute in Taiwan; David Meale, a deputy assistant secretary of state; President Tsai Ing-wen; and Leo Seewald of the American Chamber of Commerce on Wednesday in Taipei.

TAIPEI, Taiwan — President Tsai Ing-wen welcomed American dignitaries on Wednesday in the face of rising tensions with China, saying the self-ruled island needed to protect itself “from new, sophisticated threats coming from across the strait.”
Ms. Tsai made the remarks at a dinner at the American Chamber of Commerce in Taipei in honor of the 40th anniversary of the Taiwan Relations Act, the law that has guided the United States’ unofficial relationship with the island’s government.
The dinner was but the latest round of signaling of Washington’s resolve to stand by Taiwan as tensions mount with Beijing.
In the past two weeks, Washington, Taipei and Beijing have traded words over Chinese jet incursions, Taiwan’s requests for American-made fighter jets, the American military presence in its unofficial embassy in Taipei, and Ms. Tsai’s recent stop in Hawaii.
“We must make sure Taiwan’s economic and security position remains on the right track,” Ms. Tsai told a group largely comprising American businesspeople, emphasizing the need to continue diversifying Taiwan’s economy from reliance on mainland China.
The Communist government in Beijing seeks to assert sovereignty over Taiwan, potentially through military force.
The United States considers Taiwan’s political status to be undetermined, while opposing attempts by China to coerce unification.

A Chinese fighter jet on display in Beijing. Two J-11 jets crossed the median line of the Taiwan Strait in March.

On March 31, two Chinese J-11 fighter jets crossed the median line of the Taiwan Strait, which separates mainland China and Taiwan, for the first time since 1999.
The incursion came days after a United States Navy destroyer and a United States Coast Guard cutter traversed the strait, which, like the South China Sea, is considered to be international waters under international law, but Beijing claims as its territory.
Taiwan jets scrambled and repelled their Chinese counterparts, which came within 115 miles of the island’s coast.
“These actions by China are not only unilateral changes to the cross-strait status quo, even more, they are a brazen provocation to regional security and stability,” Ms. Tsai said in a Facebook post the following day, in her first public comment on the events.
Ms. Tsai warned China against further provocations.
“Our military protects our territory without rest, as president I assure our citizens that I will fight together with our soldiers to the very end,” she wrote.
“We will not yield an inch of our territory!”
The last sentence echoed widely publicized exhortations by Chinese dictator Xi Jinping who has threatened Taiwan with war should it formalize its functional independence.
The Chinese Communist Party claims Taiwan as its territory, but it has never controlled the island, which is still officially ruled by the Republic of China government overthrown in the mainland in 1949.

A flag-lowering ceremony in Taipei.

The dinner on Wednesday was stocked with American business officials, many of whom have expressed concerns about saber rattling from Beijing.
David Meale, the deputy assistant secretary of state for trade policy and negotiations, who was the event’s special guest, pledged that “the United States will remain steadfast in all of its commitments to Taiwan.”
Washington broke ties with Taiwan’s government in 1979 as a prerequisite for establishing formal relations with the People’s Republic of China in Beijing.
Months later, President Jimmy Carter signed the Taiwan Relations Act, which calls for Taiwan’s status to be determined by peaceful means, and for the United States to provide the means for Taiwan to defend itself.
In late February, Taiwan asked to buy 66 F-16V fighter jets from the United States.
If approved it would be the first aircraft sale since 1992 and a major reversal of the trend under previous administrations, which avoided large arms deals to Taiwan out of fear of angering China.
Chen Chung-chi, a spokesman for Taiwan’s Ministry of Defense, said the government hoped that Washington would approve the latest request, which was solely for defensive purposes in the face of a growing threat from China, which he described as a “troublemaker.”
Zhu Songling, the director of the Institute of Taiwan Studies at Beijing Union University, said that aside from arms sales, some members of Congress were pushing the government toward an increasingly official relationship.
One such bill, the Taiwan Travel Act, signed into law by President Trump, encourages official exchanges up to the highest level, which would include presidential visits.

The United States does not have formal diplomatic relations with Taiwan. Instead, its interests are represented by the American Institute in Taiwan.

China has used economic enticements to convince Taiwan’s allies to drop recognition of Taipei in favor of Beijing.
The Trump administration is wary of China’s gaining more footholds in the South Pacific, which the United States military views as strategically vital in the event of war with China.
While Washington does not have formal diplomatic ties with Taiwan, the American Institute of Taiwan serves its interests on the island.
The group is preparing to move into a heavily fortified $250 million compound that was recently built in Taipei.
Legally a nonprofit organization headquartered in Virginia and staffed by State Department employees on leave, the institute drew Chinese criticism this month after its spokeswoman, Amanda Mansour, told Taiwan media that active-duty American personnel from all four military branches had been stationed on the island since 2005.
For years, the institute had sidestepped saying whether it housed American military staff, and Ms. Mansour’s statement raised the question whether it was a message to an increasingly aggressive China.
The personnel will move into the new compound when it formally begins operations on May 6, she said.
Several American senators made recorded video statements shown at Wednesday’s dinner in Taipei, offering American support in the face of Chinese pressure.
The lawmakers included Marco Rubio of Florida, Pat Roberts of Kansas and Cory Gardner of Colorado — all Republicans — as well as Tim Kaine of Virginia, a Democrat.
“The United States must continue to stand by Taiwan and encourage our democratic allies and partners around the world to maintain official relations with Taipei,” Mr. Rubio said, “regardless of any pressure or coercion coming from Beijing.”

U.S. Fighters for Taiwan

The island democracy needs advanced air power to deter China.
The Wall Street Journal

A Chinese armed helicopter assaults targets with rocket projectiles in a live-fire exercise off China's southeast coast, April 18. 

Chinese bombers and warships conducted exercises near Taiwan this month, a show of force that officials in Beijing called a warning not to pursue formal independence. 

Last year the number of Chinese air patrols off Taiwan’s east coast quadrupled, and Beijing under Xi Jinping has stepped up pressure on the island democracy to “reunify” with the motherland.
China’s bullying is raising alarms in the U.S., which is obligated to help Taiwan defend itself under the Taiwan Relations Act. 

The mainland People’s Liberation Army is deploying new jets, ships and other weapons in such numbers that the island’s defenses are in danger of being overwhelmed. 

Past U.S. Administrations failed to sell Taiwan the weapons it needs, and much of its arsenal is outdated.
The island’s most pressing need is air power. 

The mainstay of Taiwan’s fighter force is a fleet of 144 F-16s bought in the mid-1990s. 

Fewer than half the planes are ready for combat at any time, thanks to the maintenance required by aging aircraft and upgrades. 

Taiwan is pleading for new fighters to counter China’s advanced planes such as the Russian-made Su-35.
China also deploys more than 1,500 ballistic missiles within range of Taiwan, some highly accurate. They could damage airfields and destroy planes on the ground in minutes. 

Taiwan has bought advanced versions of the Patriot system to counter this threat, but the number and sophistication of Chinese missiles means many would get through. 

A 2009 Rand study said China could likely achieve air superiority over the island within days.
U.S. Senators John Cornyn and James Inhofe asked Donald Trump last month to support Taiwan’s request to buy the vertical takeoff version of the new F-35 fighter. 

They wrote, “The survivability of the F35B and modern long-range sensors could help Taiwan intercept Chinese missiles, promoting deterrence well into the next decade.”
In a crisis the F-35B can be based almost anywhere, making it hard for Chinese missiles to destroy on the ground. 

Its stealth and other capabilities mean Chinese military planners couldn’t count on air superiority in a conflict.
There are several reasons the U.S. is unlikely to sell Taiwan the F-35B right away. 

One is the difficulty of getting the consortium of nations behind the F-35 to agree amid China’s inevitable howls of outrage. 

Another concern is China’s success in recruiting spies within Taiwan’s armed forces, meaning the plane’s secrets could be stolen.
One solution would be to sell Taiwan the latest version of the F-16 and lease some used fighters as a stopgap. 

Over the next few years, the U.S. could lay the groundwork for the F-35B sale as well as another layer of missile defense, the Terminal High Altitude Area Defense or Thaad. 

That would give President Tsai Ing-wen time to follow through on her promise to increase military spending, a key requirement if Taiwan is to strengthen its defenses.
Beijing keeps pressing the U.S. to abandon Taiwan. 

Last December a Chinese diplomat in Washington threatened war if a U.S. Navy ship visits a Taiwanese port. 

But the threats and intimidation are backfiring, fostering a consensus in Washington that Taiwan needs more U.S. arms and closer security cooperation to deter Chinese adventurism. 

A sizable sale of fighter aircraft this year would shore up a democratic ally and reduce the chance of conflict in the Taiwan Strait.

Sina Delenda Est

Forget Trade Wars. Trump's Taiwan Card Is China's Real Worry

Bloomberg News

Forget steel and intellectual property. 

The biggest potential flash point between U.S. President Donald Trump and Chinese dictator Xi Jinping is an island of 23 million people sitting off China’s coast.
Even as global investors shift from worrying about a second Korean conflict to a potential China-U.S. trade war, decades-old disagreements over democratically run Taiwan are simmering. 

For China at least, that is a more serious concern.
“Compared with economic and trade issues, the Taiwan issue is a top priority for Beijing and is more politically sensitive,” said Fu-Kuo Liu, an international relations professor at National Chengchi University in Taipei. 

“The U.S. will measure relations with Taiwan based on its national interest, and Taiwan will be a pawn to Beijing.”
The dispute centers on Taiwan’s 70-year slide into diplomatic isolation after ending up on the losing side of the Chinese civil war. 

While the island is self-ruled and enjoys American military protection, China considers Taiwan a province and has made acceptance of its “one-China” claim a precondition for diplomatic ties -- including with the U.S.

On trade, China has sought to maintain what it calls “strategic composure” as Trump escalates his threats, launching a probe of U.S. grain imports while warning against a trade war. 

Trump’s planned tariffs on steel and aluminum would apply to a variety of countries, not just China, which accounts for a relatively small portion of American imports. 

Indeed, Taiwan faces a bigger hit.
But challenging Xi on Taiwan -- a central focus of his “Chinese dream” of national rejuvenation -- would be another matter.
Trump’s firing of U.S. Secretary of State Rex Tillerson, a former Exxon Mobil Corp. chief executive officer with many years of China experience adds more uncertainty to the issue. 

His nominee for the role, Central Intelligence Agency Director Mike Pompeo, warned just days ago of the Chinese threat to American interests, although he hasn’t said much recently on Taiwan.
U.S. national security experts have long advocated greater Taiwan ties as a bulwark against China. 

Although Trump signaled he might try that strategy -- holding an unprecedented December 2016 phone call with Taiwan’s president, Tsai Ing-wen -- he later reaffirmed support for the one-China principle while seeking Xi’s cooperation on North Korea.
Now, a series of moves in Beijing, Taipei and Washington are threatening to bring the Taiwan question back to the fore. 

One Chinese official in Beijing said there was concern that Trump could play the Taiwan card and that the government was prepared to take a strong stand against any U.S. moves on the issue.
Tensions have been steadily rising since Taiwan’s 2016 election, which replaced a China-friendly government with one run by the pro-independence Democratic Progressive Party. 

Tsai has angered China by refusing to endorse the one-China framework while offering to sign a U.S. free-trade deal and buy more advanced American arms.
In response, China has ratcheted up pressure on Tsai, picking off Taiwan’s few remaining diplomatic allies and launching regular “encirclement patrols” with military jets around its airspace. 

China’s decision Sunday to remove presidential term limits gives Xi even more incentive to see through his pledge for Taiwan’s “peaceful reunification.”
Meanwhile, Taiwan’s allies in the U.S. Congress have pressed for greater support, passing legislation last month allowing for diplomatic exchanges with Taiwan “at all levels,” specifically citing “cabinet-level national security officials.” 

Signing the bill and holding such visits would signal whether Trump intends to test China on Taiwan. He could grant Taiwanese requests to buy advanced weapons such as Lockheed Martin Corp.’s F-35 fighter jets.
While such moves risk provoking a confrontation with China, Trump has shown a willingness to use available leverage in showdowns over North Korea, health care and immigration. 

And he’ll need to apply a lot of pressure, if he expects China to cut anywhere near $100 billion from its $375 billion trade surplus with U.S.
“Taiwan is a diplomatic card for Trump to play when he needs to annoy China,” said Cheng Yu-Chin, director of the EU-China Economics & Politics Institute in Prague. 

“In the future, Taiwan will suffer even more, as it gets caught in the middle between a stronger China and a inward-looking U.S.”
National security policy documents published by the Trump administration have described China as a “strategic competitor” and urged greater efforts to support allies in the Asia-Pacific region. 

The U.S. provides military support to the island under the Taiwan Relations Act of 1979.
A stronger line on Taiwan might also find supporters among congressional Republicans. 

Arkansas Senator Tom Cotton -- a vocal Trump ally -- has criticized China’s efforts to isolate Taiwan and said after the Taiwan Travel Act’s passage last month that “only U.S. leadership can push back against this aggression.”
China has signaled it will have little patience with the U.S. if it attempts to upgrade its relationship with Taiwan. 

In December, a senior Chinese diplomat in Washington warned that China would “unify” the island by military force if a U.S. warship made a port call there.

Once Formidable, Taiwan’s Military Now Overshadowed by China’s

By STEVEN LEE MYERS and CHRIS HORTON

The Hai Pao, a World War II-era vessel that represents a quarter of Taiwan’s submarine fleet, at anchor at Zuoying Naval Base in southern Taiwan in October. 

ZUOYING NAVAL BASE, Taiwan — The Hai Pao, one of Taiwan’s four navy submarines, began its service as the Tusk, an American vessel launched in August 1945 at the end of World War II. 

Its sister submarine, the Hai Shih, is a year older. 

Neither can fire torpedoes today, though they can still lay mines.
The submarines, said Feng Shih-kuan, Taiwan’s minister of national defense, “belong in a museum.”
The Hai Pao — with its paint-encrusted pipes, antiquated engines and a brass dial with a needle to measure speed in knots — will instead remain in service past its 80th birthday, a relic of a military that once was one of Asia’s most formidable. 

Taiwan’s aging submarine fleet is but one measure of how far the military balance across the Taiwan Strait has tilted in favor of the island’s rival, mainland China.
A military modernization overseen by Xi Jinping, whose political power reached new heights after last month’s Communist Party congress in Beijing, has proceeded in leaps and bounds, lifted by hefty budget increases that have already made China the world’s No. 2 military spender after the United States.
Taiwan’s armed forces, by contrast, have fallen way behind, struggling to recruit enough soldiers and sailors — and to equip those they have. 

A major obstacle is that countries that might sell it the most sophisticated weaponry are increasingly reluctant to do so for fear of provoking China, which claims Taiwan as part of its territory. 

The unwillingness to anger China extends even to the United States, on which Taiwan has long depended for its defense.
This shifting balance affects more than just Taiwan. 

The Taiwan Strait was once Asia’s most ominous flash point, with the potential to drag the United States into war with China. 

Now, it is just one of several potential hot spots between a more assertive China and its neighbors.
Taiwan’s experience could be a cautionary tale to Japan, South Korea, Vietnam and others in the region who are also warily watching China’s rising military capabilities.
Aboard the Hai Pao. The submarine, first deployed by the United States Navy as the Tusk, can still lay mines but cannot fire torpedoes. 

“A small snake does not make nearby frogs, chickens and ducks feel threatened,” Mr. Feng, the minister, said in an interview, “but when it grows to be a python, even nearby pigs, oxen, horses and goats feel a threat to their survival.”
Adding to the unease has been uncertainty over United States policy under Donald Trump. 

As he makes his first visit to Asia, allies and others will look for signals about the depth of the American military commitment to the region.
When he was still president-elect, Trump initially signaled a more fulsome embrace of Taiwan by accepting a congratulatory phone call from its president, Tsai Ing-wen. 

Since taking office, he has shown more deference to China.
When the Trump administration approved a new package of arms sales to Taiwan this summer, it was worth a relatively modest $1.4 billion, less than the $1.8 billion package approved by President Barack Obama two years ago. 

The sales have included missiles, radar equipment and other military gear, but they stopped short of the major systems that could give Taiwan a real edge.
Any weakening of the American defense commitment “is what Taiwan worries about most,” said Lu Cheng-fu, an assistant professor at National Quemoy University on Kinmen, an island held by Taiwan that sits just four miles from the Chinese coast.
“We need to resist a Chinese military attack for two weeks and wait for help from the United States or the international community,” said Mr. Lu, echoing a strategy that has been at the core of Taiwan’s defense doctrine for decades.
China has made no secret of its desire to absorb Taiwan, and China’s military routinely drills to do so by force, if necessary. 

It has even built a scale replica of Taiwan’s presidential building at its largest military training base in Inner Mongolia.

A museum on Kinmen Island recalls its defense against a Communist assault in 1949. Kinmen, four miles off the mainland, is still held by Taiwan. 

China’s armed forces have long outnumbered and outspent Taiwan’s. 

China now has 800,000 active combat troops in its ground forces, compared with 130,000 in Taiwan; its budget last year was $144 billion, compared with Taiwan’s $10 billion, according to the Pentagon’s most recent annual report on the Chinese military. (Congress approved a $700 billion Pentagon budget in September, with an even larger increase than President Trump had requested.)
To defend itself, Taiwan has relied on geography — a mountainous main island 80 miles across a windswept strait — and the support of the United States.
However, China’s military modernization has “eroded or negated many of Taiwan’s historical advantages” in deterring a potential attack, the Pentagon report warned in May.
The Taiwan Relations Act of 1979 commits the United States to defend the island’s sovereignty, providing “such defense articles and defense services in such quantity as may be necessary” for Taiwan to protect itself.
While Taiwan still has vocal support in Washington, especially in Congress, China’s economic and military rise has made it harder for the United States to ignore Beijing.
In 1995 and 1996, when China menaced Taiwan with missile tests, President Bill Clinton dispatched two aircraft carriers to the Taiwan Strait. 

At that time, China backed off, but an intervention now would confront a more potent Chinese military.
China has developed ballistic missiles on mobile launchers that, although untested in battle, would threaten American aircraft carriers. 

Denying the American military the ability to operate freely around Taiwan would undermine a core element of Taiwan’s strategy.
Climbing into an F-16 at Chiayi Air Force Base. Taiwan bought its F-16s from the United States in 1992; China just added stealth jets to its forces. 

In Taiwan, once home to thousands of American air and naval forces before the United States recognized the People’s Republic of China in 1979, Trump’s election last year raised hopes of more robust support.
In the months since, however, there has been a growing realization that diplomacy with China — including Trump’s very public efforts to build a personal relationship with Xi — would be the administration’s more pressing priority.
Though the arms package announced in the summer was welcomed, it was not nearly enough to help Taiwan keep pace with China’s buildup. 

More ambitious packages — like one announced by President George W. Bush in 2001 to sell Taiwan eight new diesel-powered submarines that ultimately fizzled out — no longer seem affordable or, for the United States, viable if it wants to maintain relations with Beijing.
“Taiwan needs to realize that its defense is, ultimately, in its own hands,” said Andrew S. Erickson, a professor with the China Maritime Studies Institute at the Naval War College in Newport, R.I.
During a recent visit to Hawaii, Ms. Tsai responded to concerns about the imbalance by pledging to increase military spending 2 percent a year. 

She also promised to make more funds available for purchases of larger weapons.
Since being elected in January 2016, Ms. Tsai has also promoted a plan to expand the island’s indigenous defense industry. 

Among the most ambitious of the projects envisioned is one to build its own fleet of diesel-powered submarines.
In choosing a defense minister, she turned to Mr. Feng, an air force general who spent 39 years in uniform before retiring in 2006 to become chairman of Taiwan’s largest defense company. 

In January, he announced that Taiwan would seek to develop its own stealth fighters to counter China’s introduction of stealth jets.
Many of the beaches on Kinmen are dotted with old tank obstacles that today face the growing skyline of the city of Xiamen, on the Chinese mainland. 

Until such programs are off the ground, Taiwan must rely on aging matériel.
Its two other submarines were built by the Netherlands in the 1980s. 

By contrast, China, according to the Pentagon report, has 59 attack submarines, including five that are nuclear-powered.
“Regardless of whether you are talking about the quantity or the quality of our submarines,” the Hai Pao’s captain, Wang Kuo-min, said onboard, “there is a very big gap between us and the Chinese Communist contingent.”
Some experts say that given China’s overwhelming numerical advantage in weaponry, Taiwan should focus less on big platforms like submarines and more on lower-cost weapons like antiaircraft and anti-ship missiles that can blunt China’s superiority.
“Taiwan needs to invest in things that give us new and asymmetric capabilities and can be operational in three to five years,” said Yu Hsiao-pin, who has served on Taiwan’s National Security Council.
In the meantime, China keeps ratcheting up the pressure. 

Its aircraft routinely probe Taiwan’s airspace, forcing Taiwan’s fighters to respond on at least eight occasions so far this year. 

In July, China’s first aircraft carrier, the Liaoning, traversed the Taiwan Strait in a show of force.
“We cannot allow the situation to become routine,” said Col. Hsieh Chu-yuan, political warfare director of the 455th Tactical Fighter Wing, whose F-16s scramble from the island’s main air force base at Chiayi.
The F-16s, bought from the United States in 1992, now face off against increasingly sophisticated Chinese jets, including, soon, the Chengdu J-20 stealth fighter. 

Taiwan has no choice but to use the weaponry that it has to deter China, said Mr. Feng, the defense minister.
“Taiwan can’t match China jet for jet, boat for boat,” he said, but that hardly leaves it defenseless.
“Any attempts to harm Taiwan’s people or invade its territory,” he said, “will come at a great cost.”

Trump's Mongolism Syndrome

Taiwan arms deal in limbo as Trump courts China
By Josh Rogin 

For almost four decades, the United States has upheld its commitment to help Taiwan provide for its own self-defense against China — but the Trump administration has yet to affirm it. 

As a planned arms-sales package lingers in limbo, officials, lawmakers and experts worry that Trump may be granting yet another unreciprocated concession to Beijing.
The relatively small sale to Taiwan — worth just more than $1 billion — was set to go in late 2016, but the Obama administration never pulled the trigger. 

After some early pro-Taiwan signals from Trump, including a phone call with its president, most Taiwan watchers expected the new administration to move the package forward quickly. 

Now, administration and congressional officials say, the deal is stalled due to a lack of administration consensus and the fear that angering Beijing could complicate Trump’s top Asia priority: solving the North Korean crisis.
Those inside the government and on Capitol Hill say the administration risks giving in to China on one of its top priorities in exchange for nothing concrete, while putting the safety of the island democracy in increased danger.
“I think it’s important we keep our commitments under the Taiwan Relations Act and under Ronald Reagan’s ‘Six Assurances,’ ” House Foreign Affairs Committee Chairman Edward R. Royce (R-Calif.) told me. 

“This helps keep the peace and stability in the Taiwan Strait.”
The 1979 law to which Royce referred states that U.S. policy will be to “provide Taiwan with arms of a defensive character,” and Reagan’s 1982 “assurances” made clear that there was no end date for U.S. arms sales to Taiwan and that the United States is not required to consult with Beijing on the issue. 

These two documents have been the bedrock of bipartisan U.S. strategy on Taiwan ever since.
Following the summit between Trump and Xi Jinping last month, many expected the administration to quickly approve the still-pending package and notify Congress. 

Now, administration and congressional officials say the White House has not provided clear policy direction to the national-security agencies or Congress, causing significant confusion.
Adding to those concerns were the president’s comments last month that he would consult with Xi before speaking again with the Taiwanese president. 

Trump said he would not want to be “causing difficulty” for Xi while seeking his help with North Korea.
One possibility is that the administration is preparing to bundle the limited Obama Taiwan arms package with more robust weapons. 

The Taiwanese government is expressing interest, for example, in acquiring the F-35 Joint Strike Fighter. 

But doing so might complicate the surrounding diplomacy even more and cause further delays.
Some U.S. officials want Trump to move forward with the smaller arms package now, to establish that the United States is still committed to aiding Taiwan’s defenses in the Trump era. 

Many are advocating for a return to a more regular process whereby requests are considered and sales notified on an annual basis.
“This is the only way to avoid the speed bumps of the U.S.-China relationship stalling arms packages for years on end,” one U.S. defense official said. 

The State Department said it does not comment on pending arms sales. 

The White House did not respond to requests for comment.
No matter which route the Trump administration takes, congressional support is assured. 

“I will strongly support any arms package the Trump administration will put forward for our friend and ally, Taiwan,” said Sen. Cory Gardner (R-Colo.), who chairs the Senate Foreign Relations subcommittee on East Asia.
Gardner was one of seven senators who visited Taiwan last year and pressed President Tsai Ing-wen to increase Taiwan’s own defense spending to 3 percent of its gross domestic product. 

Lawmakers worry that U.S. calls for Taiwan to spend more on defense will ring hollow if Washington won’t sell Taiwan the defense items it needs.
Even if Tsai reaches her goal, Taiwan cannot keep pace with Beijing. 

Taiwan will spend about $11.6 billion on defense this year, compared with $146 billion spent by the Chinese government, according to official figures. 

The Pentagon’s 2016 report on China’s military states that the nation’s “primary emphasis” is to develop capabilities for a potential conflict with Taiwan.
China must be reminded that it cannot push the United States away from its commitments to partners in the region with vague promises of help on North Korea that may never come. 

If China really does believe that helping to solve that crisis is in its interest, no Taiwan arms package will change that.
The Trump administration must resist the temptation to sacrifice long-term objectives for short-term aspirations. 

There will always be some imperative with Beijing that seems more urgent. 

But as Reagan well understood, the U.S. commitment to Taiwan’s defense is too important to deal away.

The Third Taiwan Strait Crisis: The Forgotten Showdown Between China and America

It made Asia what it is today.
By J. Michael Cole

Twenty-one years ago this week, as Taiwanese were readying to hold their country’s first direct presidential election later in March, China flexed its military muscles by holding a series of military exercises and firing missiles within thirty-five miles off the ports of Keelung and Kaohsiung, causing a panic in Taiwan and prompted U.S. President William J. Clinton to deploy a carrier battle group to international waters near Taiwan.

The Third Taiwan Strait Crisis, as the events came to be known, disrupted naval shipping and commercial air traffic, causing harm to Taiwan’s economy. 

Amid fears of a possible invasion—fuelled by planned People’s Liberation Army (PLA) exercises simulating an amphibious assault and live-fire exercises near the outlying island of Penghu—Taiwanese scrambled to reserve seats on flights to North America.
In the end, crisis was averted, likely due to the U.S. intervention, and Beijing’s efforts to coerce the Taiwanese backfired: Lee Teng-hui, the candidate from the ruling Kuomintang (KMT) whom China suspected had pro-independence inclinations, was elected with a majority instead of the expected mere plurality. 

According to historians, China’s military threat gave Lee a 5% boost in the March 23 election, the first indication, perhaps, that coercion, rather than cow the Taiwanese into submission, was a counterproductive policy.
Besides exacerbating momentum toward a more Taiwan-centric sentiment across the fledging democracy, Beijing’s military maneuvers (which had begun a year prior in response to President Lee’s visit to the U.S.) likely also convinced Washington of the necessity of providing Taiwan with more means to defend itself as part of its policy under the Taiwan Relations Act of 1979, passed in response to the establishment of official diplomatic relations between the United States and the People’s Republic of China (PRC).
While many historians argue that the mass killings surrounding the 2-28 Incident of 1947 by KMT forces constituted the “birth certificate” of Taiwan as a distinct nation, it could also be argue that the Missile Crisis of 1995–96 represented a breaking point in the Taiwan Strait, when Beijing’s belligerence made it clear it would not countenance the wishes of the Taiwanese to continue down the road of democratization after nearly four decades of authoritarian rule. 

Years before it became fashionable to do so, China’s actions made it clear that the “one country, two systems” framework, formulated by paramount leader Deng Xiaoping in the early 1980s to handmaiden the reunification of Hong Kong, Macau and eventually unification with Taiwan—was seriously flawed.
Learning from its overreaction and humbled by the U.S. naval deployment, Beijing did not resort to similar intimidation as Taiwanese continued to exercise their democratic right. 

It even showed self-restraint when, for the first time in 2000, a candidate from the pro-independence Democratic Progressive Party (DPP) was elected in 2000 and re-elected in 2004. 

Beijing’s rhetoric remained harshly opposed to Taiwan independence, but it had learned that coercion by military means was counterproductive. 

Instead, Beijing shifted its strategy, and for the next decade and a half it instead attempted to win the hearts and minds of the Taiwanese through economic interdependence, a process that deepened under President Chen Shui-bian of the DPP and accelerated by leaps and bounds under his successor, Ma Ying-jeou of the KMT (2008–16).
Nevertheless, the injury to Chinese pride in 1996, as well as the display of overwhelming U.S. military capability during the Gulf War of 1991, convinced Beijing of the need to modernize its military. 

The result was an intensive program of double-digit investment, foreign acquisitions (primarily from Russia and the Ukraine) and indigenous resourcing to turn the PLA into a force capable of imposing Beijing’s will within its immediate neighborhood and, eventually, beyond. 

China’s embracing of an anti-access/area-denial (A2/AD) strategy, supported by the means to enforce such a plan, was a direct response to the humiliation it suffered in 1996 at the hands of what it regarded as a “foreign intervention.”
Thus, a direct line can be drawn between the Third Taiwan Strait Crisis and China’s current efforts to displace the U.S. as the hegemon in the Asia-Pacific. 

The repercussions of this national trauma reverberate through time and are inarguably part of Beijing’s rationale for creating a new naval architecture all the way to the South China Sea, which it is busy militarizing, and beyond into the West Pacific.
Twenty-one years on, memories of the Crisis—and perhaps the lessons learned from it—appear to have faded. 

Ask ordinary Taiwanese what happened twenty-one years ago this month, and most will be unable to answer. 

For most people in Taiwan, therefore, the reality of military force and its implications are now an abstract concept. 

This partly explains why, despite the existential threat they face, the Taiwanese have not been willing to support spending on national defense that is commensurate with the nature of the external challenge.
On the Chinese side (at least within the elite and the PLA), the humiliation of direct contact with U.S. military may have dissipated, but it hasn’t been completely forgotten and may now serve as justification for the desire to expel the U.S. from the region. 

Moreover, the cultivation of an expansionist nationalism, added to the belief that China has “arrived” and is deserving of respect as a major power, borders dangerously close on hubris, one of the most powerful agents of national amnesia. 

Finally, given the failure of Beijing’s attempt to win over the Taiwanese through economic incentives and cultural propaganda (support for unification has been dropping since the early 1990s and reached an all-time, single-digit low last year), combined with Xi Jinping’s statement to the effect that the Taiwan “issue” cannot be allowed to fester indefinitely, may reinforce the notion in some circles that the only way to resolve the conflict is by use of force, in similar fashion to how Russia handled the Crimea issue.
A wavering commitment to national defense in Taiwan, stemming in part from the forgotten trauma of 1996, added to a resurgent China fixated on exorcising past humiliations and doubt over continued U.S. commitment to security and stability in the Asia Pacific, is a recipe for trouble.
Furthermore, China’s ability to coerce Taiwan today is orders of magnitude greater than it was twenty-one years ago. 

The Second Artillery Corps, the branch of the Chinese military that controls the conventional and nuclear missile arsenal, has made leaps and bounds both numerically and qualitatively; thus, not only has the number of missiles targeting Taiwan increased (according to estimates, the total number is now 1,500 ballistic missiles, plus a few hundred cruise missiles), but the destructiveness and accuracy of those missiles has also improved markedly with the decommissioning of old DF-11s and their replacement with more precise ones, as well as the addition of longer-range DF-15s and 16s. 

China’s ability to zero down on targets in and around Taiwan has also improved dramatically thanks to much better intelligence, such as GPS and aerial/orbital surveillance. 

Additionally, the number of platforms from which the PLA can launch attacks against Taiwan has increased and now includes the full spectrum of land, air and sea. 

And it is now multidirectional, as the PLA Navy (PLAN) and PLA Air Force (PLAAF) have now demonstrated their ability to operate in parts of the West Pacific and therefore on the Eastern side of Taiwan. 

The December 2016 sortie of China’s first aircraft carrier the Liaoning, which broke through the “first island chain” and looped around Taiwan before transiting the Taiwan Strait on its return home, makes it clear that naval and aerial attacks against the island-nation will no longer originate from a single direction—i.e., the Chinese mainland. 

Realizing this, Taiwan’s military recently deployed U.S.-made PAC-3 units in Hualien and Taitung to defend eastern parts of the country.
In light of the new nature of the threat and a rapidly changing security environment in the Asia-Pacific, Taiwanese authorities should implement some measures to ensure preparedness. 

Among other things, it should use history so that the Third Taiwan Strait Crisis, and the lessons learned from it, aren’t forgotten. 

While it may seem like a long time ago, there is nevertheless a precedent for use of force by the PLA against Taiwan, and the quiet period since 1996 does not signify that Beijing has shelved that option. Although such a scenario arguably constitutes an extreme, military coercion very much remains part of China’s strategy, and the current conditions could make their use seem more appealing to the Chinese Communist Party (CCP) and Chinese ultranationalists. 

By keeping memories of the 1995-96 Missile Crisis alive with the public, Taiwanese authorities would diminish the likelihood of panic, overreaction—and perhaps surrender—should the PLA once again be called upon to intimidate Taiwan.
Besides China’s growing missile arsenal, which it should be stated does not only target Taiwan, North Korea’s nuclear and missile programs has also awakened the region to the threat. 

South Korea, Japan, Taiwan, Vietnam and the Philippines are now all potential targets to missile attack by an adversary. 

Earlier this week, Pyongyang test-fired four ballistic missiles, ostensibly as part of a simulated attack on U.S. military bases in Japan. 

Meanwhile, in response to the threat from the North, South Korea has agreed to the deployment of a U.S.-made Terminal High Altitude Area Defense (THAAD) system on its territory, with the first units arriving earlier this week. 

Beijing, which sees a potential use of the system to counter its own missile force (including the possibility that the radar systems could be used to monitor the Chinese military), has reacted with consternation and launched a series of punitive measures against South Korea.
For its part, Japan is a target of both North Korean missiles and, due to its longstanding disputes with China over history and territory in the East China Sea, to PLA attacks. 

U.S. military bases across Japan, which would play a crucial role in contingencies in both the Korean Peninsula and the Taiwan Strait, would be prime targets during the initial phase of hostilities, particularly if China decided to launch major military operations against Taiwan. 

Given the threat it faces on two fronts, Japan, working in conjunction with the U.S. military, has had every incentive to take early warning, tracking, air defense and mitigation seriously. 

Pyongyang’s missile tests, while unsettling, have nevertheless contributing to better preparedness by the Japan Self-Defense Force (JSDF) and U.S. military forces deployed in the region.
Should tensions between China and North Korea on one side and South Korea, Japan, Taiwan and the U.S. on the other continue to increase—much of this contingent on the kind of policies the Donald J. Trump administration adopts for the region—the latter group may feel compelled to increase intelligence sharing on the missile threat emanating from China and North Korea. 

U.S. satellite and aerial surveillance, combined with South Korea’s early warning systems (including the X-band AN/TPY-2 radar guiding the THAAD system), Japan’s EW systems and Taiwan’s long-range early-warning radar on Leshan—a modernized version of the AN/FPS-115 Pave Paws which can track any air-breathing target 4,000 km inside China—could form the basis of a nascent missile tracking/intercept quadrumvirate within the region.
As one of the corners of that square and due to its proximity to China, Taiwan should do its utmost to ensure it has a seat at the table, both as a provider and consumer of such critical real-time EW information. 

Given the affinity between Japan and Taiwan for historical reasons, Japanese jitters at the thought of a PLA presence in Taiwan, and the greater role the U.S. is expected to give Tokyo in a transforming regional security architecture, the time might be ripe for closer security cooperation between Tokyo and Taipei, something which may already have begun since the election of the DPP’s Tsai Ing-wen to the presidency in 2016.
Buttressing the desire to share intelligence (and perhaps technology), moreover, is the fact that all four countries are U.S. allies/partners and democracies aligned against two revisionist, authoritarian, and destabilizing regimes. 

Thus, despite the growing threat it faces from an increasingly powerful China and the high uncertainty surrounding the future of the region, circumstances—particularly the potential for Beijing to alienate Seoul should the relationship continue to sour—could in fact turn more favorable for Taiwan, thus creating an opportunity to play a greater role in regional security.

'America First' Versus 'One China'

Trump is laying the groundwork for a stronger U.S.-Taiwan relationship.
By Russell Hsiao and David An

Donald J. Trump is now the forty-fifth president of the United States. 

As president of the world’s strongest democracy, Trump is bound by the Take Care Clause of the U.S. Constitution to execute the laws of the land—laws such as the Taiwan Relations Act of 1979. 

Under the principle of separation of powers enshrined in the U.S. Constitution, the executive branch—now headed by President Trump—is responsible for implementing the laws of the land by formulating policies.
As president-elect, Trump indicated that his administration’s approach to foreign policy would not be bound by the outdated conventions and self-imposed restrictions toed needlessly by previous administrations. 

He suggested that those policies would be recalibrated to better suit American interests in the twenty-first century. 

Indeed, the president-elect took a congratulatory phone call from the democratically elected leader of Taiwan—a key security partner of the United States—and questioned the efficacy of the former administration’s China policy.
Despite the public outcry, nothing Trump said or did as president-elect changed U.S. policy or the law. 

Also, Trump was completely within his legal rights to take a phone call and “question” the former administration’s policies. (Obama said as much when he stated, “I think all of our foreign policy should be subject to fresh eyes.”) 

Additionally, even if President Trump does change U.S. policy, there is nothing to legally stop him from doing so.
While much fuss has been made about the policies in question, there has been limited discussion about the dangerous logic that feeds the fear over the president’s questioning of policy. 

Lost in the polemic discourse following the president’s comments is a recognition of the legal underpinnings of U.S. policies toward Taiwan, which remain ever constant, and the elasticity of the U.S. “One China” policy itself.
The reaction, even among experts, was telling and laid bare a critical blind spot in the United States’ approach to cross-Strait relations. 

To be sure, U.S. policy towards Taiwan has operated over the past forty-five years on the premise that America’s primary interest is in the process—as opposed to the outcome—of resolving differences between the two sides of the Taiwan Strait.
It was inherently a passive policy by design, but the emphasis on process intentionally ceded the initiative of shaping the outcome to the two other parties: Taiwan and the People’s Republic of China. It was an approach that some senior policymakers at the time expected would create a fait accompli, yet it provided Washington, DC with the flexibility to adapt and respond to broader geopolitical challenges while maintaining stability in the Taiwan Straits.
Despite expectations to the contrary, Taiwan thrived in the ensuing four decades. 

The government liberalized from the top down while an active civil society fervently pushed for political reforms from the bottom up. 

Taiwan evolved from an authoritarian government to a vibrant democracy. 

Support for Taiwan and its democracy grew within the United States as well.
As the power disparity between the two sides widens, however, the policy focused on the process is increasingly under strain and has left Taiwan more susceptible to coercion and Beijing more emboldened to use military force. 

Indeed, the PRC is gradually and unceasingly pushing toward its own desired outcome for Taiwan. All the while, America’s focus on process is drawing it towards China’s objectives at the expense of its values and strategic interests.
American scholars and former policymakers have sounded the alarm about the need to accommodate China by reaching a new modus vivendi with Beijing, which will effectively abandon Taiwan. 

A debate over a Hobson’s choice, however, obscures a much-needed discussion about a Taiwan strategy that not only focuses on ensuring a peaceful process but also a vision for a desired outcome.
As the two sides of the Taiwan Strait struggle to engage in dialogue, the scope of this process-based approach to policymaking has barred U.S. policymakers from actively shaping conditions in the Taiwan Strait that would be more conducive to long-term peace and stability. 

This outdated and partly flawed premise of the approach is based on a Washington tendency to construct events in the Taiwan Strait in binary terms: independence or unification. 

That is a false dilemma, which Beijing has framed as a Hobson’s choice.
On ensuring a peaceful process, the Taiwan Relations Act—which legally governs relations between the United States and Taiwan—sets out the primary goal of U.S. policy towards cross-Strait relations as ensuring that the resolution is “not coercive, unilateral, or detrimental to U.S. interests.” 

Towards that end, the new president has a lot of tools and legal authority at his disposal to recalibrate Taiwan policy.
Five provisions within the Taiwan Relations Act are useful to highlight:

1. • The future of Taiwan will be determined by peaceful means.
2. • Consider any effort to determine the future of Taiwan by other than peaceful means, including by boycotts or embargoes, a threat to the peace and security of the Western Pacific area and of grave concern to the United States.
3. • Provide Taiwan with arms of a defensive character.
4. • Maintain the capacity of the United States to resist any resort to force or other forms of coercion that would jeopardize the security—or the social or economic system—of the people on Taiwan.
5. • The preservation and enhancement of the human rights of all the people on Taiwan are hereby reaffirmed as objectives of the United States.

On the second prong, former Pentagon official and Air Force Lt. Col. Mark Stokes mapped out possible future policy options in the Taiwan Strait. 

The report, known as The United States and Future Policy Options in the Taiwan Strait, outlines four alternative schools of thought on the future of Taiwan policy: 

1. The Accommodation School; 
2. The Status Quo School; 
3. The Normalization School; 
4. and The U.S. “One China, Two Governments” School. 

As Stokes astutely observed in a recent follow-up article, “U.S. policy has yet to catch up with the changes that have taken place on Taiwan since 1996, especially since the first peaceful transfer of power in 2000.”
Despite all the uproar, the new U.S. president—with his iconoclastic persona—has not changed U.S. policy. 

Rather, his administration has raised an important and fundamental question about the long-term viability of this current approach to policy. 

To be sure, the previous ambiguous approach has outlived its utility, and the effects have been an emboldened Beijing and a Taiwan that is now being gradually pushed into a corner (see, e.g., Beijing’s diplomatic offensive).
Alternatives to a gradual change in policy present equally destabilizing propositions, and there is a great deal of uncertainty that comes with any change. 

However, a fear of change could lead to a state of paralysis that is equally disruptive in the Taiwan Strait. 

A one-sided focus on the process has left U.S. interests increasingly susceptible to the vagaries of cross-Strait relations and Beijing’s increasing leverages. 

Indeed, policy towards Taiwan has operated over the past forty-five years on the premise that America’s primary interest is in the process—as opposed to the outcome. 

It is time for U.S. policymakers to refocus on a desired outcome.

Two Chinas Policy

Five myths about ‘one China’

By John J. Tkacik 

One China, Two Chinas Illustration by Greg Groesch

President Donald Trump sparked a brushfire of commentary a few days ago when he took a congratulatory phone call from Taiwan’s president, Tsai Ing-wen, known officially in her home country as “the president of the Republic of China.”
Talking heads in the mainstream media chided Mr. Trump: Does he not know that the only “president of China” the United States officially recognizes is Xi Jinping, “president of the People’s Republic of China.” 

Had Mr. Trump violated Washington’s long-held “one-China policy”?
Well, no. 

A fun diplomatic fact is that the “one-China policy” is mostly myth, and the “un-myth” part doesn’t mean what “experts” think it means. 

Let’s explore more fun facts about the “one-China policy.”

Myth No. 1: The “one-China policy” means “Taiwan is part of China.”
The United States has never recognized Taiwan (or “Formosa,” as it used to be called) as part of “China.” 

It still doesn’t. 

On Dec. 16, 1978, Jimmy Carter formally derecognized the “Chinese” government in Taipei and recognized the Beijing regime. 

An accompanying U.S.-China communique phrased it carefully: “The U.S. side acknowledges the Chinese position that there is one China and Taiwan is part of China.” 

This diplomatic subtlety was explained in Senate hearings two months later by Deputy Secretary of State Warren Christopher: “[The U.S.] has acknowledged the Chinese position that Taiwan is part of China, but the United States has not itself agreed to this position.”
Fun fact: Because of post-World War II peace treaty complications, along with the Communist Chinese war against the United Nations in Korea, the United States refused to recognize that Taiwan was even part of the “Republic of China.” 

In 1982, President Ronald Reagan reassured Taiwan in policy known as the “Six Assurances,” “that the United States would not alter its position regarding sovereignty over Taiwan,” and that the “United States would not formally recognize China’s sovereignty over Taiwan.” 

Every administration since supported Reagan’s “Six Assurances.”

Myth No. 2: China and Taiwan agreed to “one China” in 1992.
Representatives from Taipei’s Nationalist regime and Beijing’s Communists met in Hong Kong in November 1992 and without written record, agreed that they could proceed with official business on a vague premise that there was “one China,” and each side could define “one China” as it wished. 

In August 1993, however, Beijing issued a formal white paper declaring Taiwan to be under the sovereignty of the People’s Republic, that ” ‘self-determination’ for Taiwan is out of the question,” and that Taiwan’s airspace was Chinese and, therefore, all foreign airlines needed Beijing’s permission to fly to Taiwan.
Three months later, Taipei issued its own statement that ” ‘China’ is not ‘the People’s Republic of China [PRC],’ nor is Taiwan a part or a province thereof. Accordingly... the ROC [Republic of China] and the PRC are two independent and mutually nonsubordinate sovereign nations.” 

Since then, the only “consensus” on “one China” between Taipei and Beijing has been that the word “China” is in the dictionary.

Myth No. 3: The United States has a “one-China policy.”
Frequently, U.S. officials invoke something called “one China,” the definition of which eludes their powers of articulation. 

In 2004, Assistant Secretary of State for East Asian affairs James Kelly invented the neologism “our one-China” policy in congressional testimony. 

He said, “The definition of ‘one China’ is something that we could go on for much too long for this event. In my testimony, I made the point [of] ‘our one China,’ and I didn’t really define it, and I’m not sure I very easily could define it. [But] I can tell you what it is not. It is not the ‘one-China policy’... that Beijing suggests.” 

Beyond that, the “one-China policy” only means that the U.S. recognizes one government of “China” at a time.

Myth No. 4: The U.S. never had a “two-Chinas policy.”
Although the United States always preferred the aspirational goal of “one China,” Washington chose to maintain ties with the Nationalist Chinese on Taiwan after the Communist Peking regime entered the Korean War, and supported Taiwan in the United Nations. 

The U.S. adopted a “two-Chinas” policy as it struggled to keep Taiwan from losing its U.N. seat.
Fun fact: Ultimately, in October 1971, the United States and its allies voted against China’s U.N. membership because the resolution would also expel Taiwan. 

The resolution passed over American objections. 

But the United States continued to maintain diplomatic missions in both Taipei and Beijing until 1979. 

This “two-Chinas” policy lasted from 1969 to 1979.

Myth No. 5: The United States does not recognize Taiwan’s independence.
The U.S. “does not support” Taiwan’s independence, except in law. 

When the United States derecognized Taipei in 1979, Congress passed the Taiwan Relations Act (22 USC 48, Sections 3301-3316), which states: “Whenever the laws of the United States refer or relate to foreign countries, nations, states, governments, or similar entities, such terms shall include and such laws shall apply with respect to Taiwan.” 

Congress also declared it U.S. policy (Section 3301(b)(6)) “to maintain the capacity of the United States to resist any resort to force or other forms of coercion that would jeopardize the security, or the social or economic system, of the people on Taiwan.”

Two Chinas Policy

President Reagan's Six Assurances to Taiwan and Their Meaning Today
By Harvey Feldman

The Reagan Administration spent the first half of 1982 in increasingly tough negotiations with the People's Republic of China (PRC) over America's continuing arms sales to Taiwan following the 1979 shift of U.S. diplomatic relations to Beijing.
The Carter Administration had insisted that, given congressional opinion, continuing limited arms sales to Taiwan was a political necessity, but this was a bone in the throat as far as Beijing was concerned.
American supporters of the new relationship with China also saw the arms sales as an obstacle to good relations with Beijing and were vocal on that point.[1]
In the spring of 1982, the PRC began threatening to severely downgrade its relationship with the U.S. unless something was done about the arms sales, and some in Beijing were discussing "playing the Soviet card."
Then-Secretary of State Alexander Haig was convinced that, "in the last quarter of the twentieth century, China may well be the most important country in the world" in terms of American interests.[2]
He pressed hard and successfully for some form of accommodation with Beijing, although his ultimate recommendation that the U.S. agree to cease arms sales to Taiwan was not accepted.[3]
The result was the communiqué signed on August 17, 1982 -- almost two months after Haig had left office.
In it, the U.S. government stated "that it does not seek to carry out a long-term policy of arms sales to Taiwan, that its arms sales to Taiwan will not exceed, either in qualitative or in quantitative terms, the level of those supplied in recent years since the establishment of diplomatic relations between the United States and China, and that it intends to reduce gradually its sales of arms to Taiwan, leading over a period of time to a final resolution."[4]
Though he agreed to sign the communiqué, President Reagan was disturbed by its possible effect on Taiwan and put little trust in Chinese promises to adhere to a peaceful solution.
Therefore, while allowing the August 17 communiqué to go forward, President Reagan also placed a secret memorandum in the National Security Council files, which read:
The U.S. willingness to reduce its arms sales to Taiwan is conditioned absolutely upon the continued commitment of China to the peaceful solution of Taiwan-PRC differences. 
It should be clearly understood that the linkage between these two matters is a permanent imperative of U.S. foreign policy. 
In addition, it is essential that the quantity and quality of the arms provided Taiwan be conditioned entirely on the threat posed by the PRC. 
Both in quantitative and qualitative terms, Taiwan's defense capability relative to that of the PRC will be maintained.[5]
This was not the only step President Reagan took.
He decided that Taiwan needed to be reassured that the U.S. would not abandon the island republic. Therefore, on July 14, 1982, James Lilley, then the head of the American Institute in Taiwan, America's nominally unofficial representative body in Taiwan, called on Republic of China President Chiang Ching-kuo.
His visit came as negotiations with the PRC were close to reaching a conclusion and as Taiwan's anxiety was at its height.
In President Reagan's name, Lilley delivered orally, not in writing, six assurances regarding America's policy toward Taiwan.
The United States, he explained:

1. Had not agreed to set a date for ending arms sales to the Republic of China;
2. Had not agreed to hold prior consultations with the PRC regarding arms sales to the Republic of China;
3. Would not play a mediation role between the PRC and the Republic of China;
4. Would not revise the Taiwan Relations Act;
5. Had not altered its position regarding sovereignty over Taiwan; and
6. Would not exert pressure on the Republic of China to enter into negotiations with the PRC.

With American approval, the statement was made public in Taiwan three weeks later, and soon after that, "The Six Assurances" were the subject of a Senate hearing.
But this was not President Reagan's only message of reassurance.
Twice more, James Lilley delivered additional messages to Chiang.
Together with the assurances, they form a startling package, one that has not received the attention it deserves.
On July 26, 1982, 12 days after their first meeting, Lilley called again on President Chiang.
This time he delivered a "non-paper"[6] again stating that the "U.S. side has no intention of setting a date for termination of arms sales. The U.S. does not agree to the PRC's demand to have prior consultations with them on arms sales to Taiwan."
It went on to outline the U.S. proposal to the PRC about arms sales reduction over time -- language which in fact was included in the communiqué -- and twice made the point that this and any other concession to Beijing would be "predicated on one thing: that is, that the PRC will continue to advocate only to use peaceful means to settle the Taiwan issue."[7]
Unwilling to trust Beijing, the non-paper said, "The U.S. will not only pay attention to what the PRC says, but also will use all methods to achieve surveillance of PRC military production and military deployment."
And then, quite dramatically, it added, "The intelligence attained would be brought to your attention."
The "non-paper" concluded, "If the PRC agrees to the U.S. suggestion and issues the joint communiqué, the U.S. would continue in accordance with the provisions of the Taiwan Relations Act to sell such military items as Taiwan really needs."[8]
On August 16, 1982, the day before the issuance of the joint communiqué with the PRC (though word of its contents had already leaked to the press), Lilley delivered a third "non-paper" to Chiang Ching-kuo.
In it, President Reagan reaffirmed the Six Assurances, repeated the statement that Beijing's intentions toward Taiwan would be monitored continuously (but did not again promise to share intelligence), and said any change in circumstances "will of course change our judgment of Taiwan's defense needs."
It concluded with these words: "Our only interest in this matter is that any resolution of these issues be accomplished peacefully. We will do nothing to jeopardize the ability of the people of Taiwan to deal with this matter in their own way."[9]
Taken together, Reagan's three messages to Chiang Ching-kuo, together with the Taiwan Relations Act, laid a basis for U.S. policy toward Taiwan which, with one significant and one partial exception, has continued to this day.
The partial exception is Washington's tendency to decide which weapons will be sold Taiwan on the basis of what Beijing will, in the end, tolerate.
The more significant exception is the sovereignty question.
From the time of the Shanghai Communiqué of February 1972 to the present, the U.S. position on Taiwan's sovereignty has been a well-calibrated agnosticism, a refusal to say anything at all.
In the Shanghai Communiqué, the U.S. said it "acknowledges that all Chinese on either side of the Taiwan Strait maintain there is but one China and that Taiwan is a part of China. The United States does not challenge that position."
Nor did the U.S. state any position of its own.
This agnosticism continued in the communiqué of January 1, 1979, that recognized the PRC as the sole legal government of China.
Dropping the part about "all Chinese on either side of the Taiwan Strait," the United States said that it "acknowledges the Chinese position that there is but one China and Taiwan is a part of China" -- that is, in effect, "We hear you; we understand this is what you claim."
Again, the U.S. stated no position of its own.
In the communiqué that Reagan signed on August 17, 1982, the U.S. took an additional, but modest step.
Immediately following a paragraph in which Beijing reiterated its position that "the question of Taiwan is China's internal affair" and that its "fundamental policy is to strive for a peaceful solution to the Taiwan question," the American side pledged not to pursue either a "two Chinas" or a "one China, one Taiwan" policy.
But in a public statement immediately following the communiqué, Reagan said, "We will not interfere in this matter or prejudice the free choice of or put pressure on the people of Taiwan in this matter. At the same time, we have an abiding interest and concern that any resolution be peaceful."[10]
President Reagan's last sentence set out what became the U.S. position.
The U.S. will take no position on the ultimate goal, whether independence, unification with China, or some other status.
That will be up to the parties themselves to determine.
But the U.S. will maintain a keen interest in the process: It must be peaceful; it must not involve coercion of any kind, economic, political or military; and it must have the consent of the parties on both sides of the Taiwan Strait.
President Clinton modified this position in a statement known as the "Three No's": "We don't support independence for Taiwan, or two Chinas, or one Taiwan, one China. And we don't believe Taiwan should be a member in any organization for which statehood is a requirement."[11]
Under the current Bush Administration, a kind of corollary was added: The United States will oppose any unilateral attempt to change the status quo.
Most recently, a senior member of the National Security Council staff added a further fillip, stating that neither Taiwan nor the Republic of China (which remains Taiwan's formal name) has the status of a state internationally.
These statements move the U.S. from the position of refusing to state Taiwan's status to one of saying that, whatever Taiwan is or may be, it is not now a state.
Knowingly or not, this tack put both the current and the last administration in apparent contradiction with the Taiwan Relations Act. 
Section 4(d) of the Act reads, "Nothing in this Act may be construed as a basis for supporting the exclusion or expulsion of Taiwan from continued membership in any international financial institution or any other international organization."
For Congress to have made this part of American law must mean that Taiwan is qualified to join international organizations which make statehood a requirement for membership.
An administration could argue that, whatever the law says about Taiwan being a state -- and it is definitely treated as a state in American domestic law[12] -- the President, exercising his authority in foreign affairs, has decided that it is not in the overall U.S. interest to support Taiwan's membership in international organizations that make statehood a requirement for joining.
But even this is different from the current policy of actually opposing such membership.
Except for the sovereignty issue, then, the rest of the Six Assurances appear to be alive and essentially unchanged.
The U.S. continues to sell arms to Taiwan; does not formally consult with Beijing on arms sales though it necessarily must be aware of PRC reactions; has not adopted the position of mediator between the two but instead urges China to talk directly to Taiwan's government; has not forced Taiwan into negotiations with China; and has not altered the Taiwan Relations Act.
Recently, Taiwan government officials have suggested, and in some cases urged, that the U.S. formally repeat President Reagan's Six Assurances and declare that they remain U.S. policy. 
In considering this suggestion, it is important to understand what has changed since 1982.
Taiwan has gone from a one-party, authoritarian state under martial law to a freewheeling, sometimes messy multi-party democracy of 23 million people with per capita GDP that will reach around $15,000 this year.
China meanwhile has experienced enormous economic advancement, with unprecedented speed.
But it remains a one-party, authoritarian state where basic human and civic rights are guaranteed in the constitution but ignored in practice. 
The PRC has long since abandoned the pretense that its "fundamental policy" is peaceful reunification and instead threatens military action if Taiwan should attempt formally to change its de facto separation into de jure independence. 
Every day, China is closer to having the might to take Taiwan, with 900 missiles emplaced opposite it, fourth generation fighter aircraft, growing bomber and naval fleets, and regular military exercises which simulate invasion across the Taiwan Strait.
Its military publications discuss "decapitation strikes" and ways to overcome Taiwan before the United States can intervene.
As for reiterating that the Six Assurances remain U.S. policy, though there is nothing wrong with reiterating basic American policy from time to time -- as in the formula "U.S. China policy is based upon the three communiqués, the Taiwan Relations Act, and the Six Assurances" used by administration spokesmen from time to time -- a commitment given by the President of the United States, especially on subjects as important as those covered in the Six Assurances, must be understood to remain in effect unless and until formally revoked.
And of course such revocation can never be done lightly.
The same view applies to commitments given by the heads of state of all other parties, including Taiwan.
In particular, the assurances as to national policy -- usually referred to as the "Four No's and One May Not" -- given by President Chen Shui-bian in his inauguration speech of May 20, 2000, are understood to remain in effect.
Former Deputy Assistant Secretary of State for East Asia and Pacific Affairs Randall Schriver suggested updating the assurances in a new, expanded package.
This would include the following:

1. The survival and success of democracy in Taiwan is in the interest of the U.S. and thus the U.S. government will endorse efforts that deepen and strengthen Taiwan's democracy.
2. The U.S. will always honor the Taiwan Relations Act and will continue to ensure that the U.S. government makes available to Taiwan weapons needed for self-defense and that the U.S. military maintains the capacity to resist force in the Taiwan Strait.
3. The U.S. endorses cross-Strait dialogue and interactions but will not pressure Taiwan to enter into negotiations with the PRC on terms Taiwan may deem unfavorable.
4. Issues related to the sovereignty of Taiwan are for the people of the PRC and the people of Taiwan to decide peacefully themselves; the U.S. will not formally recognize PRC sovereignty over Taiwan; and the U.S. will not support any outcome achieved through the use of force, nor any outcome that does not enjoy the support of a majority of Taiwan's people.
5. The U.S.-Taiwan relationship is valuable in its own right and worthy of greater investment. The U.S. will not "co-manage" the issue of Taiwan with the PRC. While the U.S. needs good relations with China to further a broad range of security interests, under no circumstances will the U.S. seek to curry favor with China by making sacrifices in its relationship with Taiwan.
6. Taiwan, as a successful democracy, a thriving economy, and a global leader in health and science stands ready to contribute to the greater good as a citizen of the world. Therefore, the U.S. will seek opportunities for Taiwan to participate meaningfully in international organizations and will resist pressure to isolate Taiwan from participating and benefiting from cooperative work among nations in international organizations.[13]

Provided that they are taken together with the original Six Assurances, these new six assurances form an excellent foundation for contemporary American cross-Strait policy.
Combined with an equal commitment to partnership with America on Taiwan's part, they should meet contemporary needs and help the parties navigate the troubled waters of the present.

[1]Much of the content of this WebMemo, in a greatly expanded form, can be found in Harvey J. Feldman, "Taiwan Arms Sales and the Reagan Assurances," The American Asian Review, Vol. XIX, No. 3, Fall 2001, pp. 75-102.
[2]Alexander Haig, Caveat (New York: Macmillan, 1984), p.194.
[3]See "Ronald Reagan and Taiwan" in James Mann, About Face, (New York: Vintage, 2000).
[4]For full text of the communiqué, see Shirley A. Kan, "China/Taiwan: Evolution of the 'One China' Policy-Key Statements from Washington, Beijing and Taipei," Congressional Research Service Report for Congress, September 7, 2006, p. 41.
[5]Ibid., p. 43.
[6]As used in American diplomacy, a "non-paper" is a document on plain bond paper, without seal or signature, intended to convey a position or policy in an informal but nevertheless authoritative manner.
[7]Harvey J. Feldman, "Taiwan Arms Sales and the Reagan Assurances," p. 87.
[8]Ibid.
[9]Ibid. p. 90.
[10]For the full text of "Presidential Statement on Issuance of U.S.-PRC Communiqué of August 17, 1982," see Lester L. Wolff and David L. Simon, Legislative History of the Taiwan Relations Act, (Jamaica, NY: American Association for Chinese Studies, 1982) p. 314.
[11]White House, Office of the Press Secretary, "Remarks by the President and the First Lady in Discussion on Shaping China for the 21st Century," June 30, 1998.
[12]Section 4(B)(1) of the Taiwan Relations Act reads: "Whenever the laws of the United States refer or relate to foreign countries, nations, states, government, or similar entities, such terms shall include and such laws shall apply with such respect to Taiwan." The author claims some credit for the presence of this statement within the TRA. Without it, the U.S. could not sell Taiwan arms or enriched uranium fuel for its nuclear power reactors.
[13]"Randall Schriver on Taiwan: Taiwan needs 'six new assurances,'" Taipei Times, Wednesday, August 8, 2007, at www.taipeitimes.com/News/editorials/archives/2007/08/22/2003375330.

Jettisoning the ambiguous ‘one-China’ policy

China is not our friend — Trump's Taiwan call cuts belligerent rival down to size
BY CHRIS BUSKIRK

America’s foreign policy "elites" are in an uproar. 

Again. 

Or maybe it’s still. 

It’s hard to keep track of where one censorious tantrum ends and the next begins. 

This time their casus belli is the President’s phone conversation with Taiwanese President Tsai Ing-wen.
They warn us that this upsets the delicate international balance and that Donald Trump is a know-nothing cowboy acting without either knowledge or understanding.
Academics like NYU’s Ian Bremmer assumes that Trump’s political acts are nothing more than involuntary spasms, postulating that he “inadvertently caused a major diplomatic incident.”
The presumption is that since Trump is breaking with the current orthodoxy that he must be doing so accidentally.
It also ignores the fact that Trump is being counseled by Ambassador John Bolton, who wrote back in January that the United States should be countering China’s aggression in East Asia “may involve modifying or even jettisoning the ambiguous ‘one-China’ policy.”
Yet the more the critics talk the more they expose their own ignorance. 

American policy regarding the Republic of China (Taiwan) and the People’s Republic of China (Mainland China) is really not that complicated. 

Rather, it is predicated on a conflict and a fiction. 

Both are Made in America.
The conflict is between our morality and geopolitical reality. 

Our morality urges us to support the free, democratic people of Taiwan with whom we have a friendship that dates back to World War II when the United States supported Chiang Kai Shek against the communists. 

But they lost China’s civil war and fled to Taiwan to avoid certain humiliation and death at the hands of Mao’s advancing communist hordes.
For a quarter of a century after that the United States enjoyed diplomatic relations with the government of Taiwan including the “Sino-American Mutual Defense Treaty” which was signed in 1954 and unilaterally renounced by Jimmy Carter without the consent of Congress in 1979.

But the reality on the ground undermined our commitment to Taiwan. 

To put it simply, the PRC is bigger: More people, more land, more money. 

It’s a major strategic player in Asia, on the Pacific Rim, and increasingly in the world. 

And American businesses covet its huge population of potential customers. 

So Richard Nixon’s opening to China in 1972 led to Carter’s renunciation of Taiwan in 1979.
That’s when the U.S.-PRC-Taiwan relationship grew even more, as we say today, complicated. 

That’s where the fiction comes into play. 

We want to maintain our friendship with the free people of Taiwan but we also want access to the PRC’s markets and money.
Remember, the PRC is among the largest buyers of U.S. sovereign debt — our largest export to China. 

Meanwhile, the PRC wants to swallow Taiwan whole and settle old scores with the descendants of the Nationalists who defied Mao and his communist armies.
And Taiwan? 

They have mostly given up any dreams of imminent rapprochement with the mainland and want to be left alone to pursue life as a free and independent country without fear of Beijing.
American policy since 1979 has been official recognition of Beijing along with deepening commercial and diplomatic ties. 

At the same time we have maintained close ties with Taiwan that defy the usual categories.
The U.S. government does not officially recognize the Taiwanese government but we maintain an unofficial diplomatic outpost in Taipei known as the American Institute in Taiwan.
We also have an obligation to defend Taiwan against Chinese aggression under the Taiwan Relations Act. 

And we have sold Taiwan $46 billion of military equipment since 1990 — $1.6 billion in the last year alone.
Since breaking official ties with Taipei no American president has officially spoken with a Taiwanese president. 

Against the backdrop of this benign neglect of an erstwhile American ally, Beijing has grown increasingly bold.
Witness the 2001 Chinese provocation of President Bush just months after his inauguration. 

The Red Chinese forced an unarmed American EP-3 reconnaissance aircraft to land on Hainan Island and held the crews captive for 11 days. 

During the diplomatic stand-off the Chinese stripped the airplane of its sophisticated electronics. 

The incident is largely forgotten because the 9/11 attacks occurred just a few months later.
More recently, the Chinese have been rattling their increasingly numerous sabers in the South China Sea and across Asia intending to force local powers to accept their regional hegemony.

Philippines’ President Duterte has already made friendly overtures towards Beijing, unsettling an old alliance with the United States. 

Other countries in the region are looking to see if the United States will remain committed to peace and freedom on the Pacific Rim.
As a result, there has been an expectation that the Chinese would poke our new president early in his administration — much like they did with Bush — and take his measure.
More important, they would send a signal that the United States must accept Chinese dominance in the region. 

In talking to Taiwan’s president before taking office Donald Trump seized the initiative and now forces China to respond to American action and respect American power.
This is not foreign policy in the mold of Obama’s famously feckless “resets.” 

It is a first step in a new, interests-based foreign policy in which China is not given a veto on American diplomacy.
Trump seems to understand that China is a strategic competitor for power and influence — not a friend. 

And he is treating them as such. 

America’s China policy since Reagan has oscillated between intellectualized inconsistency (Bush) and impotent obeisance couched in the somber tones of ineffectual, nuance. (Clinton & Obama)
As libertarian economist Tyler Cowen wrote: “China was going to test Trump soon anyway, (it is) not obviously bad to troll them in advance and disrupt their strategy with tactics.”

Trump’s phone call with Taiwan’s president before taking office looks increasingly shrewd. 

What’s more, it sets up a China policy reminiscent of Ronald Reagan and the Six Assurances he made to Taiwan.
The phone call was, like so much of the diplomacy between the United States and Taiwan, unofficial. But it sets the table for a more self-confident American policy in Asia once Trump takes office — one where the interests of America and her friends are put ahead of those of her competitors and adversaries.