Doklam standoff: Indian Army prepares to beat back more Chinese incursions

With China getting more aggressive with its salami slicing policy in the Himalayas, the Indian Army must prepare for what General Bipin Rawat described as more Doklam-like incidents.

• Indian and Chinese troops are in standoff at Doklam for over two months.
• China keeps transgressing into Indian territories in three pockets of borders.
• Bipin Rawat warned of more Doklam-like incidents in future.

By Prabhash K Dutta

Delivering the General BC Joshi Memorial Lecture in Pune yesterday, Indian Army chief General Bipin Rawat warned that standoffs with China like that at Doklam are likely to "increase in future".
"The recent stand-off in the Doklam plateau by the Chinese side attempting to change the status quo are issues which we need to be wary about, and I think such kind of incidents are likely to increase in the future," General Bipin Rawat said.
Indian and Chinese troops are in eyeball encounter at Doklam plateau of Bhutan for over two months. Standoff began when Indian troops, after formal request by the Royal Army of Bhutan, stopped the People's Liberation Army of China from constructing a highway through Doklam area.
Doklam plateau is governed by Bhutan and has long been inhabited by the Bhutanese shepherds. China has been eyeing this piece of hilly terrain because of strategic significance.
Doklam lies very close to the Silliguri Corridor that connects the northeastern states of India with rest of the country.
It is the sole passage for supply of materials and transport to and from the northeastern states.

CHINA'S SALAMI SLICING IN HIMALAYAS
General Bipin Rawat has underlined what many geostrategic experts have been saying for long. China is the only country post-World War II that has been engaged in territorial expansion by poaching lands and maritime areas of its neighbours.
This Chinese policy is widely known as Salami Slicing through which it cuts into the territories of its neighbours and then stakes claim over the same.
Furthering the Salami Slicing policy China has captured the entire Tibetan kingdom in 1949 forcing the Buddhist government of the plateau state flee to India and seek asylum.
The Dalai Lama has headed the Tibetan government in-exile since 1950s with its headquarters at Dharamshala in Himachal Pradesh.
Later, India recognised Tibet as part of China.
China captured Aksai Chin area in Ladakh of the state of Jammu and Kashmir in 1962 war with India and has illegally governed it since then.
Aksai Chin is roughly of the size of Switzerland in area.
China also forced Pakistan to cede almost 6,000 sq km area north of Karakoram mountain ranges in Pakistan-occupied parts of Jammu and Kashmir state.

CHINESE BORDER POLICY WITH INDIA
Apart from Aksai Chin and the area in northern Kashmir, China stakes claim on Indian territories in two more pockets.
It claims Arunachal Pradesh to be its own territory calling it South Tibet and several patches along international borders falling in Uttarakhand and Himachal Pradesh.
The borders between India and China are not properly demarcated and the demarcation done during the British colonial regime is contested by Beijing as per its suitability.
During his lecture on India's Challenges in the Current Geo-Strategic Construct at the Department of Defence and Strategic Studies of Savitribai Phule Pune University in Pune, General Bipin Rawat said, "Pockets of dispute and contested claims to the territory continue to exist. These are due to differing perceptions on the alignments of the Line of Actual Control (LAC)."
"Transgressions across Line of Actual Control do happen and sometimes they do lead to some kind of misunderstanding between the forward troops," General Rawat said, adding, "However, we do have joint mechanisms in place to address such situations."
But, Chinese Salami Slicing policy stands in the way of resolving issues.
Even in the case of Doklam standoff, it has been reported that during all flag meetings with Chinese counterparts, the Indian Army has insisted on restoring pre-June 16 positions of the troops.
But, no resolution has been found yet.

DOKLAM AS SALAMI SLICE
The Doklam standoff is a classical example of Chinese border policy with India.
Chinese policy towards Indian borders has three well defined contours.
China invests heavily to strengthen its infrastructure in the regions where it is in stronger position.
It pursues Salami Slicing policy more aggressively where both troops are on equal footing strategically while China needles India where Indian Army is in stronger position to test water.
At Doklam plateau, Indian Army has been patrolling for decades while Chinese troops used to visit there occasionally and never stayed for long.
As it is a disputed area between China and Bhutan, and is very close to the Indian borders, PLA attempted to alter status quo.

WHY THERE MAY BE MORE DOKLAMS
China has invested in its defence forces and infrastructure more than any other Asian country over past several decades.
Even General Bipin Rawat underlined that the PLA has made significant progress in enhancing its "capabilities for mobilisation, application and sustenance of operations" particularly in the Tibet.
Xi Jinping has overhauled the entire military structure and divided the PLA commands in more reasonable units.
Their force reorganisation along with developing capabilities in space and network-centric warfare is likely to provide them greater synergy in force application," General Rawat noted in his speech.
China is also working on other aspects of geostrategy vis-a-vis India.
China is increasing its military and economic partnership with Pakistan and has also been trying to win over Maldives, Sri Lanka and even Bangladesh in India's neighbourhood.
On the other hand, while Doklam standoff continues, China has not yet confirmed about the annual joint military exercises with India.
India and China conduct joint exercise every year on reciprocal basis.
Named "Hand-in-Hand", Indian team goes to China one year followed a visit by Chinese troops next year.
Responding to a question whether Doklam standoff is affecting India-China annual military exercise, General Bipin Rawat said, "It could be, but we are not sure."
The ground realities leave no doubt that China's approach towards India is adversarial than friendly and General Bipin Rawat seems to have delivered the right message by saying, "It is always better to be prepared and alert than think that this will not happen again. So my message to troops is that do not let your guard down."

The Necessary War

This is how it could go down when China and India went to war

By Blake Stilwell

For more than a month, Indian and Chinese troops have been locked in a standoff on a remote but strategically important Himalayan plateau near where Tibet, India, and Bhutan meet.

A war between the world’s largest democracy and the world’s largest communist state may not seem likely to the casual observer. 

But not only is it possible, it’s happened before. Only things were very different back then.

China was facing an economic collapse in the early 1960s in the years following the Great Leap Forward. 

The country was struggling to feed its people, let alone support an all-out war.
India, on the other hand, was on an economic upturn. 

Militarily, however, India was unprepared and could only field 14,000 troops, compared to China’s exhaustive manpower.
In 1962, Chinese Communist leader Mao Zedong invaded India for granting asylum to the Dalai Lama and not supporting the Chinese occupation of Tibet (Indian Prime Minister Jawaharlal Nehru was an outspoken critic of the occupation). 

The Chinese won the harsh mountain war, fought without navies or air forces, at 14,000 feet.
Mao later told Sri Lankan and Swedish delegations the war was essentially to teach India a lesson.

Potential causes of a new Sino-Indian war

The 1962 war only lasted a month, resulting in slight border changes and a now-ongoing dispute on just where the border is — namely in two areas called Aksai Chin and Arunachal Pradesh, which could re-spark a conflict today. 

But any border disputes could turn the mountainous region hot.
The most recent standoff in August 2017 was about an obscure plateau in the Himalayan Doklam Plateau region, which borders India, China, and Bhutan. 

India supports Bhutan’s claim to the area, while both major powers have scores of troops in the region.
The spark for that standoff is an unfinished road from China.
China also supports India’s arch rival Pakistan, turning any conflict into a potential two-front war. But India doesn’t take it all laying down. 

Indian Prime Minister Narendra Modi confronted China’s assertiveness from his first day in office — when he invited the exiled Tibetan government to his swearing-in ceremony.

A map of Doklam, a disputed area between China, India, and Bhutan.

The two countries clashed along their border several times, including one incident over Tibet in 1967 and another near miss 1987 over Arunachal. 

There were also smaller incidents in 2013 and 2014 in Ladakh, where India has since loaded the area with infantry, tanks, and reserves to be prepared for any potential aggression from China.
But the very likely spark that could drive the two Asian giants to war could come from a clash over resources. 

In this case it wouldn’t be over oil, it would be over water. 

Both countries have an eye on the fresh water and hydroelectric power from the Brahmaputra River.
Water is not the only resource in question, though. 

Earlier in 2016, China prevented India’s membership in the Nuclear Suppliers Group, which controls the trade of nuclear material and tech.

Technology and numbers

A pilot in the cockpit of a Jian-10 fighter jet at Yangcun Air Force base on the outskirts of Tianjin municipality, April 13, 2010, during a media trip to the 24th Air Force Division of the People's Liberation Army.

China and India are now economic powerhouses, 2nd and 7th (respectively) in world GDP rankings. Militarily, India is number four on the GlobalFirepower rankings and boasts the largest standing volunteer army at 1.13 million troops with 21 million in reserve. 

Ranked number three on the same scale, China’s armed forces have 2.3 million active troops with another 2.3 million in reserve.
China’s technology is superior to India’s, but not by much. 

The Chinese air forces also vastly outnumber India’s somewhat antiquated air force. 

The Chinese also have a homegrown version of the F-35, which can outmatch India’s 50-year-old MiG-21s. 

The Chinese J-20 is currently the best for Chinese air superiority, if it’s operational in time for such a conflict.
India is working with Russia on developing a 5th-generation Sukhoi fighter with capabilities similar to the American F-22. 

But the Indian air force has been outnumbered and outclassed on many occasions and still came up with a win. 

Training and experience count for a lot. More on that in a minute.
The Indian Navy's Scorpene submarine INS Kalvari escorted by tugboats as it arrives at Mazagon Docks Ltd, a naval-vessel ship-building yard, in Mumbai, India, October 29, 2015.

India’s Navy matches China’s with two aircraft carrier groups but China still edges India in technological capability — barely. 

China also dwarfs India’s tank and submarine corps, with five times as many of each. China also has twice as many warships and military aircraft.
India’s advantage is that, despite China’s superiority in merchant marine, its sea lanes come very close to Indian waters. 

This would force the Chinese to divert ships used for a blockade to protect their shipping. 

This is why both countries invest in developing submarines and anti-sub technology.
No matter what, the air and sea war would be a slugfest. 

Even so, the primary conflict would likely be between two land armies. 

Or three if Pakistan decides to take advantage of the situation.

Joota on the ground
Chinese paramilitary policemen take an oath ahead of the 96th anniversary of the founding of the Communist Party of China (CPC) in Kunming, Yunnan province, China.

The problem with the major border disputes is that the border in question is high in the Himalayas, making quick thrusts and land grabs unlikely. 

A large disparity in ground troops between the opposing forces will decide who advances. 

China may have the manpower to make taking the disputed provinces possible.
A significant difference in India’s favor is that its troops are battle-hardened and have a long tradition of fighting to defend India’s borders. 

The Indian Army has been fighting Pakistan, terrorism, and a host of insurgencies for decades. 

Its last war ended in 1999, and it has employed significant paramilitary and special operations forces ever since.
The Chinese haven’t seen real fighting since the 1979 war with Vietnam. 

That war lasted just shy of four weeks, with each side claiming victory. 

The Chinese wanted to punish Vietnam for being in the Soviet sphere while proving to the world the USSR could not protect its allies. 

It didn’t work. 

The Vietnamese repelled the Chinese People’s Liberation Army using only border militias.
India's Rapid Action Force (RAF) personnel pose for pictures inside their base camp in New Delhi, November 6, 2014.

The truth is, the Chinese PLA, for all its growth and advances in technology, has not truly been tested since the Korean War. 

China’s biggest equalizer is its ballistic missile force, capable of hitting well inside India.
China’s biggest advantage is its economy. 

If it suffers no sanctions as a result of an invasion, it could sustain a protracted war much longer than India. 

In this instance, India’s best hope is to strangle Chinese shipping using its sizable submarine force. India sits with its boot on the neck of the Chinese economy.
If it came to a nuclear exchange, India would not fare well. 

China has a stockpile of ballistic missiles and with major Indian cities so close to the Chinese border, it doesn’t even need longer-ranged weapons to annihilate major urban centers. 

Conversely, India has few of these and primary targets in China are much further away. 

Luckily, both countries have a “no first use” policy, making a nuclear exchange unlikely.

How it plays out
An officer from the Indian Central Reserve Police Force during preparations for Republic Day parade, near the Presidential Palace in New Delhi, India, January 12, 2016. India marks Republic Day on January 26.

India invading China is highly unlikely. 

The Indian Army would not have the ground force necessary to drive through the Himalayas and sustain such a push.
This war would be fought with light infantry, mountain troops, and light armor. 

China has the advantage in numbers, but India has experienced veteran soldiers. 

Even aircraft would have trouble fighting in these mountains, but the Indian Army has developed specialized attack helicopters just for this purpose: the HAL Druv and HAL Light Attack helicopters.
China has very few airfields in the area, which would limit its ability to provide air cover, whereas India’s Air Force maintains considerable assets in the area.
India also has multiple layers of anti-air and anti-missile defense and is developing more. 

China would have to get the bulk of its ground forces across the Himalayas as fast as possible, or the war would grind to a halt.
Any halt to the Chinese advance would be a de facto win for India. 

China would have to completely capture the disputed territories and move into India to be able to claim victory. 

China’s only real chance to progress into the subcontinent is to perform an Inchon landing-style maneuver from the sea, but that would require going through India’s submarine force unopposed.
Soldiers from a special unit of the People's Armed Police in Xinjiang at a training session in Kashgar, Xinjiang Uighur Autonomous Region, China.

Frankly, any conflict between the two would be explosive and bloody, requiring a lot of manpower and ending with a massive loss of life. 

The geography and population density between the two countries makes both of them unconquerable.

The Necessary War

What's behind the India-China border stand-off?
BBC News

India and China have a long history of border disputes

For four weeks, India and China have been involved in a stand-off along part of their 3,500km (2,174-mile) shared border.
The two nations fought a war over the border in 1962 and disputes remain unresolved in several areas, causing tensions to rise from time to time.
Since this confrontation began last month, each side has reinforced its troops and called on the other to back down.

How did the row begin?
It erupted when India opposed China's attempt to extend a border road through a plateau known as Doklam.
The plateau, which lies at a junction between China, the north-eastern Indian state of Sikkim and Bhutan, is currently disputed between Beijing and Thimphu.
India supports Bhutan's claim over it.
India is concerned that if the road is completed, it will give China greater access to India's strategically vulnerable "chicken's neck", a 20km (12-mile) wide corridor that links the seven north-eastern states to the Indian mainland.
Indian military officials told regional analyst Subir Bhaumik that they protested and stopped the road-building group, which led Chinese troops to rush Indian positions and smash two bunkers at the nearby Lalten outpost.
"We did not open fire, our boys just created a human wall and stopped the Chinese from any further incursion," a brigadier said on condition of anonymity because he was not authorised to speak to the press.
Chinese officials say that in opposing the road construction, Indian border guards obstructed "normal activities" on the Chinese side, and called on India to immediately withdraw.

What is the situation now?
Both India and China have rushed more troops to the border region, and media reports say the two sides are in an "eyeball to eyeball" stand-off.
The Chinese ambassador to India Luo Zhaohui told Press Trust of India news agency on Tuesday that India had to "unconditionally pull back troops" for peace to prevail.
The statement is being seen as a diplomatic escalation by China.
China also retaliated by stopping 57 Indian pilgrims who were on their way to the Manas Sarovar Lake in Tibet via the Nathu La pass in Sikkim.
The lake is a holy Hindu site and there is a formal agreement between the neighbours to allow devotees to visit.
Bhutan, meanwhile, has asked China to stop building the road, saying it is in violation of an agreement between the two countries.

What does India say?
Indian military experts say Sikkim is the only area through which India could make an offensive response to a Chinese incursion, and the only stretch of the Himalayan frontier where Indian troops have a terrain and tactical advantage.
They have higher ground, and the Chinese positions there are squeezed between India and Bhutan.
India and China fought a bitter war in 1962.

"The Chinese know this and so they are always trying to undo our advantage there," retired Maj-Gen Gaganjit Singh, who commanded troops on the border, told the BBC.
Last week, the foreign ministry said that the construction "would represent a significant change of status quo with serious security implications for India".
Indian Defence Minister Arun Jaitley also warned that the India of 2017 was not the India of 1962, and the country was well within its rights to defend its territorial integrity.

What does China say?
China has reiterated its sovereignty over the area, saying that the road is in its territory and accusing Indian troops of "trespassing".
It said India would do well to remember its defeat in the 1962 war, warning Delhi that China was also more powerful than it was then.
On Monday, a Chinese foreign ministry spokesman said that the border in Sikkim had been settled in an 1890 agreement with the British, and that India's violation of this was "very serious".
The Global Times newspaper, meanwhile, accused India of undermining Bhutan's sovereignty by interfering in the road project, although Bhutan has since asked China to stop construction.

What's Bhutan's role in this?
Bhutan's Ambassador to Delhi Vetsop Namgyel says China's road construction is "in violation of an agreement between the two countries".
Bhutan and China do not have formal relations but maintain contact through their missions in Delhi.
An Indian soldier on the China border.

Security analyst Jaideep Saikia told the BBC that Beijing had for a while now been trying to deal directly with Thimphu, which is Delhi's closest ally in South Asia.
"By raising the issue of Bhutan's sovereignty, they are trying to force Thimphu to turn to Beijing the way Nepal has," he said.

What next?
The region saw clashes between China and India in 1967, and tensions still flare occasionally. Commentators say the latest development appears to be one of the most serious escalations in recent years.
The fact that Tibet's spiritual leader, the Dalai Lama resides in India has also been a sticking point between the two countries.
This stand-off in fact, comes within weeks of China's furious protests against the Dalai Lama's visit to Arunachal Pradesh, an Indian state that China claims and describes as its own.
China recently protested against Tibetan spiritual leader Dalai Lama's visit to Arunachal Pradesh, an Indian state Beijing claims as its own.

The Necessary War

Chinese and Indian troops face off in Bhutan border dispute
By Michael Safi in Delhi

China has demanded the withdrawal of Indian troops from a scrap of disputed territory to end an escalating border row between the two Asian powers that has drawn in tiny Bhutan.

Beijing claims the Indian troops are occupying its soil, but both Bhutan and India maintain the area in question is Bhutanese territory.
Analysts say the harsh language and scale of the mobilisation in the remote but strategically important area, where the borders of China, India and Bhutan intersect, is unprecedented in recent years.
One former Indian foreign secretary said the impasse, now in its third week, also marked the first time India and China had squared off on the soil of a third country, an overt display of the escalating regional rivalry between the pair.
The current standoff began on 16 June when a column of Chinese troops accompanied by construction vehicles and road-building equipment began moving south into what Bhutan considers its territory.
Bhutan, a small Himalayan kingdom with close military and economic ties to India, requested assistance from Delhi, which sent forces to resist the Chinese advance.
To avoid escalation, frontline troops in the area do not generally carry weapons, and the Chinese and Indian troops reportedly clashed by “jostling”: bumping chests, without punching or kicking, in order to force the other side backwards.
At the heart of the dispute are different interpretations of where the “trijunction” – the point where the three countries’ borders meet – precisely lies. 

China argues its territory extends south to an area called Gamochen, while India says Chinese control ends at Batanga La, further to the north.
About 3,000 troops from both countries are reportedly stationed near Doklam, an area initial media reports said was about 15km from Gamochen, but which satellite imagery shows could be as close as two to three kilometres away.
In support of its claim, China points to an 1890 treaty signed with the British Raj, and seemingly endorsed by India’s first prime minister, Jawaharlal Nehru, in a letter to his Chinese counterpart. India says the letter does not accurately capture Nehru’s position and that China cannot unilaterally alter the territorial status quo.
It is the longest standoff between the two armies since 1962, when tensions over Tibet and elsewhere along the border sparked a brief war from which China emerged victorious.
China still claims a section of the Indian state of Arunachal Pradesh and was angered in April when the Dalai Lama, whom Beijing regards as an “anti-China separatist”, conducted a tour of the state.
Though India says its troops in Bhutan are in “non-combative mode”, the rhetoric on both sides is growing increasingly pugilistic. 

India’s army chief, Bipin Rawat, has said that India is ready to fight a “two and half front war” – referring to Pakistan, China and against the country’s various internal insurgencies.
On Tuesday, an editorial in the Global Times, a Chinese state-run newspaper, called for Delhi to be taught “a bitter lesson”, warning in a second conflict it would suffer greater losses than in 1962.

Global attention is usually focused on China’s expansion into east Asia, but the burgeoning superpower is increasingly also muscling into south Asia, forging links with countries India considers to be firmly within its sphere of influence.

“For the past six years China has been attempting to hem India in and take away its strategic space in South Asia,” said Ashok Malik, a fellow at the Delhi-based Observer Research Foundation.
India was especially sensitive to China’s encroachment near its Bhutanese border, he said, because it brought Chinese troops uncomfortably close to a section of Indian territory called the “chicken’s neck”, a thin corridor which, if broached, could cut Delhi off from its northeastern states.
“This is in fact a provocative gesture which makes the defence of Doklam virtually the defence of India,” Malik said. 

“I expect both sides to stay put as long as Chinese supply and logistical lines will allow.”

The Necessary War: India vs. China

If 2.6 Billion People Go To War
By Kyle Mizokami

A hypothetical war between India and China would be one of the largest and most destructive conflicts in Asia. 

A war between the two powers would rock the Indo-Pacific region, cause millions of casualties on both sides and take a significant toll on the global economy. 

Geography and demographics would play a unique role, limiting the war’s scope and ultimately the conditions of victory.
India and China border one another in two distinct locations: Aksai Chin in India’s north, and Arunachal Pradesh in the country’s northeast. 

China has made claims on both locations, which from China’s perspective belong to the far western East Turkestan and China-occupied Tibet. 

China invaded both Aksai Chin and Arunachal Pradesh in 1962, with both sides fighting a monthlong war that resulted in minor Chinese gains on the ground.

Both countries have such large populations, each over 1.3 billion, that they are essentially unconquerable. 

Like all modern wars, a war between India and China would be fought over land, sea, and air; geography would limit the scope of the land conflict, while it would be the air conflict, fought with both aircraft and missiles, that would do the most damage to both countries. 

The trump card, however, may be India’s unique position to dominate a sea conflict, with dire consequences for the Chinese economy.
A war between the two countries would, unlike the 1962 war, involve major air action on both sides. Both countries maintain large tactical air forces capable of flying missions over the area. 

People’s Liberation Army Air Force units would fly from the Lanzhou Military Region against Aksai Chin, and from the expansive Chengdu Military Region against Arunachal Pradesh. 

The Lanzhou district is home to J-11 and J-11B fighters, two regiments of H-6 strategic bombers, and a grab bag of J-7 and J-8 fighters. 

A lack of forward bases in Xinjiang means the Lanzhou Military Region could probably only support a limited air campaign against northern India. 

The Chengdu Military Region is home to advanced J-11A and J-10 fighters, but there are relatively few military airfields in Tibet anywhere near India.
Still, China does not necessarily need tactical aircraft to do great damage to India. 

China could supplement its aerial firepower with ballistic missiles from the People’s Liberation Army Rocket Forces. 

The PLARF overseas both nuclear, conventional and dual-use ballistic missiles, and could conceivably move up to two thousand short- and medium-range DF-11, DF-15 and DF-21 ballistic missiles into positions adjacent to India. 

These missiles could be used to blitz Indian strategic targets on the ground, at the cost of making them unavailable for contingencies in the South and East China Seas.
Meanwhile, India’s air forces are in a better position to contest the skies than their Chinese counterparts. 

While the war would take place on China’s sparsely manned frontier, New Delhi is only 213 miles from the Tibetan frontier. 

India’s air fleet of 230 Su-30Mk1 Flankers, sixty-nine MiG-29s and even its Mirage 2000s are competitive with or even better than most of China’s aircraft in theater, at least until the J-20 fighter becomes operational. 

India likely has enough aircraft to deal with a two-front war, facing off with Pakistan’s Air Force at the same time. 

India is also fielding the Akash medium-range air defense missile system to protect air bases and other high-value targets.
While India could be reasonably confident of having an air force that deters war, at least in the near term, it has no way of stopping a Chinese ballistic-missile offensive. 

Chinese missile units, firing from Xinjiang and Tibet, could hit targets across the northern half of India with impunity. 

India has no ballistic-missile defenses and does not have the combined air- and space-based assets necessary to hunt down and destroy the missile launchers. 

India’s own ballistic missiles are dedicated to the nuclear mission and would be unavailable for conventional war.
The war on the ground between the Indian and Chinese armies might at first glance seem like the most decisive phase of the war, but it’s actually quite the opposite. 

Both theaters, the Aksai Chin/Xijiang theater and the Arunachal Pradesh/Tibet theater are in rugged locations with little transportation infrastructure, making it difficult to send a mechanized army through. 

Massed attacks could be easily stopped with artillery as attacking forces are funneled through well-known valleys and mountain passes. 

Despite the enormous size of both armies—1.2 million for India and 2.2 million for China—fighting on the ground would likely be a stalemate with little lost or gained.
The war at sea would be the decisive front in a conflict between the two countries. 

Sitting astride the Indian Ocean, India lies on China’s jugular vein. 

The Indian Navy, with its force of submarines, aircraft carrier INS Vikramaditya and surface ships could easily curtail the the flow of trade between China and Europe, the Middle East, and Africa. 

It would take the Chinese Navy weeks to assemble and sail a fleet capable of contesting the blockade. Even then, the blockade would be hard to break up, conducted over the thousands of square miles of the Indian Ocean.
Meanwhile, shipping to and from China would be forced to divert through the western Pacific Ocean, where such diversions would be vulnerable to Australian, Japanese, or American naval action. 

87 percent of the country’s petroleum needs are imported from abroad, particularly the Middle East and Africa. 

China’s strategic petroleum reserves, once completed sometime in the 2020s, could stave off a nationwide fuel shortage for up to seventy-seven days—but after that Beijing would have to seek an end to the war however possible.
The second-order effects of the war at sea would be India’s greatest weapon. 

War jitters, the shock to the global economy, and punitive economic action by India’s allies—including Japan and the United States—could see demands for exports fall, with the potential to throw millions of Chinese laborers out of work. 

Domestic unrest fueled by economic troubles could become a major problem for the Chinese Communist Party and its hold on the nation. 

China has no similar lever over India, except in the form of a rain of ballistic missiles with high-explosive warheads on New Delhi and other major cities.
A war between India and China would be nasty, brutal and short, with far-reaching consequences for the global economy. 

The balance of power and geographic constraints means a war would almost certainly fail to prove decisive. 

World War III Casualties
	2016 Population	Killed		Survivors
CHINA	1 373 541 278	1 057 119 689	77%	316 421 589
UNITED STATES	323 995 528	19 089 783	6%	304 905 745
EUROPEAN UNION	513 949 445	371 356 958	72%	142 592 487
RUSSIA	142 355 415	30 924 816	22%	111 430 599
INDIA	1 266 883 598	1 158 499 174	91%	108 384 424
PAKISTAN	201 995 540	175 747 473	87%	26 248 067
JAPAN	126 702 133	114 241 889	90%	12 460 244
VIETNAM	95 261 021	84 340 688	89%	10 920 333
PHILIPPINES	102 624 209	92 732 902	90%	9 891 307
KOREA, NORTH	25 115 311	21 141 050	84%	3 974 261
KOREA, SOUTH	50 924 172	47 636 302	94%	3 287 870
TAIWAN	23 464 787	22 278 490	95%	1 186 297
	4 246 812 437	3 195 109 214	75%	1 051 703 223

Chinese Peril

China’s One Belt, One Road initiative ignores India’s territorial sovereignty
Scroll

The Indian government on Saturday decided to make its absence felt at China’s One Belt, One Road Forum, which includes the China-Pakistan Economic Corridor, by not sending a representative to the event scheduled for May 14 to May 16.
New Delhi has opposed the project on the grounds that it does not respect India’s sovereignty and territorial integrity.
“Connectivity projects must be pursued in a manner that respects sovereignty and territorial integrity,” said Spokesperson for the Ministry of External Affairs Gopal Baglay.
India has repeatedly urged China to maintain a meaningful dialogue on the project.
Stressing that connectivity initiatives should not give way to unsustainable financial burden and ecological damage, Baglay said donor governments should focus on transparent assessment of project costs and skill and technology transfer to help long-term running.
Chinese Foreign Ministry spokesperson Geng Shuang said Indian scholars were participating in “relevant activities” at the forum, according to The Indian Express. 
The summit will have 29 heads of states and governments, including Russian President Vladimir Putin, and high-level delegations from Sri Lanka, Bangladesh, Nepal and Myanmar in attendance. The United States, Germany, France and the United Kingdom are also participating in the seminar.
India has persistently raised its concerns over the China-Pakistan Economic Corridor.
During the Raisina dialogue, Foreign Secretary S Jaishankar had said, “China is a country that is very sensitive on matters concerning its sovereignty... so we would expect that they would have some understanding of other people’s sensitivity about their sovereignty,” he had said.
“CPEC passes through a piece of land that we call Pakistan-occupied Kashmir, which is a territory that belongs to India and is illegally occupied by Pakistan.”
China had dismissed reports that the One Belt, One Road initiative will give it vested interest in the Kashmir matter.
Chinese Ambassador to India Luo Zhaohui had said Beijing could consider renaming CPEC, while stressing that it was an economic matter.
His offer was later deleted by the Chinese Embassy from his speech posted on the consulate’s website.
India’s ties with China soured after the Dalai Lama’s recent visit to Arunachal Pradesh, which was followed by the neighbouring nation renaming parts of the state to “standardised” Chinese names. Beijing has also maintained its cordial ties with Pakistan, even giving Pakistan two patrol ships to help monitor their economic corridor and the Gwadar port.

Chinese Paranoia

Arunachal Pradesh leaders slam China for renaming places in state

By PTI

The Tibetan spiritual leader the Dalai Lama had stated many times at various international and national fora that Arunachal Pradesh is an integral part of India.
ITANAGAR -- "Will naming Beijing as Mumbai make China's capital an Indian territory," asks the president of the Arunachal Chamber of Commerce and Industries summing up the mood of locals on China renaming places in Arunachal Pradesh.
People and political leaders cutting across party lines here have strongly denounced China's move to 'standardise' official names of six places in Arunachal Pradesh.
Arunachal BJP president Tapir Gao said China's claim over Arunachal is "baseless".
"China forcefully occupied Tibet in 1959 and it wants to capture Arunachal Pradesh," he said.
Gao said the Tibetan spiritual leader the Dalai Lama had stated many times at various international and national fora that Arunachal Pradesh is an integral part of India.
"So renaming of places in Arunachal by China is baseless and Beijing should learn from history that they forcefully occupied Tibet and their claim is meaningless," he said.
Criticising China's move, he said India has no boundary with China but with Tibet since 1914 when MacMohan, the British India representative, had signed an agreement with the Chinese representative at Shimla over the boundary.
When contacted, Arunachal Pradesh Chief Secretary Shakuntala Doley Gamlin refused to comment on the issue.
"We have nothing to say on the issue as the External Affairs Ministry will handle it", she said.
Senior Congress lawmaker and former chief minister Nabam Tuki also ridiculed Beijing's claim over the state's territory and said, "There is no logic in such claim. Everybody knows that Arunachal is an integral part of India. The Centre should take up the matter seriously and resolve the matter once and for all".
China had announced 'standardised' official names for six places in Arunachal Pradesh, days after it lodged strong protests with India over the Dalai Lama's visit to the frontier state.
The state media in Beijing had said the move was aimed at reaffirming China's claim over the state.
India had hit out at China for giving Chinese names to some parts of Arunachal Pradesh, saying assigning invented names to towns of the neighbour does not make illegal territorial claims legal.
APCC president Takam Sanjoy said that there is no doubt and confusion that Arunachal Pradesh is an integral part of the Indian Union.
"The indigenous and ethnic people of Arunachal Pradesh have got integrated with the Indian mainstream. Some ethnic tribe leaders had even participated in the freedom struggle. Therefore, Arunachal being disputed as claimed by China is absolutely absurd," Sanjoy said.
China's move evoked strong protests here with the apex students' body - the All Arunachal Pradesh Students' Union (AAPSU) terming it as "intriguing and uncalled for".
"China is unnecessarily interfering in the internal affairs of a sovereign nation. 

""The development is an unwarranted act on the part of the Chinese government.
"We reject outright the renaming which has been done without the concern and certification of the indigenous populace of Arunachal Pradesh," AAPSU president Hawa Bagang said.
"Arunachal was never a part of China at any given point of time and such a parochial approach and idea won't have any takers in Arunachal Pradesh", he said.
Arunachal Chamber of Commerce and Industries president Tchi Lala and general secretary Tarh Nachung pooh-poohed China for renaming six places in the state and called it a "whimsical move".
"Will naming Beijing as Mumbai make China's capital an Indian territory?
"China is ignorant of the democratic development through which Arunachal Pradesh has evolved into its present status, or else it would not have made a mockery of itself by making such an announcement," they said.

China and India renew war of words over Tibet

India calls Arunachal an ‘integral’ part of its country after Beijing adjusts place names 
By Lucy Hornby in Beijing and Aliya Ram in New Delhi

The Dalai Lama waves to supporters at a Buddhist monastery in the Himalayan Indian state of Arunachal Pradesh this month

China and India have renewed a war of words over the north-eastern Indian state of Arunachal Pradesh, a Tibetan Himalayan region claimed by Beijing, after China said it would “standardise” six place names in the territory.
The announcement of the new romanised spellings for three towns and three mountain passes by China’s ministry of civil affairs is the country’s latest move to stake its claim over an area that came under formal Indian control in a series of 19th-century boundary agreements between the Manchu Qing empire and the British government in India. 
India responded on Thursday by insisting that Arunachal Pradesh was “an integral part” of India. “Nothing can change that,” the foreign ministry in New Delhi said.
“We have an established bilateral mechanism to discuss the boundary question with China and it has made progress. We seek a fair, reasonable and mutually acceptable solution to the boundary question.”
Beijing’s current claims over Arunachal Pradesh — which it calls South Tibet — rest on its control over the rest of Tibet, the vast mountain territory it invaded and seized in 1950.
The decision to release new names follows a dispute over a visit to a Buddhist monastery in Arunachal this month by the Dalai Lama, the Tibetan spiritual leader who lives in exile in India. Chinese foreign ministry spokesman Lu Kang said the “standardisation” was in line with Chinese regulations on the management of geographical names.
The Dalai Lama has lived in exile in India since 1959 when he fled Lhasa following a failed Tibetan uprising against Chinese rule.
The influential leader is reviled by Beijing, which views him as a threat to China’s control of Tibet. After a previous visit to the Tawang monastery in Arunachal Pradesh by the Dalai Lama in 2009, China stopped recognising the Indian passports of people born in the state.
Rather than normal visas, it issued travel permits stapled into their passports.
The dispute escalated as both countries included maps in newly issued passports showing the conflicting claims.
The ageing Dalai Lama has resisted attempts by Beijing to put forward its own candidate for his reincarnated successor.
He has said the reincarnated spiritual leader will not be born in Chinese territory.  
An alternative option of identifying his successor in Mongolia — which the Dalai Lama visited late last year — seems to be ruled out by China’s growing political and economic influence over its landlocked neighbour.
The place name “standardisation” adheres to a playbook China has followed in the case of other border territories it claims, for instance the Japanese Senkaku islands and atolls in the South China Sea.
According to the process, a first step is to have the territory in question recognised as “disputed” by an international audience.
“The motivation might be to show historical claim and historical ownership of the disputed territory,” said Jian Zhang, associate professor at the University of New South Wales.

Dalai Lama says Tibetan people should decide on his succession

By Sunil Kataria

Tibetan spiritual leader the Dalai Lama arrives to deliver teachings at Yiga Choezin, in Tawang, in the northeastern state of Arunachal Pradesh, India, April 8, 2017

TAWANG, India -- Tibetan spiritual leader the Dalai Lama said on Saturday the Tibetan people should decide if they wanted to continue with his institution, adding that he wanted to convene a meeting of senior monks this year to start discussing his succession.
China, which brands the Nobel Peace laureate a dangerous separatist, says the tradition must continue and its officially atheist Communist leaders have the right to approve the Dalai Lama's successor, as a legacy inherited from China's emperors.
"Whether this very institution of Dalai Lama should continue or not is up to Tibetan people," the Dalai Lama told a news conference in the remote hill town of Tawang near the Chinese border in India's northeastern state of Arunachal Pradesh.
"So, consult people, if people feel now this institution (is) no longer relevant then this institution (will) automatically cease," the 82-year-old said, adding he wanted to start this year "some sort of preliminary discussion" on his succession.
A final decision on the fate of the institution would be taken when he reaches late 80s or 90, the Dalai Lama said.
Tibetan Buddhism holds that the soul of a senior lama, or Buddhist monk, is reincarnated in the body of a child on his death.
The Dalai Lama, who fled into exile in India after a failed uprising against Chinese rule in 1959, denies espousing violence and says he only wants genuine autonomy for Tibet.
His week-long trip to Arunachal Pradesh, an eastern Himalayan region administered by New Delhi, but claimed by China as "southern Tibet", has raised hackles in Beijing.
The Dalai Lama also said he disagreed with U.S. President Donald Trump's "America First" policy and the recent curbs on immigration saying that he admired America as a leader of the free world and expected the country to lead by that example.
The Dalai Lama now resides in the Indian hill town of Dharamsala, where his supporters also run a small government in exile. 

He has renounced any political role in leading the Tibetan diaspora.

Chinese Paranoia

China’s outrageous offer to India for settling the border dispute: Give us all the territory
By Mohan Guruswamy

Dai Bingguo is a Chinese politician and diplomat. 

Many in India will be familiar with him as a long-time interlocutor with a string of Indian National Security Advisors in the Sino-Indian border discussions. 

He has served as a State Councillor and as the director of the General Offices of Foreign Affairs and the National Security Group of the Communist Party of China’s Central Committee. 

A senior Chinese official once described him to me as China’s Kissinger. 

He retired in 2013 but his voice is still heard in the higher echelons of the Chinese Communist Party, and his voice is also often their voice. 

Hence it is as important to have him hear you, as it is to hear him.

Dai returned to headlines in India on March 2 when he told the Beijing-based magazine China-India Dialogue that: “The disputed territory in the eastern sector of the China-India boundary, including Tawang, is inalienable from China’s Tibet in terms of cultural background and administrative jurisdiction. The major reason the boundary question persists is that China’s reasonable requests [in the east] have not been met. If the Indian side takes care of China’s concerns in the eastern sector of their border, the Chinese side will respond accordingly and address India’s concerns elsewhere.”
Dai was clearly alluding to a new package deal on the border issues between India and China, quite different from an old package deal offered several times in the past. 

That package deal entailed India recognising the Aksai Chin plateau in the North as Chinese territory in lieu of China recognising Arunachal Pradesh as Indian. Chinese Premier Zhou Enlai first offered this package deal in 1960. 

But this was not acceptable to New Delhi and India and China went on to fight the 1962 war over the border issue. 

We have been eyeball-to-eyeball since.
In the interview, Dai said that the deal was offered to Foreign Minister Atal Bihari Vajpayee in 1979. 

The last time it was reportedly offered was during Prime Minister Rajiv Gandhi’s meeting with Deng Xiaoping in 1988.
At an interaction with Indian journalists in Beijing in 2015, Yang Wencheng, President of the Chinese People’s Institute for Foreign Affairs said: “As a diplomat in the late 1980s, I was witness to a chance to solve the problem with Prime Minister Rajiv and Deng. Deng said, ‘We do some compromise on the West wing, you do some on the East wing, then we can have a new border.'”
Yang added: “We offered but Prime Minister Gandhi didn’t have a response. After that I felt very sad we lost the chance.”

What China wants
The goalposts have since changed. 

The Chinese now clearly want the populated Tawang tract in Arunachal Pradesh and want to go beyond the old Macartney-MacDonald line in Ladakh. 

This proposal requires India to cede territory it holds at present.
Though the Simla Conference of 1913 between British India and an independent Tibet agreed upon the McMahon Line as the effective boundary between India and China in the North East, the border was only notified by Delhi in 1935 at the insistence of Sir Olaf Caroe, then deputy secretary in the Foreign Department. 

China disputes the legal status of this line.
In 1944, civil servant JP Mills established British Indian administration in the North East Frontier Agency up till the McMahon Line, but excluded the Tawang tract, which continued to be administered by the Lhasa-appointed head lama. 

In 1947, the present Dalai Lama wrote to newly-independent India laying claim to these parts.
On October 7, 1950, the Chinese attacked the Tibetans in Qamdo and asserted control over all of Tibet within a year. 

In anticipation, on February 16, 1951, Major Relangnao ‘Bob’ Khating of the Indian Frontier Administration Service, at the head of a column of Indian forces, raised the India tricolour in Tawang and took over the administration of the tract. 

Clearly India’s claim over Arunachal Pradesh does not rest on any long historical tradition or cultural affinity. 

But then the Chinese have no basis whatsoever to stake a claim on the area either besides a few dreamy cartographic enlargements of the notion of China among some of the hangers-on in the Qing emperor’s court. 

The important thing now is that the McMahon Line is over 100 years old and India has been directly administering the territory for almost eight decades. 

China was never there, either in 1913 or before or after.

A tribal girl looks on during the second day of the three-day Tawang festival in Tawang, near the Indo-China border in north eastern Arunachal Pradesh state on October 22, 2016.

The case of Aksai Chin
India’s claims on Aksai Chin in the North rest on the “advanced boundary line” formulated in 1865 by WH Johnson, a civil sub-assistant in the Survey of India. 

Johnson proposed this line after claiming to have surveyed the territory. 

The authorities in Delhi and London waited three decades before rejecting this alignment, now called the Ardagh-Johnson line.
Viceroy Lord Lansdowne wrote on September 28, 1889: “The country between the Karakoram and Kuen Lun ranges is, I understand, of no value, very inaccessible and not likely to be coveted by Russia. We might, I should think, encourage the Chinese to take it, if they showed any inclination to do so. This would be better than leaving a no-man’s land between our frontier and that of China.”
Lord Curzon, who was Secretary of State for India in London, wrote: “We are inclined to think that the wisest course would be to leave them in possession as it is evidently to our advantage that the tract of territory between the Karakoram and Kuen Lun mountains be held by a friendly power like China.”
In 1893, Hung Ta-chen, a senior Chinese official at Kashgar in China’s western-most province of Xinjiang, handed a map of the boundary proposed by China to George Macartney, the British consul-general there. 

This boundary placed the Lingzithang plains, which are South of the Laktsang range, in India, and Aksai Chin proper, which is North of the Laktsang range, in China. 

Macartney recommended and forwarded this to the British Indian government. 

There were good reasons for the British to support this border along the Karakorum mountains. 

The Karakorums formed a natural boundary, which would set the British borders up to the Indus river watershed while leaving the Tarim river watershed in Chinese control.
The British presented this line, known as the Macartney-MacDonald Line, to the Chinese in 1899 in a note by Sir Claude MacDonald, the British minister to the Qing dynasty, China’s last imperial dynasty. 

China believed that this then was the accepted boundary. 

But post-1962, the Chinese are ahead of this too.
In 1941 after military intelligence in Delhi got reports of Soviet troops garrisoning in Xinjiang, it was decided to push the existing boundary outwards to the old Ardagh-Johnson line. 

Thus, Aksai Chin once more became part of India. 

This late incorporation appeared in few maps only. 

The India map of the original Constitution of India adopted in 1950 leaves the boundary between India and China at Aksai Chin as an airbrushed blank without indicating any line.

Chinese claims exaggerated
There are doubts in China too about its border claims. 

Professor Ge Jianxiong, director of the Institute of Chinese Historical Geography at Fudan University in Shanghai wrote in China Review that prior to 1912 when the Republic of China was established, the idea of China was not clearly conceptualised. 

Even during the late Qing period the term China would on occasion refer to the Qing state including all the territory that fell within the claimed boundaries of the Qing Empire. 

At other times it would be taken to refer to only the 18 interior provinces excluding Manchuria, Inner Mongolia, Tibet and Sinkiang (now Xianjiang).
Professor Ge added that the notions of Greater China were based entirely on the “one-sided views of Qing court records that were written for the court’s self-aggrandisement.” 

Ge criticised those who felt that the more they exaggerated the territory of historical China the more patriotic they were deemed to be.
Both, India and China are now experiencing new levels of nationalism. 

Territory is at the core of this nationalism, making the exchange of territories unpalatable to public opinion in both countries. 

If the package entails the withdrawal of the two territorial claims, it might win a modicum of support in both countries. 

But this is clearly not so. 

What Dai Bingguo is now suggesting is that India gives up its claim on Aksai Chin, and also cede the strategically vital Tawang tract.
What is feasible is for India and China to find acceptable lines of actual control based on sound strategic principles. 

Claims and counter-claims on territories is clearly not the way to go about it.

India Brushes Off China's Objections to Dalai Lama’s Upcoming Visit

By Anjana Pasricha

Tibetan spiritual leader the Dalai Lama speaks at a conference in New Delhi, India, Feb. 5, 2017. The Tibetan spiritual leader will visit India again next month.

NEW DELHI — Overriding objections by China, India will allow the Tibetan spiritual leader, the Dalai Lama, to make a religious visit to the far northeastern state of Arunachal Pradesh, a border territory partially claimed by China.
On Friday, Beijing warned India against the weeklong visit scheduled for next month, saying it will cause severe damage to bilateral ties and to peace and stability in the China-India border area.
India dismissed China’s concerns with Foreign Ministry spokesman Gopal Bagley saying, “the government’s position is well known and has not changed.”

Official to meet Dalai Lama
India’s junior home minister, Kiran Rijiju, said there is no reason to stop the Dalai Lama, as he is coming as a religious leader.
Rijiju, who is Prime Minister Narendra Modi’s point man on Tibetan relations, told the Press Trust of India that he would meet the Dalai Lama as a devotee during his visit to Arunachal Pradesh, which is home to a famed Buddhist monastery in Tawang. 

The Tibetan spiritual leader also visited it eight years ago.
China claims about 90,000 square kilometers in Arunachal Pradesh, calling it South Tibet.
Chinese Foreign Ministry spokesman Geng Shuang said Friday that Beijing strongly opposes the Dalai Lama visiting border areas and that it has urged India not to provide a platform to the “Dalai clique.” 

India's assertive stand
Analysts in New Delhi say the green light to the Dalai Lama’s visit and the federal minister’s plan to be present when he visits Tawang indicate a more assertive stand taken by the Modi government, whose relations with China have come under strain in the past year, partly because of Beijing’s increasingly close ties with Pakistan.
“It’s basically meant to take a tough line on China. They are being more bold on that (Dalai Lama) issue,” according to Manoj Joshi at New Delhi’s Observer Research Foundation. 

“Maybe the government thinks they can extract some leverage from this,” he says.

Indian President Pranab Mukherjee hosted the Dalai Lama in December at the presidential palace along with other Nobel laureates at a conference on children’s rights. 

It was the Dalai Lama’s first meeting with an Indian head of state in 60 years.
New Delhi also dismissed Chinese objections to that meeting, calling it a non-political event.
Indian leaders have seldom shared a public platform with the Dalai Lama, who fled to India in 1959, although they have had private meetings with him.
Last month, a Taiwanese parliamentary delegation visited Delhi, angering Beijing, which regards Taiwan as an integral part of China.
Despite decades of talks, the two Asian neighbors, who fought a brief war in 1963, have failed to resolve a boundary dispute.

Hurting the Feelings of the Chinese Dictators

India to host Dalai Lama in disputed territory
By Sanjeev Miglani and Tommy Wilkes | NEW DELHI

Tibet's exiled spiritual leader the Dalai Lama wipes his face during an international conference of Tibet support groups in Brussels, Belgium, September 8, 2016. 

Tibet's exiled spiritual leader the Dalai Lama puts a towel on his head during a news conference in Paris, France, September 13, 2016.

Tibet's exiled spiritual leader the Dalai Lama is seen at the Arcimboldi theater before receiving honorary citizenship of the city of Milan, in Milan, Italy October 20, 2016. 

Indian federal government representatives will meet the Dalai Lama when he visits Arunachal Pradesh, officials said, despite a warning from Beijing that it would damage ties.
India says the Tibetan spiritual leader will make a religious trip to Arunachal Pradesh next month, and as a secular democracy it would not stop him from traveling to any part of the country.
China claims the state in the eastern Himalayas as "South Tibet", and has denounced foreign and even Indian leaders' visits to the region as attempts to bolster New Delhi's territorial claims.
A trip by the Dalai Lama, whom the Chinese regard as a dangerous "separatist", would ratchet up tensions at a time when New Delhi is at odds with China on strategic and security issues and unnerved by Beijing's growing ties with arch-rival Pakistan.
Prime Minister Narendra Modi's administration is raising its public engagement with the Tibetan leader, a change from earlier governments' reluctance to anger Beijing by sharing a public platform with him.
"It's a behavioral change you are seeing. India is more assertive," junior home minister Kiren Rijiju told Reuters in an interview.
Rijiju, who is from Arunachal and is Modi's point man on Tibetan issues, said he would meet the Dalai Lama, who is visiting the Buddhist Tawang monastery after an eight-year interval.
"He is going there as a religious leader, there is no reason to stop him. His devotees are demanding he should come, what harm can he do? He is a lama."
The Chinese Foreign Ministry said on Friday the Dalai Lama's trip would cause serious damage to India-China ties.

CHINA INVESTING NEARBY
Visits of the Dalai Lama are initiated months, if not years in advance, and approval for the April 4-13 trip predates recent disagreements between the neighbors.
But the decision to go ahead at a time of strained relations signals Modi's readiness to use diplomatic tools at a time when China's economic and political clout across South Asia is growing.
China is helping to fund a new trade corridor across India's neighbor and arch-foe Pakistan, and has also invested in Sri Lanka and Bangladesh, raising fears of strategic encirclement.
Last month a Taiwanese parliamentary delegation visited Delhi, angering Beijing, which regards Taiwan as an integral part of China.
In December, President Pranab Mukherjee hosted the Dalai Lama at his official residence with other Nobel prize winners, the first public meeting with an Indian head of state in 60 years.
Some officials said India's approach to the Tibetan issue remained cautious, reflecting a gradual evolution in policy rather than a sudden shift, and Modi appears reluctant to go too far for fear of upsetting its large northern neighbor.
India's foreign secretary, Subrahmanyam Jaishankar, was in Beijing last week on a visit that analysts said was aimed at stabilizing relations between the world's most populous countries.

TANGIBLE SHIFT
That said, Modi's desire to pursue a more assertive foreign policy since his election in 2014 was quickly felt in contacts with China.
At one bilateral meeting early in his tenure, Foreign Minister Sushma Swaraj asked her Chinese counterpart whether Beijing had a "one India" policy, according to a source familiar with India-China talks, a pointed reference to Beijing's demand that countries recognize its "one China" policy.
"One India" would imply that China recognize India's claims to Kashmir, contested by Pakistan, as well as border regions like Arunachal Pradesh.
India's hosting of the Dalai Lama since he fled to India in 1959 after a failed uprising against Chinese rule has long irritated Beijing. 

But government ministers often shied away from regular public meetings with the Buddhist monk.
"These meetings were happening before. Now it is public," Lobsang Sangay, head of the Tibetan government-in-exile based in the Indian town of Dharamsala, said in an interview.
"I notice a tangible shift. With all the Chinese investments in all the neighboring countries, that has generated debate within India," he said.
The chief minister of Arunachal Pradesh, a member of Modi's Bharatiya Janata Party, met the Dalai Lama in New Delhi in October and officially invited him to visit the state.
On the Dalai Lama's last visit in 2009, the state's chief minister met him. 

This time he will be joined by federal minister Rijiju, a move the Chinese may see as giving the trip an official imprimatur.
New Delhi has been hurt by China's refusal to let it join the Nuclear Suppliers Group, the global cartel that controls nuclear commerce.
India has also criticized Beijing for stonewalling its request to add the head of a banned Pakistani militant group to a U.N. Security Council blacklist.
Rory Medcalf, Head of the National Security College at the Australian National University, said New Delhi appeared to have been surprised by China's inflexibility since Modi came to power, fuelling distrust in the Indian security establishment.
"India does feel that the cards are stacked against it and that it should retain and play the cards that it does have," he said. 

"The Dalai Lama and Tibetan exile community is clearly one of those cards."