Welcome to an emerging Asia: India and China stop feigning friendship while Russia plays all sides

By Harsh V Pant

In a hard place.

After a few timid signs of warming, Sino-Indian relations seem to be headed for the freezer. 

While Beijing refuses to take Indian security concerns seriously, New Delhi may have decided to take the Chinese challenge head-on. 

To complicate matters for India, its erstwhile ally Russia, which has become a close friend of China, is showing interest in establishing closer ties with Pakistan.
The latest move that clenches teeth in India is China refusing to lift a hold on Pakistan-based Jaish-e-Mohammad chief Masood Azhar, accused of plotting multiple acts of terrorism against India, and blocking him in December from being listed as a terrorist by the United Nations. 

Since March, China has blocked India’s attempts to put a ban on Azhar, under the sanctions committee of the UN Security Council, despite support from other members of the 15-nation body. 

In response, India has gone beyond expressing dismay by testing its long-range ballistic missiles—Agni IV and Agni V—in recent weeks. 

Pakistan, aided by China, has also jumped in by testing its first sea cruise missile that could be eventually launched from a Pakistani submarine.
China has upped the ante, indicating a willingness to help Pakistan increase the range of its nuclear missiles. 

China’s official mouthpiece, Global Times, contended in an editorial: “if the Western countries accept India as a nuclear country and are indifferent to the nuclear race between India and Pakistan, China will not stand out and stick rigidly to those nuclear rules as necessary. At this time, Pakistan should have those privileges in nuclear development that India has.”

China’s $46 billion investment in the so-called China-Pakistan Economic Corridor, or CPEC, also troubles India as the land corridor extends through the contested territory in Kashmir which India claims as its own. 

India views CPEC as an insidious attempt by China to create new realities on the ground and a brazen breach of India’s sovereignty and territory. 

The Chinese media have suggested that India should join CPEC to “boost its export and slash its trade deficit with China” and “the northern part of India bordering Pakistan and Jammu & Kashmir will gain more economic growth momentum.”
New Delhi has questioned if China would accept an identical situation in Tibet or Taiwan, or if this is a new phase in Chinese policy with China accepting Pakistan’s claims as opposed to the previous stance of viewing Kashmir as disputed territory.

Faced with an intransigent China, India under the centre-right government led by Narendra Modi is busy reevaluating its China policy. 

Modi’s initial outreach to China soon after coming to office in May 2014 failed to produce any substantive outcome and he has since decided to take a more hard-nosed approach. 

New Delhi has strengthened partnerships with like-minded countries, including the United States, Japan, Australia, and Vietnam. 

India has bolstered its capabilities along the troubled border with China and the Indian military is operationally gearing up for a two-front war. 

India is also ramping up its nuclear and conventional deterrence against China by testing long-range missiles, raising a mountain strike corps for the border with China, enhancing submarine capabilities, and basing its first squadron of French-made Rafale fighter jets near that border.
More interesting is a significant shift in India’s Tibet policy with the Modi government deciding to bring the issue back into the Sino-Indian bilateral equation. 

India will openly welcome the Dalai Lama, Tibet’s spiritual leader who has lived in exile in India since 1959, at an international conference on Buddhism to be held in Rajgir-Nalanda, Bihar, in March. 

And ignoring Beijing’s protests, the Dalai Lama will also visit the Indian state of Arunachal Pradesh which China claims as part of its own territory.
After initially ceding ground to Chinese sensitivities on Tibet and refusing to explicitly acknowledge official interactions with the Dalai Lama, a more public role for the monk is now presented as an essential part of the Indian response to China. 

In the first meeting in decades between a serving Indian head of state and the Dalai Lama, Indian President Pranab Mukherjee hosted the Buddhist leader at the inaugural session of the first Laureates and Leaders for Children Summit, held at the president’s official residence in New Delhi in December.

Pawn for giants: China strives to curb the influence of the Dalai Lama, who lives in India. The religion emerged in India during 5th century BC and has numerous sects.

China has not taken kindly to these moves by India and vehemently opposes any attempt to boost the image or credibility of the Dalai Lama.
China has been relentless in seeking isolation for the Dalai Lama and often succeeds in bullying weaker states to bar the monk. 

After the Dalai Lama’s November visit to the predominantly Buddhist Mongolia, where he is revered as a spiritual leader, the nation incurred China’s wrath and soon apologised, promising that the Dalai Lama would no longer be allowed to enter the country.
But India is not Mongolia. 

There is growing disenchantment with Chinese behaviour in New Delhi. 

Appeasing China by sacrificing the interests of the Tibetan people has not yielded any benefits for India, nor has there been tranquility in the Himalayas in recent decades. 

As China’s aggressiveness has grown, Indian policymakers are no longer content to play by rules set by China. 

Although India has formally acknowledged Tibet as a part of China, there is a new push to support the legitimate rights of the Tibetan people so as to negotiate with China from a position of strength.
This Sino-Indian geopolitical jostling is also being shaped by the broader shift in global and regional strategic equations. 

Delhi long took Russian support for granted. 

Yet, much to India’s discomfiture, China has found a new ally in Russia which is keen to side with it, even as a junior partner, to scuttle western interests. 

Historically sound Indo-Russian ties have become a casualty of this trend and to garner Chinese support for its anti-West posturing, Russia has refrained from supporting Indian positions.
Worried about India’s growing proximity to the United States, Russia is also warming up to Pakistan. 

The two held their first joint military exercise in September and their first bilateral consultation on regional issues in December. 

After officially lifting an arms embargo against Pakistan in 2014, Russia will deliver four Russian-made Mi-35M attack helicopters in 2017 to Pakistan’s military. 

It is also likely that the China-backed CPEC might be merged with the Russia-backed Eurasian Economic Union. 

Jettisoning its traditional antipathy to the Taliban, Russia indicates a readiness to negotiate with the Taliban against the backdrop of the growing threat of the Islamic State in Afghanistan. 

Towards that end, Russia is already working with China and Pakistan, thereby marginalising India in the regional process.
As the Trump administration takes office in Washington on Jan. 20, it will be rushing into headwinds generated by growing Sino-Indian tensions and a budding Sino-Russian entente. 

Trump’s own pro-Russia and anti-China inclinations could further complicate geopolitical alignments in Asia. 

Growing tension in the Indian subcontinent promises to add to the volatility.

China's Strategic Encirclement Of India’s Core Interests

By Bhaskar Roy

Having failed to constrict India within South Asia with its “String of Pearls” Strategy, China has now embarked on a new initiative to trip India’s growing comprehensive national power (CNP) and influence beyond South Asia.
India’s neighbours swam with China periodically, depending on the government in those countries. For example, the Mahinda Rajapksa government in Sri Lanka jumped into China’s lap for their own political reasons. 

The Mathiripala Sirisena government has restored the balance.
The BNP led four party alliance government (2001-2006) in Bangladesh brought relations with India to the lowest ebb. 

The alliance had parties like the Jamaat-e-Islami which were beholden to Pakistan and actively complicit in the savage rape and attempted extermination of the pro-liberation Bengalees in 1971. They were natural allies of not only Pakistan but also China which supported Pakistan. 

The return of the Awami League to power changed this policy drastically. 

The Awami League government, due to practical necessity and real politics, crafted a friendly relationship with China, but not at the expense of their relationship with India. 

China, however, is trying to entice Dhaka, but this does not worry India because India-Bangladesh relationship has more than political market imperatives. 

There is a cultural and historical conjunction.
Nepal has been vacillating between India and China. 

Lodged between the two giant countries, they are trying to get the best out of the two. 

China recognises India’s influence in Nepal, but has been consistently trying to weaken the India-Nepal relationship.
Pakistan has emerged as China’s mainstay in the region and extends to the Gulf, the Central Asian region, and now they are trying to draw in Russia in this ambit. 

Weakening India-Russia relations is one of its aims. 

With its promised 46 billion investment in Pakistan for the China-Pakistan Economic Corridor (CPEC), Control of the Gwadar Port (a military project), primary arms and defence equipment supplier and recent acquisition of 40 percent of the Pakistan stock market by a Chinese conglomerate, Pakistan is fast emerging as a country under Chinese suzerainty. 

Evidence suggests Pakistan may soon become a platform for the projection of both soft and hard power for being along the route envisaged for the “One Belt, One Road” (OBOR) project. 

China is unlikely to declare Pakistan as one of its “core” interests, but it is already acting as such.
Lately, China has been expressing concerns about achieving the full potential of the CPEC. 

In an article in the Communist Party affiliated newspaper Global Times (Dec. 28, 2016), Wang Dehua, Director of the Institute of Southern and Central Asian Studies, Shanghai Municipal Center for Internal Studies, wrote that the CEPC was facing challenges. 

He went on to describe the project as having “significant economic, political and strategic implications for both China and Pakistan”.
Wang wrote this in the context of a spat between the Chinese Chargé d'Affaires in Islamabad Zhao Lijian and a journalist of the Pakistani newspaper Dawn. 

The concerned journalist asked Zhao some uncomfortable questions including use of Chinese prisoners as labour. 

The senior Chinese diplomat lost his cool in a public place, which is very uncharacteristic of the Chinese.
Wang Dehua revealed that Chinese investment was raised to $51 billion from the initial $46 billion. The Chinese party media have extolled the virtue of the CPEC not only for China and Pakistan but other countries of the region including India, Iran, Afghanistan and Russia. 

The emphasis has been more on India, suggesting that India joining the project could help reduce tensions between India and Pakistan. 

Simultaneously, there is a suggestion to link Gwadar and Chabahar ports as sister ports and sister cities.
The CPEC is the flagship project of the larger OBOR strategic conception of extending China’s circulatory system far and wide. 

It has political and strategic penetration as significant benefits. 

Most important is the fact that it is Xi Jinping’s prestige project. It cannot be allowed to fail at any cost. 

It is also part of China’s great power signature.
At the same time, Beijing is ramping up pressure on India in a shower, trying to destabilise India’s emerging foreign policy. 

Beijing’s stand will have serious negative implications especially on the biggest threat to the world at this moment, terrorism. 

In the last week of December, China vetoed India’s move to designate Masood Azhar, head of Pakistan-based terrorist organisation Jaish-e-Mohammad as a “terrorist” at the UN Committee 2167 on terrorism. 

This, when the organisation itself is designated as a terrorist organisation by the same committee.
This one move by China has hit at the very roots of the global movement against extremism and terrorism. 

Read plainly, China will use terrorism as a political weapon against perceived enemies, in this case India.

It also encourages Pakistan to use terrorism with impunity against India, Afghanistan and even, perhaps Bangladesh.
India is determined to continue its efforts to bring other Pakistani-based and backed terrorists in front of the 2167 committee. 

China is the only member of their 15 member committee to oppose the move against Azhar. 

In a manner China stands isolated.
China took umbrage and accused India of interfering in China’s internal affairs after the Indian President met His Holiness the Dalai Lama at a function which was totally non-political. 

Their official media threatened India of retaliation of the kind they subjected the tiny country of Mongolia after Dalai Lama’s visit to Mongolia that was a purely religious one. 

Mongolia is a Buddhist Country, mostly of the Gelugpa sect of Buddhism which the Dalai Lama heads spiritually. 

This is a stupid threat. 

Mongolia a tiny land locked country, with a population of around two million, is dependent on China for outside access. 

Such threats do not impress the Indian government and the Indian people. 

The Chinese threat appears to be an act of frustration.
Nevertheless, Tibet is a declared core interest of China, hence the Dalai Lama. 

The 80 year spiritual leader has withdrawn himself from politics, but his influence and reverence among Tibetans inside China and outside is palpable. 

The Chinese have not been able to come to a firm conclusion whether the living 14th Dalai Lama or deceased 14th Dalai Lama will be to their interest.
The Chinese leadership has tried to denigrate the Dalai Lama in all possible ways, calling him a ‘splittist’ (separatist), ‘devil’, ‘wolf in sheep’s clothing among other things, but these have not impressed anyone. 

Beijing suspects India is using Dalai Lama as a ‘card’ against China.
India has accepted Tibet Autonomous Region as a sovereign part of China (2003). 

The Tibetan refugees in India are not allowed political activities. 

Successive governments in New Delhi have bent over backwards to accommodate China’s concerns. But if China continues to attack India on this issue, India will be forced to fight back: Allow the Dalai Lama and the generally accepted Kargyupa head Ughen Thinley Dorjee freedom to move around India including Tawang and the rest of Arunachal Pradesh.

China is trying to push the OBOR to and through Nepal and Bangladesh. 

They hope that through persuasion from these two countries India may succumb and agree to join the OBOR in the interest of its good neighbourhood policy. 

If India does not relent China may seek alternative policies in India’s neighbourhood to constrict India. 

The Global Times has already hinted at this.
Beijing remains determined to keep India out of the Nuclear Supplies Group (NSG). 

It has now objected to India’s successful testing (Dec. 16, 2016) of the 5000 kms nuclear capable ballistic missile Agni V. 

In a sharply worded statement Chinese foreign ministry spokespersons threatened to take this issue to the UN Security Council resolution 1172 after the 1998 nuclear tests by India and Pakistan. 

The resolution passed at the heat of the moment and engineered by China and the US calling on the two countries to stop further nuclear tests, cap their nuclear weapon programmes, cease all fissile material production, and end development of ballistic missiles capable of carrying nuclear weapons. The resolution, however is non-binding. 

China’s threat falls through the floor.
Since then, India has come a long way on the nuclear issue. 

It issued a moratorium on nuclear testing, announced no first use of nuclear weapons policy and signed the India-US nuclear deal. 

India, however, will have to counter Chinese pressures in several such areas in the future.
The Chinese spokesperson also said that “China maintains that preserving the strategic balance and stability in South Asia is conducive to peace and prosperity of regional countries ‘and beyond’. Basically, the statement implied that India may have disturbed the strategic balance in South Asia and beyond, without counting its own intercontinental nuclear capable ballistic missiles and other weapons. 

As China its military development is defensive and not aimed at any country, so is the official India position.
But things between India and China may get worse if the CPEC and OBOR falter seriously. 

This is closely linked to Xi Jinping’s politics and stature of “core” leader of the Chinese Communist Party. 

The 19th Congress to the party will be held in autumn this year and major leadership changes will take place. 

Xi cannot have any chinks in his armour.

Axis of Terror

China blocks India's request for U.N. to blacklist militant chief
By Paritosh Bansal

Xi Jinping's Terrrorist -- Maulana Masood Azhar, head of Pakistan's militant Jaish-e-Mohammad party, attends a pro-Taliban conference organised by the Afghan Defence Council in Islamabad August 26, 2001. 

NEW DELHI -- China has blocked India's request to add the head of the Pakistan-based militant group Jaish-e-Mohammad to a U.N. Security Council blacklist of groups linked to al Qaeda, India said on Friday.
India has accused Jaish-e-Mohammad and its top leader, Maulana Masood Azhar, of masterminding several attacks, including a deadly assault on an Indian air base in January.
Pakistani security officials interrogated Azhar and his associates after the attack, and said they found no evidence linking him to it.
Jaish-e-Mohammad has already been blacklisted by the 15-nation Security Council, but not Azhar, an Islamist hardliner and long-time foe of India.
Foreign ministry spokesman Vikas Swarup said that India had requested that Azhar be added to the list nine months ago and had received strong backing from all other members of the council.
But China, which put a hold on the move in April, had now blocked it, he said.
"We had expected China would have been more understanding of the danger posed to all by terrorism," he said in a statement.
Swarup added that the inability of the international community to take the step showed the "prevalence of double standards in the fight against terrorism."
China's foreign ministry did not immediately respond to a request for comment late on Friday evening.
India has long accused its neighbour and rival Pakistan of using Jaish-e-Mohammad as a proxy to mount attacks on Indian soil, including in the disputed Kashmir region, and earlier gave what it called "actionable intelligence" to Pakistan, including telephone intercepts.
Pakistan denies giving any aid to Kashmir-based militants.
If Azhar was blacklisted by the U.N. Security Council, he would face a global travel ban and asset freeze.

Why is a Pakistani terrorist so important to China?

China was the only country among the 15-member UNSC to have opposed the ban on Jaish-e-Mohammad chief Masood Azhar
By Elizabeth Roche

A file photo of Jaish-e-Mohammad chief Maulana Masood Azhar.

New Delhi -- This year, China has twice blocked India’s bid to get Jaish-e-Mohammad chief Masood Azhar declared as a UN-designated terrorist. 

The first instance was in April and the second earlier this month.
India holds Azhar responsible for many terrorist acts in India including the 13 December 2001 attack on India’s parliament as well the 2 January 2016 attack on the Pathankot airbase. 

On the record, Beijing says it stands against all forms of terrorism, but it has refused to end its “technical hold” on the ban on Azhar. 

China was the only country among the 15-member UN Security Council (UNSC) to oppose the ban on Azhar, with countries such as Saudi Arabia backing India.
Replying to a question on criticism about China’s move to stall India’s bid for a UN ban on Azhar, China’s vice foreign minister Li Baodong last week sought to justify Beijing’s position. 

In a veiled reference to India, which is pressing for the UN ban against Azhar over his role in the Pathankot terror attack, he said: “China is opposed to all forms of terrorism. There should be no double standards on counter-terrorism. Nor should one pursue own political gains in the name of counter-terrorism.”
So, why is China supporting Mazood Azhar and why is he so important to China?
There are several possible explanations.
One, given that China and Pakistan are “all-weather friends” Beijing’s efforts are aimed at keeping its ally in South Asia happy. 

India is seen as a competitor and a threat by China and needling India in this way keeps India “boxed in” by problems in South Asia, leaving it with little leeway to focus on issues away from its immediate neighbourhood. 

Any breakthrough in South Asia in terms of peace with Pakistan or penalising Pakistan with support from other countries would mean India being free to concentrate further afield. 

Officially though, China says that its veto on Azhar “will allow more time for the committee to deliberate on the matter and for relevant parties to have further consultations” given the different views among UN Security Council members on the matter.
Pakistan’s support for China within groupings like the Organisation of Islamic Cooperation (OIC) and others like the Non-Aligned Movement where China has no representation could be another reason for Beijing extending support to Pakistan through the UNSC, where it is a powerful veto-wielding member. 

In the past, Pakistan has reportedly shielded China in the OIC against caustic remarks on Beijing’s crackdowns on its Muslim Uyghur community in its restive Xinjiang province. 

Islamabad has also stood up against any inclusion of sharp language against Beijing at the Non Aligned Movement’s meetings on its conduct in the South China Sea. 

Beijing claims almost all of the South China Sea, disputing claims by countries like the Philippines and Vietnam.
A third reason could be India’s growing proximity to the US that China definitely sees as a major challenge. 

India’s warming relations with the US in the past decade, the high water mark of which was the 2008 civil nuclear deal, has been variously debated and discussed as moves by the US to find a counterweight to China in Asia. 

These moves have fuelled Chinese suspicions and needling India using Masood Azhar could be one way of keeping India on tenterhooks. 

In the past, China has also opposed India’s membership into the elite Nuclear Suppliers Group and the UN Security Council. 

According to analysts, it is also part of power politics – keeping power concentrated within the hands of a few and keeping others out.
Another reason could be China’s pique with India for sheltering the Dalai Lama who Beijing considers a “subversive” and a “splittist.” 

The Dalai Lama is the temporal head of Tibetan Buddhists. 

He was made head of state at age 15 in 1950, the same year that Chinese troops occupied Tibet. 

In 1959, the Dalai Lama fled Tibet for exile in India after a failed uprising against Chinese rule. 

That New Delhi has given the Tibetan spiritual leader asylum is a sore point vis-a-vis Beijing. 

“For the Chinese, the Dalai Lama is sort of the equivalent of (Lashkar e Toiba terrorist group leader) Hafeez Saeed for India,” remarked an Indian diplomat who was posted in Beijing recently.
Last but not the least is the key role played by Pakistan in China’s One Belt One Road plans. 

China has pledged $51 billion in projects and investments in an economic corridor that literally runs across the length of Pakistan – connecting China’s Xinjiang region to the Arabian Sea port of Gwadar. 

The port is important for China which sees it as an alternative to sea routes from Africa and West Asia through the South China Sea. 

The project is projected as bringing development to some of Pakistan’s most backward regions like Baluchistan where Islamabad has been trying to quell an insurgency for decades.