American Paper Tiger

China Wants Confrontation in the South China Sea
By Gordon G. Chang

Last Wednesday, the USS Hopper, an Arleigh Burke–class missile destroyer, sailed within twelve nautical miles of Scarborough Shoal, a few rocks in the northern portion of the South China Sea.
We would not have known about the sail-by if we were relying on the Pentagon.

Beijing announced the event and then made threats.

The Chinese, we have to conclude, are itching for a confrontation.
Therefore, strategic Scarborough Shoal, a mere 124 nautical miles from the main Philippine island of Luzon and guarding Manila and Subic bays, could be the hinge on which America’s relations with China swings.
Think of Scarborough as perhaps this century’s Sudetenland. 

In the spring of 2012, Chinese and Philippine vessels sailed in close proximity of contested Scarborough. 

Washington brokered an agreement between Beijing and Manila for both sides to withdraw their craft. 

Only the Philippines did so, leaving China in control of the feature, which had long been thought to be part of the Philippines even though it was inside Beijing’s infamous “nine-dash line.”
Washington, unfortunately, did not enforce the agreement it had arranged, undoubtedly under the belief it could thereby avoid confrontation with China. 

The White House’s inaction just made the problem bigger, however. 

By doing nothing, the Obama administration empowered the most belligerent elements in the Chinese capital by showing everyone else there that duplicity—and aggression—worked.
An emboldened Beijing then ramped up pressure on Second Thomas Shoal, where China employed Scarborough-like tactics by swarming the area with vessels, and the Senkakus, eight specks under Japanese administration in the East China Sea.
In short, Washington, through timidity, ensured the Chinese took ever more provocative actions.
And ensured American allies questioned Washington’s leadership. 

Today, American policymakers complain that the current Philippine president, Rodrigo Duterte, has been cozying up to Beijing. 

Although thoroughly anti-American all his adult life, the Philippine leader has a point when he said his country, despite the mutual defense treaty with America, could not rely on Washington to defend his islands. 

The result of irresolute American policy is that China, which is dismembering the Philippines, is now more influential in Manila than the United States, the only nation pledged to defend the archipelago’s security.
In view of China’s growing confidence and assertion, it is no surprise that its reaction to the Hopper’s passage has been intense. 

State and party media, while replaying old themes of protecting “indisputable” sovereignty, went into overdrive with their most provocative language, that of inflicting indignity on the United States. 

“The reckless provocation ended in disgrace for the U.S. Navy,” wrote Curtis Stone of the Communist Party’s People’s Daily, China’s most authoritative publication.
The Global Times, the tabloid controlled by People’s Daily, predicted that if Washington did not change course, it would become “a lonely pirate” and “suffer complete humiliation.”
Washington’s reaction was, in keeping with its traditional posture, low-key. 

“All operations are conducted in accordance with international law and demonstrate that the United States will fly, sail, and operate wherever international law allows,” said Pentagon spokesman Lt. Col. Christopher Logan, without specifically mentioning Hopper’s patrol.
And when Washington policymakers did talk about the Hopper, they did so anonymously and in tones meant to avoid offense. 

A “U.S. official” said the transit was an “innocent passage” and not a freedom of navigation operation.
That stance allowed the Philippine defense secretary, Delfin Lorenzana, on Sunday to defend the U.S. Navy’s sail-by, because it did not impinge on his nation’s sovereignty.
Yet Hopper would have never made the transit if Manila were in sole control of the shoal. 

The motivating factor, of course, was China. 

“China’s goal in the South China Sea appears to be a gradual extension of its sovereignty to a maritime space the size of India,” Anders Corr, editor of the just-released Great Powers, Grand Strategies: The New Game in the South China Sea, told the National Interest.
In view of this expansive vision, an “innocent passage” is a counterproductive response.
“In our department in Newport, we’re always taking leaders to task for ‘self-defeating behavior,’” James Holmes of the Naval War College e-mailed me on Monday, commenting for himself and not on behalf of the U.S. government. 

“The anonymous official quoted in press accounts as saying the Hopper passage was an ‘innocent passage’ is guilty of that behavior.”
“Innocent passage is something ships do when passing within 12 nautical miles of sovereign territory,” Holmes, co-author of Red Star Over the Pacific: China’s Rise and the Challenge to U.S. Maritime Strategy, points out. 

“So if we’re depicting the Hopper passage by Scarborough Shoal as an innocent passage, we are conceding precisely what a freedom-of-navigation operation is supposed to dispute: that China is the lawful sovereign over Scarborough and that it’s entitled to a 12-mile territorial sea around the shoal.”
Scarborough is well within the exclusive economic zone of the Philippines, and China is essentially asserting squatter’s rights. 

Moreover, Philippines vs. China, the July 2016 Hague decision applying the UN Convention on the Law of the Sea, holds that the shoal does not confer a twelve-nautical-mile band of territorial water. “Our passes by Scarborough must show that they are not innocent in legal terms,” Holmes notes. 

“We must get our language straight, stay on message, and remind everyone regularly that the Hague tribunal smacked down China’s unlawful claims with extreme prejudice back in 2016. That’s how we avoid defeating ourselves.”
American officials, for years, have been characterizing freedom of navigation exercises around Chinese-held features as “innocent passages,” hoping not to rile Beijing. 

That strategy, unfortunately, has produced the opposite result.
The Trump administration, however, is changing four decades of America’s soft approach to China. That “pivot” is evident in the National Security Strategy, unveiled in December, and the National Defense Strategy, a summary of which was released Friday.
China in these landmark policy statements is essentially characterized as an adversary.
Yet historic changes in policy take years to implement.
“My belief is that we still have a long way to go to undo the pernicious impact of the policy of appeasement,” James Fanell, a former U.S. Navy intelligence officer with the Pacific Fleet, told the National Interest in strong, but nonetheless accurate, terms.
“We have several generations of government workers who have been trained to be more attuned to ‘not provoking’ or ‘not offending’ the Chinese than in openly challenging their expansionist activities. This is despite two new policy documents, the NSS and NDS, that clearly intend to challenge Beijing’s outrageous expansionism.”
American policymakers are struggling to come to terms with Beijing’s open hostility to the United States.
Obviously, Chinese officials could have ignored the Hopper’s passage, but their choosing to make an issue of it suggests they are determined to pick a fight.

Chinese Aggressions

U.S. drill designed to reject China's claim around artificial island: officials
By Idrees Ali and David Brunnstrom | WASHINGTON

A U.S. warship carried out a "maneuvering drill" when it sailed within 12 nautical miles of an artificial island built up by China in the South China Sea, to show it was not entitled to a territorial sea around it, U.S. officials said on Thursday.
The operation near Mischief Reef on Thursday, Pacific time, among a string of islets, reefs and shoals over which China has disputes with its neighbors, was the boldest U.S. challenge yet to Chinese island-building in the strategic waterway.
It drew an angry response from China, which Donald Trump has tried to court in recent weeks to persuade it to take a tougher line on North Korea's nuclear and missile programs. 

Analysts say previous U.S. "freedom-of-navigation operations" in the Spratly archipelago involved "innocent passage," in which a warship effectively recognized a territorial sea by crossing it speedily, without stopping.
On Thursday, the destroyer USS Dewey conducted a "man overboard" exercise, specifically to show that its passage within 12 nautical miles was not innocent passage, U.S. officials said.
"USS Dewey engaged in normal operations by conducting a maneuvering drill inside 12 nautical miles of Mischief Reef," one official said, speaking on condition of anonymity.

The Arleigh Burke-class guided-missile destroyer USS Dewey prepares for a replenishment-at-sea in the South China Sea May 19, 2017. Picture taken May 19, 2017.

Arleigh Burke-class guided-missile destroyer USS Dewey transits the South China Sea May 6, 2017.
Chinese dredging vessels are purportedly seen in the waters around Mischief Reef in the disputed Spratly Islands in the South China Sea in this still image from video taken by a P-8A Poseidon surveillance aircraft provided by the United States Navy May 21, 2015.
An aerial photo taken though a glass window of a Philippine military plane shows the alleged on-going land reclamation by China on Mischief Reef in the Spratly Islands in the South China Sea, west of Palawan, Philippines, May 11, 2015.

"The ship’s actions demonstrated that Mischief Reef is not entitled to its own territorial sea regardless of whether an artificial island has been built on top of it."
China claims nearly all of the South China Sea and Washington has criticized its construction of islands and build-up of military facilities there, concerned they could be used to restrict free movement and broaden Beijing's strategic reach.
U.S. allies and partners in the region had grown anxious as the Trump administration held off on carrying out South China Sea operations during its first few months in office.
Greg Poling of Washington's Center for Strategic and International Studies think tank said that under international law, Mischief Reef was not entitled to a territorial sea as it was underwater at high tide before it was built up by China.
"This was a statement to the Chinese," he said.
"The previous two freedom-of-navigation operations only challenged China's demand for prior notification for innocent passage through the territorial sea; this one asserted that there is no territorial sea at all."
The Trump administration vowed to conduct more robust South China Sea operations after Barack Obama was criticized for reinforcing China's claims by sticking to innocent passage.
Even so, this was the first freedom-of-navigation operation since October and since Trump took office in January.
It comes ahead of a visit to Singapore next week by U.S. Defense Secretary Jim Mattis to discuss security with regional counterparts.
Beijing said two Chinese guided-missile warships had warned the U.S. vessel to leave the waters and that it had lodged "stern representations" with the United States.
China's claims in the South China Sea, through which about $5 trillion in ship-borne trade passes each year, are contested by Brunei, Malaysia, the Philippines and Vietnam.

U.S. Defense Department Confirms USS Decatur Did Not Follow Innocent Passage and Challenged China’s Excessive Straight Baselines

By Julian Ku 

In my analysis of the USS Decatur’s freedom of navigation operation (FONOP) near the China-occupied Paracel Islands last month, I wrote that the FONOP “probably” did not follow innocent passage and “most likely” challenged China’s excessive straight baselines. 

 I hedged my language on both points a little because the initial US government statement called the passage “routine” and did not mention straight baselines.
Thanks to Commander Gary Ross, from the press office of the Office of the U.S. Secretary of Defense, I can now confirm both facts. 

 In an email to me, Commander Ross writes: In this operation on Oct. 21, the U.S. naval vessel USS Decatur engaged in normal operations by conducting a non-provocative maneuvering drill.
"Normal operations" refers to the exercise of "high seas" freedoms under international law as reflected in Articles 58 and 87 of the Law of the Sea Convention. 

This differs from innocent passage, which involves the continuous and expeditious traversing of the territorial sea. 

Normal operations can be demonstrated through the exercise of maneuvering drills, launch and recovery of aircraft, man-overboard drills, or other non-continuous/non-expeditious actions.
In response to my emailed query, Commander Ross also confirms that the Decatur FONOP was aimed at challenging China’s excessive straight baselines.

Paper Tiger

America's “Innocent Passage” Did More Harm Than Good

By James Holmes

Unambitious. 

That’s the proper adjective for USS Decatur’s “freedom of navigation” cruise near the Paracel Islands last week. 

Released last year, the Pentagon’s Asia-Pacific Maritime Security Strategy lists “safeguarding freedom of the seas” first among U.S. strategic priorities for the region, followed by “deterring conflict and coercion” and “promoting adherence to international law and standards.” 

The Maritime Security Strategy is a fine document on the whole, and there’s no quarreling with its to-do list. 

The document also presents observers a yardstick to judge Decatur’s exploits in the South China Sea.
The yardstick tells a sobering tale: on balance the operation advanced none of the Pentagon’s self-professed strategic aims. 

It challenged one minor Chinese infraction—Beijing’s demand that foreign ships request permission before transiting waters China regards as its own—while letting China’s major affronts to freedom of the seas stand. 

Indeed, by seeming to acquiesce in the notion that the transit was an “innocent passage” through Chinese-claimed waters, the operation may have actually vindicated Beijing’s lawlessness. 

That’s no way to promote adherence to international law and standards, let alone deter conflict or coercion.
Let’s review the legal dimension, then examine how misconceived operations ripple through U.S. alliances in the Indo-Pacific. 

Legalities first. 

The Aegis destroyer traversed waters that China deems part of its “territorial sea,” offshore waters subject to Chinese sovereignty. 

But a simple transit like Decatur’s does nothing to dispute Beijing’s assertion that it makes the rules regulating shipping in the South China Sea—including the Paracels. 

Indeed, the law of the sea explicitly permitsforeign vessels to pass through a coastal state’s territorial sea provided that’s all they do—pass through.
That’s why the doctrine is known as innocent passage. 

A vessel undertaking an innocent passage must refrain from all manner of routine military activities. It may not operate aircraft from its decks, conduct underwater surveys, or do anything else that might be construed as impeaching the coastal state’s security. 

Decatur evidently desisted from all of these activities—and thus comported itself as though it were executing an innocent passage through China’s rightful territorial waters.
What does acting as though China’s claims are legitimate prove? 

Not much. 

The voyage did nothing to dispute Beijing’s effort to fence off the Paracels within “baselines” sketched around the archipelago’s perimeter and proclaim sovereignty—physical control backed by force—over the waters within. 

To reply to that claim, Decatur should have made the transit while carrying out every activity Beijing purports to forbid—sending helicopters aloft, probing the depths with sonar, and on and on. 

What China proscribes, in other words, friends of freedom of the sea must do.
Fail to contest excesses and you consent to them by default.
Now, it is true that Decatur’s crew didn’t request Chinese permission before making the crossing. 

The destroyer’s matter-of-fact approach flouted China’s demand that foreign ships request permission before transiting its territorial sea. (For that matter, China insists that skippers ask permission before essaying “any military acts” in its offshore “exclusive economic zone,” the expanded sea belt where the coastal state has exclusive rights to harvest natural resources from the water and seafloor. Apart from the right to extract resources, the coastal state has no special say-so over what happens in the EEZ. The EEZ and the waters beyond comprise the “high seas,” a “commons” that belongs to everyone and no one.)
In effect, then, USS Decatur and the U.S. Navy were quibbling over a trivial rule China wants to enforce rather than denying that China has any right to make such rules.
One suspects Lieutenant Stephen Decatur, the destroyer’s namesake, would shake his head in bafflement. 

Decatur was among the most venturesome seafarers in U.S. naval annals, and not someone to blanch at jabbing coastal-state rulers who entertained grandiose pretensions. 

In 1804, Decatur brought the ketch USS Intrepid under the guns of Tripoli—and risked being blasted to splinters—to burn the captured sail frigate USS Philadelphia before the pasha put her to work raiding U.S. merchantmen. 

Afterward Lord Horatio Nelson—himself no slouch at nautical derring-do—reportedly acclaimed Decatur and Intrepid sailors for pulling off the “most bold and daring act of the age.”
High praise indeed! 

In fact, Decatur furnishes a north star to guide U.S. Navy exploits on behalf of maritime liberty.
Now consider alliance relations. 

The softly, softly approach underwriting Decatur’s cruise might mollify China, although you would never know it from the Chinese spokesmen huffing and puffing afterward about “illegal” and “provocative” U.S. actions. 

But circumspection in a good cause—the cause of freedom of the seas—does little to inspire fellow seafaring states to run risks of their own. 

Quite the reverse.
Consider what some of America’s closest allies have done in recent months. 

Last month the uniformed chief of the Japan Maritime Self-Defense Force distanced Tokyo from the South China Sea disputes, ruling out joint freedom-of-navigation patrols alongside the U.S. Navy. The Australian government has evidently gone wobbly as well. 

Foreign Minister Julie Bishop has declared that the Royal Australian Navy doesn’t conduct freedom-of-navigation demonstrations within 12 nautical miles of Chinese-claimed islands—the outer limit of the territorial sea. 

Nor does Canberra do much to challenge Beijing’s pretensions elsewhere in the South China Sea.
And don’t get me started on Philippine president Rodrigo Duterte, a statesman who could play a character from a Stephen King novel in his post-presidential career. 

The president takes to its utmost extreme the “realist” logic that weak powers should “bandwagon” with nearby “hegemons”—ingratiating themselves with domineering powers like China to protect themselves from those domineering powers and, with any luck, advance their parochial interests in the bargain. 

Around the same time Decatur was transiting near the Paracels, Duterte gave a fiery speech in Beijing announcing the Philippines’ “separation” from the U.S.-Philippine alliance while professing fealty to China.
Take Duterte as a symptom—not the cause—of the malaise afflicting U.S.-Philippine relations. 

One doubts he would make such a break with the Philippines’ longstanding patron were he confident in America’s staying power in Southeast Asia, and in the durability of its commitment to the archipelagic state’s defense. 

Emboldening prospective foes while disheartening allies and friends is doubtful strategy. 

And yet that’s what happens when a superpower declares ambitious strategic aims in a document like the Asia-Pacific Maritime Security Strategy yet pursues these aims incoherently and halfheartedly.
In short, Washington has made itself look like an inconstant steward of the global commons. 

In the future the U.S. Navy must challenge what needs to be challenged—reassuring allies and friends that America remains strong and resolute. 

And as naval leaders draw up operations and strategy, they should ask themselves:
What would Decatur do?