Rogue Social Media

China is Using LinkedIn to Recruit Informants
By JAVIER C. HERNÁNDEZ and MELISSA EDDY

The Chinese Embassy in Berlin on Monday. German intelligence services said that more than 10,000 German citizens had been targeted by Chinese spies on LinkedIn.

BEIJING — German’s domestic intelligence agency has accused China of using LinkedIn to infiltrate the German government.
In a scathing investigation released on Sunday, the intelligence agency, the Office for the Protection of the Constitution, accused Beijing of using social media to target more than 10,000 citizens, including lawmakers and other government employees. 

To win their trust, the agency said, Chinese agents posed as leaders of think tanks and headhunters, and offered all-expenses-paid trips to China and meetings with influential clients.
The German investigation added to anxieties in Western countries about Chinese efforts to infiltrate foreign governments and businesses, in an attempt to gain a competitive advantage, especially on economic and foreign policy issues. 

The United States has accused China of rampant economic espionage. 

Australia is debating tougher laws to guard against foreign interference, amid reports that China is meddling in Australian universities and elections.
German officials said that Chinese agents had created fake profiles in hopes of “gleaning information and recruiting sources” in Germany. 

Chinese agents approached targets by saying they were interested in exchanging information or offering to establish contact for them with an expert on China, German officials said.

Hans-Georg Maassen, the president of the German intelligence agency, called the efforts “a broad attempt to infiltrate Parliaments, ministries and administrations.”
Adam M. Segal, an expert on cybersecurity and China at the Council on Foreign Relations, said the German investigation will add “more fuel to the fire of skepticism and suspicion about Chinese actions” in the West.
He said that China would probably continue to expand its digital espionage efforts despite criticism. “Given how sensitive the regime and Xi Jinping seems to be to any challenge domestically, they also want to try to control as much as they can internationally,” Mr. Segal said.

LinkedIn is one of few foreign social media companies operating in China, in part because it adheres closely to Chinese regulations and has a relatively warm relationship with the government.
Under the scheme described by German intelligence, Chinese agents used aliases like Eva Han on LinkedIn.

They used photographs from fashion magazines as their profile pictures. 

Several listed fake company names.
Once they established contact with German citizens, the Chinese agents intensified the attempted exchange, asking for a résumé and offering compensation for work on a project.

They invited Germans to China for conferences or meetings with “important clients” who never materialized. 

They pressed the targets for sensitive information in exchange for money.

The German government has repeatedly warned in recent months that China is increasing its efforts to steal trade secrets and other sensitive information from European targets.
In July, the government said that Chinese agents were seeking information about foreign and economic policy. 

It said China had targeted lawmakers and employees of the European and German Parliaments, lobbyists, members of the military and representatives of foundations and think tanks.

Is he a spy? Probably.

Linked In Spying

Chinese agencies are using fake LinkedIn profiles to ensnare politicians
By Tobias Buck in Berlin

Chinese spies are populating LinkedIn: The Bundesamt für Verfassungsschutz released some of the fake LinkedIn profiles used by Chinese intelligence, including academics and consultants claiming to belong to established and reputable-sounding institutions, think-tanks and universities.

Chinese intelligence agencies are using LinkedIn to establish contact with German politicians and officials, according to a study by Germany’s internal security service.
The Bundesamt für Verfassungsschutz (BfV) on Sunday released some of the fake LinkedIn profiles used by Chinese intelligence, including academics and consultants claiming to belong to established and reputable-sounding institutions, think-tanks and universities.
Some of the most widely used profiles show pictures of attractive young women and men who claim to be headhunters or project managers or assistants. 
The names and profiles released by the BfV include those of Lily Wu and Alex Li from the Center for Sino-Europe Development Studies, Laeticia Chen from the China Center of International Politics and Economy and Eva Han from the China University of Political Science and Law.
 A special project group set up by the BfV earlier this year found that some 10,000 German citizens had been contacted in this manner, though the agency said it believed the true number was significantly higher. 
 “Chinese intelligence services are using new strategies of attack in the digital space. Social networks, especially LinkedIn, are being used in an ambitious manner to gather information and for recruitment,” said Hans-Georg Maassen, the BfV president.
“We are dealing with a broad attempt to infiltrate parliaments, ministries and administrations.”
The information released by the German authorities follows a nine-month survey of social networks that began in January.
 “Establishing contact through social media has for some time been on the agenda of foreign intelligence services . . . Information about habits, hobbies and even political interests can be generated with only a few clicks,” the BfV said.
“Chinese intelligence agencies in particular are active on networks like LinkedIn.” 
 According to German media reports, the Chinese intelligence services used fake profiles to contact members of the German and European parliaments, as well as senior military officials and representatives of foundations, lobby groups and consultancies.
 Once contact was made, the Chinese spies would try to launch a professional exchange of views and information, followed by invitations to conferences and other events in China.