Vatican's crypto-communism

Reality checks in Rome are badly needed these days. 
By George Weigel

Xi Jinpings' “useful idiot” Marcelo Sánchez Sorondo.

Despite the media and blogosphere attention he attracts, Bishop Marcelo Sánchez Sorondo, a 75-year-old Argentine who is chancellor of various pontifical academies, is a small-bore bit player in the current drama of what friends and critics alike regard as an increasingly dysfunctional Vatican. 
Yet when someone of even his relative insignificance announces that “right now, those who are best implementing the social doctrine of the Church are the Chinese,” that dysfunction comes into sharp relief — and a correction of the record is imperative. 
Catholic social doctrine is built on four foundational principles: the inviolable dignity and value of every human person, the responsibility of all to exercise their rights in ways that contribute to the common good, the importance of social pluralism and civil society (and thus the rejection of totalitarianism), and the imperative of solidarity (the virtue of civic friendship that binds free societies together). 
Those principles helped shape the revolution of conscience that preceded and helped make possible the political revolution of 1989 in Central and Eastern Europe. 
Those principles were also in play in the democratic transformations of Latin America and East Asia in the latter decades of the 20th century. 
Those principles remain the core of the social doctrine of the Church today.
And in 2018, those principles are systematically denied, in both theory and practice, by the People’s Republic of China. 
Bishop Sánchez Sorondo seems to have been much impressed by a recent tour of the PRC, noting in an interview that the Chinese “do not have shantytowns” and Chinese young people “do not take drugs,” which he attributed to a “positive national conscience.” 
In that same interview, the Argentine prelate also managed to get in a dig at El Norte, claiming that, in China, “the economy does not dominate politics, as happens in the United States.” 
What the bishop evidently did not see, or conjure with, during his tour were the following:

• There are over 1,000 laogai camps spread across China, where slave labor is the rule and political prisoners are frequently murdered, so their transplantable organs can be harvested to benefit the more politically reliable members of the population. 
• In China, the state, not a husband and wife, determine the number of children a couple can have, and while the notorious one-child policy has been replaced by a two-child policy, the regime continues to insist that official cadres, not parents, decide on the number of children a family may welcome.
• To enforce its internal population policies, the Chinese state claims the right to conduct compulsory abortions when women become pregnant in violation of state-determined birth quotas — a grotesque cruelty regularly practiced in the PRC today. 
• China’s draconian population-control policies have resulted in what amounts to a genocide of unborn baby girls, which has resulted in the most imbalanced boy-to-girl ratio of any country on the planet. 
• China’s people have no right of free movement within their own country, as the ministry of public security assigns every subject of the regime an official residence, a hukou, which is usually the home of one’s parents; yet many Chinese do move away from their hukou, making them illegal aliens in their own country. As one of America’s keenest students of China, Nicholas Eberstadt, put it in a memo to me, “Peasants who move for work to a big city have no right to services like health care or education; are routinely compensated less for work than ‘natives’ with comparable education and skills; and are virtually certain to lose in any dispute with a local. It’s Soweto with Chinese characteristics.” 
• China is an officially atheistic state, according to the Chinese Communist Party, and religious persecution is a staple of the regime’s repressive apparatus.

Those are the facts. 
To try to square them with the social doctrine of the Catholic Church requires something approaching a psychotic detachment from reality — or, worse, a willful ignorance, turning a blind eye to repression and persecution in order to indulge fantasies of a socialist paradise freed from the unpleasantness of bourgeois liberal society. 
The same detachment from reality also informed Bishop Sánchez’s praise of China’s adherence to the Paris climate accord and its “moral leadership” in the field of climate change. 
What air, one wonders, did the bishop breathe in China, one of the most heavily polluted countries in the world? 
And does His Excellency imagine that a totalitarian regime, bent on asserting itself as a global power and unaccountable to its populace, is going to seriously address its problems of massive air, water, and soil pollution because it signed a piece of paper in the City of Light? 
The “useful idiot” has been a player on the world stage since the days of Lenin (although one wonders whether, in this case, the idiocy is so extreme that the perpetrator’s utility to the regime begins to decline). 
Bishop Sánchez Sorondo’s absurd misrepresentations of the realities of 21st-century China put him in a rogues’ gallery that includes such notables as Walter Duranty, who deliberately failed to report the Ukrainian terror famine in 1932–33 to the readers of the New York Times, and Herbert Matthews, whose encomia to Fidel Castro similarly misled the readers of what was once a national paper of record. 
The further problem in Sánchez’s case is that his statements, however bizarre, inevitably implicate the pope he serves and cast doubt not only on the prudence of the Vatican’s current attempts at a démarche with the PRC (which I addressed here) but on the integrity of the Holy See. 
If a Vatican official, no matter how far down the totem pole, can, with impunity, spout inanities that provide cover for a wicked regime, something is gravely wrong in one of the few centers of power in the world whose primary stock-in-trade is truth-telling. 
According to the Vatican yearbook, the Annuario Pontificio, Bishop Marcelo Sánchez Sorondo turned 75, the normal retirement age for bishops, last September 8. 
Perhaps his China escapade will suggest to his superiors that it is past time to accept the resignation he submitted then, and thereby deprive him of the megaphone he has used to embarrass the Church, to grossly distort Catholic social doctrine, and to betray the persecuted Catholics of China.

Inventivity With Chinese Characteristics

China invents the digital totalitarian state
The Economist

GARY SHTEYNGART’S novel of 2010, “Super Sad True Love Story”, is set in a near future when the Chinese yuan is a global currency and people all wear an “apparat” around their neck with RateMe Plus technology. 

Personal details are displayed in public on ubiquitous Credit Poles, posts on street corners with “little LED counters at eye level that registered your Credit ranking as you walked by.” 

The protagonist’s are summed up thus:
LENNY ABRAMOV. Income averaged over five-year span, $289,420 yuan-pegged… Current blood pressure: 120 over 70. O-type blood… Thirty-nine years of age, lifespan estimated at eighty-three…Ailments: high cholesterol, depression…Consumer profile: heterosexual, nonathletic, non-automotive, nonreligious… Sexual preferences: low-functioning Asian/Korean…Child abuse indicator: on… Last purchases: bound, printed, nonstreaming Media artifact” [ie, book].
The novel is a fictional dystopia about the destruction of privacy. 

China’s Communist Party may be on its way to inventing the real thing. 

It is planning what it calls a “social-credit system”. 

This aims to score not only the financial creditworthiness of citizens, as happens everywhere, but also their social and political behaviour. 

It is not yet clear how extensive the system will be, nor whether it will work, nor how far it will withstand the criticism ranged against it in the state-controlled media. 

But an outline is complete and some of the building blocks are in place. 

The early signs are that China is starting on the most ambitious experiment in digital social control in the world.
A pilot scheme in Suining county, in Jiangsu province north of Shanghai, gives clues about what such a system might mean in practice. 

Starting in 2010, the local government awarded people points for good behaviour (such as winning a national honour of some kind) and deducted points for everything from minor traffic offences to “illegally petitioning higher authorities for help”. 

Those who scored highest were eligible for rewards such as fast-track promotion at work or jumping the queue for public housing.
The project was a failure. 

The data on which it was based were patchy. 

Amid a public backlash, a report in China Youth Daily, a state-owned newspaper, criticised the system. 

It said “political” data (such as petitions) should not have been included, declaring that “people should have rated government employees and instead the government has [rated] the people.” Another state-run newspaper, Beijing Times, even compared the scheme with the “good citizen” certificates issued by Japan during its wartime occupation of China.
But the party and government seem undaunted, issuing outline plans for the social-credit system in 2014 and more detailed guidelines this year. 

About 30 local governments are collecting data that would support it. 

The plan appears hugely ambitious, aiming explicitly to influence the behaviour of a whole society. By 2020, Chinese officials say, it will “allow the trustworthy to roam everywhere under heaven while making it hard for the discredited to take a single step.”
The project is a response to the party’s biggest problems: the collapse of confidence in public institutions, and the need to keep track of the changing views and interests of China’s population (without letting them vote). 

It seeks to collect information on the "honesty" of ordinary citizens, public officials and companies alike.

A question of trust
Despite years of economic growth, popular discontent at widespread corruption has grown stronger. A series of scandals about everything from shoddy housing to out-of-date vaccines has led to public cynicism about companies and the government’s ability to enforce rules. 

Social-credit scoring aims to change that by cracking down on the corrupt officials and companies that plague Chinese life. 

And it aims to keep a closer track on public opinion. 

In a society with few outlets for free expression, big data might paradoxically help make institutions more accountable.
But it could also vastly increase snooping and social control. 

In other countries there have been many scare stories about Big Data leading to Big Brother. 

Most have proven false. 

But China is different. 

It is a one-party state, with few checks on its power, a tradition of social control and, in Xi Jinping, a leader even more prone to authoritarianism than his immediate predecessors. 

The extent of social-credit scoring will depend on what the government intends, whether the technology works and how the party responds to public concerns.
Start with intent. 

The “planning outline” published in 2014 said the government “pays high regard to the construction of a social-credit system”—suggesting the project has the imprimatur of Xi and Li Keqiang, the prime minister. 

Social credit, it declared, “is an important component …of the social-governance system”: in other words, it is part of governing the country.
The paper did not set out how the system would work but was clear about its aims. 

They are to strengthen confidence in the government by improving its efficiency through big data; to crack down on companies that cheat and sell unsafe goods; and to “encourage keeping trust and punish breaking trust…throughout the entire society”. 

Social credit, it concluded, would be “an important basis for…building a harmonious socialist society”.

Getting to know you
Such thinking is in keeping with the party’s long record of using bureaucratic tools to restrict freedom and invade privacy in the name of public order. 

Almost everyone has a hukou (household registration) document that determines where citizens can get public services. 

Most people once had a dang’an (personal file) containing school and work reports, and salary details. 

Both controls have been relaxed, notably the dang’an. 

But both still exist.
Increasing numbers of people in government, state-owned firms and universities are required to hand over their passports “for safe keeping”. 

Holders of passports in some parts of the restless regions of Xinjiang and Tibet have also been told to hand them over to the police.
Punishments and rewards for behaviour are woven into the government’s activities. 

The one- (now two-) child policy remains the extreme example of a supposed greater good trampling over private interests. 

But it is not the only one. 

The Elder-care law of 2013 requires all adult children, on penalty of fines or jail, to visit parents over 60 “often” (the courts define what counts as often). 

A few people have been fined under the law and one official said their offences might be entered onto their dang’an, though there is no sign that this has been done.
China has “an administrative rewards system” in which hundreds of thousands of people a year receive honours and titles, such as “outstanding cadre”, “spiritually advanced individual” and “civilised village”. 

Winners get money, a higher pension, better health insurance and the right to jump the queue for public housing. 

The honours system is valued by the leadership. 

Last year, all seven members of the country’s highest decision-making body, the Standing Committee of the Politburo, attended the awards ceremony of the National Model Worker programme.
Wholesale surveillance, increasingly of the digital sort, is a central pillar of Chinese communist rule. 

A system of block-by-block surveillance called “grid management” is being set up in several parts of the country: police and volunteers keep tabs on groups of a few hundred people, supposedly to ensure the rubbish is collected and disputes resolved. 

It is part of a tradition of self-policing that stretches back to the Song dynasty in the 11th century.
Newer forms of monitoring involve the ubiquitous use of closed-circuit television cameras. 

In 2009 China had 2.7m of them; now it may have overtaken America as the country with the largest number of CCTV devices. 

According to Jack Ma, head of Alibaba, China’s largest internet firm, the company’s home town of Hangzhou has more surveillance cameras than New York, a somewhat larger city.
As internet use has grown (see chart), so have China’s comprehensive controls in cyberspace—from the Great Firewall, the system that blocks access to tens of thousands of websites (Economist.com among them); to the Golden Shield, an extensive online surveillance system; and the Great Cannon, a tool to attack hostile websites. 

China’s cyber-censors can suspend internet or social-media accounts if their users send messages containing sensitive terms such as “Tibetan independence” or “Tiananmen Square incident”.

The scale of the data-collection effort suggests that the long-term aim is to keep track of the transactions made, websites visited and messages sent by all of China’s 700m internet users. 

That would be enormously ambitious but probably not impossible. 

According to leaked documents, America’s National Security Agency can collect 42bn internet records a month and 5bn mobile-phone location records a day.
To make such surveillance work, the government has to match the owners of devices with the digital footprints they leave. 

So laws passed in 2012 and 2016 require internet firms to keep their customers’ real names and other personal information. 

But there are lots of fake registrations. 

And it is unclear how censors plan to tackle virtual private networks, which mask a user’s IP address.

Who’s naughty and nice
The emerging social-credit system builds on this history of monitoring and control of people’s private lives. 

Lists are central to the project: you need lists of identities to order the data you gather. 

And lists are a Chinese speciality. 

China’s tourist authority keeps a no-fly list for ill-mannered travellers, who can be banned from going abroad for up to ten years. 

The Cyberspace administration keeps a “white list” of favoured media firms that may sell their articles to other outlets. 

And so on.
The list at the heart of the social-credit system is called the “judgment defaulter’s list”, composed of those who have defied a court order. 

If two people or companies have a contract dispute, or if couples are fighting over a divorce or child support, the parties can go to a civil court for judgment. 

If the losing party then defaults on payment, he, she or it is put on the list. 

Names of offenders are displayed on an electronic crawl outside court houses. 

According to the supreme court, there were 3.1m defaulters on the list at the end of 2015.
All countries have problems enforcing civil judgments in financial cases, so the list may not look unusual. 

But it is. 

It is exceptionally long, and made available to dozens of government departments and party organisations, all of which can apply their own sanctions to defaulters. 

People on the list can be prevented from buying aeroplane, bullet-train or first- or business-class rail tickets; selling, buying or building a house; or enrolling their children in expensive fee-paying schools. 

There are restrictions on offenders joining or being promoted in the party and army, and on receiving honours and titles. 

If the defaulter is a company, it may not issue shares or bonds, accept foreign investment or work on government projects. 

By August 2016 defaulters had been stopped from buying airline tickets about 5m times. 

This goes far beyond normal legal enforcements.

Sins with Chinese characteristics
From blacklisting debt-defaulters the system could be expanded a bit, say, to keep track of companies that sell poisoned milk or build shoddy houses. 

Yet guidelines issued in May and September suggest it could go much further. 

They call the defaulters list “an important component of social-credit information”, implying that it is part of a larger system, and that financial offences are only one category of wrongdoing. 

Other sorts of “untrustworthy behaviour” meriting attention include: “conduct that seriously undermines…the normal social order…seriously undermines the order of cyberspace transmissions”, as well as “assembling to disrupt social order [and] endangering national defence interests”. 

Such broad categories imply the system could be used to rate and punish dissent, expressions of opinion and perceived threats to security.
Although not spelled out clearly, the guidelines could, on the face of it, allow the state to integrate its many databases: everyone’s hukou and dang’an, information from electronic surveillance, the tourist blacklist, the national model-worker programme and more. 

Even regulations on video games published in December say that firms and gamers that violate the rules could be blacklisted and inscribed in the social-credit database. 

At worst, the social-credit project could become a 360-degree digital-surveillance panopticon.
That may sound like scaremongering. 

After all, Google, Facebook, data-brokers and marketing companies in Western countries—even American presidential-election campaigns—all hold vast quantities of personal information without causing serious harm to civil liberties, at least not so far.
But China treats personal information differently from the West. 

In democracies, laws limit what companies may do with it and the extent to which governments can get their hands on it. 

Such protections are imperfect everywhere. 

But in China they do not exist. 

The national-security law and the new cyber-security law give the government unrestricted access to all personal data. 

Civil-liberty advocates who might protest are increasingly in jail. 

And companies that hold data, such as Alibaba, Baidu (China’s largest search engine) and Tencent (which runs a popular social-messaging app) routinely obey government demands for data.
Big-data systems in democracies are not designed for social control. China’s explicitly would be. 

And because its leaders consider the interest of the party and society to be the same, instruments of social control are used for political purposes. 

Earlier this year, for instance, the party asked China Electronics Technology Group, one of the country’s largest defence contractors, to develop software to predict terrorist risks on the basis of people’s job records, financial background, consumption habits, hobbies and data from surveillance cameras. 

Sifting data to seek terrorists can easily morph into looking for dissidents. 

It is telling that Western intelligence agencies have tried to use data-mining schemes to identify individual terrorists, but failed because of an excess of “false positives”.
So can a vast social-credit system work? 

The Chinese face two big technical hurdles: the quality of the data and the sensitivity of the instruments to analyse it. 

Big-data projects everywhere—such as the attempt by Britain’s National Health Service to create a nationwide medical database—have stumbled over the problem of how to prevent incorrect information from fouling the system (this undermined the Suining experiment, too). 

Problems of bad data would be even more onerous in a country of 1.3bn people. 

Vast treasuries of data would also give big incentives for cyber-criminals to steal or change information.

How to analyse the data would be equally problematic. 

The feature of the social-credit system that has attracted the most attention and alarm is the notion of ascribing “credit scores” (points) to social and political activity. 

Here, the model seems to be America’s marketing industry. 

Companies work out credit scores that predict people’s patterns of consumption based on things such as job security, health risks and youth delinquency. 

But errors abound. 

The World Privacy Forum, a non-profit organisation, says credit scores are based on hundreds of data points with no standards of accuracy, transparency or completeness. 

As the report concluded, “error rates and false readings become a big issue.” 

Garbage in, garbage out.

What could go wrong?
The government is well aware of these difficulties. 

It has allowed an unusual amount of discussion on them in state-run media, suggesting it may be testing the waters before deciding how far to plunge in. 

A recent high-level “social-credit summit” in Shanghai, for example, talked about how scores can be checked, and mistakes rectified; many argued that legal protections needed to be improved. 

Zhang Zheng, director of the China Credit Research Centre at Peking University, said multiple problems remain unsolved, and that the administration needed to be reined in.
A commentary in Beijing Times complained about plans to punish people who do not pay their electricity bills by limiting foreign travel and bank borrowing. 

“I have never opposed the establishment and improvement of a credit-information system,” wrote the author, Yang Gengshen. 

“I am only against using credit to expand the power of the strong and further compress the space for civil rights.”
Much about the social-credit system remains unclear. 

The government has not yet determined whether it wants the system mainly for cracking down on crooks or to go the full Big Brother. 

It is uncertain about how much of the information it holds should be incorporated into the system. The surveillance technology is largely untested at the vast scale of China. 

And the fragmentation of China’s intelligence agencies would have to be overcome.
But the government is creating the capacity for a long-tentacled regime of social control. 

Many of the elements are ready: the databases; the digital surveillance; the system of reward and punishment; and the we-know-best paternalism. 

What remains is to join the pieces together. 

If and when that is done, China would have the world’s first digital totalitarian state. 

As another character in “Super Sad True Love Story” writes to a friend: “This is what happens when there’s only one party and we live in a police state.”

The Perfect Dictatorship: Seeing China With Fresh Eyes

The hard work and enterprise of China’s people—not Communist Party policies—have lifted hundreds of millions of people out of poverty.
By HOWARD W. FRENCH

THE PERFECT DICTATORSHIP
By Stein Ringen
Hong Kong University Press, 191 pages, $25

More than two-thirds of the way into Stein Ringen’s slim, curious volume on contemporary China, he describes the sorts of conversations that Westerners who watch the country closely tend to have.
“Professor A: China is a dictatorship,” Mr. Ringen writes.
“Professor B: 500 million people have been lifted out of poverty.”
“Silence.”
Such indeed is the nature of a great deal of the back and forth about the world’s most populous country, whose economy has been utterly transformed over the past four decades but whose politics, for the most part, have not.
Mr. Ringen, a Norwegian emeritus professor at Oxford with a background in sociology and political science and a wide-ranging list of books to his credit, boasts of another credential for a book that reaches strong conclusions about China—and it is an unusual one. 

Before writing “The Perfect Dictatorship,” Mr. Ringen had no expertise on the topic and little exposure to the country. 

“I do not come from China studies and am not an authority on China,” he writes early on, seeking to make a virtue of this seeming weakness. 

“Where I do come from is state analysis, which I have been doing for forty years, and I have tried to bring that experience to bear on a new case.”

It is certainly possible that a fresh, nonspecialist approach will have value. 

When waxing ironic, scholars of China have long observed that the more one works at understanding this extraordinarily diverse and fast-changing country the less certain one becomes. 

For large chunks of “The Perfect Dictatorship,” however, Mr. Ringen labors over pedestrian observations—the telltale signs of a dilettante, expert readers might feel tempted to conclude. 

One of the most insistent of these observations is that China is something called a “party-state,” meaning that the government cannot be separated from the Communist Party. 

Another is that the country maintains effectively separate labor markets by restricting the movements of large numbers of rural citizens through a registration system known as the hukou.
Yet for all of this familiar material, Mr. Ringen also delivers up compelling arguments. 

Take the would-be debate-ending claim—a favorite of the Chinese government—that Beijing has lifted hundreds of millions of people out of poverty (the precise number is always being adjusted upward). 

There are two reasons why this assertion has always grated. 

First, by late in Mao Zedong’s nearly three-decade rule, which ended in 1976, Chinese per capita income ranked only slightly ahead of Bangladesh, a fact that derives from disastrous policies under the same Communist Party that rules the country today. 

Second, if the Chinese stopped making colossal mistakes in economic policy beginning under Mao’s successor, Deng Xiaoping, the country’s rapid growth has had less to do with any supposed “lifting” by the government than with the hard work and enterprise of the Chinese people once they were allowed to seek their fortunes.
Mr. Ringen explodes this favorite propaganda slogan even further and does so with the fresh eye he promises. 

China’s growth over the past few decades, he says, is far from unique and has been even less uniquely transformative. 

Many nowadays forget—and he reminds readers—that several other East Asian societies, including Japan, South Korea and Taiwan, pulled off similar growth spurts over a roughly 40-year period before China did. 

Using South Korea as an example, Mr. Ringen argues that China’s recent achievements should be assessed in a much broader social context, one in which they begin to pale.
“In South Korea, in forty years, there were three monumental achievements: Poverty was turned to affluence (and to real affluence, making Korea a high-income country), dictatorship was turned to democracy, and a safety net was spread under the country so that no significant section of the population was excluded from the benefits of economic advancement,” he writes. 

“China’s reform and opening up has now been unfolding for nearly forty years but has followed South Korea in only one achievement, in economic growth. And in the time South Korea made itself a high-income country, China has made itself no more than a middle-income one.” 

Moreover, South Korea, like Japan and Taiwan shifted from authoritarianism to democracy by allowing non-state actors to organize and associate freely, something that Beijing solemnly forswears.
Much of “The Perfect Dictatorship” is given over to pondering the nature of the Chinese polity under the ambitious current leader, Xi Jinping, who speaks of making this the century of the Chinese Dream. 

Is China a new kind of welfare state, whose central preoccupation is attending to the well-being of the world’s largest population? 

Or is it a power state obsessed with strength, focused on a higher values-oriented purpose? 

Or should China be seen instead as a “trivial state,” a system with little purpose beyond “perpetuation of the regime itself and the protection of the country’s territorial integrity”?
Mr. Ringen turns these questions over and over, almost playfully, until finally addressing them inconclusively: “If the Chinese state continues to operate as a custodian of economic growth and political control, and does so effectively, it is likely to remain dictatorial but pragmatic. If it becomes dependent on ideology and embraces a narrative in which persons are subsumed in the nation, it will have made itself a totalitarian state of the most sinister kind, the kind in which persons are only ‘the masses’ and do not matter individually.”
Which path will China take? 

Unspeakable in public, this question resonates in the minds of more and more Chinese, especially the newly minted members of the middle class, who await an answer.