People's Republic of Coronavirus

Trendy Now: Acute Sinophobia

No Country For Sick Chinese: As Chinese Coronavirus Spreads, So Does Anti-Chinese Sentiment
By Motoko Rich

South Korean protesters calling for a ban on Chinese visitors.

In Japan, the hashtag #ChineseDon’tComeToJapan has been trending on Twitter. 

In Singapore, hundreds of thousands of residents have signed a petition calling for the government to ban Chinese nationals from entering the country.
In Hong Kong, South Korea and Vietnam, businesses have posted signs saying that mainland Chinese customers are not welcome. 

In France, a front-page headline in a regional newspaper warned of a “Chinese Alert.” 

And in a suburb of Toronto, parents demanded that a school district keep children of a family that had recently returned from China out of classes for 17 days.
The rapid spread of the Chinese coronavirus that has sickened about 9,800 people — the overwhelming majority in China, with all of the 213 deaths there — has unleashed a wave of panic and outright anti-Chinese sentiment across the globe.
While officials scramble to contain the crisis — the World Health Organization declared a global health emergency and the State Department issued a “do not travel” to China advisory — fears over the dangerous outbreak have fueled global Sinophobia. 

And the wave of spreading panic has, at times, far outstripped practical concerns.
At a time when China’s rise as a global economic and military threat has unsettled its neighbors in Asia as well as democracies in the West, the Chinese coronavirus is feeding into latent allergy against the Chinese.
“Sinophobia is likely undergirded by broader political and economic tensions and anxieties related to China, which are interacting with more recent fears of contagion,” said Kristi Govella, an assistant professor of Asian studies at the University of Hawaii, Manoa.
Some of the response to the outbreak can be seen as a rational calculation based on the risk of infection: Airlines are canceling flights to Wuhan, the center of the epidemic, and other Chinese cities, and conference organizers are asking Chinese delegations not to attend.

Chinese tourists in Bangkok on Thursday.

Late Thursday, Italy’s prime minister said that his country had blocked all flights to and from China. And countries like Malaysia, the Philippines, Russia and Vietnam have temporarily stopped issuing certain classes of visas to travelers from Hubei Province, where Wuhan is situated, or China altogether.
“I think it is time to put a ‘do not enter’ sign on our doorstep for visitors from China,” said Ralph Recto, a lawmaker in the Philippines.
Bangkok residents are avoiding malls that are particularly popular with Chinese tourists. 

A plastic surgery office in the wealthy Gangnam neighborhood of Seoul has instructed employees that they can see Chinese customers only if they can prove that they have been in South Korea for 14 days or more, the potential period that the virus can lie dormant.
At a sushi restaurant in the neighborhood that once housed the Tsukiji fish market in Tokyo, where about 90 percent of the customers are Chinese, Yaeko Suenaga, 70, a server, said she understood why stores might want to reject visitors from China.
“I don’t think this fear comes from discrimination,” Ms. Suenaga said, “but from the true fear that humans have of getting infected with a virus that may lead to death.” 

Ms. Suenaga said that her restaurant would continue to welcome all customers, but that workers would wear masks.
It is not always easy to discern the boundary between understandable fear and unmistakable phobia. 

But some protective measures have effectively amounted to Han racial profiling.
At Bread Box, a banh mi restaurant in central Hoi An, a popular tourist outpost in Vietnam, the owners posted a makeshift sign outside their storefront this month reading, “We can’t service for Chinese, SORRY!” 

Up the coast, the Danang Riverside Hotel announced on Saturday that it would not accept any Chinese guests because of the Chinese virus.

A sign at a nail shop in Phu Quoc, Vietnam.

Kwong Wing Catering, a small restaurant chain in Hong Kong, announced in a Facebook post on Wednesday that it would serve only patrons speaking English or Cantonese, the city’s native language — a tongue distinct from the Mandarin spoken on the mainland. 

The business has been a vocal supporter of the Hong Kong democracy movement that has risen up in defiance of Beijing.
Public health experts said they understood the impulses. 

“In a sense, it’s a natural reaction to try to distance yourself from a potential cause of illness, particularly when there’s no known cure,” said Karen Eggleston, director of the Asia health policy program at the Shorenstein Asia-Pacific Research Center at Stanford University.

In Australia, The Herald Sun, a Murdoch-owned newspaper, published the words “China Virus Panda-monium” over an image of a red mask. 

Le Courrier Picard, a regional newspaper in northern France, caused outrage with its “Chinese Alert” headline this month. 

Chinese bioterrorists

On Twitter in Japan, where there has long been unease about the conduct of Chinese tourists, commenters have labeled them “dirty” and “insensitive” and have called them “bioterrorists.”
Chinese travelers at the airport in Colombo, Sri Lanka, on Thursday.

A much-viewed YouTube video in South Korea claims that a biochemical weapons facility in China leaked the coronavirus, a theory that has gained currency in other corners of the globe. 

In Australia, a post circulating on Instagram warned that shops in Sydney containing items like fortune cookies, rice and “Chinese Red Bull” were contaminated.

In France, one Chinese woman told the newspaper Le Monde that she had been insulted by a car driver who shouted “Keep your virus, dirty Chinese!” and “You are not welcome in France” as he sped away through a puddle, splashing her.

In Australia, Andy Miao, 24, an ethnic Chinese Australian who returned this month from a trip to China, said that passengers on public transport gave him odd looks if he was not wearing a face mask.
“It makes people like me who are very "Australian" feel like outsiders,” Miao said. 

The Chinese were subjected to similar Sinophobic reactions during the SARS epidemic of 2003. 

But now far more Chinese are traveling abroad: According to the Ministry of Culture and Tourism, Chinese travelers made about 150 million overseas trips in 2018, up more than 14 percent from the previous year.

Chinese tourists in Sydney, Australia, last year.

China’s lockdown of tens of millions of people, intended to curb the spread of the Chinese virus, may be spurring other governments to react, said Koichi Nakano, a political scientist at Sophia University in Tokyo.
“The fact that the Chinese government itself is treating people like that would in some ways enable or encourage some of the other people or governments to take equally draconian measures,” Mr. Nakano said.
Some governments are trying to ease the panic. 

In Toronto, politicians, a school board and some community groups have issued public appeals to avoid a repetition of the Sinophobia that swept the city in 2003, when SARS killed 44 people there.
“While the Chinese virus can be traced to a province in China, we have to be cautious that this not be seen as a Chinese virus,” the school board in the York Region, a suburb with many Chinese residents, said in a statement issued on Monday. 

“At times such as this, we must come together as Canadians and avoid any hint of Sinophobia, which in this case can victimize our East Asian Chinese community.”

In the Ginza shopping district of Tokyo, which is often thronged with Chinese tourists, Michiko Kubota, who runs a clothing boutique, said she hoped the Japanese government might do more to help Chinese, such as by sending masks or other medical supplies.

Aggressive Outbursts Mar Xi's Plan to Raise China on the World Stage

Beijing rewards diplomats that are aggressive advocates of China’s views and scorns those that it perceives as overly timid

Bloomberg News

China’s diplomats aren’t being very diplomatic.
In the past few months, its envoy to Canada publicly accused his hosts of “white supremacy,” its ambassador in Sweden labeled the Swedish police “inhumane” and blasted the country’s “so-called freedom of expression,” and its chief emissary in South Africa said President Donald Trump’s policies were making the U.S. “the enemy of the whole world.”
“I don’t think we are witnessing a pattern of misstatements and slips of the tongue," said Ryan Hass, a fellow at the Brookings Institution who previously oversaw China affairs at the U.S. National Security Council. 

“We seem to be watching China’s diplomats matching the mood of the moment in Beijing. Beijing rewards diplomats that are aggressive advocates of China’s views and scorns those that it perceives as overly timid.”
That may be damaging Xi Jinping’s efforts to win friends abroad and capitalize on Donald Trump’s international unpopularity. 

While China has seized on the trade war and U.S. disengagement abroad to pitch itself as a champion of globalization, 63 percent of respondents to a 2018 Pew poll in 25 countries said they preferred the U.S. as a world leader, compared with 19 percent for China.

Backlash Builds
At stake is China’s avowed goal of establishing itself as a global superpower with influence over a network of allies to balance U.S. influence. 

China is pouring billions into global efforts such as Xi’s Belt and Road Initiative to forge stronger links with countries around the world.
But China’s increasingly strident diplomatic approach could do more harm than good. 

Anti-China sentiment has played a pivotal role in election surprises across Asia, and more countries around the world are becoming skeptical of Chinese investment -- particularly in telecommunications, with fears growing about using its equipment in 5G networks due to concerns about espionage.
China’s foreign ministry didn’t respond to faxed questions about the more aggressive language from diplomats. 

After Trump took office, China has sought to portray itself as a supporter of the international order, with Xi himself defending globalization at the World Economic Forum in Davos, Switzerland. 

His charm offensive stood in contrast to Trump, who has reshaped public discourse with regular insults of other world leaders on Twitter.
Even so, foreign diplomats in Beijing say that the behavior of Chinese officials has become far more aggressive and assertive in private meetings in recent years. 

Their discussions have become more ideological, according to one senior foreign envoy, who described the behavior as a strong sense of grievance combined with increasing entitlement about China’s international role and rights.
China’s reported behavior at the APEC summit in November highlighted the shift. 

Papua New Guinea police were called after Chinese officials attempted to “barge” into the office of the country’s foreign minister to influence the summit’s communique, according to the Agence France-Presse news agency. 

Chinese officials later denied the report, calling it “a rumor spread by some people with a hidden agenda.”

Huawei Advocacy
Chinese diplomats’ advocacy for the country’s embattled tech giant, Huawei Technologies Co., has even riled heads of government. 

After the Chinese ambassador to the Czech Republic, Zhang Jianmin, announced in November that the Czech cyber security body’s decision to ban Huawei did not represent the view of the Czech government, Prime Minister Andrej Babis said, “I do not know what the ambassador is talking about," according to Czech Radio. 

One European ambassador in Beijing said China’s aggressive advocacy for the company has been prevalent across the 28-nation bloc.

Zhang Jianmin

In some regions, China’s overseas rhetoric has been hardening for years. 

Foreign officials noticed an increasingly strident tone from Beijing following the global financial crisis. 

At a 2010 meeting hosted by Southeast Asian nations in Hanoi, then foreign minister Yang Jiechi famously dismissed some of China’s neighbors as “small countries” when challenged over Beijing’s stance in the South China Sea.
Foreign diplomats said the outbursts have increased in both frequency and intensity since Xi took power in 2012. 

In the last few years, South Korea, the Philippines, Australia and now Canada have all incurred Beijing’s wrath, with diplomatic barbs often accompanied by economic pressure through import restrictions, store inspections and safety warnings to Chinese tour groups.
In a speech at the 2017 Communist Party conclave that saw Xi appointed for a second term as party chief without an apparent successor, Xi described China as “standing tall and firm in the East” and pledged to make the country a global leader in innovation, influence and military might. 

At a conference for Chinese ambassadors at the end of that year, Xi urged diplomats to play a more proactive part in an increasingly multipolar world -- a speech China’s ambassador to the United Kingdom described as a “mobilization order,” or “bugle call.”

‘Crags and Torrents’
China’s diplomatic corps has been quick to show its loyalty to Xi. 

In a 2017 essay in the party’s theoretical magazine Qiushi, top diplomat Yang Jiechi pledged to study and implement Xi’s thought on diplomacy in a “deep-going way.” 

And Foreign Minister Wang Yi recently praised Xi for “taking the front line of history” and “braving 10,000 crags and torrents.”
“Chinese ambassadors always feel they have to speak to the leaders in Beijing more than to the local public. Their promotions depend on it,” said Susan Shirk, a former U.S. deputy assistant Secretary of State for East Asia. 

“If today what they say is more overtly anti-American or anti-Western then that reflects the changing foreign policy line.”
In line with national “party-building” campaigns, Chinese diplomats regularly engage in “self-criticism” sessions at the Ministry of Foreign Affairs, according to people familiar with the meetings. Last month, the former deputy head of the party’s powerful Organization Department, Qi Yu, was appointed as the foreign ministry’s Party Secretary despite a lack of diplomatic experience. 

One foreign ambassador said Chinese diplomats are increasingly “scared.”
China has seen this kind of ideology-driven diplomacy before. 

During the Cultural Revolution, Chinese diplomats in London videotaped themselves fighting protesters on the streets of London, according to the book China’s Quest by historian John Garver. 

In Beijing, British and Soviet diplomatic missions were besieged or invaded and other diplomats were threatened on the streets.
The new wave of truculence is also affecting how foreign envoys are treated in China. 

Detained Canadian citizen and former diplomat Michael Kovrig has been questioned about his work as a diplomat, according to people familiar with the discussions. 

The move is a violation of Article 39 of the Vienna Convention, which explicitly covers the past work of former diplomats. 

China is a signatory.
Foreign diplomats visiting China’s far western colony of East Turkestan have been followed, temporarily detained and forced to delete photographs from their phones, while Swedish citizen Gui Minhai was grabbed by Chinese authorities in front of Swedish diplomats.
The shift in mood, and tensions with the U.S., have altered the tone of discussions inside China’s bureaucracy. 

One Chinese trade diplomat said that while it’s never been easy to be a dove in China, all but the most senior officials now refrain from publicly voicing moderate positions toward the U.S.
“Beijing has established a pattern of making examples of middle powers in hopes that doing so deters others from challenging China’s interests,” said Hass at the Brookings Institution. 

“Some in Beijing also seem to be growing frustrated that China’s rising national power is not yet translating into the types of deference from others that it seeks.”

"The Chinese are not buying in Brazil. They are buying Brazil"

Presidential candidate Jair Bolsonaro's anti-China sentiment has Beijing nervous
By Jake Spring

BRASILIA - The Chinese government is trying to make peace with Brazil's leading presidential candidate, Jair Bolsonaro, whose China-bashing threatens to chill a profitable trading relationship.
Chinese diplomats based in Brasilia have met twice with top Bolsonaro advisors in recent weeks, according to participants in the meetings. 

Their aim is to highlight cooperation with Latin America's largest country, whose grain and minerals have fueled China's rise.
Mr Bolsonaro has portrayed China as a predator looking to dominate key sectors of its economy.
With its own economy slowing, China cannot afford to become embroiled in another costly trade war like that which has erupted between Beijing and Washington.
Two-way trade between China and Brazil stood at $75 billion last year, according to Brazilian government statistics. 

China has invested $124 billion in Brazil since 2003, mostly in the oil, mining and energy sectors. China is eager to bankroll railway, port and other infrastructure projects here to speed the movement of its Brazilian grain.
But the patriotic Bolsonaro, much like U.S. President Donald Trump, has criticized China repeatedly on the campaign trail, saying the Chinese should not be allowed to own Brazilian land or control key industries. 

An ardent nationalist, Mr Bolsonaro is expected to win a landslide victory in balloting this Sunday.
"The Chinese are not buying in Brazil. They are buying Brazil," Mr Bolsonaro has warned repeatedly.
Companies in the crosshairs include China Molybdenum Co Ltd, which bought a $1.7 billion niobium mine in 2016 that Mr Bolsonaro says Brazil should develop itself.
Niobium is used as an additive to steel to make it stronger and lighter. 

It is used in cars, buildings, jet engines and a host of other applications. 

Brazil controls about 85 percent of the world's supply and Mr Bolsonaro wants his nation to reap the benefits.
Mr Bolsonaro is also on record opposing a planned privatization of some assets of state-owned utility Centrais Eletricas Brasileiras SA (Eletrobras) on concerns that Chinese buyers would win the bid.
Officials at China Molybdenum declined requests for comment. 

But six senior executives at Chinese companies operating in Brazil told Reuters they were watching Mr Bolsonaro's remarks with varying degrees of concern.
"We are worrying a bit about some of his extreme views," one Chinese infrastructure executive told Reuters. 

"He is on guard against China."
Bolsonaro's friendly leanings toward Taiwan are likewise vexing to Beijing.

Mr Bolsonaro in February became the first Brazilian presidential candidate to visit Taiwan since Brazil recognized Beijing as the sole Chinese government under the One China policy in the 1970s.
The Chinese embassy in Brazil issued a letter condemning Mr Bolsonaro's Taiwan trip as an "affront to the sovereignty and territorial integrity of China."
Mr Bolsonaro's combative stance is in stark contrast to the rest of Latin America, whose leaders have welcomed Chinese investment, loans and commodities purchases.
And it could eventually put him at odds with Brazil's powerful farm and mining industries, for whom China is an indispensable customer.
Shares of Brazilian miner Vale SA, for example, the world's largest iron ore producer, hit an all-time high last month on strong Chinese demand for its high-quality ore.
Brazil's farm sector, meanwhile, has reaped the benefit of China's feud with President Trump. 

Beijing has sharply reduced purchases of American soybeans, filling the gap with Brazilian grain. Brazilian exports of soy to China are up 22 percent by value this year with about 80 percent of its soy shipments now destined there.
The U.S.-China trade war has given Brazil leverage for now. 

Presidential candidate Jair Bolsonaro attends a news conference in Rio de Janeiro, Brazil October 11, 2018. 

PRIVATE MEETINGS
Chinese diplomats met with Mr Bolsonaro's top economic advisor Paulo Guedes in early September to discuss the importance of the bilateral relationship, Qu Yuhui, Chinese Minister-Counselor at the embassy in Brasilia, told Reuters on Monday.
Guedes was offered a trip to China to strengthen his knowledge of the world's second-largest economy, Qu said. 

He said Chinese diplomats made it clear they would like to meet Mr Bolsonaro in person, although no meeting has been set.
"Regardless of right- or left-wing, we want to talk and advance the smooth development of China-Brazil relations," Qu said. 

Guedes did not respond to requests for comment.
Last week Reuters spotted Qu and another Chinese diplomat entering the offices of Congressman Onyx Lorenzoni, Mr Bolsonaro's campaign manager, proposed chief of staff and the organizer of the candidate's Taiwan trip.
Qu declined to comment on the matter.
Lorenzoni said he met with two Chinese diplomats and that there would be further talks after the election. 

He said China is a vital partner and the two countries would maintain good relations.
If elected, Mr Bolsonaro's first major meeting with the Chinese would come early in his presidency. Brazil hosts the BRICS summit in 2019, an event that Chinese dictator Xi Jinping is likely to attend.

'BUYING BRAZIL'
Mr Bolsonaro is content with China purchasing commodities. 

But the former Army captain is wary of the Asian nation's recent shopping spree in Brazil's energy and infrastructure sectors.
China Three Gorges Corp paid 4.8 billion reais ($1.48 billion) in 2016 to operate two of Brazil's largest dams. 

Last year, State Grid Corp of China bought a controlling stake in Sao Paulo's CPFL Energia SA and a subsidiary for 17.36 billion reais ($4.90 billion), while China's HNA Airport Holding Group Co Ltd bought a controlling stake in Brazil's second-busiest airport.
Brazil is now expected to put a number of government concessions and assets up for bid next year, including railways and state-held energy assets.
The outgoing administration of Brazilian President Michel Temer has attempted to privatize state-controlled energy company Eletrobras, a move which requires congressional approval.
Mr Bolsonaro has said he is against selling Eletrobras generation assets because it would "leave Brazil in Chinese hands."
The Chinese infrastructure executive said his company was worried that Mr Bolsonaro might change the government auction rules to disadvantage Chinese bidders. 

He and other Chinese executives who spoke to Reuters declined to be identified.
To date, Mr Bolsonaro has been vague about how he would carry out actions to stop Chinese investment he sees as undesirable. 

Brazil has no equivalent of the U.S. Committee on Foreign Investment, which reviews the national security implications of foreign investment in American companies.

Chinese Colonialism

African countries have started to push back against Chinese development aid. Here’s why.

By Richard Aidoo

Senegal President Macky Sall, left, and Chinese dictatorXi Jinping inspect the honor guard during a state visit in Dakar, Senegal, on July 21, 2018. 

Just how entrenched is China in Africa these days? 

The Forum on China Africa Cooperation (FOCAC) in Beijing in September highlighted China’s expansive economic diplomacy – and $60 billion pledge in “no-strings” attached development assistance.
But Zimbabwe’s historic election during the summer offered up a different view, and suggests that an increasing number of Africans have less enthusiasm for China’s assistance — and Chinese money. During the campaign, opposition candidate Nelson Chamisa of the MDC alliance evoked strong anti-China rhetoric in an effort to galvanize popular support against the incumbent, Emmerson Mnangagwa of the ZANU-PF. 

Chamisa promised to expel Chinese businesses if he won, though it’s unclear whether this threat influenced his 44.3 percent to 50.7 percent loss to Mnangagwa.
Opinion surveys and research on China-Africa ties are generally positive about Chinese engagements. So election rhetoric offers a way to chart anti-Chinese sentiment in Africa, which is increasingly harnessed for electoral gain. 

One often-cited example is Zambia’s 2011 election, when challenger Michael Sata frequently denounced Chinese businesspeople as “profiteers.” 

Sata’s anti-Chinese sentiment struck a chord with voters, and helped him defeat incumbent President Rupiah Banda. 

But is this an emerging pattern — or a sporadic political occurrence in African elections?
With China as a popular development partner for many African countries, and provider of infrastructure and financial resources, here are four reasons why anti-China rhetoric nevertheless has some appeal:

1. African elections are essentially about the economy, and China is a significant economic player.
Beijing has edged out Western economies to become the most crucial economic partner to many African countries — which have diverse needs and resources. 

With South Africa’s unemployment rate expected to reach more than 26 percent in 2018, even the continent’s top performers and Beijing’s major partners need to increase trade and investments, and build resilient economies that provide and protect jobs. 

The stakes are high, as over one-third of African workers fall below the poverty line of $1.90 a day.
For pro-China African politicians and incumbents, China-Africa engagement means immense job creation, much-needed infrastructure and, most significantly, the chance to meet electoral promises with an injection of foreign capital with few conditions. 

The anti-China view, alternatively, sees the opportunity to remind voters of high rates of unemployment, particularly among the youth, and stir up popular anger to defeat incumbency.
Opponents can blame the incumbent’s willingness to accept an expanding Chinese economic influence that fails to address the country’s economic woes — but if they win, they may decide to follow through with their anti-China pronouncements, or not. 

Recently, newly installed President Julius Maada Bio of Sierra Leone canceled a Chinese-funded airport project signed by his predecessor, after referring to Chinese projects as “a sham” during a campaign debate.

2. African economies are largely extractive, and China is heavily engaged in this sector. 

According to the China Africa Research Initiative, the top three Chinese imports from Africa in 2015 were oil, copper and other ores. 

China’s oil purchases come from Angola, Congo and South Sudan, for instance. 

Zambia’s exports to China largely consist of copper, and its neighbor Zimbabwe sends nickel and other precious stones to China.
As extractive sectors are often at the core of African economies, foreign involvement or domination of such sectors can easily elicit popular discontent. 

China’s increased interests in these sectors no doubt sparks intense political debates, especially when there are reports of mistreatment of local mine workers or increased Chinese involvement in unregulated mining activities. 

Sociologist Ching Kwan Lee, for example, details the hardships of Zambian mine workers in Chinese-owned mines, which explains the anti-China popular fury that fueled Michael Sata’s victory in 2011.
In Ghana, Chinese involvement in illegal artisanal gold mining incurred local resentment, which featured in the 2016 vote that elected Nana Akufo-Addo — who promised to deal with the situation. While some research shows that local population in proximity to Chinese-operated mines enjoy better infrastructure and social services, anti-Chinese sentiments are also highest around these areas, making the local residents prime anti-incumbent constituencies.

3. China has flooded African markets with poor-quality products.
A 2016 Afrobarometer survey of 35 African countries indicated an average of 35 percent of respondents perceived the quality of Chinese products in Africa as problematic for China’s image. Despite the benefits of providing cheaper options of products to African consumers with meager incomes, consumers don’t want to see substandard materials in infrastructure building, or risk purchasing fake pharmaceutical products.
And some African politicians often like to remind voters that cheap Chinese textiles and other goods compete with local products. 

African governments and their monitoring institutions may be complicit in this China-Africa issue, but this is an issue that can be exploited on the campaign trail to influence voters at the polls.

4. The ghost of colonialism hangs over China-Africa relations.
To some Western politicians, China’s increased engagement in Africa is nothing more than “new colonialism,” and growing indebtedness to Beijing should be a bigger concern. 

Deborah Brautigam, who directs the China Africa Research Initiative at Johns Hopkins School of Advanced International Studies, argues against the notion that Africans are powerlessly dependent on arrangements skewed in China’s favor. 

African politicians tend to make this association not only as a cautious reminder, but because this is a deeply emotive claim that encourages Africans to challenge a repeat of the continent’s not-too-distant history.
What does this mean for China, and for African nations? 

For a global China, the benefits of increased economic engagement in Africa and becoming the continent’s preferred development partner comes with the burden of ensuring the viability and sustainability of these projects. 

A politically stable Africa would likely enhance these benefits — but Africa’s vibrant democratic cultures may sometimes feature not-so-friendly political rhetoric. 

For Africans in an economically and politically dynamic continent, the current increase in Chinese investments and loans mean China may remain a major factor in future African elections.

VIETNAMESE SEE SPECIAL ECONOMIC ZONES AS ASSAULT FROM CHINA

The South China Sea dispute, along with memories of the 1979 border war, run deep in the Vietnamese national psyche, making SEZs viscerally unpopular

BY BENNETT MURRAY

The Vietnamese government is confronting a rising tide of public anger as its parliament debates a controversial bill to create three new special economic zones (SEZs), raising fears of Chinese encroachment on Vietnamese soil.
Although Vietnam already has 18 SEZs, the new concerns largely stem from a provision that would allow 99-year leases in some cases within the three new zones in Quang Ninh and Khanh Hoa provinces, as well as on Phu Quoc Island. 

The bill does not explicitly mention any particular country but it is widely presumed China, Vietnam’s largest trading partner, would dominate investments in the SEZs.
Attempting to allay concerns, Prime Minister Nguyen Xhan Phuc announced on Thursday the government would adjust the 99-year time frame but did not elaborate.
“In recent days, we have listened to a lot of intellectuals, the people, members of the National Assembly, senior citizens and overseas Vietnamese,” Phuc said.
Activists stage a rally marking the 42nd anniversary of the 1974 naval battle between China and then-South Vietnamese troops over the Paracel Islands, in front of the statue of Vietnamese King Ly Thai Tô in Hanoi. 

Nguyen Chi Tuyen, a Hanoi-based dissident blogger with 42,500 Facebook followers, said he rarely saw such public interest in the National Assembly, a legislature that usually acts as a rubber stamp for the Communist Party’s Central Committee.
“This time they’ve got a lot of attention from the people, not just activists or dissidents but the normal people,” he said, adding that anti-China sentiment has fuelled anger.
He was unimpressed by Phuc’s pledge to adjust the 99-year lease provision.
“It’s not how long, but this is one kind of selling our land to foreigners under the so-called SEZs,” Tuyen said.
With popular Vietnamese anger towards China simmering over Beijing’s maritime claims in the South China Sea, Le Dang Doanh, a retired senior economic adviser to the government and member of the Communist Party, said he fears an explosive response from the public should the bill pass. 

That the proposed SEZ in Quang Ninh province is not far from China’s Guangxi autonomous region is of particular concern, he added.
Vietnamese security officers move a sign advising people not to take photographs near the Chinese embassy in Hanoi after authorities forcibly broke up small protests against China in May 2014. 
“If now the Chinese occupy the three special economic zones, especially the one in Quang Ninh, it will trigger a very strong reaction from the Vietnamese people,” said Doanh, adding that he had signed a petition asking to postpone passage of the law.
Tuyen said the South China Sea dispute, along with memories of the 1979 border war, run deep in the national psyche, making SEZs viscerally unpopular.
“We have a long history with the Chinese people, they always want to invade our country, so it is dangerous to allow them to use these SEZs to control our country,” he said.
In recent years, the maritime dispute has prompted rare public protests in the one-party communist state. 

Demonstrations turned violent in 2014 following China’s deployment of the Hai Yang Shi You 981 oil rig in the South China Sea, with at least 21 killed and 100 injured in clashes targeting Chinese-owned factories, although many were owned by firms from other countries. 

The government has since cracked down on anti-China protests.
Nguyen Quang A, a retired banker and prominent pro-democracy activist, said the government must guard against suspicions it has become too cosy with fellow communists to the north.
“There are a few issues which are very dangerous for the legitimacy of the Communist Party in Vietnam, and that is one,” said Quang A, himself a former party member.

China's expansionism fuels protests in Vietnam

Popular opinion has concluded that China will be the main beneficiary of pending economic policy in Vietnam, triggering two weeks of protests. The proposed economic zones will enable Chinese companies to take over the coast with little regard for the environment or fishermen. 

By Martin Petty

Protests by thousands of people in cities across Vietnam are showing just how easy it is to unite public opinion and mobilize dissent when an issue has one key ingredient: China.
The demonstrations, which are technically illegal, sprung up for a second consecutive week on Sunday, stoked by fears that proposed coastal economic zones for foreigners would be beachheads for an invasion of Chinese businesses.
The proposal makes no mention of China. 

But Vietnamese minds were already made up, with popular Facebook posts reinforcing deep-rooted suspicion that Chinese interests are influencing state policy.
Central to the issue is a combustible mix of generations of anger over Chinese bullying, and a lack of faith in Vietnam's ruling communist party to do anything about it.
"The government underestimated the amount of anti-China sentiment in the country," said Murray Hiebert, a Southeast Asia specialist at the Center for Strategic and International Studies in Washington.

"There's a constant undertone among many in Vietnam that the government isn't doing enough to protect the country's sovereignty against China," Mr. Hiebert added.
Social media such as Facebook, used by half of Vietnam's 90 million people, makes such fervor easy to stoke and hard to contain.
After protests spanned cities nationwide, the National Assembly last week postponed its vote on the economic zones until October.
Security was tightened on Sunday to prevent protests in major cities, but thousands still gathered in central Ha Tinh province, many with signs saying "No leasing land to Chinese communists for even one day."
Tensions are likely to persist as long as China pushes its Belt and Road initiative to advance its overseas business, and takes stronger action to fortify its claims over almost the entire South China Sea.
China has been accelerating construction and militarisation in the Spratly and Paracel islands claimed by Vietnam, and in March pressured Hanoi to suspend some major offshore oil drilling for the second time in the space of a year.
The Vietnamese government's resistance to Chinese pressure has been very limited.
The communist party top brass rarely acknowledges anti-China sentiment even exists in Vietnam. 

On Friday, house speaker Nguyen Thi Kim Ngan skirted the issue, saying the legislature "appreciates the people's patriotism and their profound concerns about important issues."
Party chief Nguyen Phu Trong weighed in on Sunday to reassure the public about the economic zones, which have 99-year leases, but also made no specific mention of China.
The June 10 protests were in large part peaceful, but turned violent in central Binh Thuan province, where vehicles were set ablaze and angry mobs hurled rocks and charged at riot police.
Tran Vu Hai, a prominent lawyer, said the anger had been festering for years in Binh Thuan, where China is blamed for assaulting fishermen, polluting the land with a Chinese-built power plant, and for deforestation to mine minerals exported primarily to China.
Hai said people were venting fury not only at China, but at a local government, which is perceived as being corrupt and enslaved by destructive Chinese commercial interests.
"They don't investigate why people are irritated and they don't solve the people's problems," he said. "The trust in the authority in that area has already been lost."
The turnout and coordination of protests is now emboldening ordinary Vietnamese, but also complicating the party's difficult balancing act of tolerating some dissent while keeping it under control.
That risks angering a vital trade partner that can hold Vietnam's economy hostage.
The protests are being taken seriously by China; its diplomatic missions in Vietnam held meetings last week with Chinese business groups, local government and local media.
In one of several postings on the embassy's website, it said charge d'affaires Yin Haihong "demanded" that Vietnamese authorities protect Chinese businesses and citizens.
Ms. Yin said the embassy had been informed by the Vietnamese authorities that people with "ulterior motives" had "deliberately misrepresented the situation and linked it to China."
The recent rallies follow similar protests in 2014 after China's deployment of an oil rig off central Vietnam, and months of demonstrations in 2016 over an environmental disaster at a steel plant run by Taiwan's Formosa Plastics.
Responding to questions from Reuters, Vietnam foreign ministry spokeswoman Le Thi Thu Hang made no mention of China but said "extremists" had "incited illegal gatherings." 

Lawmakers say it is time to revisit a long-delayed law to regulate demonstrations. 

The constitution allows freedom of assembly, but protests are often broken up by police and participants held for "causing public disorder."

Others say it's time to listen more to public opinion.

Manila’s pivot to Beijing spells peril—not just opportunity—for Chinese-Filipinos

By Clinton Palanca

In 1417 the sultan of Sulu, now part of the southern Philippines, sailed to China to pay tribute to Zhu Di, the third emperor of the Ming dynasty. 

After the sultan fell ill and died unexpectedly on his way home, the emperor built an elaborate tomb for him in Dezhou, in Shandong province. 

In recent years that tomb was restored—with financial help from a Chinese-Filipino business leader—and last month trade and cultural groups marked the voyage’s 600th anniversary with a flurry of activities.
Their efforts to play up historic ties between the two nations come amid growing mistrust in the Philippines of the nation’s ethnic Chinese, who comprise about 1% of the population but have an outsize influence over the economy. 

They are seen as midwives to China’s economic expansion in the region, and a pivot to Beijing by president Rodrigo Duterte places even more opportunities within their reach. 

But the social inequality, coupled with ethnic distrust, could erode the decades of trust-building that makes their integration so different from the segregation experienced by ethnic Chinese in Indonesia and Malaysia—nearby nations that also received many of the immigrants who left China in the years prior to the start of communist rule in 1949.
Duterte, who is scheduled to hold bilateral talks with Xi Jinping on Saturday (Nov. 11) in Vietnam, ushered in the thaw in relations between Beijing and Manila after taking office in mid-2016. 

Before then, the relationship was marked more by Philippine anger over China seizing control of reefs, shoals, and other features in the South China Sea claimed by both nations. 

Public indignation culminated in Manila opening a case against China’s sweeping maritime claims before an international tribunal in the Hague, which ruled in favor of the Philippines in July 2016. 

But Beijing dismissed the ruling and has been busy fortifying artificial islands it’s set atop reefs—some quite near the Philippines—complete with airstrips, barracks, and missile shelters.
China’s nine-dash line, with which it dubiously claims most of the sea, intersects with large portions of the Philippine exclusive economic zone, where it legally has sole rights to the natural resources in and below the water. 

Beijing favors joint exploration of oil and natural gas within the disputed waters, but in the Philippines that could translate to infringing on national sovereignty. 

Anti-China sentiment could turn into anti-Chinese sentiment. 
Despite the win at the Hague, Duterte has kept the maritime dispute on the back burner, though this weekend he’s expected to ask Xi for clarification on China’s position and express concerns about militarization in the waterway. 

His focus has instead been on boosting commercial links between the two nations. 

In October 2016, just four months into his term, he went on a four-day state visit to Beijing, announcing his “separation from the United States” and telling his hosts, “I’ve realigned myself in your ideological flow.” 

Although the business sector of the delegation had invited only two dozen delegates, hundreds of businessmen crashed the party. 

Among them were over a hundred members of the Federation of Filipino-Chinese Chambers of Commerce and Industry.
Upon his return to the Philippines, Mr. Duterte announced that he had scored $24 billion worth of deals. 

But it remains unclear how much of that is actual investment, and how much is loans to be funneled through the Asian Infrastructure Investment Bank and the Bank of China. 

The interest rate on loans has not been disclosed, either. 

Alarmed observers soon warned that the Philippine national debt could balloon dramatically during Duterte’s six-year term.
More recent Chinese migrants who arrived after 1990, known as the xinqiao, have been gaining notoriety in the news, largely because of links to the illegal drugs flowing in from China. 

In September last year authorities raided a large methamphetamine lab masquerading as a pig farm north of Manila and arrested seven Chinese nationals linked to it. 

One Chinese businessman was the subject of a senate inquiry last August as the recipient of about 600 kg (1,323 lbs) of meth shipped out of Xiamen, a coastal city in China. 

As of 2010 there were 61,372 registered Chinese nationals; many more are believed to be in the country illegally.
Chinese migrants also operate a vast network of illegal mining operations throughout the country, achieved by bribing local officials and using the loophole of the 1991 Small-Scale Mining Act, which was intended to help disenfranchised indigenous communities. 

Chinese mining companies operating in the country use the names of local mining groups to avoid attention. 

In 2012, 97% of the gold mined from the Philippines was carried offshore unregulated, most of it ending up in Hong Kong.
The older generations of Chinese-Filipinos, who now hold Philippine passports and speak fluent Tagalog and English, have been quick to distance themselves from the newer migrants. 

But the mainstream population is not always able to parse the difference. 

China’s territorial aggression, as well as its economic expansion, have already resulted in widespread distrust of China. 

The Chinese-Filipinos are seen to be collaborators in China’s incursion into the Philippine economy—and vice versa. 

Philippine investment in China is still greater than Chinese investment in the Philippines. 

The nostalgic allegiance of the overseas Chinese has been targeted by Xi, who spent 17 years of his government service in Fujian, where many of the migrants come from.
The task of regulation falls on the government. 

But the laws on foreign ownership are easily circumvented. 

The finance secretary recently announced that an upcoming constitutional amendment will further ease restrictions on foreign ownership. 

In the absence of enforceable regulation controlling capital flow, Chinese-Filipinos will have to seriously evaluate what the long-term consequences of their relations with China and Chinese businesses will be—and the tensions these may raise. 

Awareness must continue to be raised in order to differentiate the issues of territorial sovereignty, aggressive investment, and local Chinese dominance over the Philippine economy.
While the history of friendship between China and the Philippines since the sultan of Sulu sailed to China six centuries ago are worth celebrating, it must also be noted that the journey was that of a subservient vassal. 

In order for the Philippines to maintain its economic independence from China, the Chinese-Filipinos must remain clear-eyed in defending the interests of the country where they have made their home.

Hong Kong is not China

Hong Kong football fans boo China national anthem
BBC News

Fans held up signs saying "boo" or "Hong Kong is not China" during a world cup qualifier in 2015

A group of Hong Kong football fans have booed their national anthem -- which the territory shares with mainland China -- during a friendly match with Laos.
Fans jeered and raised their middle fingers as the anthem played ahead of the game, which Hong Kong won 4-0.
There has been rising anti-Beijing sentiment in Hong Kong in recent years.
In September, China passed a law making it illegal to abuse the national anthem -- although the measures have not yet been incorporated into Hong Kong law.
Thursday night's match at Hong Kong's Mong Kok Stadium was not the first time locals booed their national anthem, March of the Volunteers.
In 2015, the Hong Kong Football Association was fined by Fifa for "improper conduct" after attendees booed and an object was thrown onto the pitch during the World Cup qualifier against Qatar.
The latest incident comes weeks ahead of China's 19th Communist Party congress, where China's top leaders will be selected.
Hong Kong, a former British colony, is a special administrative region of China.
But it has seen increased tensions with the Chinese government following a row over the pace of democratic reform in the territory, and growing calls for independence.

China's growing intolerance for dissent will come at a high price

By pushing the Hong Kong opposition out of the legislature and persecuting Liu Xiaobo, Beijing has set in motion a new era of resistance

By Jason Y Ng

People attend a candlelight march for the late Chinese Nobel laureate Liu Xiaobo in Hong Kong. 

On Thursday evening, Chinese dissident and political prisoner Liu Xiaobo died from liver cancer in a Shenyang Hospital. 

Liu was, as the Western press sharply pointed out, the first Nobel Peace Prize laureate to die in custody since Carl von Ossietzky did in Nazi Germany in 1938. 

Supporters the world over mourned the death of a man who lived and died a hero. 

The only crime he ever committed was penning a proposal that maps out a bloodless path for his country to democratise.
Then on Friday afternoon, Beijing’s long arm stretched across the border and reached into Hong Kong’s courtroom. 

Bound by the National People’s Congress Standing Committee’s decision on oath-taking etiquettes, the Hong Kong High Court ruled to unseat four democratically-elected opposition lawmakers, including Nathan Law, the youngest person ever to be elected to the legislature. 

The only infraction the four ever committed was straying from their oaths during the swearing-in ceremony to voice their desire for their city to democratise.
The two news stories, less than 24 hours apart, share a chilling symmetry. 

They underscore the Chinese government’s growing intolerance for dissent on both the mainland and the territories it controls.
But Beijing’s tightening grip comes at a cost. 

In Hong Kong, Liu’s death has rekindled an anti-mainland sentiment that has been smouldering for years. 

To the seven million citizens who watched Liu’s slow death in equal parts horror and grief, any remaining pretence that modern China is a benevolent paternal state that has moved beyond a brutal response to political debate has been shattered once and for all. 

And all current and future attempts by Beijing to win over Hong Kong people, especially the younger generations, are doomed to fail. 

The indelible images of a skin-and-bone dissident on his deathbed or of that famous empty chair in the Oslo City Hall have been seared into their collective mind. 

China has lost Hong Kong forever.
Similarly, the removal of four pro-democracy lawmakers is not without consequence for Beijing. 

By reinterpreting the oath-taking provisions in the Basic Law, the Chinese government has sidestepped the judiciary in Hong Kong and dealt another blow to the city’s rule of law. 

Each time the NPCSC rewrites the rules and overrides local judges, Hong Kong’s independent judiciary—the bedrock of its economic success—means a bit less. 

With each heavy-handed attempt to squash the opposition, “one country, two systems”—the framework of happy coexistence for Hong Kong that Xi Jinping is fond of parading in front of world leaders and hopes that Taiwan will one day embrace—looks a little more like a broken promise.
What’s more, the loss of four pro-democracy seats has removed the checks and balances in Hong Kong’s bicameral legislature – the Legislative Council – which comprises the democratically-elected Geographical Constituencies and the undemocratic Functional Constituencies stacked with pro-business special interest lobbyists. 

The unseating of the foursome has cost the opposition its majority in the Geographical Constituencies, which means that any unwanted bill proposed by a pro-Beijing lawmaker will sail pass both houses.
One of the first things that the pro-Beijing camp plans on doing is amend the voting procedures in the legislature to put an end to filibusters. 

Without the ability to block that amendment, the opposition will see its only effective weapon against the government taken away. 

That means there will be nothing to stop the Hong Kong government from pushing through Beijing’s political agenda for Hong Kong, from the passing of a highly unpopular anti-subversion law to the approval of multi-billion dollar infrastructure projects for great economic integration with the mainland.
All that will work in Beijing’s favour in the short run, but the headache won’t be far behind. 

A legislature that acts with complete impunity will further embitter the population and destabilize Hong Kong. 

By pushing the opposition out of the legislature and back onto the streets, Beijing may have inadvertently set in motion a new era of resistance.
The same ingredients that ignited the Occupy Movement three years ago will once again bubble to the surface, pushing the city toward a political movement of a larger scale and with more far-reaching repercussions. 

None of that is in Xi’s interest, considering that the senior Chinese leadership is already mired in factional infighting and an increasingly ungovernable Hong Kong will hurt the strongman image that Xi has so carefully crafted for himself.
What separates a skilled autocrat from the rest of the mad dictators is his ability to judge the difference between going too far and just far enough. 

Control may be the Chinese Communist Party’s best substitute for legitimacy and a necessary condition for self-perpetuation, but how much control is too much continues to confound –and may one day trip up – Xi’s leadership. 

What happened to Liu Xiaobo and the four ousted lawmakers in Hong Kong suggests that Beijing is now dangerously close to overstepping that line. 

The price for misjudging the situation will be high, and while most of it will be borne by mainland dissidents and the citizens of Hong Kong, it may pack enough punch to upset the ever-delicate balance in the house of cards.

Chinese Quiet Invasion of Siberia: A Geopolitical Time Bomb

Demographic genocide: The influx of Chinese migrants fuels resentment regarding China’s presence

BY IVAN TSELICHTCHEV

Children transport spring water to their village outside Khabarovsk, Russia. A 100 billion yuan investment fund is the latest in a string of efforts to strengthen ties along the border of China and Russia.

Recent meetings between Beijing and Moscow – at the Belt and Road Forum last month and at a two-day summit last week in Russia – are the latest in a string of efforts to strengthen Sino-Russian ties, especially along the border. 

However, like many nations, Russia has found that working with China can be a double-edged sword.
Sino-Russian relations are “at their best time in history”, Xi Jinping told Russian media attending the summit – words that were backed up with the announcement of a US$10 billion fund for cross-border infrastructure projects.
But for all the fanfare surrounding the fund, Chinese investment in the region is helping to fuel tension, raising fears of China’s growing presence in the Russian Far East. 

A side effect of Beijing’s investment – an influx of Chinese migrants – is perceived by locals as an expression of China’s territorial expansion. 

Russian political groups and media outlets have tapped into this anxiety.

An apocalyptic film China – a Deadly Friend (in the series “Russia Deceived”) became an instant internet hit after its release in 2015. 

In the film, China is preparing to invade the RFE in its quest for global dominance and that Chinese tanks could reach the centre of the city of Khabarovsk within 30 minutes. 

Just 30km from the Chinese border, Khabarovsk is the second largest city in the RFE after Vladivostok and the region’s administrative centre.

According to Russia’s census of 2010, the number of Chinese residing in the country was just 29,000, down from 35,000 in 2002 – no more than 0.5 per cent of the total population of the RFE.
Other estimates, however, put the number of Chinese in Russia at 300,000 to 500,000.
Transfer of territory: Xi Jinping shakes hands with Vladimir Putin during their meeting in Astana. 

The issue of Chinese presence in the RFE touches a raw nerve in Russia, largely for two reasons. First, Russians view it in the context of the enormous and growing economic and population incongruence with China and second, the three-decades-long Sino-Soviet confrontation, including border clashes in the late 1960s.

China’s population is about 10 times that of Russia. 

The population of the RFE, comprising seven provinces, is only a little more than 6 million – an average density of less than one person per square kilometre. 

Furthermore, the population in this region is in decline due to low birth rates and migration to other regions of Russia where living and working conditions are better. 

Since 1991, the RFE has lost about a quarter of its population.
China’s gross domestic product is almost 10 times that of Russia’s and the gap is increasing. 

The Chinese economy grows almost 7 per cent a year, while Russia has just gotten over a recession and is unlikely to grow more than 1.5 per cent to 2 per cent in the coming years.
Irrespective of its rich natural resources, the RFE remains one of the most problematic Russian regions in terms of infrastructure, industrial development and living conditions. 

The outdated infrastructure of most towns and villages, especially those in the border area, is in stark contrast to the state-of-the-art facilities built in Chinese border cities like Suifenhe or Heihe.

Territorial issues
The 1858 Aigun Treaty between the Russian Empire and the Qing Dynasty established the Sino-Russian border along the Amur River, reversing the previous Nerchinsk Treaty of 1689. 

Russia got over 600,000 sq km on the left bank of the Amur, known as Priamurye, which had been held by China. 

With the signing of the Convention of Beijing two years later, it also acquired the vast area on the right bank of Amur, east of its tributary Ussuri River (Ussuri joins Amur in Khabarovsk) – thus gaining complete control over the Primorye region down to Vladivostok.

A Chinese man sells goods at a market in the town of Vladivostok. Some estimates put the number of Chinese in Russia at 300,000 to 500,000.

In China, both treaties are viewed as unequal, drawn up in a time of China’s weakness.
In 1969, when confrontation between Beijing and Moscow peaked, military clashes broke out on the border, raising fears of an all-out war. 

In 1989, bilateral relations were normalised. 

The border was largely finalised by the agreement of 1991. 

Historian Boris Tkachenko said China netted 720 sq km. 

Ironically, the territories it got included the Island of Zhenbao – the scene of the bitterest military confrontation in 1969. 

The issue of the territorial status of the two small islands near Khabarovsk along the junction of Amur and Ussuri rivers – Yinlong and Heixiazi – was left to be settled later. 

Under the agreement of 2004, the former and about half of the latter were transferred to China. Critics say that Moscow made too many concessions. 

With the signing of the additional border agreement in 2008, officially all the territorial issues were settled. 

China and Russia are now strategic partners. 

But many in China feel that as the Aigun Treaty and the Convention of Beijing were unjust, China should at some point get back territories it ceded.

The economic dimension
Economic activities of the Chinese in the RFE are still expanding, with the tacit approval of the Russia.
One of the major Chinese activities in the RFE, and also Siberia, is agriculture. 

Chinese farmers are cultivating corn, soybean, vegetables and fruits there while many are engaged in pig husbandry. 

For this, Russia is leasing land – hundreds of thousands of hectares, usually at preferential rates.
Recently a new accord was signed to lease about 150,000 hectares of farm land in the Trans-Baikal region in Eastern Siberia to the Chinese for 49 years at a symbolic price of about US$5 per hectare. 

Almost all the woodlands in the area near the Chinese border had already been leased for timber extraction.
Critics are saying that it means a sell-out of the native land at a discount price. 

However, more major matters for concern also exist.
The top headache is the excessive use of chemicals. 

The nitrates in the fruits and vegetables grown by the Chinese far exceed the norms, according to Russian monitoring authorities. 

Many chemicals they use are unknown in Russia, and there is no methodology for their analysis. 

This poses health risks for consumers, and also risks soil degradation.
One more surprise for Russians was Chinese-run pig farms. 

The animals grow at an “unthinkable” pace and to an “unthinkable” size – apparently, due to the intensive use of chemicals in their forage.
Builders work at the construction site of Heihe-Blagoveshchensk road bridge at the border of China and Russia. The 19.9km highway bridge stretches from Heihe, a border town in northeastern China's Heilongjiang Province, to the Russian city of Blagoveshchensk. The road bridge is scheduled to open to traffic in October 2019. 

In 2009, China and Russia launched a long-term programme of cooperation in the border regions. 

It includes 205 key projects: 94 on the Russian side and 111 on the Chinese side. 

The latter, however, are mostly stalled as Russian counterparts don’t provide enough financing to implement them. 

In contrast, projects started in Russia by the Chinese are extracting metallic ores and other natural resources, producing cement and modernising customs and border control facilities.
When implementing cooperation projects, the Chinese side, first and foremost, seeks to send in large numbers of labourers. 

More often than not, it appears to be a precondition for launching such projects.
In 2014, Russia enacted the Territories of Accelerated Development (TAD) law – special economic zones providing substantial tax and other benefits, including reduced mineral extraction fees. 

No permits are required for hiring foreign workers.

The territories are established initially for 70 years, but the term can be extended. 

They are managed not by local administrations but by Committees and Management Companies appointed by the government. 

Land or real estate there can be confiscated from Russian citizens at the request of the managing company.
Initially TAD will be created only in the RFE, starting from the Khabarovsk and Primorye provinces. The Chinese will be the major players and beneficiaries.
China may transfer more major enterprises to the RFE, from construction projects to shipbuilding to telecoms. 

The Russian side is willing to accept them, provided they meet environmental standards.
All this obviously sets the stage for a deeper involvement of the Chinese in the RFE economy and the rise in the number of Chinese residents. 

Yet, their numbers will not surge dramatically. 

Economic factors, limiting China’s presence are also at work.
Guests view the sand table model of a heat and power plant in Yaroslavl Province, Russia. A gas-steam combined heat and power plant built by a China-Russia joint venture has been officially brought online.

First, China has vast underdeveloped areas of its own, especially in the west with a sparse population density comparable to the RFE. 

For Beijing, development of those areas appears to be a priority.
Second, Russia’s attractiveness as an employment destination is declining as wages in China are growing faster and may have already exceeded Russian levels.
Third, Russia’s economy has gone through a recession and very low growth rates are expected. Chinese investors’ enthusiasm is not increasing. 

They have many other attractive foreign investment destinations around the world to choose from.

Diagnosis and prospects
The scale of the Chinese presence in the RFE is still comparatively small. 

In the coming years it is likely to grow at a moderate pace.
Economic interests of both sides are complementary, not conflicting. 

The RFE needs Chinese labour resources, money and technologies. China needs RFE’s land, natural resources and markets. 

That said, there is a risk that those stronger links may also raise anxieties and tensions, especially on the Russian side, and may amplify xenophobic sentiments. 

Russia will have to accommodate more and more Chinese, providing a comfortable working and living environment, making them abide by their rules.

Interaction with the Chinese will be productive only if more Russians choose to live and work in the RFE, drawn in by improved infrastructure and new industries. 

Otherwise, as Vladimir Putin put it, the majority of Russia’s population there will speak Chinese, no doubt. 

The issue of the Chinese in the RFE is manageable only if Russia is able to attract more Russians to the region. 

If not, then the growing Chinese presence may become a geopolitical bomb. ■

"I Am Not Chinese"

Two decades after handover, scant love for China among Hong Kong youth
By Venus Wu and Tyrone 

Kalok Leung, who was born four months after the Hong Kong's handover to Chinese rule in 1997, poses with his childhood photo which was taken at the same spot in 2002, at Golden Bauhinia Square in Hong Kong, China June 15, 2017.  

Apple Siu poses with her childhood photo around the same spot where it was taken in Hong Kong, China June 14, 2017.

Hong Kong student activist Chau Ho-oi, born in the year the Asian financial hub returned to Chinese rule 20 years ago, recalls the sense of pride she once felt toward mainland China.
Sitting with her parents when she was 11, Chau watched the 2008 Beijing Olympics on television in awe and felt "excitement in the heart" as China's athletes swept the board with 48 gold medals, more than any other nation.
"I thought China was great," Chau said. 

"If you asked me back then if I was Chinese, I'd say yes."
Fast forward nine years, however, and the former British colony's first post-handover generation is increasingly turning its back on the mainland.
"Now ... I don't want to say I am Chinese," said Chau, who was arrested during mass pro-democracy protests in 2014. 

"It gives me a very negative feeling. Even if you ask me 100 times, I would say the same thing."
According to a University of Hong Kong survey released on Tuesday that polled 120 youths, only 3.1 percent of those aged between 18 to 29 identify themselves as "broadly Chinese". 

The figure stood at 31 percent when the regular half-yearly survey started 20 years ago.
In interviews with 10 Hong Kong youths born in 1997 including Chau, all of them, including an immigrant from mainland China, told Reuters they primarily identify themselves as "Hong Kongers" and their loyalty lies with the city.
The territory became a British colony in stages in the 19th century and returned to Chinese rule under a "one country, two systems" formula which guarantees it wide-ranging autonomy, including an independent judiciary and freedom of speech, for at least 50 years.
The 20-year-olds' attitudes were hardened, they said, by a series of shadowy maneuvers suggesting a slow squeeze on those freedoms by Communist Party rulers in Beijing.
Graphic on public opinion: tmsnrt.rs/2sw6cDG

In 2012, a skinny 15-year-old student named Joshua Wong led tens of thousands of Hong Kong residents to protest against a mandatory national education curriculum they claimed would "brainwash" students by promoting Chinese patriotism. 

The curriculum was eventually shelved.
Two years later, the "Occupy" movement, with Wong at the helm, sought to pressure Beijing to allow full democracy in the election of its leader, demands that were ultimately ignored after 79 days of street protests.
The abduction of several Hong Kong booksellers by mainland agents and China's efforts to disqualify two young lawmakers who support Hong Kong independence have also shaken confidence in the "one-country, two systems" arrangement.
Student Candy Lau fears Hong Kong will become more controlled.
"You see how mass surveillance is so pervasive in China. If Hong Kong gets worse, it may become that way, and it may not become safe anymore," she said. 

"It's an invisible fear."
More and more youngsters are now pushing for the right to self-determination, and even independence, alarming Beijing.
Last month, Beijing's No. 3 official, Zhang Dejiang, who also oversees Hong Kong issues, stressed the need to "strengthen national education and legal education to Hong Kong's youth, and develop correct concepts about the country from a young age" so that they could be moulded into those who "love the country".
Hong Kong's incoming leader, Carrie Lam, speaking to China's Xinhua state news agency, said she would seek to cultivate the concept of "I am Chinese" at nursery level.
More than 120,000 Hong Kong youths will join China-related exchange programs, some sponsored by the Hong Kong government, as part of the handover's 20th anniversary celebrations, according to Xinhua.
But this patriotic push could trigger a greater backlash.
"How could the government not understand the more it forces Hong Kong people to love China, the more opposition this would draw?" asked 20-year-old Jojo Wong, no relation to Joshua.
Even more moderate students like Felix Wu, who says he's apathetic about politics, chooses to identify himself first as a Hong Konger, before his Han Chinese ethnicity.
"China is a pretty big market and Hong Kong has a need to integrate with this market," Wu said. 

"But politically they promised nothing would change for 50 years. I think they're going back on their word a bit."
Ludovic Chan, a business student hoping to join the civil service, sees himself first as a Hong Konger, but doesn't think that identity is in conflict with being Chinese.
"The two different cultures can co-exist. They shouldn't always say Hong Kong and China should integrate. But the two sides should try to understand each other more."

Rogue Nation

China to Select New Hong Kong Leader Amid Anger at China Meddling
By James Pomfret

People attend an election campaign by candidate John Tsang, former Financial Secretary, at the financial Central district, two days before the Chief Executive election, in Hong Kong, China March 24, 2017. 

HONG KONG -- A small electoral college chooses a new Hong Kong leader on Sunday amid accusations of meddling by Beijing, denying the Chinese-ruled financial hub a more populist leader perhaps better suited to defuse political tension.
The vast majority of the city's 7.3 million people have no say in their next leader, with the winner to be chosen by a 1,200-person "election committee" stacked with pro-Beijing and pro-establishment loyalists.
Three candidates are running for the top post, two former officials, Carrie Lam and John Tsang, and a retired judge, Woo Kwok-hing. 

Lam is considered the favorite.
"I hope we all remember on 24 March 2017, we Hong Kong people have all come together and given our most sincere blessings for a more united, a better Hong Kong," Tsang told a rally of thousands of cheering supporters on Friday night.
Mass protests are planned over the weekend denouncing Beijing's "interference" in the election amid widespread reports of lobbying of the 1,200 voters to back Lam, rather than the more populist and conciliatory former finance chief, Tsang.
Since Hong Kong returned to Chinese rule in 1997, Beijing has gradually increased control over the territory even though Beijing promised wide-ranging freedoms and autonomy under the formula of "one country, two systems", along with an undated promise of universal suffrage.
Many fear that Lam will continue the tough policies of staunchly pro-Beijing incumbent Leung Chun-ying, a divisive figure who ordered the firing of tear gas on pro-democracy protesters in 2014 and who wasn't seen to be defending Hong Kong's autonomy and core values.
The political upheavals with Beijing over the city's autonomy and democratic reforms -- that many hoped would have allowed a direct election this time round -- have roiled a new generation and weighed on the city's economy, ranked 33rd globally by the World Bank in 2015.
Political and social divisions, mainly over democracy and anxieties over China's creeping influence, have dominated political debate leading to some legislative and policy-making paralysis and the stalling of major projects, including a cultural hub and high-speed rail link to China.
Businesses have also faced growing competition from mainland Chinese firms in core sectors like services and property. 

Housing prices, now among the world's highest, are widely seen to have been jacked up by an unrelenting wave of buying from rich Chinese, intensifying anti-China sentiment.
Many observers, leading businessmen and politicians have warned Hong Kong can't afford another period of upheaval if the city is to regain its former capitalist mojo.
Beijing's shadowy detention of five Hong Kong booksellers in late 2015, and the disappearance of a Chinese billionaire this year, have also undermined confidence in "one country, two systems" formula.
While Beijing hasn't explicitly backed any candidate, senior officials have stressed certain conditions must be met including a new leader having the "trust" of China's Communist leaders.
"Just because a candidate is leading popularity polls doesn't necessarily mean you should vote for (that person)," said Leung Chun-ying on Friday.
Nearly 2,000 police will be stationed around the harbourfront voting center in case of any unrest.

Beijing Bully

Beijing's Anti-THAAD Moves Sour China Views in South Korea
By Brian Padden

A worker removes part of a sign that consists of the Chinese characters that collectively read South Korea, at a shop in Shanghai, China, March 15, 2017

SEOUL — A new public opinion poll shows growing anti-China sentiment in South Korea over reports of economic retaliation by Beijing against the deployment of the Terminal High Altitude Area Defense (THAAD) missile defense system.
The United States military has already begun to deploy the advanced U.S. anti-ballistic missile system in South Korea over the objections of China, and it is expected to be fully operational within the next month. 

Seoul and Washington argue THAAD is needed to defend against North Korea’s increasing nuclear and ballistic missile capabilities.
A Terminal High Altitude Area Defense (THAAD) interceptor is launched during a successful intercept test, in this undated handout photo provided by the U.S. Department of Defense, Missile Defense Agency.

Beijing says it is a provocative regional military escalation and is worried the systems powerful radar could be used against them. 

Beijing is retaliating against the THAAD deployment by restricting the operations of South Korean companies inside China, and putting limits on some imports and the number of Chinese tourists to South Korea.
Chinese tourists pose for a group photo at the Gyeongbok Palace in central Seoul, South Korea, Oct. 5, 2016. About 8 million Chinese tourists have visited South Korea in the last five years.
South Korea this week complained to the World Trade Organization that China, its largest trading partner, is violating trade agreements over THAAD. 

Beijing has not acknowledged imposing any new economic restrictions.

Survey results
The Asan Institute for Policy Studies in Seoul published the results Monday of a study measuring South Korean favorability ratings for the United States, China, Japan and North Korea based on a national survey of 1,000 respondents from across the country.
In Asan’s March 2017 survey China’s favorability rating fell to 3.21 on scale of 1 to 10, with 10 being the highest rating.
“Interestingly it is lower than that of Japan, which was 3.33,” said Kim Ji-yoon, a research fellow at the Asan Institute for Policy Studies and co-author of the study.
In past surveys, Japan has consistently ranked lower than China due to unresolved South Korean anger over atrocities committed during Japan’s past colonization of the Korean Peninsula.
Japan’s favorability rating hasn’t changed, but China’s standing has dropped precipitously from a high of 5.0 in 2015, when then President Park Geun-hye stood beside Xi Jinping at a WWII anniversary parade in Beijing.
The study found that the growing anti-China sentiment was fueled by the perception that Beijing is using economic pressure to interfere in South Korean national security matters.

THAAD support growing

South Korean opposition to THAAD also dropped from 46 percent in November to 38 percent in March.
The study found that even South Korean THAAD opponents voiced increased resentment over the Chinese threat to sovereignty.
“Regardless of your attitude or opinion towards THAAD deployment on the Korean Peninsula, China has lost in lot of popularity among the Korean public,” said Kim.
Growing public support for THAAD, said Kim, may cause some liberal presidential candidates who voiced reservations for the controversial missile system to reassess their positions.

Trump support
It is no surprise that North Korea continues to rank last in the Asan favorability rating with a score of 2.17, given the Kim Jong Un government’s continued threats and provocations in the last year, including numerous ballistic missiles launches and two nuclear tests.
The United States, the South’s most important military ally, achieved the highest favorability rating at 5.71, that is down only slightly from 5.77 in January before Donald Trump took office.
The study indicates the South Korean public continues to strongly support the U.S. alliance, despite initial concerns over Trump’s past campaign statements criticizing South Korea for not adequately contributing to mutual defense costs and threats to withdrawal American troops.
However among respondents 40 years old and younger, the U.S. favorability rating has dropped significantly, and that is beginning to indicate a downward trend, that Kim said is “worth paying attention to.”