Lethal Threat: The Quantum Gap with China

China has ramped up its investment in developing quantum technologies, but few understand the impacts of losing this modern-day space race.
BY THOMAS E. RICKS

China has ramped up its investment in developing quantum technologies, but few understand the impacts of losing this modern-day space race.
Seventy-five years ago, the United States and imperial Japanese navies (IJN) faced off at the Battle of Midway, an engagement that would prove decisive in determining the outcome of World War II in the Pacific. 

The U.S. navy (USN) had devoted tremendous intelligence resources to detecting when and where such a battle might occur. 

They had long known that the IJN’s primary strategic objective was to lure the USN into a decisive fight. 

The IJN planned a surprise attack. 

Why then did the USN take such a risk?
The USN knew it had two critical advantages despite being outgunned and likely years behind in naval readiness than their Japanese counterparts. 

First, it had broken its adversary’s codes and unlocked access to all of imperial Japan’s communications. 

They knew precisely when and where an attack would take place. 

Second, the USN had outclassed its adversary’s fighting platforms with two new and revolutionary technologies, radar and sonar. 

Therefore, not only did the USN know precisely when and where to place its forces to counter the IJN punch, but it also maintained better situational awareness throughout the fight. 

Had the United States not recognized the strategic importance these technologies would play throughout the war it may have cost it victory at Midway and many other points along the way.

U.S. navy aircraft on the deck of the USS Enterprise on the first day of the Battle of Midway. 

How does the Battle of Midway relate to the ongoing race to develop quantum technologies? Quantum technologies are those that make use of some of the properties of quantum mechanics. Features such as quantum entanglement, quantum superposition, and quantum tunneling can be applied in new forms of computation, sensing, and cryptography. 

Many are convinced that whoever masters this esoteric field will gain a similar dominance both in codebreaking and advanced sensors. 

These advantages will tip scales both in the ongoing cyber war being carried out daily over the global internet and in future state-on-state combat.
Given these risks, China’s recent announcement of a $10 billion, four million square foot national quantum laboratory in Hefei should raise alarms. 

Having already demonstrated a head-start in a handful of quantum technology applications — such as its launch of the Micius satellite, the first satellite-to-ground quantum network, and China’s claimed engineering of a quantum radar capable of detecting current stealth technologies — China has proven it wants to maintain its advantage. 

These achievements combined with the massive investment by the Chinese government in quantum research should be a wake-up call to policy-makers and military leaders alike.
China’s increased spending and demonstrated advances in developing quantum technologies will enable advantages both commercially, and militarily, for a handful of reasons. 

The most concerning advantage relates to codebreaking. 

Today, communication networks pass digital information over public infrastructures, such as fiber optic pathways and wireless airwaves, using encryption to prevent eavesdroppers from reading the content of the message traffic. 

The only thing stopping eavesdroppers from decrypting this traffic is the mathematical complexity of doing so. 

Quantum computers will have the ability to crack these codes in far less time than today’s most advanced conventional computers. 

Furthermore, as quantum computers make linear gains in computational power, they will exponentially decrease the time it takes to break current means of encryption.
Conversely, just as quantum technologies can be used to decrypt traditional security measures, it also can protect information in sophisticated new quantum communication channels. 

One of the more pervasive concerns of relying on public infrastructure to communicate sensitive information comes from eavesdroppers. 

Man-in-the-middle attacks allow eavesdroppers to place sensors along public communication pathways to copy all data passing through these channels and attempt to decrypt it either in real-time or later through brute-force. 

Today, traditional networks have no reliable means to detect when these types of listening apparatus are emplaced. 

Quantum technologies, by design, detect changes at the smallest of scales. 

The extreme sensitivity of quantum technologies enables them to detect anomalies such as when an eavesdropper attempts to copy or siphon off data. 

China has already tested a 2,000km long quantum communication pathway from Beijing to Shanghai that employs this powerful new means of detecting man-in-the-middle eavesdroppers. 

They have already begun to defend their most sensitive networks.
If we return to the lessons learned from the Battle of Midway, the USN realized early on that having better sensors meant providing military leaders better situational awareness in tactical engagements. 

The rise of quantum technologies that enhance sensing will also dramatically change the landscape of military technologies in coming years. 

Quantum metrology technologies enable measurements of minute changes such as gravity upon subatomic particles and other characteristic changes that occur at atomic scales. 

Developments in this arena will have profound effects on a variety of sensors. 

China claims that it has already created a new form of quantum radar capable of defeating the electromagnetic stealth technologies employed in the $1 trillion F-35 program. 

This would render much of the strategic investments sunk into this platform tragically outdated and call into question the future viability of this already controversial program. 

The announced quantum information sciences laboratory in Hefei would also focus on the development of quantum metrology and appears set to build upon China’s early claims regarding quantum radar successes.
China has demonstrated it wishes to maintain its first mover advantage in this field. 

Given this, what should policy-makers, military leaders, and commercial decision-makers do? 

Just as previous world leaders have made calls for increased scientific spending to bolster national security interests, leaders today must recognize the changing threat landscape imposed by quantum technologies and put some skin in the game. 

To produce a profound increase in opportunities in this field someone must provide incentives for the next generation of researchers and developers. 

The free market may not be enough. 

Recently the U.S. House Science Committee voiced concerns that the United States was falling behind countries such as China that are ramping up research and development in this area.
As policymakers consider what technologies will give their societies and militaries distinct advantages — it is evident quantum technologies should be near the top of their list. 

The value proposition is clear. 

Quantum technologies enable better access to, and protection of, quality information. 

Policy and decision makers live and die by intelligence. 

Just as nations trembled at the prospect of another country owning the ultimate high ground — space — so too should they worry about who dominates the development and application of quantum technologies. 

Today, China has the high ground in quantum technologies.

Chinese Peril

China May Have Created a New Way to Sink U.S. Aircraft Carriers

By Dave Majumdar

The Pentagon just released its annual report on China’s military power, which once again highlighted Beijing’s efforts to put American aircraft carriers at risk. 

Right on cue, China announced a major milestone for a system that might be a key component of its antiaccess/area-denial (A2/AD) strategy.

This week, Chinese state media reported that the Caihong-T 4 (CH-T4), China’s massive, solar-powered drone, for the first time flew at an altitude of twenty thousand meters. 

This is important because there are no clouds above twenty thousand meters, which allows solar-powered drones to operate for significantly longer periods of time.
How long? 

Basically, indefinitely. 

According to China Daily, “future improvements will enable it to remain aloft several months or even several years.”
Jeffrey Lin and P.W. Singer, who write the excellent Eastern Arsenal blog, note that the CH-T4 is an impressive combination of big and light. 

The drone’s wingspan is around 130 feet, which is wider than a Boeing 737. 

At the same time, the CH-T4 only weighs between 880 and 1,100 pounds. 

By way of comparison, Boeing 737’s lowest typical operating empty weight is over seventy thousand pounds, and its maximum gross takeoff weight can reach as high as 170,000 pounds. 

Besides being slender, the CH-T4’s lightness is due to its carbon fiber and plastic components.
The drone can also travel at speeds of 125 miles per hour. 

However, it will also be able to cruise at sixty-five thousand feet, so it will be able to cover a huge swath of land without moving very far. 

Indeed, Lin and Singer point out: “It can utilize its high flight ceiling to maintain line-of-sight contact with over 400,000 square miles of ground and water. That's about the size of Egypt. For both militaries and tech firms, covering so much territory makes it an excellent data relay and communications node.”
What Lin and Singer don’t mention is that these capabilities will make the CH-T4 an excellent asset in China’s quest to hold America’s aircraft carriers at risk in the Western Pacific. 

Much of the attention given to that effort focuses on China’s so-called “carrier-killer” missile, the DF-21D. 

But as I noted last week in relation to North Korea, the missile itself is only one piece of the puzzle. Even more important is the sophisticated “kill chain” of surveillance, radar and communications systems needed to track and provide updated targeting information to the antiship ballistic missile while it is in flight.
Publicly available information indicates that America’s efforts to defeat China’s antiaccess/area-denial strategies focus on disrupting this “kill chain.” 

For example, in 2013, then chief of naval operations Jonathan Greenert and then Air Force chief of staff Gen. Mark Welsh coauthored an essay in Foreign Policy on how Air-Sea Battle intended to overcome A2/AD threats. 

In the article, they wrote that “Air-Sea Battle defeats threats to access by, first, disrupting an adversary’s command, control, communications, computers, intelligence, surveillance, and reconnaissance (C4ISR) systems; second, destroying adversary weapons launchers (including aircraft, ships, and missile sites); and finally, defeating the weapons an adversary launches.”
The logic of this approach, they argued, is that it “exploits the fact that, to attack our forces, an adversary must complete a sequence of actions, commonly referred to as a ‘kill chain.’ 

For example, surveillance systems locate U.S. forces, communications networks relay targeting information to weapons launchers, weapons are launched, and then they must hone in on U.S. forces. 

Each of these steps is vulnerable to interdiction or disruption, and because each step must work, our forces can focus on the weakest links in the chain, not each and every one.”
Once it is operational, the CH-T4 will complicate these efforts by increasing the redundancies in China’s kill chain. 

For instance, if America is able to disrupt or destroy Chinese satellites, Beijing can rely on the drone to provide the information necessary to track American ships. 

The CH-T4 will have other comparable advantages over other surveillance systems. 

On the one hand, they will be cheaper and more flexible than satellites, while at the same time flying higher and farther away from the battlefield than different surveillance aircraft and ships. 

This combination will make it more difficult for Washington to destroy the surveillance step of the kill chain, although it could still focus on other steps such as disrupting the communication networks.
None of this is news to the U.S. military. 

Although the Pentagon’s newest report on China’s military didn’t mention the CH-T4 by name, it did note that “the acquisition and development of longer-range unmanned aerial vehicles (UAVs) will increase China’s ability to conduct long-range ISR and strike operations.”
Fortunately, the U.S. military will have some time to figure out its response, as China Daily reports that it will “take several years for designers and engineers to improve and test the aircraft before it is delivered to users.” 

If the United States’ own record at developing this type of technology is any guide, Beijing should expect a few more hiccups along the way. 

NASA's Environmental Research Aircraft and Sensor Technology (ERAST) began working on the Helios Prototype well over a decade ago. 

In 2001, it completed an important milestone by flying at an altitude of ninety-six thousand feet (29,260 meters). 

Yet a Helios crashed during a flight test just two years later. 

Europe, meanwhile, is also trying to develop so-called pseudo satellites.

China Lake

Aircraft hangars, radar installed on artificial islands

• Hangars can accommodate combat aircraft or surveillance planes
• Militarization will help China establish an Air Defense Zone

By Ben Westcott

Dozens of aircraft hangars and high-end radar capabilities on China's man-made islands in the South China Sea are almost operational, according to new satellite imagery released by a US-based think tank.
The new facilities will further establish China's military dominance over the highly contested region, experts told CNN, and could help China establish a controversial Air Defense Identification Zone in the area.
Images released by the Asia Maritime Transparency Initiative, AMTI, taken in early March, show nearly completed defense infrastructure on three of China's largest artificial islands in the disputed Spratly chain: Fiery Cross, Mischief and Subi reefs.
Each of the islands has new aircraft hangers, capable of holding 24 military aircraft, as well as several larger hangars that can hold bombers or surveillance planes.
Though completion of these facilities in early 2017 was expected, the question remains: Where does China go from here?
"I mean, you don't build facilities like that and then not use them," Ian Storey, a senior fellow at the Institute of Southeast Asian Studies Yusof Ishak Institute, told CNN.
A Chinese Ministry of Foreign Affairs spokeswoman said Tuesday she wasn't aware of the report's details but reiterated the Spratly Islands were Chinese territory.
"Whether we decide to deploy or not deploy relevant military equipment, it is within our scope of sovereignty. It's our right to self-defense and self-preservation as recognized by international law," Hua Chunying said.

A satellite photo of China's artificial island on Fiery Cross Reef, taken on March 9, and highlighted by AMTI.

New hangers, radar almost complete
Fiery Cross, Mischief and Subi reefs are the largest of seven artificial islands built by China in the Spratlys.
China claims the majority of the South China Sea as its territory, despite overlapping claims by a number of other Southeast Asian countries, including the Philippines and Vietnam.



Four bigger hangars have already been completed on Subi Reef, AMTI said, as well as another four on Fiery Cross Reef. 

Hangars to accommodate five larger planes, such as bombers, were in the final stages of construction on Mischief Reef.
"China's three military bases in the Spratlys and another on Woody Island in the Paracels will allow Chinese military aircraft to operate over nearly the entire South China Sea," AMTI said in a statement.
In addition to the hangars, new radar domes are in various stages of construction on each artificial island, about three arrays on each reef. 

Fiery Cross, Subi and Mischief reefs now all also have shelters for mobile missiles launchers, according to AMTI.

Subi Reef, taken on March 14, with new Chinese military infrastructure highlighted, courtesy of AMTI.

Air Defense Zone planned
The establishment of an Air Defense Identification Zone, dubbed ADIZ, in the South China Sea has long been considered a possibility by analysts, especially in the wake of July's international court decision against China's maritime claims.
China declared its East China Sea ADIZ in November 2013, antagonizing Japan and the United States, who both said they didn't recognize it.
A similar zone in the South China Sea could rapidly increase tensions in the region, experts said.

New radar arrays and an aircraft hanger freshly completed at China's artificial island on Fiery Cross Reef, according to AMTI

"The worry has to be that if China bases its military aircraft (in the South China Sea), they could fly up and challenge anyone's military aircraft or civilian aircraft if they wanted to," said Carl Thayer, regional security analyst and emeritus professor at the University of New South Wales.
China had very rarely enforced its previous ADIZ, and any new zone in the south sea would start out as mostly "symbolic," Storey said.
"And the US will ignore it as it did with the East China Sea ADIZ," he said. 

"The interesting question is really how the Southeast Asian states will respond."

Planes yet to arrive
Though the infrastructure is almost completed, no military aircraft has been deployed to the islands yet, Thayer and Storey said.
China's next step would be to very slowly deploy planes to the artificial islands to gauge the local and US response, Thayer said.
"What China's going to do is habituate," he said. 

"You land one there, and then you fly it out, report it in the state media and see what the reaction is."
"Then you add two or three or four, land one and repair it, see what the response is," he said.
South China Sea tensions generally had waned in the past nine months, since Philippines President Rodrigo Duterte took power and sought a closer relationship with China, Storey said.
If China deploys aircraft, "there will be pro forma protests from certain countries, Vietnam in particular. There will be grumbling from certain ASEAN members," he said, referring to the Association of Southeast Asian Nations. 

"Then, over a period of time, this will become the norm."