Sina Delenda Est

China expands presence in Antarctica and the Arctic in positioning itself as a polar power
By Goh Sui Noi 

Chinese tourists going abroad must be used to it by now -- the lists of dos and don'ts to prevent them from tarnishing their country's image.
"Do not spit phlegm or gum" and "don't take a long time using public toilets" are just two of the exhortations in a 2013 pamphlet from the National Tourism Administration.
But the latest set of regulations is different, with rules against collecting soil, rocks and animals, carrying toxic objects and leaving behind solid waste. 

They are meant to protect Antarctica's environment and promote sustainable development of China's activities in the region, said the China Arctic and Antarctic Administration.
The rules -- released by the State Oceanic Administration earlier this month -- include a ban on violators from the area for three years.
They come at a time when the number of Chinese tourists to Antarctica and the Arctic has spiked. Antarctica attracted 5,289 Chinese visitors last year -- making up 12 per cent of visitors - overtaking Australians as the second-largest group of travellers there.
Up in the Arctic, Chinese tourists going to the Russian Arctic National Park and the Finnish Lapland have risen as well.
The regulations also come amid closer scrutiny of China's expanding polar activities.

Tourists are the most visible signs of the growing Chinese presence in the polar regions, which now feature mainly scientific research activities, but will increasingly include economic activities.
This is occurring as global warming causes ice melt in the polar regions, leading to possibilities in shipping and the exploitation of natural resources there.
This increasing Chinese presence in the poles has drawn mixed responses from other parties, whether those with direct stakes like the Arctic states and claimant states to Antarctica, or those with no direct claims but which want a piece of the action.
China is set to expand its activities as it positions itself as a polar power, in line with its foreign policy to be a global presence. 

As early as 2014, then director of the State Oceanic Administration Liu Cigui wrote: "Today, we are already standing at the starting point of a brand-new historical era, of striding towards becoming a polar-region power."
Its 13th five-year development plan of 2016-2020 includes a major programme to explore the polar regions. 

China's polar ambitions are a function of its rise, said Chinese agent Liu Nengye of Adelaide University.
"China is now able to reach remote parts of the world, be it the Arctic, Antarctica, deep seabed or outer space," he said in an e-mail interview. 

He added that economic interests are key, but there are geopolitical reasons as well.
The rest of the world, particularly nations that have been driving polar policies, "may be worried that they will no longer play leading roles in the international decision-making process or at least (are) not as comfortable as they used to be", he added.

ARCTIC INTERESTS
A key foreign relations moment for China this year was the publication of its first White Paper on its Arctic policy last month. 

China positions itself as an important stakeholder as a "near-Arctic state" whose climate and environment are affected by changes there.
While scientific and environmental research is talked about in the policy paper, economic activities also figure strongly. 

China wants to take part in the development of Arctic shipping routes.
It wants to develop a Polar Silk Road to link with its Belt and Road Initiative to build infrastructure along land and sea routes that link China to Africa and Europe.
Beijing is keen on the Polar Silk Road because it not only cuts by about a third the travel time from China to Europe, compared with the route via the South China Sea and Indian Ocean now, but also runs through an area free of pirates.
It also wants to take part in the exploration and exploitation of oil, gas and mineral resources, utilise fisheries and other living resources and develop tourism in the Arctic.
In addition, it wants to take part in shaping its governance.
Response to the White Paper has been mixed among Arctic states.
Canadian analysts worry about its ambiguity on Canadian jurisdiction over the North-west Passage that runs through the Canadian Arctic Archipelago. 

While the White Paper acknowledges the sovereignty of Arctic states, it also says international law needs to be observed.
"We don't know how China places the hierarchy between Arctic states and international law," Universite Laval professor Frederic Lasserre told CBC News.
He found the ambiguity over what China wants to do in the Arctic "a bit troubling".
But the Russians have welcomed China's engagement in the Arctic. 

China National Petroleum Corporation has a 20 per cent stake in the Yamal liquefied natural gas project in Siberia, and the two nations are looking to cooperate on developing rail and port facilities at Arkhangelsk city near the Arctic Circle.
China has also cooperated with Nordic state, including Iceland, on scientific research. 

What worries the West is that China and Russia appear to be stepping up military cooperation, having held naval drills in the Baltic Sea last year.
Chinese naval vessels have also at times operated close to the Arctic waters, noted Dr Marc Lanteigne of Massey University in New Zealand.

ANTARCTIC ANXIETIES
In Antarctica, China's activities are also coming under greater scrutiny.
China runs four research stations there and is building a fifth that is expected to be completed in 2022.
Antarctica is not governed by any one country but by the Antarctica Treaty signed in 1959. 

China is one of 29 consultative nations of the treaty that govern the territory.
One of the treaty's objectives is to keep Antarctica demilitarised and nuclear-free, and ensure that it is used for peaceful purposes only.
China published a White Paper on its Antarctic activities last May that focused heavily on its scientific concerns and interest in cooperating with other states on projects related to the environment and climate, noted Dr Lanteigne.
However, a report published last August by the Australian Strategic Policy Institute said China "has conducted undeclared military activities in Antarctica, is building a territorial claim, and is engaging in military exploration there".
It also said China is looking for resources, including minerals, hydrocarbons and fish.
All territorial claims have been suspended since the Antarctic Treaty came into force in 1961, while the Madrid Protocol forbids any activity related to mineral resources other than for scientific research. This protocol is up for review in 2048.
The report said that for the Chinese, the protocol simply postpones what they believe is the inevitable opening up of Antarctic resources. 

It suggests that China should be encouraged to issue an official Antarctic strategy.
Professor Anne-Marie Brady of Canterbury University in New Zealand, who wrote the report, said in an e-mail: "China needs to clearly signal its intentions and strategic interests in the Antarctic, as other Antarctic states have done before them."
As a consultative nation, China is entitled to help shape the evolution of Antarctic governance, she added.
As a non-Arctic state and non-claimant to Antarctica, China is seeking to walk a fine line between avoiding being seen as a "gatecrasher" and not being marginalised, said Dr Lanteigne.

The Real Russia-China Connection That Should Worry America

… in the Arctic.
By Lyle J. Goldstein

Great power relations seem to be in flux during the uncertain days since the U.S. election surprise. Some Washington strategists are examining the possibility that a “Kissinger move in reverse” that energetically breaks the ice with Moscow could throw a major wrench into Beijing’s calculations, causing it to adopt a more restrained and cautious outlook. 

The logic of reengaging the Kissingerian strategic triangle once again is not entirely without merit. However, the obstacles are so apparent as to seemingly limit the chances of success.
Another significant obstacle to such a strategy is that Russia-China relations have been continuously strengthened over three decades, so that they no longer constitute the brittle “marriage of convenience” so often perceived from Washington. 

One need only point to the recent arrival of the long-sought after Russian-made Su-35 fighter aircraft into China’s air combat arsenal, not to mention the increasing scope and pace of Russian-Chinese naval exercises to realize this is the case. 

Yet, China-Russia cooperation often operates “below the radar” and this edition of Dragon Eye will examine one aspect of the partnership that is somehow usually missed: the Arctic. 

That is especially odd because, looking at a map, one immediately sees that between China and the Arctic lies the vast terrain of Russian Siberia, so that bilateral partnership may form the only viable path to actually develop these regions effectively. 

A 30-plus-page spread with eight serious research articles in one of China’s leading naval magazines Naval & Merchant Ships 舰船知识 at the end of 2016 suggests a new level of impetus in China’s focus on the North.
The first article by Su Han 苏涵, possibly a senior researcher in the international department of the Central Committee of the Chinese Communist Party, is quite breathtaking in its candor. 

He opens his discussion with the bold claim that the Arctic is “not simply a geographic concept, but … is inseparable from our country’s future building and development …” 

He makes clear, however, that this line of thinking runs directly through Moscow: “…whether concerning use of the navigation route … or opening the development of resources, these [projects] are all closely connected with Russia. China-Russia ties form our country’s key link to participation in Arctic activities.”
So far, so good, but then the author steers into a rather scathing critique of U.S. foreign policy and its impact on Russia. 

Su explains that “In the 25 years since the collapse of the USSR, the U.S. has never retreated from its strategic containment of Russia.” 

For good measure, he additionally explains that all of Europe’s contemporary problems, from the refugees to terrorism to the Ukraine issue are all “… closely connected to the US.” …与美国密切相关.

In so far as the U.S. has sought to wield influence across the “Eurasian landmass” 欧亚大陆, “efforts by either China or by Russia to energetically develop the Arctic have in certain respects the significance of dispersing U.S. strategic pressures in other areas… It opens up a resistance space 对抗的空间 in the Arctic.”
Addressing skepticism about China’s role in the Arctic, Su argues: “All voices are slowly coalescing around the idea that the Arctic is becoming our new strategic breakthrough point” 我们新的战略突破口.

Su notes that the USSR never took China seriously as a player on Arctic issues, but he observes now that the situation has vastly changed, as illustrated by the fact that China has begun work on its second large-scale icebreaker. 

In addition, two mid-size military icebreakers recently joined the PLA Navy’s North Sea Fleet. 

Su’s analysis does highlight the potentially pivotal role of the North Korean port of Rajin 朝鲜罗津港 in both Russia-China relations and also China’s Arctic strategy more broadly. 

He points out numerous challenges, including the shallow depth of the Tyumen River, and the different rail gauges for North Korea and Russia, but ultimately points out that the project could be critically important to further development of China’s northeastern provinces and their international trading relationships.
However, the Yamal natural gas project gets top billing in this analysis as the “pearl” of the Arctic treasures. 

Grabbing the attention of the Chinese shipbuilding industry, moreover, this analysis relates a market projection that at least 20 Liquefied Natural Gas (LNG) tankers will ply the route from Yamal through Arctic waters and down to East Asia, providing China with a stable supply of 3 million tons of LNG each year. 

Other articles in this series detail aspects of contemporary Russian ice-breaker development and discuss other key shipping imperatives, such as state-of-the-art port logistics that will interest Chinese companies. 

Su offers a Chinese perspective on the Northern Sea Route [северный морской путь]: “… the majority of this sea route traverses Russia’s near seas. While this could generate some fees, the overall safety/security is assured.” 

Moreover, such cooperative efforts to develop the Arctic fit easily into the “Belt and Road Initiative,” (BRI) according to this analysis, as BRI aims to create infrastructure linkages that span Asia’s vastness, to include apparently its northern vastness.
Su’s analysis does broach the delicate issue of Chinese military deployments, although this is not a major theme of this series of articles. 

He recalls the September 2015 deployment of a squadron of five PLA Navy ships that crossed through the “Barents Strait in the international waters off the coast of Alaska” 白令海峡阿拉斯加海岸附近的公海. 

The northern route, he writes, can “weaken attempts to use the island chain to fetter our Navy.” 

On a related point, the final article appearing in this series explores Soviet/Russian nuclear submarine operations in the Arctic. 

These forces, the article notes, “were prepared at any time to strike the enemy.” 

It is further observed that Russia has recently increased the pattern of its nuclear submarine deployments by 50%. 

However, much of the article recounts the story of Soviet determination to send a nuclear submarine to the North Pole after the USS Nautilus made its pioneering visit in 1958. 

The Soviet Navy submarine K-3 reached the Pole in July 1962. 

While China’s approach to the Arctic is much more likely to follow economic interests than strategic imperatives, no one should be surprised to see a Chinese nuclear submarine surfacing through the ice at the top of the world in the next few years. 

That “stunt” might even entail Russian coaching.

Sina Delenda Est

China’s creeping ambitions in the Arctic set the stage for icy showdown

By Nick Whigham

CHINA is considered an Arctic newcomer but the increasingly emboldened superpower is certainly making its presence known in the critically important, a region considered to be the stage for the next big resource battle.

In a remote valley near the Arctic Circle construction workers are building a research facility to study the spectacular streaks of colour that light up Iceland’s wintry sky known as the Northern Lights. 

The joint facility between Beijing and Iceland is funded by China’s Polar Research Institute and the facility will house Chinese, Icelandic and international scientists when it opens next year.
The facility which will resemble a cement shell nestled in the snow is the product of a unique, and rather lopsided, friendship — and one that points to Beijing’s ever growing Arctic ambitions.
Iceland is happy to have a powerful friend while China wants to strengthen its presence in the region and cultivate an Arctic ally as climate change opens up new sea routes and resource-extraction opportunities.
Opportunities that a lot of countries are vying for.
The US Geological Survey carried out in 2008 estimated there is 30 per cent of the world’s undiscovered gas and 13 per cent of oil waiting to be found inside the Arctic Circle. 

So it’s no surprise that China has been steadily working to insert itself in a quiet struggle in the region.
Most estimates predict there will be no more ice in the Arctic Summer by 2050 while some climate scientists have even said it could disappear in the next two years during the Arctic Summer — hastening a potential scramble for resources.

THE FINAL FRONTIER
The Arctic is the closest thing left to virgin territory in the modern world.
Once of relatively little interest to the Asian giant, China has begun to formulate a regional strategy for the Arctic in the past decade in a mission to get a piece of the action.
Xi Jinping first referred to China as a polar great power when he visited Australia in November 2014 — a declaration that was years in the making.
Since then the country has become one of the most vocal of all external actors in justifying the involvement of non-Arctic states in the region.
On the surface, China’s latest project in the Arctic is about studying the Northern Lights. 

But China’s growing interest has also aroused suspicion among Icelanders, who are wary of big powers trying to grab their resources, whether it be fish, energy or land.
“We are a very small country, we are only 300,000 people, so we don’t look at our independence as an automatic thing,” said Asgeir Jonsson, an economist at the University of Iceland. 

“It’s something that you have to protect and look after,” he told the Associated Press this week.
“In our history, we have a long story of fighting with the bigger powers around us over fish and the resources that we have. That has left its mark on the population.”
Iceland was devastated by the 2008 financial crisis. 

When the calamity struck Iceland’s banks — which had accrued debts more than 10 times the country’s GDP — collapsed and the government had to be bailed out by the IMF.
The resulting financial turmoil nudged the tiny country in the direction of China who saw an opportunity and was more than willing to help. 

Shortly after the two countries signed a free-trade agreement, making Iceland the first European country to do so with China.
“China needs a partner in the Arctic,” said Dr Nengye Liu from the University of New England’s School of Law. 

According to him, Iceland is a good partner but actually the second choice for China.
“Ideally, Norway would be the best ally because it shares a border with the Arctic,” he told news.com.au. 

However relations between the two nations soured in 2010 when the Norwegian Nobel Committee awarded the Nobel Peace Prize to incarcerated Chinese human rights activist Liu Xiaobo.

Northern Lights, Lapland Image courtesy Kakslauttanen Arctic Resort, Finland.
Unlike Antarctica, most of the Arctic is under national jurisdiction and China has no chance of exerting the same influence as countries such as Canada, Norway, the US and Russia who border the Arctic.
It puts China at a massive disadvantage when trying to assert its national interest in the region. 

But Iceland can help in that quest, at least in part.
“We all know China is very interested in the Arctic,” Dr Liu said. 

The relationship with Iceland is more about a move from “symbolic participation to real participation,” he said.
Most importantly, “China wants to ensure it doesn’t get left behind.”
Some of the plans discussed by the two countries have been grandly ambitious, such as making a deep-sea port in a northern Iceland fjord to create a major shipping hub on the Northern Sea Route.
It remains unbuilt, but the economic relationship between the two countries is growing steadily.
Iceland has granted the China National Offshore Oil Company permission to explore in Iceland’s waters, and Beijing has tapped Icelandic expertise in geothermal power, a major industry in volcanic Iceland and a potential source of clean energy for China.
Aside from the increasing opportunity for the extraction of resources as the Arctic ice melts, there is also potential for greater fishing and the emergence of better shipping routes for Chinese cargo.
In an email to The Associated Press, the Chinese embassy in the US said China could benefit from Iceland’s “cutting-edge technologies in renewable energy, life-science (and) carbon-fibre industries,” as well as its fresh fish, meat, dairy products and mineral water. 

In return, China can provide Iceland with a wide range of Chinese-made goods.
The Usual Suspect: Xi Jinping

In the past other world powers have also viewed China’s growing ambition in the Arctic with unease. However that seemed to shift in 2013 when the Arctic Council agreed to expand in order to include six nations, including China, as observer states.
The core members of the council are Canada, Denmark, Finland, Sweden, Norway, Russia, the United States and Iceland who all have territorial claims in the region.
China now attends annual Arctic Circle Assemblies hosted by Iceland which see gatherings of politicians, officials, scientists and businesspeople to discuss the future of the region.
Anne-Marie Brady, editor in chief of the Journal Polar and a global fellow at the Wilson Center in Washington. 

She has written extensively on China’s creeping Arctic ambitions and says the country has a “broad range” of intentions but says China’s main goal right now “is to make sure it has a seat at any decision-making table and has access to any rights that are up for grabs.”
She also points out that Iceland’s politicians have become adept at “playing the big powers off each other” in regional struggles.
“They are getting a lot more attention from the United States in recent years because of their perceived very good relationship with China,” she said. 

“And yet what the ordinary people think about that is often quite different from their government. ... the population has some misgivings about this close relationship.”
That suspicion was certainly evident when the Chinese-funded observatory was announced for a sparsely populated region 400 kilometres northeast of Iceland’s capital, Reykjavik.
That suspicion was fanned when former official at the Organisation for Security and Cooperation in Europe, Pascal Heyman, said the Chinese want to use such equipment to keep an eye on NATO airspace.

In this photo provided by Dirk Notz, taken April 24, 2009, ice floats in the Arctic near Svalbard, Norway. At current carbon emission levels, the Arctic will likely be free of sea ice in September around mid-century.

THE BATTLE FOR THE NORTH
In 2008 the Arctic five committed themselves to the existing legal framework of the Arctic and the orderly settlement of possible overlapping claims.
The US Navy predicted as far back as 2002, there could be no ice in the Arctic summer by 2050. More recent studies by US agencies state it could happen much sooner.
The world is already seeing a scramble to lay claim to the resources currently locked away by the pack ice — and Russia is making a serious move.
In the past few years a newly aggressive Kremlin has been building a swathe of new (and reactivating many old) military bases along its Arctic frontier, something that has not gone unnoticed by the Pentagon.
The Polish Institute of International Affairs has previously warned recently that Moscow is setting up a naval infantry brigade, an air defence division, and a coastal missile system, in outlying archipelagos in the Arctic Ocean.
As the polar ice cap continues to melt, the world is witnessing nothing less than the opening of a new ocean and anyone able to exert influence over such a strong commercial area will be in the box-seat when it comes to world affairs.
The new shipping routes that are set to open up hold the promise of linking Europe and Asia via the northern pole that could, in the view of numerous maritime experts, substantially reduce travel distances, transit times, and overall transportation costs in the coming years.
As for the China and Iceland’s latest project, scientists hope the observatory will help them learn about the interaction between the sun and the Earth’s magnetic field, which could help predict space weather.
The building of the facility is behind schedule — in part due to a shortage of building contractors in Iceland — but is due to open late next year.