Han peril: China’s island chain plans

Beijing’s not just keen to annex the South China Sea and Taiwan — it has its eyes set on whole other island chains to dominate the Indian and Pacific Oceans.
By Jamie Seidel

Beijing wants to be an international super power.

To achieve this, it needs to carve out a vast swath of economic and military influence. 

And it has a plan.
A recent US Defense Intelligence Agency analysis of China’s growing strength and expanding international ambitions judged Xi Jinping wants to project power far beyond its shores.
The China Military Power report delves into deep detail about what is known about Beijings capabilities and intentions.
“China is rapidly building a robust lethal force with capabilities spanning the ground, air, maritime, space and information domains designed to table to impose its will in the regional and beyond,” A DIA spokesperson told media at its launch.
Beijing is seeking to ‘unchain’ itself from what it sees as the shackles of Western cultural, military and economic dominance.
To do this, it has its eyes set on a series of five ‘island chains’ over which it seeks to exert its national interests.
Any one of them could be the spark of an international crisis.
And the talk has been getting tough.

The US Naval Base at Guam’s Apra Harbor.

RESTRAINING CHAINS
Beijing’s ‘Belt and Road initiative’ is an expansive project to connect China’s expansive economy with the rest of Europe and Asia.
But there are ‘choke-points’.
On land, the narrow mountain passes of China’s East Turkestan colony (where the suppressed ethnic Muslim Uighurs reside), along with Pakistan and Afghanistan, funnel road and rail traffic with the Middle East.
At sea, Singapore and the slender Malacca Straits is an unavoidable bottleneck in the flow of shipping between the South China Sea and the Indian Ocean.
And then there is the small island democracy of Taiwan, the last outpost of pre-Communist China, acting as what Beijing believes as a link in a chain holding it back from the broader Pacific.

It already dominates what has been defined as the “First Island Chain”: the waters of the East and South China Seas following a rough ‘nine-dash line’ from Japan in the north, past Taiwan and the Philippines down to Singapore and Malaysia.
It’s achieved this through a rapid build-up of its navy and long-range strike aircraft, along with the internationally condemned construction of artificial island fortresses on remote reefs also claimed by neighbouring countries.
Now this victory of might over right has been achieved, analysts believe Beijing is setting out on its next objective: dominating the “Second Island Chain”.
Meanwhile, it’s begun defining the next boundaries of its desired influence … a ‘Third Island Chain’ (encompassing Alaska, Hawaii and New Zealand), a ‘Fourth Island Chain’ (Linking Pakistan, Sri Lanka, the Maldive Islands and the US/UK military facility at Diego Garcia in the midst of the Indian Ocean), and, finally, the ‘Fifth Chain’ extending from Djibouti on the Horn of Africa, past Madagascar to South Africa.

US strategic bombers on the island of Diego Garcia, in the middle of the Indian Ocean.

DANGEROUS IDEAS
Every island chain represents a sphere of influence over the nations they encompass.
Every island chain has at least one major US military base.
Every island chain is a potential flashpoint for international tensions.
All affect Australia: they fall to the north, east and west of the remote island nation.
But the nations most fearful of a dramatic shift in regional power dynamics from Washington to Beijing are Singapore and Japan.
Both could rapidly find themselves encompassed by seas dominated by China’s navy and skies by its air force.
Australia and New Zealand would soon follow.
But it’s the remote islands that are most at risk of conflict.
The United States has long since built up a strategy of using island bases to project power over a region.
Warships and combat aircraft can be based there.
But, most importantly, they can be used as launch pads for strong ground-based forces (such as troops and tanks).
Beijing has followed this line of thinking.
Its artificial island fortresses in the South China Sea are bristling with missiles, guns and military radars.
Their airfields and ports are military-grade.
They have strong garrisons.
All that is missing — for the time being — are permanently stationed combat aircraft and warships.
And it’s keenly aware of the strategic geographic importance of the Pacific island chains.
Which is why there’s a diplomatic land-grab underway.
Australia and the US have moved to head-off Beijing’s interest in Papua New Guinea’s Manus Island, making a last-minute deal to reactivate the old World War II naval facility there as a forward operating base.
A recent change in government in Micronesia upset Beijing’s ambitions there, and resulted in what is in effect an economic embargo — the suspension of government-sanctioned holiday tours there.
It’s a similar story in the Indian Ocean, with a democratic change of government stifling Beijing’s growing economic dominance over the Maldive Islands.
Such ‘push-back’ has led some international affairs analysts, including in China, to suggest Xi Jinping has ‘overextended’ himself.
He’s moved too hard, too early — and is meeting an unexpected backlash over his plans to make China great again.
The question is: how will he react?

HMAS Choules pictured at the Manus Island Lombrum Naval Base, Paupa New Guinea. The US and Australia are planning a joint military facility there to stave-off Beijing’s interest. 

THE NEXT CRISIS
China’s own 2015 Military White Paper outlines a mission statement: “It is a Chinese Dream to achieve the great rejuvenation of the Chinese nation. The Chinese Dream is to make the country strong …”
It’s already been enacting this mission through the building of extensive artificial island fortresses in the South China Sea, as well as establishing its first foreign military places at locations including Djibouti and Pakistan.
But military analysts are worried this expansion is set to accelerate.
With the European Union hobbled and distracted by a shambolic ‘Brexit’ divorce with the United Kingdom, and President Donald Trump’s insular ‘Make America Great Again’ perspective, Beijing has sensed an opportunity.
This has Australian, Singaporean and Japanese strategic think-tanks worried: can we rely on our treaties and relationships with the US, UK and Europe in the face of growing Chinese ambition?
Or will they retreat from their old island chains of influence?
The next real test will be the ‘Second Island Chain’.
This is defined as a wavy line starting in the middle of Japan, weaving through the scattered islands of Micronesia (including the major US military base of Guam) and down to the Indonesia’s Western New Guinea
Its growing naval and missile strength appears designed to project power at this scale.
Aircraft carriers can provide protection and strike power for naval formations.
Swarms of long-range guided missiles can force back larger US carrier battle groups.
Beijing’s already working to extend its diplomatic influence into the region.
As its hydrographic survey ships plough the waters to the north of Papua New Guinea and through Micronesia, it’s also pushing hard to establish a strong economic and diplomatic foothold in these Pacific states as well as the Philippines.
The major US defence facility on the Japanese island of Okinawa is grappling with deep unpopularity among the island’s residents.
Ties with Thailand are being cultivated, with talk of a possible canal to bypass Singapore.
And Xi is becoming increasingly vocal over ‘reunification’ with Taiwan — whether it wants it or not.

China Encroaches on India’s Sphere of Influence

An autocrat in the Maldives tests New Delhi’s resolve.
By Sadanand Dhume

Maldivian police stand guard near the opposition party’s headquarters in Male after President Abdulla Yameen declared a state of emergency, Feb. 6. 

Is India still top dog in its neighborhood? 

This is the question raised by a political crisis in the Maldives, an Indian Ocean island chain known for its luxury beach resorts. 

Unless New Delhi swiftly restores democracy, it risks looking ineffectual in the face of Chinese inroads into India’s traditional zone of influence.
The crisis began earlier this month, when President Abdulla Yameen’s government declared a state of emergency and arrested two Supreme Court judges as well as a long-serving former president who is Mr. Yameen’s half-brother. 

The arrests followed a Supreme Court ruling that declared the terrorism conviction of exiled former President Mohamed Nasheed unconstitutional and ordered the release of eight other jailed opposition lawmakers.
Major democracies reacted to Mr. Yameen’s actions with dismay. 

The State Department said the U.S. was “troubled and disappointed” by the declaration of emergency. India’s Foreign Ministry announced that New Delhi was “disturbed.” 

The United Kingdom, from which the Maldives gained independence in 1965, said it was “gravely concerned.”
By contrast, China urged the international community to “play a constructive role on the basis of respecting the sovereignty of the Maldives.” 

Translation: Mr. Yameen should be allowed to snuff out constitutional checks without fear of foreign intervention. 

The People’s Liberation Army reinforced this message last week by posting on social media photos of training exercises in the Indian Ocean.
The Maldives has a population of 400,000 people, about as many as Staten Island, N.Y., or the south Mumbai neighborhood of Byculla. 

The country has come to symbolize a broader tussle between the world’s two most populous nations, China and India. 

For India it represents a stark challenge: Beijing’s growing influence in countries where New Delhi has traditionally loomed large.
In Nepal, K.P. Oli, a veteran communist leader with links to China, took over as prime minister last week. 

In Bangladesh, China has rolled out $24 billion in loans, mostly for infrastructure projects, dwarfing India’s more modest forays into checkbook diplomacy.
In the tiny Himalayan kingdom of Bhutan, arguably India’s closest ally, Beijing is lobbying to establish full diplomatic relations. 

Last year Indian and Chinese troops were involved in a 10-week standoff on territory claimed by both Bhutan and China, and regarded by India as strategically vital. 

It ended when the Chinese agreed to halt construction of a road to which India objected, and both countries pulled back troops.
Nowhere in the region is China’s dramatically enlarged presence more visible than in Sri Lanka, the teardrop-shaped island that dangles off the southern tip of India. 

In Colombo, hulking cranes rise above a $1.4 billion port expansion and new commercial and residential development built by a Chinese firm on reclaimed land. 

Company officials say the development could turn Colombo into a commercial hub midway between the thriving entrepôts of Singapore and Dubai.
A 45-minute helicopter ride south of Colombo—over dense forests, manicured tea plantations, herds of wild elephants, and $2,000-a-night resorts—is China’s most controversial project in the region. 

In the sleepy town of Hambantota, China has built an airport with an 11,500-foot runway capable of landing an Airbus A380, as well as a modern seaport able to dock oil tankers. 

Both are largely unused.
Unable to pay back the money it borrowed to build the port, last year Sri Lanka handed it to China on a 99-year-lease. 

Both the Colombo Port project and Hambantota are part of China’s ambitious One Belt, One Road initiative.
In an interview in Colombo earlier this month, Sri Lankan Prime Minister Ranil Wickremesinghe flatly stated that his country will not allow the Chinese to use the port for military purposes. 

But U.S. and Indian officials say that is a possibility.
This regional backdrop raises the stakes for India in the Maldives. 

Should Mr. Yameen continue to flout the Supreme Court order, it will send a signal across the region and beyond that even the smallest nations can, with China’s backing, thumb their noses at New Delhi without consequence.
In a phone interview from Colombo, former Maldivian President Nasheed says he’s concerned that expensive Chinese infrastructure projects amount to a potential “land grab” that is “hollowing out” his country’s sovereignty. 

He also worries that under Mr. Yameen the Maldives has allowed Islamic State to make inroads into the Muslim-majority country.
Mr. Nasheed stops short of explicitly calling for an Indian military intervention to restore democracy. (Thirty years ago, India sent troops to ward off mercenaries who attempted to depose the then-president.) 

Nonetheless, when asked what New Delhi should do to ensure Mr. Yameen respects the Supreme Court decision that sparked the current crisis, he leaves ajar the door to intervention: “How they impress this upon him, I’m sure countries have the imagination and the tools to do that.”

The former president may have to pick his words carefully, but for India the choice is clear. 

If it wants to retain credibility as South Asia’s leading power, it cannot allow the Maldives to turn into an authoritarian Chinese vassal. 

This means keeping all options on the table, including using military force if necessary.

India to build major military facility in Seychelles amid growing China influence

Insecurities deepen in Delhi after Beijing inaugurates overseas base near one of world's busiest shipping lanes
By Samuel Osborne 

India signs 20-year-pact with Seychelles to build airstrip and jetty for navy on Assumption Island 

India is preparing to build a military base in the Seychelles as part of the country’s ongoing contest with China for influence in the Indian Ocean.
Last month, India signed a 20 year pact with the Seychelles to build an airstrip and a jetty for its navy on Assumption Island.
The Seychelles are of high strategic importance to India, as the island chain lies close to key global shipping lanes.
It came after China inaugurated its first overseas military base in Djibouti last year, near one of the world’s busiest shipping lanes, deepening Indian insecurities and pushing it to gain a foothold in the region.
The pact, which was first announced when the Indian Prime Minister, Narendra Modi, visited the islands in 2015, has faced problems as critics who feared a handover of territory demanded the Seychelles government make clear the terms of India’s role.
Earlier this month, around 50 people held a protest against the construction of the naval base. 

They argued the details of the project had not been made public and it could have a catastrophic impact on the local environment.
One of the organisers of the protest, Ralph Volcere, told the Seychelles News Agency: “This agreement is not being supported by the people of Seychelles. We do not know any details, what is the arrangement? What are the costs?
“Our problem is that Seychelles cannot get involved in conflicts of superpowers. We need to remain nonaligned, friendly to all – enemy to none.”
He added: “This facility on Assumption will place Seychelles at great risk should a military conflict involving India ever happen. We are dealing with countries with nuclear powers here.”
India and the Seychelles are maritime neighbours with a stake in each other’s security, India’s foreign secretary, Subrahmaniam Jaishankar, said after signing the deal.
The two countries “have drawn up a cooperation agenda that covers joint efforts in anti-piracy operations, and enhanced surveillance and monitoring to prevent intrusions by potential economic offenders,” he said.
These are people engaged in illegal fishing, poaching, drug and human trafficking, he added.
China has been building ports, power stations and highways across Asia, but the terms of its investments have caused anger.
In Sri Lanka, it faced criticism after taking control of the southern port of Hambantota it had built in a debt-to-equity swap deal.
India has tried to be more careful, avoiding giving hard loans and casting its assistance as a joint endeavour.
However, military officials called the Seychelles pact a big step in extending the reach of India’s navy, which is expected to rotate its ships and aircraft through the islands.
“The development is a clear indicator that India’s geostrategic frontier is expanding in tandem with China’s growing strategic footprint in the Indo-Pacific,” Captain Gurpreet Khurana, of the Indian Navy’s National Maritime Foundation, said.

Han Peril: China ensnares vulnerable states in a debt trap

Cheap credits are used to secure influence and grab control of strategic assets
By Brahma Chellaney
A ship departs a port in Zhanjiang, China, in July for Africa's Djibouti to dispatch members of the People's Liberation Army to man a military base there.

"There are two ways to conquer and enslave a country," American statesman John Adams (U.S. president from 1797 to 1801) famously said. 

"One is by the sword. The other is by debt."
China has chosen the second path.  

Aggressively employing economic tools to advance its strategic interests, Beijing has extended huge loans to financially weak states and ensnared some in debt traps that greatly strengthen its leverage.
After establishing a growing presence in the South China Sea, Beijing seems increasingly determined to extend its influence in the Indian Ocean, not least in countries surrounding India, its regional strategic rival.
From Djibouti in Africa to the Indian Ocean island of Sri Lanka, China has converted big credits into political influence and even a military presence.
Now a political crisis in the Maldives has highlighted the fact that China has quietly acquired several islets in the heavily indebted Indian Ocean archipelago.
Mohamed Nasheed, the nation's first and only democratically elected president who was ousted at gunpoint, says the country cannot repay the $1.5bn-$2bn it owes China, equivalent to 80% of the total foreign debt. 

"Without firing a single shot, China has grabbed more land" in the Maldives than what Britain's "East India Company did at the height of the 19th century."
Among the unpopulated Maldivian islands China has acquired on lease are Feydhoo Finolhu, lying close to the capital Male and previously used for police training, and the 7km-long Kalhufahalufushi, with a magnificent reef. 

For Feydhoo Finolhu, it paid $4 million, which is what a luxury apartment in Hong Kong sells for; Kalhufahalufushi was even cheaper.
China is the only country to come out in support of Maldives' embattled authoritarian president, Abdulla Yameen, who came to power in 2013. 

Beijing has also issued an open threat against India, which has traditionally been the dominant foreign influence in the Maldives, since the islands were granted independence from Britain. 

Chinese state-controlled media has warned that if India militarily intervenes in the Maldives, Beijing won't "sit idly by" but will "take action to stop" it.
To be sure, China claims sound commercial grounds for acquiring its Maldivian islands. 

But across the Indian Ocean, port projects that China insisted were purely commercial have acquired military dimensions.
After lending billions of dollars to Djibouti, China last year established its first overseas military base in that tiny but strategically important state, located on the northwestern edge of the Indian Ocean. 

In Pakistan, Beijing has deployed its warships for the security of the Chinese-built Gwadar port, whilst seeking to establish a military base nearby.

Beijing's creditor diplomacy scored a major success in December when Sri Lanka formally handed over its strategically located Hambantota port to China under a 99-year lease valued at $1.12 billion. 

Earlier, after Sri Lanka's $500-million, largely Chinese-owned Colombo Port container terminal opened in 2014, Chinese submarines arrived quietly and docked there.
Further east in Myanmar, there are concerns in India and the West that Kyauk Pyu, a deep-water port to be developed and financed largely by China, could eventually also serve military purposes.
In the Maldives, Beijing has shown interest in turning an uninhabited island into a naval base by cutting through the surrounding coral reefs to create passageways for its warships. 

Or it could create an artificial island and militarize it, as it has done in the South China Sea.
Underscoring Beijing's strategic calculations, three Chinese frigates visited the Maldives about six months ago, docking in Male and at Girifushi Island and imparting special training to Maldivian troops.
Meanwhile, China's stepped-up naval presence in the Indian Ocean in recent weeks might be intended to send a message to India, including seeking to deter it from militarily intervening in the Maldives, as New Delhi did with Western backing in 1988, when Indian paratroopers foiled a coup attempt. 

The action reinforced India's claim to be the region's peacekeeper.
The current ruler, Yameen, has facilitated China's island acquisitions in his country by amending the constitution in 2015 to legalize foreign ownership of land. 

The amendment appeared tailored for China; the new rules for foreign ownership require a minimum $1 billion construction project that involves reclaiming at least 70% of the desired land from the ocean.
By also awarding Beijing major Chinese-financed infrastructure contracts, Yameen is saddling the Maldives with mounting debt that is likely to prove unserviceable.
Several countries that have fallen into debt servitude to China are India's immediate neighbors, including Bangladesh, the Maldives, Myanmar, Nepal, Pakistan and Sri Lanka. 

This holds major foreign-policy implications for India, which is seeing its influence erode in its backyard. 

By establishing a Djibouti-type naval base in the Maldives, China could open an Indian Ocean front against India in the same quiet way that it opened the trans-Himalayan threat under Mao Zedong by gobbling up Tibet, the historical buffer.
China's strategy in southern Asia and beyond is aimed at fashioning a Sinosphere of trade, communication, transportation and security links.  

By financially shackling smaller states through projects it funds and builds, it is crimping their decision-making autonomy in a way that helps bring them within its strategic orbit. 

It is even replicating some of the practices that were used against it during the European-colonial period when, in the words of the Chinese nationalist revolutionary leader Sun Yat-sen, "India was the favored wife of Britain while China was the common prostitute of all powers." 

One such practice is the long-term lease, an echo of the 99-year-lease through which 19th-century Britain secured control of the New Territories, expanding Hong Kong's landmass by 90%.
The International Monetary Fund has warned that Chinese loans, offered at rates as high as 7%, are promoting unsustainable debt burdens. 

The price that such loans exact can extend to national sovereignty and self-respect. 

The handover of Hambantota was seen in Sri Lanka as the equivalent of a heavily indebted farmer giving away his daughter to the cruel money lender.
In Pakistan, Chinese state companies have secured energy contracts on terms that include ownership of the plants and 16% guaranteed yearly returns, very high by global standards. 

The "economic corridor" that China seems intent on building across Pakistan has become a vehicle for a deep Chinese penetration of the Pakistani state, with most of the investment going into energy, agricultural and security projects often unrelated to a corridor.
Against this background, the word "predatory" is increasingly being used internationally about China's practices. 

U.S. Secretary of State Rex Tillerson has called China a "new imperialist power" whose practices are "reminiscent of European colonialism."
Mao said, "Political power grows out of the barrel of a gun." 

But with China emerging as the first major power in modern history without real allies, an additional principle is guiding its policy: buying friendship by opening a fat wallet. 

China is co-opting states into its sphere of influence by burying them in debt.

Chinese Paranoia

China Wants To Turn The Indian Ocean Into The China Ocean
By Panos Mourdoukoutas 

China wants to turn the vast Indian Ocean into the China Ocean. 

When it comes to investment and commerce that is.
To execute this grand plan, Beijing is investing heavily in several infrastructure projects. 

Like Sri Lanka’s ports of Colombo and Hambantota, which give Beijing a trade outpost into the Indian Ocean. 

And the China–Pakistan Economic Corridor (CPEC), a colossal infrastructure project, which connects China’s western territories to the Indian Ocean.
But that’s the old news. 

The new news is that China is turning Maldives into another trading outpost with the acquisition of land there, and the signing of a free trade agreement.
These developments have irked India, for a couple of reasons. 

One of them is economic. 

Sri Lanka and Maldives can serve as a base for China to flood the Indian market with its products. Malvides, for instance, has a free trade agreement with both India and China. 

This means that Beijing can send products to Maldives first, and then re-export them to India.
The other reason is geopolitical. 

China wants to encircle India by turning trade outposts into military outposts.
To be fair, China has repeatedly asserted that it doesn’t plan to use the port for military purposes.
The trouble is that history proves otherwise. 

In the past four years, Chinese submarines have begun suddenly and repeatedly showing up in the Chinese-operated South Container Terminal in the port of Colombo.
And that’s in spite of India’s high-profile protests, which included join naval exercises with America, Japan, and Australia.
While it is unclear whether China will succeed in turning the Indian Ocean into the China Ocean, one thing is clear: antagonism between China on the one side and India and its allies on the other will intensify, as China rises economically.
And that raises geopolitical risks, something investors should be concerned.

Island Paradise Becomes Latest Flashpoint in India-China Rivalry

• Maldives under state of emergency as president battles court
• China, India are jockeying for influence as regime teeters

By Iain Marlow

A power struggle in the Maldives, a tiny Indian Ocean nation known for scenic luxury resorts and crystal-clear blue water, is taking center stage in a wider battle for regional influence between India and China.
On Monday, President Abdulla Yameen declared a state of emergency after the Supreme Court ordered him to free political prisoners and opposition politicians he’s thrown in jail. 

Security forces then stormed the court and arrested two judges, as well as a former leader. 

The remaining judges later annulled the previous ruling, the Associated Press reported Wednesday.
The political drama has sparked concern in India, which said last week in an unusually strong statement that it’s “imperative” for the government to obey the Supreme Court. 

China, which signed a free trade agreement with the Maldives last year, said Tuesday the country of roughly 400,000 people has “the wisdom and capabilities to cope with the current situation independently.”
India, which views China as its main geopolitical foe in Asia, has been more assertive under Prime Minister Narendra Modi in pushing to maintain geo-strategic supremacy in the Indian Ocean, with backing from the U.S. and Japan. 

China, meanwhile, has expanded its influence by building ports in Sri Lanka, Pakistan and Djibouti, a small African nation that is also home to its first overseas military base.

China Outreach
“As India tries to establish itself as the preeminent power in the Indian Ocean region, the Maldives have become increasingly important,” said Constantino Xavier, a fellow at Carnegie India in New Delhi. 

Yameen has “definitely accelerated his outreach to China, to fend off pressure from the west and also reduce leverage from India.”
The Maldives has become politically volatile in recent years. 

Yameen, who has courted Chinese and Saudi investment since coming to power in an election in 2013, has been criticized by the State Department for jailing opposition politicians and eroding human rights protections.
Before the decision to annul the court ruling, Mohamed Nasheed, an exiled former Maldives president and opposition leader, had asked India’s armed forces to back an envoy that would help enforce the order, free political prisoners and secure the safety of judges. 

The U.S. has condemned the state of emergency.

No Good Options
The judiciary has acted as a democratic check on Yameen, who still enjoys control over the state’s security forces, according to Dhruva Jaishankar, a foreign policy fellow at Brookings India.
“Yameen has been trying over the last few years to consolidate his political presence,” Jaishankar said, adding this has involved seeking Chinese funding. 

“India has been tentatively backing pro-democracy forces, but is also trying not to push him into the arms of the Chinese and the Saudis.”
Beijing has become more economically important to the Maldives in recent years. 

China sent about 300,000 tourists to the Maldives in 2017, more than any other country. 

Beijing has begun financing infrastructure projects, and unidentified Chinese company recently took out a 50-year lease on an island near the capital Male to build a resort.
Concerns are growing that China may eventually engage in land reclamation in the Maldives similar to what Beijing has done in the South China Sea, according to David Brewster, an academic at the Australian National University.
“It would take a miracle to be able to turn Yameen away from China while also restoring some semblance of democracy,” Brewster said. 

“India has no good options.”

China Is Starting to See India as a Major Threat

More and more, Chinese see India replacing Japan as the second biggest threat to Beijing, following the U.S.
By Hemant Adlakha

As the new year gets underway, and Chinese foreign policy analysts join their counterparts around the world in assessing the events of 2017, the emerging international relations (IR) discourse in Beijing is quite a revelation — at least to the Japanese and Indian strategic affairs community.
While most Chinese believe Japan to be the second biggest threat to China’s “peaceful rise,” according to a few Chinese experts, the rising global profile of India, especially under the “right-wing” nationalist Prime Minister Narendra Modi and his Bharatiya Janata Party (BJP), has gone unacknowledged.
In February 2015, The Diplomat carried an article by a Chinese scholar titled “Why China Doesn’t See India as a Threat.” 

In April 2017, Sanjeev Nayyar, an independent columnist, wrote: “One thing China must understand is that the Indian government is not obsessed with being a threat to China but only wants a rightful place for India in the world.” 

And in the fall of 2017, China’s semi-official, hyper-nationalist Global Times dismissed with disdain any talk of India worrying China in an article titled “India-Japan intimacy poses no real threat to China.” 

The article was written in response to Japanese Prime Minister Shinzo Abe’s India visit in September.

The Global Times also – it now seems ignorantly – wrote off India’s successful test of its long-range ballistic missile Agni-IV a year ago, commenting: “China should realize that Beijing wouldn’t hold back India’s development of Agni-IV. However, Chinese people don’t think India’s development has posed any big threat to it.”
As the year 2017 was drawing to a close, however, Yin Guoming, a Chinese foreign affairs analyst, argued that India, and not Japan, is now the second biggest threat to China after the United States. Here’s an excerpt:
"China-India standoff has compelled us to regard India as a serious rival. 

"During the Doklam confrontation, it became very clear to everyone – from ordinary "Chinese to foreign policy experts – China must reckon India to be its second biggest rival. 

"And that China needs to re-assess, re-examine, and reformulate its India strategy."
However, more significantly, the article pointed out that most people in China were not yet ready to recognize the Indian threat.
China’s strategic affairs community has been arguing for some time now that, viewed geopolitically, Sino-Indian relations are the second most important bilateral ties for Beijing following the Sino-U.S. relationship. 

Most Chinese came in for a rude shock in the summer of 2017, when the Indian army openly crossed into Doklam border region and for weeks refused to withdraw. 

Writing in an influential, widely read online patriotic portal based in China’s Hainan province and popular among rich, educated urban Chinese, Li Yang, a current affairs commentator wrote in July – midway through the Doklam confrontation – “The biggest mistake we have made in the past two decades has been to underestimate India and ignore India. During these years of India’s rapid progress, we did not trouble India, did not make India stumble or make India shed tears.”
Earlier, in May 2017, India announced – just a day in advance – that it would not be present at the inauguration of China’s first mega-diplomatic event of the year, the Belt and Road Forum, citing sovereignty concerns. 

The Chinese, though angered by India’s last minute boycott, chose to officially remain silent. 

A section of China’s foreign affairs commentators did indeed hint it was a mild setback to their diplomacy.
By comparison, the Doklam faceoff, which cropped up within a few weeks of Belt and Road Forum, was a “game changer.” 

It went well beyond the Chinese imagination. 

Interestingly, as the days passed, India’s refusal to withdraw its troops as well as its dismissive attitude toward engaging with the Chinese on the issue, simply left the Chinese puzzled and clueless as to the Indian game plan. 

Not surprisingly, Shen Dingli, a Chinese international relations scholar at Fudan University, counted the Doklam crisis as among China’s top five diplomatic failures under the so-called “Xi-style Diplomacy.”
Current trends in Chinese discourse on the potential India threat, if acknowledged and accepted at the official level by the central authorities in Beijing, would mean further intensification of China and India viewing each other as a hostile “enemy” in the future. 

The following arguments have been offered by some Chinese scholars as to why India, and not Japan, will pose a bigger threat and challenge for China in the coming years.
In the context of geopolitics, China believes it enjoys a greater advantage over Japan. 

Japan is a maritime nation and maritime trade and transportation forms Japan’s economic as well as survival lifeline. 

Geographically too, Japan’s location makes its energy supply route from the Middle East longer than China’s. 

Both logistically and economically, the South China Sea route is the shortest path. 

Once China establishes its full hegemony in the South China Sea (and also regains control over Taiwan, which has long been Beijing’s dream), China would naturally be able to easily place a stranglehold on Japan by dominating maritime trade routes – crucial for Japan’s existence.
In contrast, China’s own crucial maritime energy supply route passes through the Indian Ocean, which falls within the Indian military threat zone. 

During the Doklam confrontation, the Chinese took due notice of Indian analysts making statements that in the event of a India-China military clash, India would cut off China’s maritime access to the Indian Ocean.
Of course, it is true many Chinese dismiss the Indian threat as nothing but a joke. 

But that is more because India has not yet fully realized its potential, not because India is not capable of becoming a future threat to China.
Some analysts in China have also expressed their frustration over India’s “unchecked” rapid economic progress during the past two decades. 

These experts and scholars are rather candid in admitting China had failed to anticipate the “revolutionary” transformation Narendra Modi has brought about in the Indian national psyche. 

True, it is not a revelation to the Chinese that India has always viewed China is its “imaginary enemy.” 

Moreover, it is not hidden from the Chinese either that the Indian defeat during the 1962 boundary war has since remained the single most crucial factor in determining India’s national defense strategy. Yet, it is only now and under Modi, as India’s stature in global politics has risen, that China has suddenly realized that — unlike Japan — India is a nuclear weapon state. 

Finally, thanks to the Modi government’s uncharitable stance, it has dawned upon China’s strategic affairs community that Beijing’s Belt and Road strategy is bound to produce more and more structural contradictions between the two neighbors, already rapidly becoming hostile.
No wonder, if the media reports from Beijing are true, that the People's Republic of China for the first time keenly awaited the outcome of this year’s assembly elections in India. 

Following the Gujarat elections, the mandarins watching India in the Chinese foreign affairs ministry, it is believed, have predicted in their dossier that Modi will enjoy a second term as the prime minister in 2019.
Going by the current Chinese discourse, Beijing is certainly not going to just sit and watch and let India become a threat. 

The question that looms large, then, is what China is going to do about it.

WHAT AN EMPTY SRI LANKAN AIRPORT SHOWS ABOUT THE INDIA-CHINA RIVALRY

Hambantota is a perfect example of what can happen when an authoritarian leader, not subject to usual democratic balances, gets into bed with Chinese companies that have ulterior motives. 

By DAVID BREWSTER

Geopolitical rivalry between big powers sometimes yields odd results. 

The latest development in growing strategic competition across the Indian Ocean region is India’s purchase of what has become known as the “world’s emptiest international airport” in Sri Lanka, maybe just to keep it empty.

Hambantota Dreaming
The small fishing town of Hambantota, near the southern tip of Sri Lanka, has long been Exhibit A for those who worry about the strategic impact of China’s Belt and Road Initiative. 

Hambantota burst into international consciousness around a decade ago when Chinese companies were contracted to build a big new port, an international airport and, of course, an international cricket stadium – all connected by Chinese-built multi-lane freeways.
It was all part of a plan by Sri Lanka’s then-president Mahinda Rajapaksa to turn his own sleepy constituency into a new global shipping hub. 

After international investors and aid agencies balked at the business case, Rajapaksa went to China to finance and build the projects. 

Although the commercial terms are opaque, the projects have probably cost more than $1.5 billion in all, much of it in relatively high-interest loans.
According to its backers, the new port’s location next to the busiest sea lanes across the northern Indian Ocean makes it a natural hub for transhipment and logistics. 

It is part of Sri Lanka’s ambitious plans to turn itself into an all-purpose Indian Ocean hub that might one day come to rival Singapore.
But security analysts argued that Hambantota might also be a good place for a Chinese naval base, as part of a Chinese “string of pearls” across the Indian Ocean. 

It was, according to several Indian analysts, part of a grand Chinese plan to surround India in the Indian Ocean.

A Sri Lankan White Elephant
Unfortunately for Sri Lanka, the foreign bean counters were right. 

The whole project has turned out to be a white elephant. 

International shipping companies had no interest in using Hambantota, when there was an excellent port at nearby Colombo. 

Only a handful of ships visit the port, mostly docking there at the insistence of embarrassed Sri Lankan agencies.
The shiny new Rajapaksa International Airport also sits virtually unused, with a full complement of employees and only one international flight a week. 

The empty terminal and its bored-looking workers make a great photo opportunity for journalists. Some of the newly-built hangars are even rented out to locals to store rice.
When the bills became due, the government couldn’t repay them. 

Sri Lanka, now minus Mahinda Rajapaksa, was forced to go to its Chinese backers cap in hand – essentially to hand over ownership of the port in a debt-for-equity swap. 

Although Sri Lanka claims to have retained control over management of the port, the details are suspiciously murky. 

China now has plans to build a big Special Economic Zone around Hambantota. 

This may eventually drive some demand for shipping, but it is hard to see it ever becoming the global shipping hub it was once touted to be.
Hambantota is a perfect example of what can happen when an authoritarian leader, not subject to usual democratic balances, gets into bed with Chinese companies that have ulterior motives.

The project is held up as proof that the Belt and Road often involves foisting uneconomic projects on developing countries with loans that can never be repaid. 

These projects will only damage long term economic development and make many countries politically indebted to Beijing.
Similar claims are being made about the China-Pakistan Economic Corridor now being constructed in Pakistan at a cost of somewhere like $40-100 billion, with some fearing it will create a “debt trap” for Pakistan.

Checkmating the Chinese Navy
The Chinese takeover of Hambantota port only increases New Delhi’s worries that it will become an Indian Ocean hub for the Chinese navy. 

But, in fact, Hambantota has never been feasible as a full-blown Chinese naval base. 

Its proximity to India would make it highly vulnerable to air attack in the event of conflict between the two countries. 

But short of war, Hambantota would make a fine logistics point for an expanded Chinese naval presence. 

Although Colombo has repeatedly claimed that no Chinese naval facility will be permitted in Sri Lanka, New Delhi worries that Beijing’s influence will one day reach a point where the Sri Lankan government simply cannot say no.
This is where the world’s emptiest airport comes in. 

India is proposing to spend around $300 million to buy out Sri Lanka’s debt to China in return for a 40-year lease over Hambantota airport. 

But India’s future plans for the airport are hazy. 

Maybe a flight school? 

A new destination for Indian weddings? 

There seems little chance that it will turn a profit.
That is not the point of the deal. 

A key element in any overseas naval base, and even a logistics facility, is easy access by air for people and supplies. 

A naval base also requires maritime air surveillance capabilities. 

Control over Hambantota airport will give India considerable control over how the port is used. 

It is difficult to conceive of the Chinese navy developing a significant facility at Hambantota without also controlling the airport. 

In short, India is spending $300 million buying an airport to block a Chinese naval base.
The long and twisted saga of Hambantota is emblematic of growing strategic competition in the Indian Ocean region, much of it focused on ownership and access to infrastructure. 

In coming years, we are likely to see a lot more jostling between India, China, and others in the Indian Ocean over control of ports, airports and other pieces of critical infrastructure – and perhaps increasingly for control over governments.

China Threat

New Delhi wants to buy US drones to monitor China in the Indian Ocean
By Nyshka Chandran

New Delhi is expected to purchase two dozen unarmed drones from the United States to monitor growing Chinese activity in the Indian Ocean.

General Atomics' Guardian drone, which is the maritime version of the company's Predator B or MQ-9 Reaper unmanned aerial vehicle.

President Donald Trump's administration authorized the sale in June, with the price tag estimated at $3 billion, according to defense researcher Jane's IHS Markit. 

The U.S. approval was the first such clearance to a friendly, non-NATO nation, but the transaction has yet to be finalized and was a key topic of discussion during General James Mattis' visit to India this week.
Manufactured by American defense contractor General Atomics, the unmanned devices— called Guardians — are "the world's most advanced maritime reconnaissance drones and can help India track the movement of Chinese warships with its multi-mode maritime radar," said Harsh Pant, head of the strategic studies program at the Observer Research Foundation, a New Delhi-based think tank.
Privately held General Atomics makes the drone in question as a maritime variant of its Reaper unmanned vehicle.

China moves into Indian Ocean
The world's second-largest economy has ratcheted up maritime patrols around the Indian Ocean, which is home to seaborne routes crucial to global trade as well as a major U.S. military base. 

The mainland has also built up a presence in other countries around the region.
July saw Beijing establish its first overseas naval base in Djibouti, located on the ocean's northwestern side. 

That same month, state-owned China Merchant Port Holdings acquired Sri Lanka's Hambantota Port, which juts out into the strategic waterway, in a move expected to facilitate Chinese naval deployments. 

It's a similiar story in Bangaldesh, where state-owned enterprise China Harbour Engineering Company bought a majority stake in Payra Port, located at the southern-most tip of the country. 

The mainland is also looking to take an 85 percent stake in Myanmar's deep sea port of Kyauk Pyu on the Bay of Bengal, according to reports.
Occuring right in India's backyard, these projects — part of China's massive "Belt and Road" infrastructure program — are a worrying development for New Delhi, which has long held sway as the region's major power and comes just weeks following the end of a Sino-Indian border dispute in the Himalayas.
As a result of increasing Chinese influence, Prime Minister Narendra Modi's government has been taking steps to boost its capabilities in the Indian Ocean, reflected by initiatives such as the Guardian drone purchase.
All that comes amid Beijing's use of underwater drones in the South China Sea, a separate body of water where Xi Jinping's administration is trying to enforce a tremendous, 1.4-million square mile claim despite losing a legal case on that claim last year.
"Unmanned vehicles, like those whose sale has been proposed by the United States, would allow India to monitor activities in the region much better... Clearly, there are concerns about the militarization of the Indian Ocean, including the increased presence of China's People's Liberation Army Navy," explained Dhruva Jaishankar, foreign policy fellow at Brookings India.
Those worries are shared by the White House, which remains wary of China's intentions in the Asian region. 

Speaking on Wednesday, General Joseph Dunford, chairman of the U.S. Joint Chiefs of Staff, said a security relationship with New Delhi was critical to ensuring freedom of navigation in the Indian Ocean.
China was the main factor behind Washington's approval of the Guardian drone sale, noted Pant of the Observer Research Foundation.
India's air force has also requested for 90 armed Avenger Predator drones, also produced by General Atomics, that many believe could be used for cross-border strikes on Pakistani militants in the Kashmir conflict.
"Armed drones can be used for a number of functions, including counter-terrorism activities," said Jaishankar. 

"The U.S. has used them quite effectively against groups in Pakistan and Afghanistan."
However, the sale of armed drones is subject to approval by U.S. Congress members who retain concerns about intellectual property and the danger of misuse by third parties, Jaishankar warned.

Chinese Aggressions

Countering China's Submarine Presence in the Indian Ocean
By Abhijit Singh

As Indian Prime Minister Narendra Modi visited Sri Lanka earlier this month, reports emerged that the Sri Lankan government had turned down China's request for a submarine docking in Colombo harbor. 

Beijing, apparently, wanted one of its submarines (ostensibly on its way to the Gulf of Aden for 'anti-piracy' patrols) to make a logistical stopover at a Sri Lankan port, but Colombo is believed to have quietly declined, after which the submarine is supposed to have been diverted to Karachi.
The Sri Lankan government's decision to nix the Chinese request is likely to have been shaped by an experience three years ago, when the docking of a People's Liberation Army Navy (PLA Navy) submarine in Colombo resulted in a firestorm of protest from New Delhi. 

Acutely conscious of India's strategic sensitivities around Chinese naval presence in Sri Lanka, Colombo this time around moved quickly to avoid a repeat of the incident.
If rejecting China's proposal made for startling optics, the message seemed directed at the political class in New Delhi. 

Indian observers found it curious that Sri Lankan sources cited in initial media reports were eager to portray Colombo's refusal to allow the submarine's docking in Colombo as an act of Sri Lankan solidarity with India. 

More strikingly, however, Beijing's request for the submarine docking nearly coincided with Modi's visit to Colombo, raising doubts about China's intentions in raising the matter in a manner that would ensure it soon went public.
Indeed, there seemed something strange about the whole affair. 

China's maritime managers are likely to have drawn up a passage plan for the submarine visit to the Indian Ocean many weeks in advance. 

At a time when Sri Lankan Prime Minister Ranil Wickramasinghe was preparing to visit Beijing for the Belt and Road Summit, PLA Navy commanders would presumably be wary of raking controversy by bringing up a submarine visit. 

Indeed, if such a request were to be made, Chinese planners would have reached out to Colombo weeks before the arrival of the submarine in Sri Lankan waters. 

That China's naval elite chose to overlook political sensitivities by making a request which they knew had little chance of being accepted indicates an act of strategic signalling by Beijing – the delivery of an explicit message that the PLA Navy doesn't really care about New Delhi's nautical redlines.
This is not to underplay China's tactical imperative for sustained undersea operations in the Indian Ocean. 

The expansion of PLA Navy submarine activity in South Asia is quite in keeping with a powerful navy's need to familiarise itself with alien operating conditions. 

The pattern of Chinese submarine visits reveals that the PLA Navy has been incrementally raising the complexity of its deployments, sending both conventional and nuclear submarines to learn more about the Indian Ocean's operating environment.
Indian observers note a rise in the docking of submarine tender ships in Sri Lankan ports, suggesting the presence of PLA Navy diesel-electric submarines (SSKs) in Sri Lanka's near-seas. 

The deployments seem aimed at fine-tuning standard operating procedures for coastal operations, in particular the collection of vital hydrological and bathymetric data and the training of submarine crews. 

Indian imagery experts report the possibility of Yuan-class submarines in Sri Lanka's littoral seas, optimised for shallow water and littoral water operations. 

Chinese submarine crews appear to be assessing the variable 'thermocline' in the Indian Ocean, a phenomenon that directly affects SONAR performance. 

The prolonged deployment of Chinese conventional submarines around Sri Lanka is strongly suggestive of an attempt by PLA Navy crews to master shallow water operations in the Indian Ocean.
The PLA Navy's emphasis on 'theatre access' in distant littoral spaces seemed modelled on the US Navy's blueprint of global operations. 

Since May 2015, when China released its military strategy white paper, the Indian Ocean has been a focal area of interest for PLA Navy commanders. 

The Chinese navy has accordingly expanded its anti-piracy patrols and increased the stationing of ships and marines at an overseas outpost in Djibouti. 

Beijing's primary instrument for exerting coercive influence in Asia's western and southern rim, however, has been its submarines. 

With Beijing continuing to expand naval engagement with regional states, there has been a dramatic rise in PLA Navy submarine visit in the region, with Indian analysts reporting at least seven deployments since 2013, including three nuclear submarines. 

China's growing undersea presence in the Arabian Sea and the Bay of Bengal, Indian naval commanders say, is meant to display increased naval capability and strategic intent in India's near-seas.
More disquieting for Indian analysts has been the strengthening of the China-Pakistan maritime partnership in the Indian Ocean. 

After the announcement of a special taskforce to protect the China-Pakistan Economic Corridor, there is a possibility that Beijing might set-up a maritime logistics facility on the Makran coast. 

With eight Chinese submarines planned for transfer to Pakistan, it is highly likely that the PLA Navy may eventually establish a dual-use commercial/military facility at Gwadar. 

China's interests in securing its sea lines of communications in the northern Indian Ocean has resulted in a partnership with Pakistan in modernising the Pakistan Navy, including the sale of Azmat-class fast attack craft, new frigates and Type-022 Houbei catamaran missile boats.
Despite denials by their regional leaders, Sri Lanka, Myanmar and Bangladesh are poised to witness a substantial expansion of China's maritime footprint. 

With more than 80% of assets at Hambantota under the control of Chinese state-owned companies, it seems to be a matter of time before the PLA Navy sets up a maritime repair/replenishment facility in Sri Lanka. 

After delivering two Ming-class submarines to Bangladesh and announcing the sale of three submarines to Thailand, Beijing has already announced its maritime ambitions in the Bay of Bengal region. 

In Myanmar too Chinese companies are set to acquire majority stakes in Kyaukpyu port, with the PLA Navy expanding its naval engagement with the Myanmar Navy. 

Indian observers fear that Sri Lanka's reluctance to allow basing facilities for PLA Navy warships and submarines immediately will lead Beijing to consider Gwadar, Maldives, Chittagong (Bangladesh) or Kyaukphu (Myanmar) as alternate basing options. 

For New Delhi, China's growing maritime involvement with these states indicates a tightening strategic stranglehold over the South Asian rim, a traditional Indian sphere of geo-political influence.
How then must the Indian Navy respond to the PLA Navy's enhanced undersea presence in maritime South Asia? 

To begin, India must take urgent measures to boost its submarine capability. 

With delays in the Scorpene construction program and a lack of critical armament, the Indian Navy isn't ready to face up to China's rapidly growing conventional and nuclear submarines fleet. 

While New Delhi has been looking to expand aerial capabilities in countering assertive PLA Navy manoeuvres in the Indian Ocean, the Indian Navy is constrained by the absence of anti-submarine warfare (ASW) assets. 

Despite the induction of ASW capable P-8Is, the shortage of multirole ASW helicopters on frontline warships has been telling. 

The awareness of ASW weakness is, in fact, a key driver for India's improved naval cooperation with Japan, in particular a proposal to set-up communication links and a line of undersea sensors in the Eastern Indian Ocean. 

But even here, formal approval has only been given to the installation of a submarine optical fibre cable between Chennai and Port Blair.
Meanwhile, New Delhi is yet to develop the Andaman and Nicobar Islands into a truly strategic outpost to comprehensively monitor Chinese naval activity and launch operations against threatening PLA Navy manoeuvres. 

While there has been some progress is creating naval air stations and deploying P8-Is for maritime patrols, the Indian Navy is yet to develop existing facilities into full-fledged military centres with active A2/AD capabilities, perhaps on account of a lack of consensus in adopting too aggressive a combat posture in the Bay of Bengal.
In friendly Indian Ocean states too, New Delhi's initiative to set-up an integrated surveillance network through the installation of a chain of radars has made limited headway. 

Indian maritime planners realise tracking Chinese submarines will need coordinated search operations with other friendly navies, only made possible through a formal agreement to allow Indian, American, Japanese and Australian warships to share data with each other.
On the operational front, progress has been steady but slow. 

As a response to growing Chinese submarine deployments in its maritime neighbourhood, India has moved to include Japan in the India-US 'Malabar' series of maritime exercises. 

But a request by Australia for observer status has been turned down by New Delhi. 

It will, at some, point need favourable consideration. 

With Canberra and Tokyo keen to partner India in the Indian Ocean, New Delhi will need to take a clear position on seemingly controversial proposals such as the maritime 'quad'. 

To counter Chinese maritime presence in the Indian Ocean, India realises it needs to raise its operational coordination with other friendly Indo-Pacific states.
Ultimately, China's submarine operations in the South Asian littorals portend greater Chinese force projection in the Indian Ocean. 

This is detrimental to New Delhi's geopolitical influence and strategic leverages in the region. 

If India does not move to protect its equities, South Asia could soon fall under the sway of Beijing's rapidly expanding maritime power.

Chinese Paranoia

China Tries To Encircle India. It Won't Work
By Panos Mourdoukoutas 

China’s efforts to encircle India won’t work. 

That’s the message India and its allies, America and Japan are prepared to send to Beijing in a joint naval exercise.
China has an official and an unofficial agenda for the Indian Ocean.
The official agenda is to foster trade and economic growth for all countries in the region, from Pakistan to Sri Lanka, to India, and Bangladesh.
The unofficial agenda is to encircle India, something investors should keep a close eye on, as it is expected to raise geopolitical risks in the region.
To execute this agenda, China has been pursuing massive infrastructure projects -- like CEPC in Pakistan, and the building and modernizing of ports in both Pakistan and Sri Lanka, something these countries needed very badly.
“China has clearly responded to a strong demand from Indian Ocean countries for better maritime infrastructure and increased connectivity,” says Nilanthi Samaranayake, strategic studies analyst, CNA, a non-profit research organization in the Washington area. 

“Some countries see their ports as being too congested or unable to handle larger container ships, so projects by Chinese companies are seen as helping to build or modernize infrastructure and promote wider national development goals.”
There are clear signs that these projects are beginning to yield results for China's official agenda. 

The China-Pakistan Economic Corridor (CPEC) is changing life in China’s Northwest Xinjiang Uyghur region, bringing something special to the region: seafood from Pakistan.
This little bonus is being shipped by container trucks through the corridor, which currently accounts for 2 percent of the total trade between the two countries; and more goods are expected to come through CPEC from the Middle East and Africa.
“Regarding India, it’s important to note that some of China’s maritime infrastructure developments have facilitated India’s trade, such as through the port of Colombo,” adds Samaranayake.
But China’s enormous investment in CPEC and port infrastructure in the Indian Ocean serves much more than trade. 

It advances Beijing’s “String of Pearls” strategy, as well as its unofficial agenda to encircle India through its arch-rival, Pakistan.
“Besides having investments that have purely commercial goals in Pakistan as they would in any other country, the Chinese have two main goals in investing in that particular country,” explains Dimitrijevic. 

 “First is to continue the “String of Pearls” strategy of developing commercial and military outposts along their main maritime trading route. These include the Strait of Malacca, Sri Lanka, Pakistan, the Maldives, the Strait of Hormuz and Somalia. There is a second reason for the Chinese to invest and that’s to make India feel China’s strong presence, in its neighbor and arch-rival Pakistan.”
That could explain India’s unease with China’s ambitious Indian Ocean agenda. 

“Despite the commercial benefits of this activity, India is concerned about the strategic implications of China’s increasing commercial and military presence in the Indian Ocean,” says Samaranayake. “China continues to deploy naval task forces in support of counterpiracy operations and is building a base in Djibouti. This is a region that India sees as its primary area of interest, so concern about China’s expansion of Indian Ocean activity is understandable.”
Understandable or not, China’s unofficial agenda to encircle India won’t work. 

New Delhi and its allies—the US and Japan—won’t let it happen. 

And they are prepared to send this message to Beijing with a joint naval exercise in the Malabar in the Bay of Bengal this coming July.

Why China's New Aircraft Carrier Should Worry India

By Mihir Sharma
THE VIKRAMADITYA HAS BEEN PLAGUED WITH DELAYS.

The launch of China’s second aircraft carrier, expected as soon as this week, will be an important and depressing moment for India. 

The “Type 001A” -- likely to be named the “Shandong” -- will give China an edge for the first time in the carrier race with its Asian rival, a literal two-to-one advantage. 

After decommissioning the INS Viraat earlier this year, the Indian Navy is down to a single carrier, INS Vikramaditya. 

Worse, the Shandong has been built at China’s own giant shipyard at Dalian; Vikramaditya is merely a repurposed 1980s-era Russian carrier formerly known as the Admiral Gorshkov.
Even more telling than the raw numbers is what China’s progress says about India’s ability to provide security in its own backyard. 

Chinese naval strategists have open designs on the Indian Ocean: According to one, “China needs two carrier strike groups in the West Pacific Ocean and two in the Indian Ocean.” 

The government of Prime Minister Narendra Modi has talked a great deal about revitalizing the Indian military; it’s opened the defense sector up to greater foreign investment and is building a much-closer relationship with the U.S. military, largely with China in mind. 

But spending has lagged. 

Worse, successive governments simply don’t seem to have thought through where best to direct those scarce resources.
For its part, the Indian Navy has gone all-in on a strategy that emphasizes carrier battle groups. 

The idea is that India must dominate the ocean that bears its name and needs carriers in order to project power well beyond its shores. 

As a result, it wasted far too much time and treasure on the Admiral Gorshkov, which arrived from Russia six years late and at three times the cost that had initially been promised.
Its efforts to develop a homegrown carrier have been even more misbegotten. 

The Navy plans to name, commission and float the INS Vikrant next year. 

At that point, the ship reportedly won’t have its aviation complex in place, or even anti-aircraft missiles. 

The Navy has puzzlingly refused to buy India’s indigenous light fighter, the Tejas, saying it’s too heavy. 

Meanwhile, the MiG-29s being used instead are enormously troubled, according to India’s government auditor; more than 60 percent of their engines were withdrawn from service or rejected in just four years. 

The Vikrant will only be properly combat-ready by 2023 -- eight years behind schedule.
No one would expect India to match China’s defense spending head-to-head. 

China’s economy is four times the size of India’s; not surprisingly, its defense budget is at least three times larger. 

But the People’s Republic faces a parallel dilemma when confronting the U.S., whose military budget is about three times as big as China’s.
China has approached this disparity with a much clearer strategy in mind, as well as a far more rational evaluation of its relative strength. 

Rather than focusing on matching America’s carrier fleet, China first emphasized asymmetric weaponry such as ballistic missiles and submarines, a reflection of the Soviets’ Cold War strategy. 

Only now -- as its interests and capabilities have grown -- is it pouring resources into developing carrier groups.
By contrast, India’s carrier-first strategy has drained the Navy of resources and left it with just 13 conventional submarines in service. 

Eleven of those are more than a quarter-century old. 

The two new ones, amazingly, were commissioned and sent out to wander the deep sea without their main armament, torpedoes. 

Nor has India tried to counter China’s numerical superiority -- 70 to 15 -- in terms of submarines with specialized anti-submarine weaponry, including helicopters. 

The Indian fleet has less than 30 superannuated medium-sized anti-sub helicopters, the first of which was bought in 1971.
India’s problem isn’t ultimately a shortage of money; it’s a lack of forethought and political courage. Carriers are big and showy, and bolster national pride; diesel submarines don’t, or at least not to the same degree. 

A more rational strategy for India -- and its peers in Asia and the Pacific Rim who fear China’s growing military might -- would ensure that India’s submarine fleet and its anti-submarine armaments are capable enough on their own to deter attempts to control the Indian Ocean, while closer ties with other navies fill in the gaps.
That would require a clear-eyed appraisal of India’s defense and economic capabilities and requirements -- a problem when India doesn’t have an outline of its strategy on the lines of American or Chinese white papers, nor even a full-time defense minister. 

The Navy is fortunately starting to train more closely with the U.S. and other partners such as Japan, which should increase its effectiveness. 

But until it thinks harder about where its money should go, it’s going to have a tricky time keeping China out of its backyard.

1.Granted, China's first aircraft carrier was also constructed around the shell of a Russian vessel, the Varyag, which the Chinese pretended to have purchased to use as a floating casino.

Chinese Peril

The Real Reasons Behind China's Big Investments In Sri Lanka
By Panos Mourdoukoutas

What’s China doing in Sri Lanka? 

Officially, it’s building the country’s infrastructure. 

Like the ports of Colombo and Hambantota, which have left the country heavily indebted.
Unofficially, China is setting up outposts in the Indian Ocean as part of Beijing’s broader strategy to secure the passage of Middle East oil through the Strait of Malacca and counter American naval hegemony in the region.
China has increasingly come to rely on the Middle East for its oil needs, which must be shipped through the Strait of Malacca to reach its shores. 

This means that Beijing runs the risk of being cut off from Middle East oil supplies should America blockade the Strait -- in the event of a further escalation of South China Sea disputes or an outright war between America and China.
“In the event of war with the United States, Chinese policy planners have long feared a retaliatory US naval blockade of the Strait of Malacca to cut off vital oil supplies,” says Nilanthi Samaranayake. 

“In a 2003 speech, Hu Jintao even acknowledged China’s vulnerability in the Strait. Thus, some American security analysts have argued that the People’s Republic of China (PRC) has been actively constructing a “string of pearls in the Indian Ocean Region (IOR) to secure the safe passage of oil by Chinese ships, as well as to position China as a countervailing presence to US naval hegemony in the Sea Lines of Communications (SLOCs).”
That could explain why Chinese submarines have begun suddenly and repeatedly showing up in the Chinese-operated South Container Terminal in the port of Colombo.
And why China has been telling India to stay off Sri Lanka.
That’s something investors in Southeast Asian markets should keep a wary eye on, as it opens yet another front between the two Asian giants, which could drag in America.
And that raises the geopolitical risk of investing in the region. 

Though Chinese and Indian markets seem to be ignoring these risks, for now.

China Tells India To Stay Off Its Indian Ocean 'Colony,' Sri Lanka

By Panos Mourdoukoutas

After claiming South China Sea to be its own sea, telling America to stay off its islands, China is reaching for the Indian Ocean, telling India to stay off its own colony, Sri Lanka.

That’s something investors in Southeast Asian markets should keep a wary eye on, as it opens yet another front between the two Asian giants, raising the geopolitical risk of investing in the region.

Markets, for the time being, seem to be ignoring these risks.

Sri Lanka’s colonization began back in 2007, when China supplied President Rajapaksaboth military and diplomatic support to crush the Tamil Tigers. 

Then came high profile construction projects and high interest loans that eventually were swapped for equity, transforming China into an owner of Sri Lanka’s major port— and a key outpost in the Indian Ocean for Beijing.

That’s bad news for India, which is becoming encircled by China.

“China’s growing involvement in sensitive ports so close to India’s shores fed New Delhi’s long-standing concerns about Chinese encirclement,” writes Jeff M. Smith in Foreign Affairs.

For its part, China has repeatedly asserted that it doesn’t plan to use the port for military purposes, this assertion coming as recently as last week.

But history proves otherwise. 

In the past three years, Chinese submarines  have begun suddenly and repeatedly showing up in the Chinese-operated South Container Terminal in the port of Colombo.

And that’s in spite of India’s high profile protests.

“For India, the sudden appearance of a Chinese submarine in Sri Lanka was too much to bear,” continues Smith.

“Seventy percent of Colombo’s transshipment traffic comes from India, and New Delhi has long been concerned over China’s efforts to expand its presence in the island nation.”

When Indian Prime Minister Narendra Modi met Rajapaksa a few weeks later, he reminded him that Colombo ‘was obliged to inform its neighbors about such port calls under a maritime pact.’ 

But the same submarine surfaced again in November 2014, catching New Delhi by surprise once more.

Apparently, what China says it plans to do with its colony and what it actually intends to do are two different things. 

And India must either devise a plan to contain China or be prepared to put up with it.

China Threat

Chinese development in Indian Ocean raising concern of militarisation among major players
By James Bennett

China's Liaoning aircraft carrier with accompanying fleet in the South China Sea.

Japan, India, Australia and the United States are closely monitoring China's infrastructure development on the Indian Ocean rim amid increasing concern about the potential for militarisation in the sea lanes which carry much of the world's oil.
One former American intelligence chief is warning the only way to avoid that is to make confrontation unpalatable for China.
With an eye to China's current island reclamation activity in the South China Sea, Japan, which is almost wholly dependent on imported oil, is particularly nervous.
"Yes, China is a kind of threat to us in the South China Sea. Will this Indian Ocean be the same, or different?" asked Nobuo Tanaka, a former Japanese bureaucrat and head of the International Energy Agency.
More than 80 per cent of the world's seaborne oil trade passes through three Indian Ocean choke points — the Strait of Hormuz, Strait of Malacca and Bab el-Mandab.
"This area, the Indian Ocean, is so important for us now because it connects our energy sources in the Middle East to Asia and to Japan," Mr Tanaka said at an Indian Ocean security conference in New Delhi this week.
The chair of the Sasakawa Peace Foundation think tank said Japan was worried about a Chinese road, rail and pipeline project from China through central Asia and Pakistan, which culminates at a deep-water port close to Karachi, strategically located near the entrance to the Persian gulf.
"China is trying to develop so-called 'one belt, one road' strategy and they're extending their power projecting their power to this area also," he said.

Shared concern
"The fear is this could become increasingly militarised," said Dhruva Jaishankar, a foreign policy fellow at the Brookings Institute in India.
"The Indian Ocean is already seeing a level of competition that I think we would not have anticipated 10 years ago, we've seen investments by China, Japan, the United States, Singapore, India all across the Indian ocean littoral from Iran to Djibouti, east Africa to South-East Asia.

What will the United States do?
The biggest uncertainty is US President Donald Trump.

White House spokesman Sean Spicer has already signalled President Trump's intention to "defend international territories from being taken over by one country", in reference to potential confrontation in the South China Sea.
The question among policy wonks is whether he will adopt a similar stance in the Indian Ocean.
"I would also urge those of you who are watching the United States to look a little bit below the surface and not to be captured by social media — from whatever source," retired US Admiral and former Director of America's National Intelligence agencies, Dennis Blair, joked at the New Delhi conference.
"Enjoy the spectacle," Admiral Blair said, in reference to President Trump's penchant for conducting foreign policy via Twitter.

Make it 'very high risk' for China
But in support of President Trump's promised military build-up, Admiral Blair also said the only way to deter Chinese aggression was for other countries to ensure that China knew it would lose any confrontation.
"What's really important, I believe, is for India, Japan and the United States to modernise and strengthen our own maritime, air and, where necessary, ground capabilities to improve that military balance in our favour, and therefore make it very high risk for China to undertake military aggression."

Australia's balancing act
Australia's foreign policy establishment is similarly awaiting direction from Washington.
Within Australia's Department of Foreign Affairs, there is also continued debate on the merits of reviving formal four-way security cooperation between Australia, Japan, India and the United States.
Supporters argue it would send an important message about the democracies' shared desire to protect the status quo.
Opponents fear it would be seen as provocative by China.
Former Labor Foreign Minister Stephen Smith withdrew Australia from the Japanese-led initiative in 2007, a move widely seen as a win for Chinese diplomacy.
Professor Rory Medcalf, from the Australian National University's National Security College, said since then, much of the work as continued 'by stealth' under three-way arrangements between Australia, Japan and the US, and the US, Japan and India.
"The four countries are of course being careful about Chinese reactions, but at the same time, none of us wants to allow China to veto the dialogues we have with each other," he said.
Professor Medcalf argues Australia's interests are best served by working with regional powers to urge Chinese restraint, and to keep America engaged.
"Countries like Japan, Australia and India will get together with one voice, to say, on the one hand to China, 'be more stabilising' in the way its using its growing power," Professor Medcalf said.
"But also to send a message to the United States, that we want a forthright and engaged and balanced American presence in the region."