U.S.'s 5,025,817 Chinese Spies

A Chinese’s sloppy cover story exposed smuggling of sensitive US microchips
By Justin Rohrlich

The restricted components are specifically barred from export to China, under US law.

US federal agents arrested a Chinese attempting to obtain hundreds of radiation-hardened microchips typically used in satellites and ballistic missile systems as he tried to leave the United States last year, according to court documents obtained by Quartz.

The bust, which had not been reported in the media until now, was the culmination of an elaborate international sting that stretched from China to Arizona, and included an undercover operation in Bangkok.
The made-to-order chip is manufactured and sold in the United States by Cobham, a multinational defense contractor headquartered in Britain. 

They cost $2,500 each, and the company only makes about 1,000 of them a year. 

They are made to withstand extreme temperatures, severe vibrations, and radiation exposure. 

Known as “rad-hard chips,” they require a license from the Department of Commerce to export, and sending the chips to China—as well as a small handful of other countries, including Russia—is banned outright. 

A commercial version of the same chip, with the same memory capacity but without the ability to survive in the harsh conditions of outer space, goes for about $60.
A 2011 attempt by the Chinese to obtain an earlier version of the same chip was also foiled by the Department of Homeland Security. 

But more than 100 of the 312 chips purchased by the suspect in that case remain missing.
In this latest case, authorities say Jian Fun Tso, who goes by Steven, emailed Cobham in January 2018 to ask about purchasing the microchips for a group of unidentified customers. 

He said the buyers intended to use the chips in a radar-assisted parking device for cars. 

Tso called the sales potential “huge.” 

According to prosecutors, Tso’s clients were based in China.
A Cobham representative told Tso that, although his managers would certainly love “huge” numbers, the chips he was inquiring about—aside from being illegal to ship to China—cost far more than anyone creating such a product would ever need to spend.
Nicholas Eftimiades, a veteran intelligence officer who held positions with the CIA, the Bureau of Diplomatic Security, and the Defense Intelligence Agency during his 34-year career, said the technology in radiation-hardened microchips is “very, very closely guarded.” 

He said Tso’s explanation of how his clients would use them was nothing short of “ridiculous.”
“That chip could only be used by a certain number of state institutions in China, all leading to the People’s Liberation Army,” Eftimiades told Quartz. 

“They’re trying to steal it in a covert manner, the likelihood is a military space program or missile program.” 

Court documents quote a Cobham official saying there was “absolutely no rational reason” for anyone to use the chip in an automotive application.
China, which maintains the most extensive intelligence apparatus in the world, has increased the size and scope of its efforts in recent years. 

Beijing’s attempts to acquire sensitive American technology target not just the US government and the defense industry, but major universities and research scientists as well.
Chinese hackers have already compromised dozens of critical US weapons systems. 

In 2018, Chinese hackers stole top-secret plans for a supersonic anti-ship missile the Navy was developing. 

Last fall, two Chinese diplomats living in the United States—one of whom authorities believe was in fact an undercover intelligence officer—were expelled from the country after attempting to get onto a secure Virginia military base. 

Authorities recently charged a Chinese tour guide in San Francisco with passing US secrets to China’s Ministry of State Security. 

And last month, two different Chinese were caught surveilling the same Florida military base twice in two weeks.
“The Chinese have been eating our lunch since the eighties,” former CIA officer Robert Baer told Quartz. 

“Every single scientific and technological breakthrough they’ve made is thanks to what they’ve ripped off from us. And it’s only getting worse. Chinese theft of our technology is up there with our worst national security threats.”

Tso tries again
According to court filings, Cobham—which in 2018 alone received eight requests from Chinese entities for the valuable microchips—reported Tso’s call to US counterintelligence.
Unable to get the chips from Cobham, Tso tried a US electronics distributor that acts as a reseller. This time, Tso left out the part about China being the chips’ ultimate destination.
The distributor emailed Tso a blank end user agreement to fill out. 

Tso returned it, listing the end user as an electrical engineer named “John Anderson” from Metech ICT, an automotive electronics company based in Liverpool, England. 

Like Cobham, the distributor found his request suspicious and referred him to an undercover agent with the Defense Criminal Investigative Service (DCIS).
Tso soon made contact with the undercover agent, who was stationed in Phoenix, Arizona. 

He sent the agent, who claimed to work for the distribution company, a purchase order for the chips. DCIS checked the information Tso provided for Metech ICT against the UK corporate registration database. 

No one named John Anderson worked there. 

The address Tso provided was for a restaurant he ran in Liverpool.The undercover agent agreed to sell 200 chips to Tso, who said he planned to pick them up in the United States and personally take them back to the UK. 

Tso said he would wire the undercover agent 50% of the payment up front, and the remainder upon delivery, transferring his own money from Hong Kong to the UK and then on to the United States, claiming the nonexistent John Anderson would reimburse him later.


In what Eftimiades describes as a “whole of society approach,” the Chinese security services deploy overseas agents who range from trained intelligence officers to rank amateurs who engage in comically bad spycraft. 

Non-professional “freelance” operatives like Tso tend to do it for the money, and often become involved through personal networks.
It’s all part of a worldwide program to steal information that will increase Chinese power economically and politically, former CIA officer Joseph Wippl told Quartz. 

“It is not limited to the United States, although we are the priority No. 1 target,” he said.

To Bangkok and back
In November 2018, some 10 months after Tso’s original email to Cobham, the undercover agent met him at the Bangkok Intercontinental Hotel to finalize the deal.
Tso, who brought his wife to the rendezvous, asked the agent to provide him with a set of false invoices reflecting a total price of $10,000 for the $550,000 worth of chips, saying it would help him avoid any potential problems with customs if he were stopped.
That’s when Tso admitted the chips were ultimately destined for China. 

Tso also confided to the undercover agent that the money he sent from the UK had in fact originated in Hong Kong and China, and that Metech ICT was a front company he had set up.
As long as they were “both protected,” the agent told Tso this was fine. 

Tso called a female contact he referred to as “Big Sister,” who told the undercover agent she planned to meet Tso in the UK and hand-carry the chips from there to Hong Kong. 

“Other individuals” would transport the chips from Hong Kong to China, Big Sister said.
The following month, Tso wired a payment of $275,000 to the undercover agent’s bank account, which was $10,000 more than the actual balance due. 

Tso, who had given his customers a purposely inflated price, was planning to keep the extra money for himself and asked to be reimbursed when he arrived in Phoenix to pick up the chips.


On January 14, 2019, Tso flew from Liverpool to Philadelphia, where he boarded a connection to Phoenix. 

A day later, he met with the undercover agent, who gave Tso $10,000 in cash and a box he said contained the 200 radiation-hardened chips they had discussed. 

The agent reminded Tso that it would be illegal to bring the chips from the UK to China, to which Tso responded that he “hoped” the chips would stay in the UK but that “the less he knew about the ultimate end user, the better.”
The next day the undercover agent drove Tso to Phoenix’ Sky Harbor airport. 

He was intercepted by US Customs and Border Protection as he attempted to board his flight.
Tso pleaded guilty to conspiracy charges a year later, just before his trial was set to begin. 

He is scheduled to be sentenced April 13, and faces up to 20 years in prison and a $1 million fine.
Tso’s lawyer, Seth Apfel, declined to comment, as did the federal prosecutors handling the proceedings.
John Sipher, who spent 28 years in the CIA’s National Clandestine Service before retiring in 2014, told Quartz that the Tso case “mirrors dozens of other cases and is likely the tip of the iceberg.”
This time, Tso’s unlikely story for how the chips would be used gave away his intentions before it was too late, said Eftimiades. 

“When someone’s putting $200,000 out, not asking for financing, and they don’t know the [real] use of the chip, it becomes apparent very quickly that this is a lie.”

Chinese Aggressions

Using satellites to count buildings in South China Sea

By Greg Torode

HONG KONG -- Shrouded in Chinese military secrecy and hidden from the eyes of journalists, Beijing’s build-up of man-made islands on reefs deep in the maritime heart of Southeast Asia is a vexing story to report.
Reuters deputy head of graphics Simon Scarr, based in Singapore, had previously dealt with private sector satellite imagery providers but always felt more could be done within the highly competitive field.
Late last year in a conversation with Earthrise Media, an independent group helping journalists obtain and analyze satellite data, Scarr wondered if it would be possible to count buildings on China’s seven man-made islands in the Spratly archipelago of the hotly contested South China Sea.
During a six-week period, Earthrise digitally scrutinized hundreds of images dating back to 2014 when China started rapidly building up those islands. 

Reuters journalists checked the data with a range of military and academic contacts.
On a spread sheet of figures confirming extensive construction across the South China Sea, one number stood out – Subi reef was home to nearly 400 buildings, more than expected and nearly double the number on similar islands.
“It was great data to have, and it really helped us build-up the webpage, with imagery and information from other sources, too,” Scarr said.
The Subi information helped journalists in Hong Kong, Beijing and Sydney research the story that would anchor the package on the islands.
For multimedia package on the data, click tmsnrt.rs/2szwA0a
It also provided insight into Chinese intentions for military bases on islands that Beijing once described as mostly civilian. 

The buildings on Subi, along with extensive facilities on Fiery Cross and Mischief reefs, appeared to match military bases inside China and could house up to 2,400 personnel.

Chinese structures are pictured in Subi Reef at disputed South China Sea, April 21, 2017. 
Subi is the largest of China’s seven man-made outposts in the Spratlys. 

The so-called “Big Three” of Subi, Mischief and Fiery Cross reefs all share similar infrastructure – including emplacements for missiles, 3km runways, extensive storage facilities and a range of installations that can track satellites, foreign military activity and communications.
Determined to use the package to test their innovations, a Reuters RTV team headed to the Hong Kong coast to shoot footage that would be overlaid with animation to illustrate the development.
“This was one of the most elaborate things we’ve done,” said senior producer Ryan Brooks.

Space Pearl Harbor

How China Would Win a War Against America: Kill Washington's Satellites
By Zachary Keck

While much attention has been paid to China’s development of traditional ground-based antisatellite weapons, a more nefarious threat to America’s space assets continues to receive far less attention.
In a new article, “Stalkers in Space: Defeating the Threat,” in Strategic Studies Quarterly, Brian Chow, formerly senior physical scientist at the RAND Corporation, discusses China’s “space stalkers,” which he calls a “game-changing threat” to America’s satellites.
“Since 2008, China has been developing a new co-orbital antisatellite weapon (ASAT),” Chow writes.
“These ‘space stalkers’ could be placed on orbit in peacetime and maneuvered to tailgate US satellites during a crisis. At a moment’s notice, they could simultaneously attack multiple critical satellites from such close proximity that the United States would not have time to prevent damage.”
These co-orbital ASATs are often indistinguishable from benign satellites, yet they are able to knock out satellites in close proximity through various weapons, such as kinetic-energy weapons, explosive charges, fragmentation devices and robotic arms.
China has been testing its capabilities to use space stalkers, by conducting a number of rendezvous-proximity operations in which these satellites fly within striking distance of potential targets.
For instance, Chow points to a September 2008 incident, in which a Chinese miniature imaging satellite came within forty-five kilometers of the International Space Station without providing prior notification. 
Another example came in 2010, when China launched the SJ-12 satellite.
Once in orbit, the satellite maneuvered to bump into China’s SJ-6F satellite.
Most illuminating, in July 2013 China launched a rocket carrying the CX-3, SY-7 and SJ-15 satellites into space.
One of these satellites was equipped with a robotic arm, and once all were in orbit, that satellite grabbed one of the others with its arm.
Space stalkers are only one part of China’s much larger counterspace doctrine.
People’s Liberation Army (PLA) writings have continuously stressed the importance of destroying America’s space assets. 
As the Pentagon recounts in its annual reports on China’s military, “PLA writings emphasize the necessity of ‘destroying, damaging, and interfering with the enemy’s reconnaissance and communications satellites, suggesting that such systems, as well as navigation and early warning satellites, could be among the targets of attacks designed to ‘blind and deafen the enemy.”
The reason is not hard to discern; as STRATCOM commander General John Hyten has warned, if enough satellites are destroyed, the U.S. military would be reduced to fighting primitive “industrial age warfare.”
To achieve this, the Chinese military has been acquiring a toxic mix of traditional and new capabilities.
“This mix,” Chow writes “is coherently and asymmetrically designed to counter a far more technologically advanced US space capability.”
Among the more traditional threats are ground-based ASAT weapons like the one China used to destroy its own weather satellite in 2007.
The space debris that resulted from this test led to widespread international condemnation, including among nominally friendly nations like Russia.
Since then, China has continued to test these ASAT weapons in “nondestructive” ways that create minimal amounts of debris.
Indeed, Bill Gertz reported that China conducted another test of a new Dong Neng-3 direct-ascent antisatellite missile last month, although that test was unsuccessful.
However, if these weapons were actually used to attack satellites, they would generate huge amount of debris, which the world abhors.
As Chow notes, space stalkers, especially those equipped with robotic arms, would produce far less space debris than ascent missiles, making them more attractive to Beijing.
Most worrisome, space stalkers can simultaneously destroy many more U.S. satellites than the traditional ground-based ASAT weapons at the opening of a space war, which could result in a space Pearl Harbor.
As Chow has explained elsewhere, traditional ground-based ascent missiles typically take about four hours to reach geosynchronous orbits, where many of the most important U.S. satellites are located. This is not the case with space stalkers.
Because there is no international or U.S. understanding, any country can preset as many space stalkers as one wants, in close range to another country’s satellites. 
Consequently, space stalkers could conduct simultaneous attacks on America’s critical geosynchronous satellites, and the warning time would be too short for Washington to defend them.
Ground-based ASATs could reach critical low-earth-orbit satellites in much shorter amounts of time. Nonetheless, killing many satellites at a time would be difficult, “because a low-Earth-orbit satellite will only fly over a given launch site twice a day and a ground-launched ASAT needs the target to be in view.”
This problem would not exist with China’s space stalkers.
More to the point, the United States has been threatened by ground-based ascent missiles for over half a century, so Washington is familiar in how to deal with them.
However, America’s current space strategy has been so fixated with ascent missiles that it is wholly inadequate for dealing with the new space stalker threat, and Chow’s greatest contribution is in presenting a new strategy to deal with space stalkers.
Once the threat of a space Pearl Harbor is gone, the traditional satellite defenses and those being planned would work far better with the traditional ASAT threats, and other new threats, such as cyber ASAT.
Chow concludes that “the United States as well as other nations should forewarn any party that positioning space stalkers for surprise attack would be treated as an aggressive act and the perpetrator considered an aggressor. Once this position is clearly defined in peacetime, existing and developing defense measures then will have the necessary warning time to defeat the space stalkers and protect the threatened satellites.”
This approach starts from two basic principles.
First, once a space object is in orbit, one cannot reliably distinguish a space stalker from an ordinary satellite, especially a spacecraft providing satellite service or a space debris clearer like China’s Aolong-1.
Second, routine space operations could bring one or even a few space objects close to another country’s satellites at the same time.
These occurrences cannot be prohibited and must be accommodated.
From there, Chow sets out guidelines for a preemptive self-defense approach that draws inspiration from parts of the UN Convention on the Law of the Sea.
Namely, Chow proposes that satellites be given contiguous zones (measured by 148 kilometers, but actual size to be determined by the Defense Department) from which they can punish dangerous infringements, while still allowing other satellites innocent right of passage. 
To differentiate between the two, Chow suggests that the Space Security and Defense Program and National Intelligence Office establish a threshold for the number of satellites another country can place within the contiguous zones of U.S. satellites before triggering a preemptive self-defense response. 
For example, if the United States set the threshold number at four, and five American satellites were being simultaneously stalked by Chinese counterparts, “the United States can plan to use preemption as the last resort.”
There are mainly advantages to a preemptive self-defense approach.
First, it protects against the most damaging attacks, which would come from a knockout blow against many U.S. satellites simultaneously. 
Secondly, it should be able to gain international support, because there is no legitimate, peaceful reason to tailgate so many satellites from another country. 
Accordingly, “simultaneously stalking a large number of another nation’s satellites is justifiably treated as hostile intent requiring a last-resort preemption to neutralize such a threat.” 
Indeed, finding an internationally agreed-upon threshold number would not be in the sole interest of the United States, but also in that of countries like China and Russia, as they’d be protected from America’s own space-stalker capabilities.
As Chow argues, “The ultimate purpose of last-resort preemptive self-defense is that it does not actually have to be executed. Therefore, the adversary knowing its space-stalking attack to be futile would not pose a space-stalking threat in the first place.”
Whatever one’s take on Chow’s proposed strategy, the threat he points to is impossible to ignore.

India-China rivalry reaches into orbit and beyond

Regional giants chase prestige, power and prosperity in space race
By Go Yamada and Shuhei Yamada

Scientists and engineers work on a Mars Orbiter vehicle at the Indian Space Research Organisation's (ISRO) satellite centre in Bangalore on September 11, 2013.

A new space race is under way in Asia, with China and India duelling for dominance while other countries make leaps of their own.
National pride and defence are major motivators, but so are practical considerations — generating income from satellite launches, mitigating natural disasters and monitoring crops.
By establishing a presence in Earth’s orbit, and perhaps the expanse beyond it, governments and companies aim to ensure prosperity on the ground.
After India’s decision in November to scrap its largest bank notes, the picture on the back of the new 2,000-rupee replacement bill was surely the last thing on the minds of cash-strapped citizens.
The image, though, highlights a major national achievement and emphasises the country’s highest aspiration: to secure its place among the stars.
The note features a picture of India’s Mangalyaan probe, Asia’s first successful Mars orbiter. Launched in November 2013, the craft travelled around 670m kilometers and began circling the red planet the following September.
Prime Minister Narendra Modi lauded the mission in a televised address. “History has been created,” he said.
“We have dared to reach out into the unknown and have achieved the near impossible.”
Of course, India is hardly alone up there.
Regional rival China in 2003 became only the third nation in history to achieve manned space flight, after the former Soviet Union and the US.
Just as the 20th century space race pitted those Cold War rivals against each other, a 21st century race is picking up in Asia, with New Delhi and Beijing doing some serious jockeying.
The broad goals of enhancing national defence and gaining international prestige remain powerful motivators for reaching skyward.
But Asian countries also have specific, diverse and practical ambitions: to develop their own high-speed communications infrastructure, to explore for natural resources, to mitigate natural disasters and to snag satellite launch contracts from other nations.


In December, Indians saw just how valuable their space program can be.
As Cyclone Vardah bore down on the southern state of Tamil Nadu, the India Meteorological Department used data from the country’s weather satellites to project the storm’s path.
This prompted the evacuation of more than 10,000 people, saving untold lives.
Not a few Indians take advantage of the country’s satellites every time they turn on the television. Tata Sky, a direct-to-home satellite TV company launched in 2006 by Tata Group and 21st Century Fox, is capitalising on entertainment demand among the growing middle class, providing more than 400 channels.
It has a contract with the Indian Space Research Organization (ISRO) to use INSAT-4A, a national satellite system; it began 4K telecasts in January 2015.
India’s first satellite launch with its own rocket came in 1979.
It has since sent up 142 satellites aboard 59 rockets, including launches commissioned by other countries and unsuccessful attempts.
The pace has picked up in recent years, with 75 satellites launched on 24 missions since 2012.
The business of launching satellites for other countries is flourishing. 
The ISRO has so far handled 79 satellites for 21 nations, including the US, Japan, Canada, Algeria and Indonesia.


India’s goal, according to the ISRO, is to use satellites for the benefit of society, though as with many space programmes, the defence factor cannot be ignored.
India’s endeavours have been closely linked to its development of long-range nuclear missile technology.
The late APJ Abdul Kalam — whose work on weapons earned him the nickname “Missile Man of India” and who also served as the country’s president — was once a member of the ISRO.
Satellites play a crucial role in military communications and missile guidance.
Remote sensing technology, which uses radar and high-performance cameras to observe the Earth’s surface, can be employed in spy satellites.
In any case, the programme hit a turning point in December 2014, when India fired off a prototype of the Geosynchronous Satellite Launch Vehicle Mark III — a large, advanced rocket that can carry a payload of eight tons into low Earth orbit and four tons into a high-altitude geostationary transfer orbit.
The maximum payload is 60 per cent greater than that for the GSLV-MK-II, previously India’s largest rocket in service.

Demand for communications, broadcasting, weather and Earth resources satellites is rapidly growing in emerging countries, where millions are signing up for cell phones and disaster preparedness is an ever-present challenge.
“Many countries, like South Korea and Saudi Arabia, are trying to launch their own satellites,” noted YS Rajan, honorary distinguished professor at the ISRO.
“With the GSLV-MK-III, India will be able to meet the requirements.”
Recent missions have shown the world what India can do.
Last June, it launched 20 satellites in one go — a national record.
In September, it pulled off the feat of launching eight satellites into two different orbits.
The ISRO is now preparing to launch 82 satellites in one mission. That would be a world record.
Low-cost launches are India’s forte. 
The mission to Mars made this clear.
Launching the Mangalyaan cost $74m, about one-ninth the cost of the Maven, an American Mars probe.
The difference was thanks to domestic production, downsizing of parts and the decision to limit the equipment and functionality.
The Mangalyaan project also shows India harbors ambitions far beyond simply putting satellites in orbit.
It plans to follow up by launching a Mangalyaan-2 Mars probe in 2018.
Manned space missions are another possibility.
The launch of the Mark III prototype in December 2014 carried an unmanned crew module, which re-entered the atmosphere and splashed down in the Bay of Bengal, as designed.
Another leap came last May, when India launched and recovered its Reusable Launch Vehicle — a craft that resembles the Space Shuttle.
With the backing of Modi and other officials, the organisation’s budget has been increasing steadily. And engineers who once might have sought jobs in information technology are turning their attention to the heavens.
Some influential voices, however, question the wisdom of chasing national prestige.
“People prefer having rice to eat,” Mr Rajan said.
“A space program involves an enormous cost.”
Last year, ISRO Chairman AS Kiran Kumar said a manned mission “is not a priority at all.”
“Our priority,” Mr Kumar stressed, “is to build capacity for new [satellite] launches.”
Rather than trying to compete in manned space flight — a field in which China has a head start — it may be more realistic for India to focus on higher-performance satellites and probes.
Either way, the country’s space program bears watching.
China, meanwhile, continues to build on that head start, as it strives to become a “great space power”.
That is how Xi Jinping described Beijing’s goal in a ceremony at the Great Hall of the People on December 20.
The event was held to celebrate the successful launch of the Shenzhou-11 manned spacecraft in the autumn.
The craft ferried two astronauts to the Tiangong-2 space laboratory, where they stayed for 33 days — a record for China.
Xi said the mission “solidified the foundation” for achieving China’s ambition.
Experience gained during the sojourn should help in the completion of the Chinese space station, scheduled for 2022.
In the first half of this year, China is to launch its Tianzhou-1 cargo spacecraft — a stepping stone to transporting supplies to the space station.
Wu Yanhua, vice administrator of the China National Space Administration, said the aim “is to rank among the world’s top three by around 2030,” alongside the US and Russia.
On December 27, the government published a space development plan featuring missions to the moon and Mars.
Back in 2011, China entrusted Russia with the launch of a Mars orbiter, but the mission failed.
The country now plans to dispatch a craft to Mars on its own in 2020, including a rover that would explore the planet.
China also aims to develop technology for bringing back soil samples from the planet, and for asteroid exploration.
To the moon — where China soft-landed a craft in December 2013 — it intends to send another two unmanned probes.
The first, scheduled to land in late 2017, is to retrieve soil samples.
The second mission, expected in 2018, will be an attempt at the first soft landing on the far side of the moon.
China hopes to develop technology to communicate with that side through relay equipment.
As for sending humans to the lunar surface — something only the US has done so far — Mr Wu said China is looking into “various methods”.
Behind all of this are three main objectives.

1. National prestige is one, as Mr Xi’s speech showed. 
2. Another is to prepare for a space war with the US — after all, China’s space programme is managed by the People’s Liberation Army. 
3. The third is to develop domestic industries and promote an economic realignment.

The BeiDou Navigation Satellite System, China’s answer to GPS, is expected to help with the third goal.
The system is to cover the whole globe, but especially countries tied to Beijing’s Belt and Road Initiative — its plan to develop infrastructure along routes connecting Asia and Europe.
Thirty-five satellites are expected to be operational by around 2020.
BeiDou is already providing location information services in 317 Chinese cities in China, and related businesses are expected to be worth a total of Rmb400bn ($58.1bn) by 2020.
Plus, offering an alternative to the US-led GPS could strengthen China’s international influence.
Like India, China is also pushing its satellite launch services, mainly through China Aerospace Science and Technology, a state-owned aerospace and defence company.
The country had launched more than 240 Long March rockets as of the end of 2016, boasting a 97 per cent success rate.
In 2016, it launched satellites for Spain, Uruguay and Belarus.
India and China are competing not just to impress the world or flex their military muscles, but to control the region’s communications infrastructure and reap the economic rewards of that dominance. Welcome to the new space race.

Sina Delenda Est

The Necessary U.S.-China War
By George Friedman 

A report last week stated that Chinese anti-ship missile systems locked onto a U.S. aircraft carrier in the South China Sea. 

It is not good manners to lock radar on a ship, as it means you could, if you chose, suddenly launch a missile. 

If the target gets nervous, it could launch first to take out the missiles. 

I cite this because there is much chatter about the possibility of conflict in the South China Sea. 

Here is a cursory strategic analysis of how such a war might be fought.
There are two scenarios. 

1. In the first, China invades Taiwan. 
2. In the second, the U.S. decides to block the exits of the South and East China seas, in order to cut China’s global maritime access. 

I want to emphasize that these will be extremely high-level analyses, with vital details excluded.

The Chinese strategic motive for seizing Taiwan would be to open a wide gap in the archipelago running from Okinawa to the Strait of Malacca. 

The seizure of Taiwan, plus a few minor islands to the north and south, would open a substantial passage into the Pacific. 

As important, it would create a platform for Chinese land-based aircraft and missiles, which would force the border of the contested area in the Pacific east about 1,300 miles, bringing Chinese cruise missiles close to, or in operational range of, Guam and Anderson Air Force Base, a critical U.S. air base.
The oft-discussed Chinese strategy of placing underwater mines around Taiwan would not help for what the Chinese must assume would be an extended war. 

That strategy might cut trade, but Taiwanese and American aircraft could still use the island to stage operations against Chinese air, missile and naval targets. 

In addition, the U.S. response to mining might be to mine the areas around Chinese ports. 

It is a strategy in which the risks outweigh the benefits. 

Seizing Taiwan has higher risks, but a very substantial payoff in that it could solve China’s strategic problem of guaranteed access to the Pacific, as well as enhance its deep strike capacity in the Pacific.
Taiwan has about 130,000 battle-ready troops, with a reserve of about 1.5 million troops. 

They are equipped with about 2,000 armored fighting vehicles and substantial self-propelled artillery. Taiwan is a small country, and even taken by surprise, it would be able to amass its forces, if not to defeat the enemy on the beach then to engage them in mobile warfare to impose attrition on them. According to the 3-to-1 rule of combat, the Chinese would need to deploy at least 390,000 troops to defeat this force.

An invasion of Taiwan would mean amphibious warfare, in which the Chinese have no experience. 

It requires extraordinarily complex coordination between air, land and sea forces, and especially with logistics. 

As the U.S. learned in World War II, amphibious operations face this problem. 

No matter how lavish the supply of amphibious ships and landing craft, the number of forces landed initially is entirely incapable of defeating the defenders. 

The number of sea-to-land vessels and time of loading and unloading limit the buildup of forces. 

In other words, the landing area remains extremely vulnerable, particularly against a large, concentrated defense force.
Assuming that the landing area is secure and a large force could be built up, going on the offensive depends on supplies, and supplies depend not so much on ships as on offloading capabilities and the ability to move supplies to the troops. 

Forces in offensive operations against a peer enemy consume supplies at a staggering rate, and the Chinese would have to supply extremely large forces. 

During the battle for France in 1944, a lack of supplies could have defeated the Allies. 

The Germans were not the problem. 

We are very advanced these days, but we haven’t solved the problem of soldiers eating, artillery shells weighing hundreds of pounds or the need for more missiles. 

The Taiwanese would be operating on very short supply lines on well-practiced terrain. 

The Chinese would be operating at a distance.
Long before landing, the Chinese would be concerned with protecting ships in transit through achieving air superiority over the Taiwan Strait. 

This poses the classic problem of amphibious warfare. 

A battle for air superiority and attacking enemy bases would lose the element of strategic surprise. 

Undertaking air superiority operations after the initial assault could leave the landing force and their support vessels helpless. 

The Chinese don’t know what the U.S. would do, but they have to assume the worst case. 

And the worst case is a pile on by American aircraft and ship- and land-based missiles.
If the Chinese decide to attack Taiwan, they must protect the amphibious force and the logistical follow-on. 

They can only do that by achieving air superiority, and they can only do that by annihilating the enemy air and naval forces in a stroke. 

This is where surprise comes in. 

The first attack must follow the Israeli model in 1967. 

Israel executed a tactical surprise that annihilated the Egyptian air force in the first hour of the war. 

This gave Israel the ability to maneuver at will in the Sinai Peninsula. 

If the embarkation ports and amphibious and supply vessels sink, the war is lost.
For China to invade Taiwan it must open the war with an annihilating strike both against Taiwan and against U.S. naval forces in the region. 

The key would be the destruction of U.S. aircraft carriers. 

Assuming surprise, it is unlikely that more than two carrier battle groups would be in the Western Pacific. 

We must assume that the Chinese have already acquired long-range missiles sufficiently sized to significantly damage any warship and with terminal target acquisition systems that would recognize an enemy ship and hit it.
China must, in the first strike, destroy Taiwanese air bases and missile launchers, attack the two carrier battle groups that pose an immediate threat, and also attack both Guam and Diego Garcia – an island in the Indian Ocean where U.S. strategic bombers have been based. 

They must do all of these things nearly simultaneously to prevent warning. 

The Chinese know they can’t achieve this for two reasons. 

First, hiding an invasion is hard. 

The allies managed to confuse the Germans about where the invasion was going to happen, but there was no way they could hide the buildup. 

The Chinese might manage to confuse U.S. intelligence about the meaning of the buildup, as the Egyptians did with Israel in 1973, but there is no way to keep the United States from going on alert. That means air defense systems on the carriers and at Guam and Diego Garcia would be on extreme alert. 

In that case everyone, including the Americans and Chinese, would discover whether these systems actually work. 

China must also attempt to destroy American satellites and engage in complex electronic warfare to blind the U.S.
The Chinese do not expect such a strike to annihilate the enemy. 

The U.S. would expect losses. 

The crucial question will be whether U.S. forces have at least temporarily weakened enough so that Chinese air defense can protect the embarkation ports, the invasion force and the beachhead – as well as systematically cripple the Taiwanese army with intense airstrikes.
Assuming a crippling attack on all targets that reduces U.S. capabilities by 80 percent, the most extreme likely, the U.S. would now rush reinforcements to the region, repairing airfields and sending all available carrier battle groups to redeploy at flank speed. 

In addition, U.S. submarines would flood the regions north and south of the Taiwan Strait, with Chinese destroyers trying to destroy them.
The Chinese goal would be to defeat the Taiwanese army in less than two weeks. 

The U.S. goal would be to use submarines to impose severe attrition on follow-on Chinese forces and supplies and prevent the defeat of the Taiwanese until the balance of forces shifts. 

During this time, the U.S. would be working to blind the Chinese in space and other areas.
The problem that China has with an invasion of Taiwan is that too many things have to must go right. 

• China must keep its intentions secret in spite of a prolonged buildup of forces in multiple ports. 
• It must strike multiple heavily defended targets with aircraft and missiles, simultaneously and without being detected. 
• It must execute an amphibious assault against a superior force and hold the landing area until reinforcements arrive. 
• It must control the sea lanes across the strait in the face of submarine attacks, potential air attacks and mine laying. 
• Finally, it has to complete the operation before the U.S. commits significant reserves to the battle. 

If any of these strategic components fails, the invasion fails.

Obviously, this is barely a sketch of the battle problem. 

Nevertheless, the strategic point is valid. 

The Chinese cannot take Taiwan without a Pearl Harbor scenario several orders more ambitious than the Japanese operation in 1941. 

The Japanese had a reason to risk Pearl Harbor. 

Their oil was running out and their supplies were running low due to U.S. embargoes and interference. 

They had to act. 

China is not in that position. 

Therefore, risking such a complex operation is not a rational option.

***

China has a key geopolitical imperative. 

It depends on exports to sustain its economy. 

Most of those exports are shipped by sea, and therefore access to the world market begins at its eastern coastal ports. 

Geography poses a problem for the Chinese. 

Shipments from the country’s east coast ports, both south and north of the Taiwan Straits, must transit through a string of islands. 

Some are large islands, while others are extremely small. 

But they form a string of choke points through which Chinese maritime trade must pass.
Choke points are normally geographic realities important to navigators but no one else. 

But they also create a potential vulnerability for China. 

The existence of choke points, however many, makes the movement of Chinese vessels predictable. More importantly, given a sufficient air-sea force, blocking those points can block Chinese exports and cripple the Chinese economy.

A Jan. 2, 2017 photo shows a Chinese navy formation, including the aircraft carrier Liaoning, center, during military drills in the South China Sea.

The Chinese see the United States in three ways. 

1. First, the U.S. has an extremely powerful Navy. 
2. Second, the U.S. is highly unpredictable in how it responds to challenges. The Chinese saw this unpredictability in Korea, Vietnam, Kosovo, Operation Desert Storm, Iraq and so on. At times, the U.S. does not respond. Other times it over-reacts, from the Chinese point of view. 
3. Third, the U.S. prefers economic sanctions that at times include physically blocking the trade of a given country.

Given these three facts about China’s potential adversary, China finds itself in an extremely difficult position. 

It cannot match American naval power. 

It cannot predict what the U.S. will do. 

To the extent that the U.S. might choose, sanctions that include interference with Chinese trade are the most likely opening move. 

Therefore, the geography of the Western Pacific archipelago poses a potential threat to core Chinese national interests.
There are many passages from China’s east coast into the Pacific. 

The American task would be to create sustained interdiction of all passages without exposing U.S. vessels to excessive risk. 

The likely strategy would be to place about five carrier battle groups east and south of the archipelago. 

The vessels would be located as far east as possible to assure interception before the maritime vessels reach high seas. 

They would be close enough to be within reach of air and sea anti-ship missiles, and close enough that carrier-based aircraft could have overlapping patrol zones without having to refuel. 

Submarines would also be used.
The Chinese counter to this deployment would be primarily land-based anti-ship missiles. 

With so much American sea power backed by land-based strategic aircraft from Guam, Chinese ships would find it dangerous to sortie. 

Having anticipated this, the Chinese would try to strike at the blockade with anti-ship missiles. 

The problem with using anti-ship missiles is that while they have terminal guidance systems, they require some general targeting information. 

That would come from signal intelligence, satellites or longer-range drones. 

Chinese aircraft patrolling east of the archipelago would face both fighters and American missiles. The U.S. likely has anti-satellite capability. 

But I would assume that both American and Chinese satellites have defensive systems, from the ability to maneuver to deploying ball bearings in an attacker’s path. 

While it would be useful for the Chinese to blind American satellites, it would be essential for the Americans to do so. 

That would be difficult, but the real threat would be Chinese high-altitude drones locating American carrier battle groups. 

The Chinese would then deliver saturation attacks to overwhelm U.S. fleet anti-missile defenses. 

The U.S. would try to shoot down the drones or render them mute through electronic warfare.


The Chinese have been pushing toward this point. 

They cannot tolerate a blockade and cannot engage in full-fleet action against the Americans. 

The construction of extensive anti-ship systems coupled with multiple types of sensors is the key. Therefore, if the U.S. wants to carry out a blockade, it would need an extensive air operation to destroy Chinese anti-missile capabilities. 

And that must be preceded by massive suppression of air defense.
Note that as with the Chinese invasion of Taiwan, what appears to be a simple problem spins out of control. 

The U.S. can’t be certain it would not be detected and would have to attack the Chinese mainland. Even then it would be unlikely to destroy all Chinese missiles, and Chinese command and control is undoubtedly redundant. 

The possibility of significant U.S. losses can’t be discounted. 

That would mean that the use of sanctions and blockades as an alternative to armed conflict would lead to armed conflict.
The Chinese have not, however, fully solved their problem. 

Even if they drive everyone out of the East and South China seas, which isn’t likely, they are still enclosed by the archipelago. 

They know the U.S. is unpredictable and therefore can’t assume that the U.S. is reading the battle problem as they are. 

The Chinese are not facing imminent crisis, but they must have a long-term goal of taking control of the choke points and basing in such a way as to push the U.S. Navy back into the central Pacific.
Attack by main force is not an option. 

There are too many choke points, and the American response is too unpredictable. 

The ideal solution is political. 

This works one of two ways. 

The first is to reach an agreement with a major country that controls key choke points to allow passage and a Chinese naval presence. 

Aside from Taiwan, the country that would be valuable in this regard is the Philippines. 

As long as the Taiwan Straits are open, the Philippines could serve as an exit point. 

You might note the behavior of the Filipino president of late.
The second option would be to create insurgencies to destabilize one or more countries. 

This is far less efficient than a political shift, but the Chinese have been quite good in the past with supporting insurgencies, while the U.S. is not at all good at counterinsurgency. 

It would not provide a satisfactory solution to the Chinese in any reasonable time frame.
The point I am making here is that any discussion of war between the U.S. and China overestimates either the Chinese capability or the American capability. 

The Chinese would not be able to take Taiwan. 

There are too many failure points. 

The U.S. could blockade China if it was prepared to accept losses. 

The U.S. is risk averse, and minimizing threats would mean a far larger war than merely a naval picket line.
Each action by either side faces a counter that opens the door not only to failure but also to losing forces neither side can afford to lose. 

The only practical way to force a change in the balance of power in the region is a shift in alliances by one of the countries, and the Philippines is the one to watch.