Affichage des articles dont le libellé est capital flight. Afficher tous les articles
Affichage des articles dont le libellé est capital flight. Afficher tous les articles

vendredi 20 décembre 2019

Like rats deserting a sinking ship

Money has been leaving China at a record rate. Beijing is battling to stem the tide
By Laura He

Hong Kong -- Beijing is stepping up the battle to stop money flowing out of China as the country contends with economic woes and trade war tensions that have eased but show no sign of ending altogether.
Money was leaving the country at a record clip earlier this year through unauthorized channels, according to analysts.
That's bad news for China, which needs to keep financial reserves high to maintain confidence in its markets.
Now Chinese officials are trying harder than ever to avoid a repeat of the financial scare four years ago that sapped its money reserves by hundreds of billions of dollars.
The State Administration of Foreign Exchange, a key government regulator, said Sunday that its most important job next year is to prevent major financial risks, avoid "abnormal" capital flows across its borders and crack down on illegal trading activities.
"We need to fight a critical battle" to defuse financial risks and maintain market stability, SAFE said in an statement.
The pledge was an unusually strong one for the agency, which deployed the kind of military language more often used by top leaders in China.

Cracking down
The agency has already started cracking down on capital flight.
In November, it fined Chinabank Payments $4.2 million — one of the largest-ever fines SAFE has imposed — for moving money overseas.
The regulator didn't say how much had been transferred, but it could have been tens of millions of yuan because China calculates fines based on the amount of money in question.
The online payments firm, a subsidiary of billionaire Richard Liu's JD.com, told CNN Business that the transfers were made by "external merchants" who had taken advantage of loopholes.
But it said it felt "deeply sorry" and would reflect on its management.
Major corporations aren't the only ones linked to the flight of money out of China.
Earlier this month, a Bank of China customer took out $50,000 in cash from his bank account over the course of a week.
SAFE fined the bank nearly $6,000 for breaking a government rule limiting how much foreign currency people can take out of their accounts within a short period of time.
While the amount was small, it still symbolizes how far the government is willing to go to crack down on such withdrawals.
"Controls on outflows are increasingly tight," said Alicia Garcia Herrero, chief economist for Asia Pacific at Natixis Bank.

Fleeing money
The threat of fleeing capital stems from concerns about the country's economy, which has been hurt by cooling domestic demand and a prolonged trade war with the United States.
The People's Bank of China also allowed the yuan to weaken, a way to help the country to counter the impact of higher US tariffs on its exports.
Since the trade war began last year, the currency has depreciated by around 12% against the US dollar.
A weaker currency, though, raises the risk that people will try to move money out of the country, which in turn threatens to drive the yuan's value even lower.
The Chinese government has been able to stop some money from leaving.
About $74 billion left China through regulated channels in the first half of this year — the smallest amount in a decade, wrote Gene Ma, head of China research for the Institute of International Finance, in an October report.
Even so, a record amount of funds have left China through "unrecorded transactions" during that time, he said.
The Washington-based trade group estimates that $131 billion left China in the first six months of 2019 — the most recent data available — through "hidden capital outflows." (People can move money through such means, for example, by asking friends and family to pool the annual limit on foreign currency they are allowed to withdraw from Chinese banks, or by claiming to make investments overseas that don't really exist.)
Ma wrote that the surge was triggered by "intensifying trade tensions."
China has also been trying to help its economy by cutting benchmark interest rates, which will likely increase the amount of money leaving China, said Herrero, the Natixis Bank economist.
And while China and the United States recently agreed to a "phase one" trade agreement that could cool tensions between the two countries, Herrero said that deal isn't likely to alleviate the pressure on China entirely.
She said the yuan's respite might be "temporary," adding that China's central bank will likely let the currency depreciate again if the deal is not signed, or is eventually watered down.

Lessons learned
China has good reason to keep its money in the country.
The last time China experienced this kind of capital flight was in 2015 and 2016, when the economy faltered and the People's Bank of China suddenly devalued the yuan, roiling global financial markets.
On average, the amount of money leaving China was equivalent to 6% of the country's GDP in each of those two years, according to an estimate by the Chinese Academy of Social Sciences, a government think tank.
In total, China lost $1.28 trillion, and it was forced to tap into its foreign exchange reserves to prevent its currency from rapidly depreciating even further.
China's foreign reserves shrank by more than $800 billion in those two years before recovering some losses in 2017.
Since then, Beijing has significantly tightened control of capital and made it more difficult for people to exchange money for foreign currency or transfer funds abroad.
"Chinese regulators have learned their lessons during the frightening period of 2015-16," analysts from Bank of America wrote in November.
Analysts at UBS also pointed out that China has taken steps to offset capital flight.
They noted earlier this month that the country recently opened up its financial markets further to attract foreign investors and companies.
Those kind of measures can boost interest from foreign investors in the Chinese market and attract more money within the country's borders.

lundi 29 mai 2017

Rogue Nation

China's Belt And Road Initiative Does Not Support Globalisation, So Much As Subvert It.
By Douglas Bulloch

In this Monday, May 15, 2017, photo, Xi Jinping, front row third right, waves with leaders attending the Belt and Road Forum as they pose for a group photo at the Yanqi Lake venue on the outskirt of Beijing. They are, front row from left, Turkish President Recep Tayyip Erdogan, Vietnamese President Tran Dai Quang, Russian President Vladimir Putin, Xi, Indonesian President Joko "Jokowi" Widodo and Kazakhstan President Nursultan Nazarbayev, and second row from third left to right, Hungarian Prime Minister Viktor Orban, Cambodian Prime Minister Hun Sen, Spanish Prime Minister Mariano Rajoy, Malaysian Prime Minister Najib Razak and Ethiopian Prime Minister Hailemariam Desalegn.

Now that the flurry of breathless commentary – occasioned by China's recent 'Belt and Road Forum' – is subsiding, it is time for another look at this Initiative.' 
Following my earlier piece from a couple of weeks ago, clearly there are plenty of commentators prepared to give it a fair wind and who see it very much as a corollary to the familiar narrative of China's rise to hegemonic status. 
Indeed, some see it as a key part of China's laudable effort to support 'globalisation' so warmly welcomed at Davos earlier this year.
Others remain skeptical, suggesting that it is both lacking in detail, and has failed so far to come up with an answer to the strategic, as well as the economic challenges implied. 
One sharp eyed tweeter last week pointed out that the maps which ordinarily decorate the feature puff-pieces usually include Kolkata in India – a country which is becoming ever more hostile to the Belt and Road initiative – revealing most of them to be little more than aspirational doodles.
In fact, insiders have long known that both Russia and India are concerned about strategic encroachment from China on areas of the world they regard as their own spheres of influence, which is one reason why China has so routinely spoken of the project in terms of 'win win' cooperation. 
At least two years ago, for example, Indian sources began to speak of a 'Project Mausam' as their own variation on the same geopolitical theme. 
Now they talk about the Indian Ocean Region (IOR), referred to by Brookings as a 'pivot for India's growth' which neatly mixes a Chinese style acronym, with a dynamic U.S. reference for its own geopolitical aspirations with the 'pivot.'

Conceptual pathways
In each case, the geopolitical term attempts to describe an amorphous set of aspirations which only hints at the ultimate goal. 
For the U.S., the 'pivot' explained something about a hoped for reorientation that has become ever more confused. 
At the same time, India's growing self-confidence as a future economic leviathan also needs some conceptual pathway towards a strategic presence they cannot yet express, economically or militarily.
To many observers it seems so obvious that China is the coming power, that legions of commentators are stumbling over themselves to herald its arrival. 
China is, of course, happy to play along. 
What was 'One Belt, One Road' has now morphed into the 'Belt and Road Initiative' with everyone taking their cues from Beijing and dutifully using the approved acronym while admitting to uncertainty over its scope.
A week or so after the culmination of the 'Belt and Road Forum' in Beijing and the press coverage has turned hostile in India and skeptical elsewhere
Even in China there are quietly expressed doubts about whether it really makes sense in the long run, and indeed, whether China can actually afford it given that such vast infrastructure outlay must generate equally vast returns to pay for it.

Closing down

Setting aside the practical and strategic concerns, there is the small matter of whether China has enough on its plate with its own reform programme? 
Many of those who would like to see China succeed with the Belt and Road Initiative have been cheerleaders in the past for China's opening up, and the broad pathway of liberal reforms they have been following. 
These have come under strain since the elevation of Xi Jinping, but still form a backdrop of expectation, if somewhat deferred. 
Yet while China has become more authoritarian domestically, reversing direction on many market reforms, it has simultaneously taken control of its overseas strategic direction with the Belt and Road Initiative.
There is, therefore, a curious coincidence in the timing of China's most ambitious announcements yet concerning the Belt and Road Initiative, and the progressive closure of China's capital account in the face of unrelenting capital flight. 
Then last week saw the PBOC alter its methodology to include a counter-cyclical factor when weighing the daily rate of the yuan against the US dollar, leading some to suggest this amounts to a re-pegging.
Had China simply liberalised its capital account and allowed the market a decisive role in both capital allocation and price discovery, then the question of where Chinese firms might invest would depend on expected returns. 
However, the current Chinese leadership has stepped back from these long standing commitments and reasserted the central role of the state in economic decision making, through state banks and State Owned Enterprises.
And it is in this approach to driving international trade that the Belt and Road Initiative aligns itself with China's wider retreat from the path of liberal reform. 
Instead of the Belt and Road Initiative serving as a useful conduit for free trade between willing partners, it secures a role for the Chinese state in the direction of trade through investment. 
In other words, it is less the realisation of China's liberal reforms than their final repudiation.
The very idea of the Belt and Road Initiative therefore, might come to be seen as not so much a step forward for China, but as a defensive retreat, an attempt to control the conditions of its opening up, to direct not so much their own affairs, but the affairs of others too. 
It shows as clearly as anything else, that globalisation, as far as China is concerned, comes with conditions, some of which the rest of the world might not be ready to accept.