South China Sea: Deterring a Fait Accompli

Many rogue states have resorted to limited land grabs designed to unilaterally change the territorial status quo before the target could muster an effective response. China is following this pattern.

by Lan D. Ngo

While the South China Sea has experienced a period of relative calm following HYSY-981 oil rig crisis in 2014, it is unclear whether the dispute would fully stabilize in the coming years, despite continuous efforts to negotiate a binding Code of Conduct.
Russia’s bolt-from-the-blue annexation of Crimea in early 2014 reminds states that their territories could be swiftly seized by an aggressive neighbor with territorial ambitions.
Therefore, claimants to the South China Sea dispute, such as Vietnam and the Philippines, should be prepared to deter a potential fait accompli, especially when modern history shows that states increasingly choose fait accompli rather than brute force to conquer new territory.

The Logic of Fait Accompli
States that seek to expand their territories have three basic options:
(i) brute force,
(ii) coercion, or
(iii) fait accompli. 
In a brute force scenario, the aggressor first defeats the target state on the battlefield and then makes territorial demands.
Defeated militarily, the target state has no choice but to acquiesce to the victor’s demands. Alternatively, the aggressor could coerce the target to give up some of its territories.
Facing coercive pressures and in some cases, the looming threat of war, the target may decide that it would be better off acceding to the demands of the aggressor rather than risking escalation.
The problem with brute force is that it tends to be very costly in blood and treasure.
Even the weakest victims would fight back if their survival is truly at stake.
Hence a deliberately short war could quickly turn into an inextricable morass.
This is why brute force may be the only option when the aggressor seeks to conquer another state’s entire territory but makes little sense in the pursuit of limited territorial goals.
Coercion is less costly than brute force, but its track record is rather dismal, especially when the coercive demand involves territory.
Furthermore, by coercing the target, the aggressor inevitably reveals its intentions, thus giving an early warning to the target which may then engage in military preparations to blunt a possible first-strike advantage.
In other words, coercion is an ineffective tool of territorial conquest that would also reduce the range of options available to the aggressor to achieve its territorial goal.
This is why many states have resorted to fait accompli, i.e. limited land grabs designed to minimize risks of escalation.
A fait accompli allows the aggressor to unilaterally change the territorial status quo before the target could muster an effective response.
This forces the target into a tough position as it must choose between two unappealing choices:
(i) try to dislodge the invaders from the seized territory and risk escalation or
(ii) accept the territorial loss.
Every time an aggressor resorts to fait accompli, it is betting that the territorial loss for the target is small enough that it would rather give up than fight back and risk a larger conflict.
This is why decisiveness and limited scale are intrinsic features of every fait accompli.
While any fait accompli only directly involves two states, it usually has significant implications for third parties.
Russia’s annexation of Crimea is a territorial loss only for Ukraine, but the United States and other European countries are rightly concerned about the broader implications of Russia’s land grab. European leaders could be forgiven for believing that Crimea was just the first act and that Russia’s westward expansion would not stop in Ukraine.
Even if they can be absolutely certain of Moscow’s limited territorial appetite, many states still have strong incentives to reverse Russia’s fait accompli because failing to do so could embolden countries that also seek territorial expansion.
Yet fait accompli is a tactic designed to deter external intervention.
Brute force and coercion unfold over a lengthier period of time that allows third parties like the UN or a great power to intervene.
By rapidly changing facts on the ground, the aggressor could achieve its territorial goal before any third party could intervene.
Once faced with an accomplished fact, third parties could only intervene by attempting to roll back the aggressor’s territorial gains, which usually demands the use of force.
Since using force is costly and risky, third parties are less likely to intervene after the fait accompli had already occurred.
Thus a fait accompli usually aims at two targets simultaneously: the immediate victim and potential third party interveners.
In launching a fait accompli, the aggressor seeks to minimize two kinds of risk:
(i) risk of a protracted conflict (if the target fights back) and
(ii) risk of a broader conflict (if a third party intervenes).

After the Fact: Dealing with Territorial Loss after Fait Accompli
Assuming that states always seek to reclaim their lost territory over the long term, states facing a fait accompli have two basic options in the short term: they could immediately try to recapture the lost territory or they could wait for a more opportune moment to reclaim the lost territory in the distant future.
This decision, to respond immediately or delay, crucially hinges on two factors: the value of the contested territory and the visibility of the fait accompli.
A contested territory could be highly valuable for strategic and/or symbolic reasons.
A strategic territory usually offers immediate military advantages to the state that controls it.
The Crimean Peninsula with the Sevastopol naval base and the Strait of Malacca are examples of strategic territory.
Some territories are important because they hold symbolic importance, either because they are considered sacred grounds (e.g. Temple Mount/Haram al-Sharif) or because they symbolize a larger power struggle (e.g. Berlin during the Cold War).
Leaders of a state facing the loss of a high-value territory should have strong incentives to immediately dislodge the invaders because losing such vital territory could endanger national security.
Even when security is not at stake, failing to immediately respond to such fait accompli could lead to severe political punishment as the people would not tolerate the loss of symbolically important territory.
This is why Ukraine immediately responded to recover Crimea after the Russian annexation in 2014.
What happens when the fait accompli targets a territory with little intrinsic value?
In such cases, leaders are likely to respond immediately only when the fait accompli is highly visible to the public audience.
When Argentina seized the Southern Thule island in 1976, the Callaghan government turned a blind eye toward the incident, even keeping the parliament and the British people in the dark for eighteen months before the fait accompli became public knowledge.
In contrast, when the Argentines seized the Falklands in 1982, Thatcher immediately appealed to the UN Security Council and dispatched the Navy across the Atlantic to recapture the islands.
Neither the Falkland Islands nor Southern Thule held much value in the eyes of British policymakers. The crucial difference here is that whereas Argentina stealthily took over Southern Thule, they publicly seized the Falklands.
Because the Falklands invasion was such a public event, it was a direct assault on British national honor and therefore humiliating.
Thatcher did not have any other choice than to respond immediately to Argentina’s fait accompli because failing to respond would have opened herself to attacks by her political rivals and precipitated the fall of her government.

Deterring a Fait Accompli in the South China Sea
Although China has not used military force to expand their territorial control in the South China Sea in recent years, this is no cause for complacent.
After all, China is the only claimant in the South China Sea dispute to have used force to seize islands controlled by other states.
They forcibly took the Paracel Islands from South Vietnam in 1974 and in 1988, the PLA Navy once again opened fire to seize control over a number of islands in the Spratlys controlled by Vietnam.
The 1995 Mischief Reef incident and more recently, the Scarborough Shoal standoff in 2012 remind us that Beijing will resort to force when it finds no other way to enforce its claims in the disputed area.
The risk of a Chinese fait accompli in the South China Sea is also high because many factors play to its advantage.
Given the high level of asymmetric economic interdependence, China’s neighbors like the Philippines and Vietnam will pay an enormous cost for trying to recapture an island that China seizes. Furthermore, given the clear imbalance of power in favor of China, small countries are unlikely to resort to force to dislodge Chinese invading troops, lest the response provokes a larger and more devastating conflict.
The great power most capable of deterring Chinese adventurism in the South China Sea at this point is the United States. 
Ideally, the United States would announce that it does not tolerate any attempt to solve the dispute by force, similar to its veiled deterrent threat against a potential Chinese invasion of Taiwan.
However, this is unlikely to happen any time soon as U.S. behavior thus far shows that it lacks the resolve to directly challenge China in the South China Sea.
The best way to deter China from attempting a fait accompli, for the time being, is to convince Beijing that there is no possible way they could take the islands in a swift and bloodless fait accompli. 
States increasingly rely on fait accompli rather than war or coercion because they believe it is a low-cost and low-risk alternative that could achieve similar territorial goals.
Consequently, fait accompli will become less attractive if those contemplating are convinced that the tactic actually carries more risk and costs than they previously believed.
Thus, states at risk of having their territories seized through fait accompli must convince the potential aggressors that they would definitely make an attempt to reclaim the lost territory, regardless of its intrinsic value.
To make this deterrent threat credible, leaders have to sacrifice policy flexibility and tie their hands by raising the public’s awareness about the disputed territories and therefore ensure strong public reaction should the disputed territories be invaded.
States should also garrison troops in territories that are vulnerable to a fait accompli. 
In extreme cases, they could convince their own populace to inhabit the hitherto uninhabitable islands by supplying them with all necessary wherewithals to sustain a normal life on these islands.
These measures enhance the credibility of a retaliatory threat because it precludes the possibility of stealthily seizing a piece of territory.
More importantly, it ensures that leaders of target state must respond to the territorial challenge or risk losing power at home.

Axis of Evil: The New Gestapo

Interpol Is Helping Enforce China’s Political Purges

Beijing is happy to take advantage of an international red notice system that is notoriously easy to abuse — and is now overseen by a Chinese official.
By Bethany Allen-ebrahimian

The New Gestapo

In November 2016, Interpol, the international police body, received its first Chinese president, Meng Hongwei. 

This wasn’t strange: China is a member in good standing of the organization, and Meng, who had previously served as vice minister of public security in Beijing, was duly elected by its general assembly. 

But Meng’s ascension also aroused suspicion because of China’s own record on blurring police work and politics — a pattern that will carry over into Interpol’s work.
Those simmering suspicions bubbled over this week. 

After a Chinese billionaire based abroad threatened to reveal high-level corruption in his home country, Beijing rapidly requested and was granted an Interpol red notice against him — that is, an official request for his arrest and extradition issued by the intergovernmental organization that facilitates police cooperation among its 190 member countries. 

The timing gives reason to believe that China’s motive is purely political and that Interpol is becoming an extension of the increasingly long reach of the Chinese state.
In March, Guo Wengui, a charismatic real estate tycoon who left China two years ago and now resides in the United States, gave two interviews to a U.S.-based Chinese-language media outlet in which he claimed that one of China’s most powerful families has enriched itself by leveraging political connections to gain holdings in large companies.
Guo said he had learned through business dealings that the family of He Guoqiang, a former member of the Politburo, the highest ruling body in China, controlled a large but hidden stake in one of China’s biggest brokerage firms, and threatened to reveal further details of the He family’s wealth. 

But his allegations went largely unnoticed until a New York Times investigation, published on April 15, traced the He family’s business holdings and backed up his claims.
Three days later, Interpol issued a red notice alleging that Guo had bribed a former top Chinese official who is now under investigation for corruption. 

Beijing reportedly requested the red notice, according to anonymous sources who spoke to the Hong Kong-based South China Morning Post. 

A Chinese Foreign Ministry spokesman confirmed the news but took no responsibility, stating only, “We have learnt that the Interpol has issued a red notice on suspect Guo Wengui.”
Guo’s residence in the United States puts him out of the direct reach of the Chinese Communist Party — but not of harassment conducted through Interpol’s easily abusable system. 

Interpol red notices are essentially a data-sharing mechanism between police forces in its member countries, allowing law enforcement to communicate internationally about wanted criminals. 

The notices are not legally binding and are enforced differently in different countries, or not enforced at all.
But some countries — Russia, the Central Asian nations, Turkey, Venezuela, and China — issue politically motivated red notices against dissidents, activists, and journalists. 

Issuing such warnings, even if they do not lead to arrest, can harm the reputation of the targets, turn routine financial matters into criminal actions, and make it harder to live an ordinary life. 

Interpol has previously refused to issue some red notices on the grounds that they involve purely political charges, such as the attempt by the Russian government to harass American-born whistleblower Bill Browder.
It’s no surprise that China is using every tool it can to go after Guo. 

High-level corruption is a sensitive topic in China, where Xi Jinping has led a sweeping anti-corruption campaign and political purge that has felled some of the country’s most powerful political elites, including former security czar Zhou Yongkang and former military chief Xu Caihou. 

The anti-corruption campaign has cemented Xi’s own power, sweeping away opponents and helping make Xi the most influential Chinese leader in decades.
He Guoqiang, however, has faced no official allegations of corruption; he was the top anti-graft official under former Chinese President Hu Jintao. 

And the Chinese Communist Party wants to be the only judge of its members’ purity. 

Charges of corruption originating outside the party against unauthorized targets are rarely tolerated. 

China experts and human rights watchdogs suspect that is the true reason for the Interpol red notice — to silence an embarrassing critic.
“The 19th Party Congress is only about six months away,” Bill Bishop, author of the Sinocism newsletter and longtime observer of Chinese elite politics, commented on April 19. 

“Xi does not want to lose control of the narrative and any credible revelations of high-level infighting or corruption by the family of Wang Qishan” — another top official Guo mentioned in his interview — “could create enough noise to hinder Xi’s preferred personnel arrangements at the 19th Party Congress.”
In recent years, China has made use of red notices as it has expanded its anti-graft campaign beyond its borders. 

In 2015, China hailed the issuance of 100 red notices against economic fugitives, largely as part of its “Sky Net” operation, which seeks to repatriate and punish corrupt Chinese officials and businesspeople who have fled abroad. 

Chinese media have repeatedly emphasized the power of the Chinese authorities to reach anywhere in the world, broadcasting scenes of fugitives, such as former official Yang Xiuzhu, being escorted by police through Beijing’s airport.
“Interpol’s red notice system is vulnerable to weaponization by abusive regimes in the guise of criminal prosecution of dissidents, journalists, human rights defenders, and others fleeing persecution,” said Rebecca Shaeffer, a senior legal and policy advisor at Fair Trials, a Brussels- and London-based advocacy organization that has closely followed Interpol red notices for years, in an interview with Foreign Policy.

Interpol has several organizational flaws that make it particularly vulnerable to abuse.

Like the police bodies from which it’s built, the opaque organization is often unwilling to divulge information publicly. 

Most red notices are not made public, and there is no public database to search the more than 100,000 notices in active circulation. 

The evidence backing up the allegations is also frequently kept private, making it difficult to verify whether or not an alert is justifiable. 

Until recent procedural reforms, it was difficult and time-consuming to get politically motivated red notices removed from circulation.
“What we can say is that the timing raises serious questions about the integrity of Interpol’s internal vetting procedures for issuing red notices,” said Nicholas Bequelin, Amnesty International’s regional director for East Asia, in a phone interview with FP.
The vast majority of notices are not politically motivated. 

But those that are can be difficult to detect. 

“Most of the time, if someone is wanted for a legitimate red notice, people stay hidden. They know that it’s for a valid arrest warrant,” Michelle Estlund, a Florida-based lawyer who specializes in defending against Interpol red notices, told FP in a phone interview. 

“The people who come looking for assistance to deal directly with Interpol feel that the red notices issued against them are invalid.”
Estlund explained that it isn’t Interpol’s job to determine innocence or guilt when evaluating a request for a red notice. 

Rather, it determines whether or not the requesting country has followed appropriate laws and procedures to request the notice.
“The tricky part is for Interpol to know this information when they receive the red notice. It’s almost impossible for them to know that,” Estlund said. 

“There is a basic criteria that Interpol requires upon receipt of the application, and there is a review process in place, but for Interpol to review every application would be virtually impossible.”
In other words, the system is based in large part on trust — a trust that politically motivated red notices violate. 

“China and Russia have abused the trust on which the system rests,” Bequelin said. 

“Interpol does play a role in fighting international crime. If the system is broken and becomes perceived as a political tool, then it will hinder law enforcement efforts worldwide.”
But red notices are just one tool available to a Chinese state increasingly seeking to extend its influence over unruly citizens abroad — and they are highly effective, often resulting in frozen bank accounts and travel restrictions. 

Others include threats, coercion, and kidnappings. 

In 2015, four booksellers in Hong Kong and one in Thailand went missing. 

All Chinese-born, the five men had published books containing information that Beijing deemed sensitive. 

They later turned up in custody on the Chinese mainland. 

Upon release, one described how he had been kidnapped and spirited over the border into the mainland without normal judicial procedure. 

The kidnappings have cast a chill over Hong Kong, once believed to be beyond the reach of Chinese political oppression.
As a result, Meng’s election further alarmed international human rights advocates, including Bequelin. 

“This is extraordinarily worrying given China’s longstanding practice of trying to use Interpol to arrest dissidents and refugees abroad,” Bequelin said at the time. 

“Unlike most law enforcement agencies around the world, the Chinese police have a political mandate to protect the power of the Communist Party.”
The concern is that extralegal methods and political motivations are being merged within international rules and institutions and that, with a Chinese public security official in an influential position, Interpol’s bureaucratic incentives might tilt away from facilitating legitimate investigative work.
Estlund told FP that Meng’s election was concerning primarily due to the lack of sufficient rule of law or human rights protections in China. 

“I think that anytime the leadership of a law enforcement organization like Interpol comes from a country where there are significant human rights concerns — of course that is going to be a concern,” she said. 

“I would not say that that concern is limited only to this particular president. I would have a concern if the president hailed from any one of a variety of countries where there are routinely documented human rights violations.”
Chinese state-run media have suggested that Meng’s election will be a boon to the international expansion of China’s own anti-graft campaign. 

One November 2016 article in the party-affiliated Beijing Youth Daily hailed Interpol as the most effective platform for combating international crime and pursuing stolen goods and highlighted how well that fit with China’s own recent emphasis on fighting corruption and recovering assets lost through corruption. 

“Against this backdrop, a Chinese person has been elected as the head of Interpol,” continued the article, “which undoubtedly further reflects the recognition that Interpol and international society now give to China’s own rule of law.”

Another sign of Chinese influence over the international crime-fighting organization is the continued exclusion of Taiwan.

China claims sovereignty over the self-ruling island and has worked steadily to reduce its participation in international organizations where its membership might be seen as a sign of Taiwanese nationhood. 

Interpol rejected Taiwan’s bid to participate in the November 2016 general assembly in which Meng was elected.
But Shaeffer expressed less concern about direct Chinese influence over Interpol, telling FP that the position of Interpol president is largely ceremonial. 

“Meng Hongwei’s presidency of Interpol’s executive committee has brought attention to China’s history of using Interpol red notices to pursue dissidents, activists, and others who have fled its persecution over the years,” she said. 

“But presidents of Interpol don’t have the power to issue alerts. That role sits with Interpol’s secretariat, who are bound by Interpol’s rules and constitution, which were beefed up at the end of last year to prevent abuse.”
The problem, according to Shaeffer, is that any country already has the ability to issue politically motivated red notices if desired. 

“These rules must now be implemented and enforced to stop China from misusing this global crime-fighting tool,” she remarked.
Those rules have not yet seemed to protect Guo. 

But the red notice hasn’t silenced him. 

On April 19, he gave an interview to Voice of America in which he made further claims of corruption and misbehavior among several high-ranking Chinese officials and their relatives. 

Whether he’ll be able to keep making those claims — and what other techniques Beijing will bring to bear against him — is another question.