China Is Leasing an Entire Pacific Island. Its Residents Are Shocked.

What could Beijing want with Tulagi, where Allied forces fought a bloody battle with Japan in World War II? Some fear military ambitions.
By Damien Cave

Residents of Tulagi, an island of a little over 1,000 people in the Solomon Islands.

SYDNEY, Australia — The island of Tulagi served as a strategic headquarters for Britain and then Japan when each dominated the Pacific.

Before World War II, it was the capital of the Solomon Islands. 

During the war, its natural deepwater harbor across from Guadalcanal made it a military gem fought and died for.
Now Tulagi is about to fall into Chinese hands.
Under a secretive deal signed last month with a provincial government in the South Pacific nation, a Beijing-based company with close ties to the Chinese Communist Party has secured exclusive development rights for the entire island and its surroundings.
The lease agreement has shocked Tulagi residents and alarmed American officials who see the island chains of the South Pacific as crucial to keeping China in check and protecting important sea routes. It is the latest example of China using promises of prosperity to pursue its global aspirations — often by funneling money to governments and investing in local infrastructure projects that critics call debt traps for developing nations.
“The geography tells you that this is a good location,” said Anne-Marie Brady, a China scholar at the University of Canterbury in Christchurch, New Zealand. 

“China is expanding its military assets into the South Pacific and is looking for friendly ports and friendly airfields just like other rising powers before them.”
Beijing’s ambitions in the South Pacific have economic, political and military ramifications.
The region is rich in natural resources, and China’s investments have provoked worries in the United States and Australia that the projects could give Beijing an opening to establish a military foothold for everything from ships and planes to its own version of the Global Positioning System.
China is also pushing to end the region’s status as a diplomatic stronghold for Taiwan.
The Solomons cut ties to Taipei and allied with Beijing just a few days before the Tulagi deal.
A second Pacific nation, Kiribati, followed suit the same week.

A boat in the waters off Tulagi.

Even compared to previous Chinese development deals in nearby countries — including a wharf in Vanuatu, whose terms were not publicly released for years — the Tulagi agreement is remarkable for both its scope and lack of public input.
The renewable 75-year lease was granted to the China Sam Enterprise Group, a conglomerate founded in 1985 as a state-owned enterprise, according to corporate records.
A copy of the “strategic cooperation agreement,” obtained by The New York Times and verified by two people with knowledge of the deal, reveals both the immediate ambitions of China Sam and the potential — just as in Vanuatu — for infrastructure that could share civilian and military uses.

CHINA’S SURGE
Signed on Sept. 22, the agreement includes provisions for a fishery base, an operations center, and “the building or enhancement of the airport.”
Though there are no oil or gas reserves in the Solomons, the agreement also notes that China Sam is interested in building an oil and gas terminal.
These are just the explicit possibilities.
The document also states that the government will lease all of Tulagi and the surrounding islands in the province for the development of “a special economic zone or any other industry that is suitable for any development.”
The provincial governor who signed the deal, Stanley Maniteva, could not be reached for comment. Noting that laws and landowner rights would be respected, he told local reporters this week that the agreement had not been completed.
“I want to make clear that the agreement does not bear the official stamp of the province so it is not official and formalized yet,” he said.
But many residents of Tulagi, an island of a little over 1,000 people, are taking the signing of the document to mean it is a real agreement, and outrage has quickly set in.
“They cannot come in and lease the whole island like that,” said Michael Salini, 46, a business owner on Tulagi who is helping organize a petition to oppose the China Sam agreement.
“Everyone is really scared about the possibility of China turning the island into a military base,” he added.
“That is what really scares people — because why else do they want to lease the whole island?”
A military installation would carry strategic and symbolic significance.
China’s efforts in the region echo the period before and during World War II, when Japan wrested control of island assets, which were won back in turn by American and Australian troops in bloody battles.
But it is also a matter of feasibility: China goes where there’s value and interest.
With the United States pulling back in much of the world under Trump’s America First policy, Beijing is often knocking on doors left open.
American and Solomon Islands officials note that Chinese businesses and officials have cultivated local politicians for years with bribes and gifts like luxury trips to China and Singapore. 
In a poor country of 600,000 people with a national Parliament of 50 members, it doesn’t take much to tilt debate.
“What worries me much more about the new Chinese engagement, be it political or economic, in the Pacific is the way in which this engagement is taking place, being lubricated by elite capture and corruption,” said Jonathan Pryke, a Pacific islands expert with the Lowy Institute in Sydney.
Though patronage and corruption have long been a challenge, he added, “this engagement has certainly taken it to a whole new level.”

Li Keqiang and Prime Minister Manasseh Sogavare of the Solomon Islands at the Great Hall of the People in Beijing last week.

The prime minister of the Solomon Islands, Manasseh Sogavare, visited China earlier this month. Photographs from the trip showed him smiling with China Sam executives.
The visit carried a whiff of victory for Beijing.
It followed a failed lobbying effort by Australia and the United States to keep the Solomons loyal to Taiwan and the alignment that began when American Marines dislodged Japanese troops from Tulagi and Guadalcanal in 1942.
Australia’s prime minister, Scott Morrison, visited the Solomons in June — the first official visit by an Australian leader in a decade.
He announced an infrastructure program worth up to 250 million Australian dollars, or about $168 million, in grant financing over 10 years.
Vice President Mike Pence also pressed Sogavare to hold off on deciding about Taiwan, promising infrastructure investments and making plans for an in-person discussion in September around the time of the United Nations General Assembly.
But Sogavare then announced the severing of ties with Taiwan, and Mr. Pence canceled the meeting.
Still, some argue that the United States could revive support.
“It’s not too late in the game,” said Phillip Tagini, a mining executive who served in the Solomons as a prime minister’s adviser from 2012 to 2015.
“At this stage we don’t have the history with China to say we can trust them.”
After an election in 2006, rioting and violence broke out amid allegations that money from Chinese businessmen had rigged the results.
Protests also greeted Sogavare’s election win in April, with demonstrators marching toward the capital’s Chinatown to register discontent.
“Separate from China’s agenda is the risk of destabilizing a vulnerable society,” Professor Brady said.
But the tangible effects of the deals being struck now, some say, could win over even the skeptics.
“The fact is, people in the Solomons are going to see infrastructure from China, and when they see these things happening they are going to say, ‘Wow, this is what we were waiting for,’” Mr. Tagini said.
“If the Americans are going to come, they need to choose where their impacts are going to be seen. They need to be seen.”

China’s South China Sea Militarization Has Peaked

Artificial islands are becoming more trouble than they’re worth.
BY STEVEN STASHWICK
Activists burn Chinese flags and display anti-China placards during a protest at a park in Manila on June 18, 2019. 

Following years of Russian noncompliance, the United States officially withdrew from the Intermediate-Range Nuclear Forces Treaty on Aug. 2. 

The Cold War-era arms control agreement had banned land-based missiles with ranges between 500 and 5,500 kilometers, and the next day the new U.S. defense secretary, Mark Esper, told reporters that he wanted to counter China’s massive missile inventory “sooner rather than later.” 

China responded furiously.
Ironically, the threat comes as the most conspicuous flash point between the two countries, China’s military buildup on its artificial islands in the South China Sea, appears to be reaching a peak. 

In part, this is because of limits on the bases’ military usefulness in future conflict, but the key reason is that the backlash and counterbalancing its militarization encourages from the United States and other countries threaten the islands’ usefulness as a political signal at home, something that the Communist Party may value far more than their actual military potency.
Since 2013, China has constructed more than 3,000 dredged-up acres across seven features that are now studded with long-range sensor arrays, port facilities, runways, and reinforced bunkers for fuel and weapons. 

That’s a huge military footprint, despite Chinese dictator Xi Jinping’s nominal 2015 pledge not to militarize the islands and the Foreign Ministry’s claims that these “necessary defense facilities” are provided primarily for maritime safety and natural disaster support.
But as conspicuous as the bases’ capacity to project China’s offensive power is how little of that might Beijing has actually deployed there. 

The Pentagon’s latest report on China’s military notes that no new militarization has been observed since China placed air defense and anti-ship missiles in the Spratlys last year. 

Gen. Joseph Dunford, the chairman of the U.S. Joint Chiefs of Staff, recently remarked that if China’s militarization of the islands had plateaued, it was because they had achieved the military capability China required of them. 

If that’s true, then China requires much less of those bases militarily than their apparent potential to deliver.
Despite the islands’ scale, China’s maximalist regional claims, and its aggressive coercion of regional rivals, tension between China’s political and military incentives suggest it has little more to gain from expanding its buildup in the Spratly Islands and it could even have quite a bit to lose. 

Additional overt militarization doesn’t help China exert control over the South China Sea in peacetime and may not be decisive in wartime. 

It also encourages a greater and more public U.S. military presence, undermining the islands’ political symbolism. 

It also reduces China’s room for diplomacy and de-escalation in a crisis, increasing the potential for an uncertain and potentially embarrassing clash that would risk further undermining the party’s legitimacy.
The United States can leverage those incentives to its advantage as it debates how to implement the Pentagon’s National Defense Strategy, but if it pushes back too hard, the Communist Party may feel it has to escalate to preserve its legitimacy.
China is hardly reticent in asserting its maximalist claims over the South China Sea. 

Its law enforcement and paramilitary maritime militia vessels, often operating out of those same bases in the Spratly Islands, keep up a strong campaign of harassment and coercion against coastal states with competing claims and in contravention of provisions in the United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea and a 2016 international arbitration ruling that nullified most of China’s claims.
But compared with the expanding shadow of China’s gray-zone activity, the military presence on its Spratly bases is anemic. 

In early 2016, U.S. intelligence assessed that those bases would be capable of hosting significant force projection capabilities by the end of that year. 

Three years on from that assessment, China has yet to deploy warplanes or other long-range strike weapons that can hit land targets to the islands, though they appear more than capable of accommodating them.
One explanation is that the region’s climate simply isn’t hospitable to China’s most advanced military systems. 

Chinese state media reported in 2017 on special measures required to protect a short deployment of J-11 fighter jets to the Paracel Islands from the island’s heat and humidity. 

More recent reports claim that China’s environmental problems in the Spratlys are even more serious, with heat and humidity causing structures to crumble, mechanical equipment to fail, and even some weapon systems to break down. 

This is on top of persistent concerns about the artificial islands’ ability to withstand a major Pacific weather event—and a poor record of equipment and infrastructure maintenance in general in an often corruption-riddled People’s Liberation Army (PLA).

Peacetime assets but wartime liabilities
The islands are useful during peacetime to monitor rivals’ air and sea movements and as a base for coast guard and maritime militia operations against those countries’ fishermen and hydrocarbon exploitation. 

But increasing its overt military capability on the islands neither increases China’s practical civil control over waters crowded with rival fishermen and law enforcement vessels nor deters the presence of U.S. and other foreign warships and planes. 

And in wartime, that additional militarization may not translate to a decisive advantage over the United States anyway.

Axis of Evil

Russia and China romance runs into friction in Central Asia
US strategists call for driving wedge between the traditional rivals
By HIROYUKI AKITA
Russian President Vladimir Putin greets Xi Jinping in Saint Petersburg in June: Although the two leaders have found common cause in opposing Washington, their friendship has limits, experts say. 

 
TOKYO -- China and Russia are cozying up ever closer as they find a common enemy in Washington.
During Chinese dictator Xi Jinping's visit to Russia in early June, the two countries singed a joint statement pledging to deepen their ties, as well as around 30 economic agreements.
Xi's Russian counterpart, Vladimir Putin, has criticized the U.S. for leveling trade and technology sanctions against China and pledged to cooperate with it to resist U.S. pressure. 

The two countries are also pushing back against U.S. objectives regarding North Korea and Iran.
While analysts puzzle over whether the romance between China and Russia has peaked or will grow still more fervent, it seems clear they need each other more than ever.
Laboring under U.S. and European sanctions, Russia's economic growth is forecast to slow to around 1% this year. 

That will encourage it to lean more heavily on China. 

For Xi, Russia is a useful tool in countering Washington's increasingly hard-line policies against China.
But despite their growing closeness, China and Russia must deal with frictions.
Russia "is feeling a potential threat" from China, according to an expert on the Russian military. 

The difference the two countries' power continues to widen: China's gross domestic product is roughly eight times larger than Russia's and its population is 10 times larger. 

Russia is especially nervous about the possibility of Central Asia -- much of which was once part of the Soviet Union and is seen by Russians as their backyard -- falling under China's sway.
That is already happening economically. 

In 2018, China became the largest trading partner of three former Soviet republics: Uzbekistan, Turkmenistan and Kyrgyzstan. 

According to official data released by Kyrgyzstan and Tajikistan, China is the largest source of foreign direct investment in the two countries. 

China has also overtaken Russia as the fourth-largest investor in Kazakhstan.
Russia tolerates China's economic advance in Central Asia because its stands to benefit from infrastructure improvements and regional development that the flood of Chinese investment will bring. 

Security, however, is another matter. 

Moscow will not want China encroaching on its turf.
In Uzbekistan, in mid-June, cabinet ministers, senior officials and experts from the U.S., Europe and neighboring countries gathered to discuss the regional situation. 

China's activities loomed large during the meeting.

The strategic environment began shifting a few years ago as China began secretly deploying troops in Tajikistan, according to local experts. 

Although the Chinese Foreign Ministry has denied its troops are in the area, a person familiar with the matter said there are similar indication in Afghanistan.
China has, up to now, refrained from involving itself in regional security issues out of consideration for Russia. 

But its actions in Tajikistan, part of its effort to keep Islamist militants from entering the East Turkestan colony, indicate a change in Beijing's thinking.
In light of Tajikistan's lax border controls, China may have sent troops to help it shore up security, one expert said. 

China is likely to have received a green light to do so from Moscow. 

But local diplomats said Russia is growing concerned about China's military moves.
Russia's largest military base outside its borders is in Tajikistan. 

The base is scheduled to remain until 2042, under a bilateral agreement. 

Given that it has around 8,000 troops at the base, it is unthinkable that the Russian and Chinese forces will both stay in the country without friction over the long term, according to one security strategist in Central Asia.
Russian President Vladimir Putin meets Tajik President Emomali Rakhmon in Moscow in April. Russia's largest military base outside its borders is in Tajikistan.

China's objective is to play a larger security role in Central Asia as part of its counterterrorism strategy without irritating Russia. 

That is easier said than done. 

Russia also seems anxious about U.S. ambitions in the region.
Leaders of the five Central Asian countries had planned to hold their second summit meeting in March. 

But the conference was canceled due a sudden change in Kazakhstan's president. 

So far, no new meeting has been scheduled. 

Whatever the official reason given for calling off the summit, a local diplomatic source said the real reason was that the participants were worried about provoking a backlash from Russia.
"Many in Russia still maintain an empire mentality. They consider the former Soviet Union to be their own sphere of influence," said Dr. Farkhod Tolipov, a political scientist who heads Knowledge Caravan, an independent education and research institution in Tashkent. 

"Russia wrongly believes that if the Central Asia region integrates it will gradually lean toward the United States and eventually enter U.S. sphere," he said.
If a rift develops between China and Russia, the implications for global politics would be significant. A weakening of the Sino-Russian axis would be favorable to the West and Japan. 

It would also help the international community increase pressure on North Korea.
At a public-private strategic dialogue between the U.S. and Europe in the polish capital, Warsaw, in June, an idea was floated for how to drive a wedge between China and Russia to give the West an edge in its strategic competition with Beijing.
It may be impossible for Europe to reconcile with Putin, given Russia's annexation of Crimea, according to military strategists in Washington. 

But they argue the U.S. should try to ease tensions with Moscow after Putin's term of office ends in 2024 to encourage Russia to keep China at arm's length.
China and Russia share a border of more than 4,000 km. 

And although they are unlikely to repeat their military clashes of 1969, it also seems unlikely that their current love affair will last forever, given their historical geopolitical rivalry.

China Must Either Trim Its South China Sea Sails Or Face Disaster

By Panos Mourdoukoutas

China’s leaders have a grand strategy for the South China Sea. 

They want to control all of it, because they see it as China’s own property. 

And they are prepared to defend every speck of land—real or artificial -- in it.
That’s according to statements by the country’s high-ranking officials recently—vowing to defend every “island and rock” that belongs to China.
But there’s a fundamental problem with Beijing’s grand strategy: it will never succeed in aligning China’s aspirations with its capabilities and resources, and is therefore doomed to fail badly.
That’s what has happened with the grand strategies of previous rising powers, and it will happen with China now.
A failure of Beijing’s South China Sea strategy is a far more serious threat to the global economy and financial markets than the on-going trade disputes.
Yale University Professor John Lewis Gaddis defines grand strategy as “the alignment of potentially unlimited aspirations with necessarily limited capabilities.” 

That’s easier said than done, for a fundamental reason pointed in every introductory economics textbook: desires and aspirations are unlimited, while capabilities are limited.
That’s why a nation – or an individual, for that matter -- should scale back on aspirations to the means available to achieve them, according to Gaddis. 

 “If you seek ends beyond your means, then sooner or later you’ll have to scale back your ends to fit your means.”
Do what’s feasible, that is.
What about raising your means—your capabilities rather than scaling back on your aspirations? 

It won’t work, according to Gaddis.
“Expanding means may attain more ends, but not all because ends can be infinite and means can never be,” he says. 

“Whatever balance you strike, there’ll be a link between what’s real and what’s imagined: between your current location and your intended destination.”
That’s why Xerxes, Persia’s King of Kings, lost the war against the Greeks, according to Gaddis.
“Because ends exist only in the imagination, they can be infinite: a throne on the moon, perhaps, with a great view,” explains Gaddis. 

“Means, though, are stubbornly finite: they’re boots on the ground, ships in the sea, and the bodies required to fill them. Ends and means have to connect if anything is to happen. They’re never, however, interchangeable.”
In the case of South China Sea “war,” China may have a dot, a couple of artificial islands, but it doesn’t have a second dot to draw a line. 

Its aspirations make it one player playing against all the other nations with interests in the region: the Philippines, Brunei, Malaysia, Taiwan, and Vietnam.
China is also playing against the navies of US, Japan, France, the UK, and Australia. 

These navies seek to enforce the freedom of navigation in the vast trade waterway. 

Close to $5 trillion in merchandise moves through every year.
The waterway is the beginning of China’s maritime silk road. 

But so are the Indian Ocean ports, and the Middle East and Africa riches. 

Does China have the capabilities to fulfill aspirations in those locations too?
Apparently not.
“China has made great progress in building its military and naval capabilities,” says Yannis Tsinas, a retired Washington diplomat and Greek naval officer. 

“But it isn’t in any position to fight the US and its allies.”
That’s why its leaders should trim the sails on their global aspirations, beginning with the South China Sea, or end up facing disaster, as it did during the Opium Wars.

China Threat

The message to China behind Singapore's US F-35 jet plan
By Brad Lendon

Hong Kong -- They are at the cutting-edge of America's elite stealth jet technology, capable of seamlessly connecting pilots for co-ordinated missions.
And now Singapore wants to become the fourth country to enmesh US F-35 warplanes above and around the South China Sea -- a move likely to be greeted with trepidation in Beijing.
In a speech before Parliament last week, Singaporean Defense Minister Ng Eng Hen announced a plan to buy up to 12 F-35 warplanes from the US.
If the deal goes through, Singapore will become the fourth American ally in the Pacific to own them.
The purchase would require US congressional approval, but Ng said that both the Trump administration and the Pentagon favored the deal.

A US Marine Corps F-35B flies above the East China Sea, Oct. 23, 2018.

"Next Gen Singapore Armed Forces will be more lethal in all domains," read a graphic shown to legislators during the defense minister's presentation.
It showed dozens of pieces of military hardware Singapore plans to have in its arsenal by 2030 as it ramps up its defense capabilities.
The US stealth fighters are the crown jewel on the list.
The Pentagon touts the F-35, with the world's most advanced avionics, engines and weaponry, as the "the most affordable, lethal, supportable and survivable aircraft ever to be used."

Regional stability
Singapore sits on the western approaches to the South China Sea.
Analysts say the country's decision to acquire F-35 technology is indicative of growing concerns within Asia regarding China's regional ambitions.
"Singapore probably does not trust China's assurances that its South China Sea claims are benign, without military intentions and will not result in China taking control of air and sea commerce," said Carl Schuster, a former director of operations at the US Pacific Command's Joint Intelligence Center.
China has claimed almost the entire 1.3-million-square-mile South China Sea as its sovereign territory.
It has aggressively asserted its stake in recent years in the face of conflicting claims from several Southeast Asian nations, building up and fortifying islands in the Spratly and Paracel chains.
The US has steadfastly contested those claims, sending warships on freedom of navigation operations near the islands and regularly flying reconnaissance -- and sometimes bomber -- flights over the South China Sea.
When it acquires the F-35s, Singapore will join US allies Australia, Japan and South Korea in operating the jets in the Pacific.
The US also has F-35s based in Japan, and they can operate off US Navy ships moving through the region.
Even the United Kingdom said earlier this year it would send an aircraft carrier with F-35s into the region in 2020.
US officials have previously dismissed the idea they are pursuing a cold war or containment policy in regards to China in the Pacific, but Singapore's decision to join the list of F-35 capable countries risks strengthening that divide between the US and China.
"Beijing should see in this development evidence that there remains strong demand in the Asia-Pacific region for a US presence," said Timothy Heath, senior defense analyst at the RAND Corp.
"The network of air forces that employ the F-35 expands the possibility that these militaries could work together in a coalition if necessary. This development can provide a robust deterrence message to China regarding its behavior in the South and East China seas," Heath said.

Coordination among allies
The F-35's advanced electronic warfare suite can allow seamless integration among allied users and that could be cause for concern in Beijing.

A new F-35B fighter jet is prepped for take off from the deck of the United Kingdom's aircraft carrier HMS Queen Elizabeth in 2018. The jet's electronics enable close coordination between allied air forces.

Peter Layton, defense analyst at the Griffith Asia Institute in Australia, says the F-35's stealth and electronic warfare capabilities make it a "force multiplier."
F-35s are able to sneak past air defenses and send detailed targeting information to trailing planes carrying long-range missiles or to land-based anti-ship missile systems, he added.
"The acquisition may spur China to think about how it can improve its air defense network in the South China Sea and on ships to detect and target stealth aircraft such as Singapore's F-35," said Layton.
Previous F-35 purchases from US allies have prompted bravado from Chinese media.
A January report in the state-sponsored Global Times brushed away any threat from "the US F-35 friends circle" in the Asia-Pacific, with Chinese analysts saying the F-35 was no match for China's fifth-generation stealth jet, the J-20.
Yet even though the F-35 procurement sends strong signals to China, analysts agree that Singapore is sending them carefully.
Defense Minister Ng did not mention China when revealing purchase plans last week.
His presentation to Parliament said only that the jets "will significantly contribute to the (air force's) ability to safeguard Singapore's sovereignty and security."
He also said the country was being deliberate in how it acquired them, buying four with its first order and then adding up to eight others if the first batch fit requirements.

Singapore Air Force F-15SGs fighter aircraft flay as part of the National Day Parade in 2018. The jets would work in concert with the county's F-35s in the future.

'Low-key player'
The F-35s would eventually work in concert with Singapore's US-built F-15s when they replace the country's F-16s, which will be obsolete in a decade, the defense minister said.

Two Singaporean F-16s fly in formation with an F-15 in 2017. The country's defense minister says the F-16s will be obsolete by 2030.

While Singapore has been a close and longtime US ally -- it even hosts a US Navy facility -- it tends to be a low-key player in military matters.
"Despite good relations with the United States, Singapore generally remains reluctant to take a leadership role in challenging Chinese power due to its small size and depth of economic ties with China," Heath said.
Schuster added: "Singapore does not want to anger China... Singapore tends to act quietly and with nuance and subtlety."
However, the subtle approach should not be mistaken for military weakness.
Australia's Lowy Institute ranked Singapore's military power 10th among 25 Asian nations last year -- just behind Australia and ahead of larger countries like Vietnam, Indonesia and Malaysia.
Singapore boasts quality military hardware and strong defense relationships in the region.
"Singapore sees its role as a facilitator of regional security and stability, not as a member of any alliance directed at any particular nation," said Schuster.

Chinese expansionism

Vietnam Dares What Philippines Didn't
By Panos Mourdoukoutas

In the South China Sea disputes, Vietnam dares to do what the Philippines didn’t: challenge China’s mission to turn the vast waterway into its own sea.
That’s according to a recent Reuters report, which claims that Vietnam is pushing for a pact that will outlaw many of China’s ongoing activities in the South China Sea. 

Like the building of artificial islands, blockades and offensive weaponry such as missile deployments; and the Air Defence Identification Zone—a conduct code China initiated back in 2013.
This isn’t the first time Hanoi is challenging China’s claims in the South China Sea. 

Back in July of 2017, Vietnam granted Indian oil firm ONGC Videsh a two-year extension to explore oil block 128, according to another Reuters report.
And that’s something Beijing loudly opposed.
In recent years, China has considered the South China Sea its own. 

All of it, including the artificial islands Beijing has been building in disputed waters, and the economic resources that are hidden below the vast sea area. 

And it is determined to use its old and new naval powers to make sure that no other country reaches for these resources without its permission.
Philippines President Rodrigo Duterte understands Beijing’s determination very well. 

Back in April of 2018 he reversed his earlier decision to raise the Philippine flag in disputed islands, following Beijing’s “friendly” advice.
A year before that incident, the Philippines and its close ally, the U.S., won an international arbitration ruling that China has no historic title over the waters of the South China Sea. 

Yet Duterte didn’t dare enforce it. 

Instead, he sided with Beijing on the dispute, and sought a “divorce” from the U.S.
Duterte’s flip-flops saved peace in the South China Sea by changing the rules of the game for China and the US, at least according to his own wisdom.
That doesn’t seem to be the case with Vietnam– which also claims parts of the waterway.
And it has a strong ally on its side: the US, which has been trying to enforce the freedom of navigation in the South China Sea, and save peace, too!
So far, financial markets in the region do not seem that concerned, at least for now. 

Instead, they have been focusing on the economic fundamentals rather than the geopolitics of the region; and on the rising interest rates in the US.

China, Vietnam, and Philippines Shares

But things may change in the future, as an escalation of South China Sea disputes could add to investor anxieties fueled by the US-China trade war.

Chinese Expansionism

Greenland could become China's Arctic base
By John Simpson

Greenland's capital, Nuuk, needs investment -- but could it come from China?

China is flexing its muscles. 

As the second richest economy in the world, its businessmen and politicians are involved just about everywhere in Asia, Africa and Latin America.
Now, though, China is taking a big interest in a very different part of the world: the Arctic.
It has started calling itself a "near-Arctic" power, even though Beijing is almost 3,000km (1,800 miles) from the Arctic Circle. 

It has bought or commissioned several ice-breakers -- including nuclear-powered ones -- to carve out new routes for its goods through the Arctic ice.
And it is eyeing Greenland as a particularly useful way-station on its polar silk road.

Greenland is self-governing, though still nominally controlled by Denmark.
It is important strategically for the United States, which maintains a vast military base at Thule, in the far north. 

Both the Danes and the Americans are deeply worried that China should be showing such an interest in Greenland.

Least densely populated place on Earth
You've got to go there to get an idea of how enormous Greenland is.
It's the 12th-largest territory in the world, 10 times bigger than the United Kingdom: two million square kilometres of rock and ice.Most of Greenland is covered in permanent ice -- a vast frozen wilderness

Yet its population is minuscule at 56,000 – roughly the size of a town in England.
As a result, Greenland is the least densely populated territory on Earth. 

About 88% of the people are Inuit; most of the rest are ethnically Danish.
In terms of investment neither the Americans nor the Danes have put all that much money into Greenland over the years, and Nuuk, the capital, feels pretty poor. 

Denmark does hand over an annual subsidy to help Greenland meet its needs.
Every day, small numbers of people gather in the centre to sell things that will generate a bit of cash: cast-off clothes, children's schoolbooks, cakes they've made, dried fish, reindeer-horn carvings. 

Some people also sell the bloody carcases of the big King Eider ducks, which Inuits are allowed to hunt but aren't supposed to sell for profit.

China's air power
At present you can only fly to Nuuk in small propeller-driven planes. 

In four years, though, that will change spectacularly.
The Greenlandic government has decided to build three big international airports capable of taking large passenger jets.
China is bidding for the contracts.

Airport officials say the planned work is a huge project -- but an important one

There'll be pressure from the Danes and Americans to ensure the Chinese bid doesn't succeed, but that won't stop China's involvement in Greenland.
Interestingly, I found that opinion about the Chinese tended to divide along ethnic lines.
Danish people were worried about it, while Inuits thought it was a good idea.
The Greenlandic prime minister and foreign minister refused to speak to us about their government's attitude to China, but a former prime minister, Kuupik Kleist, told us he thought it would be good for Greenland.
But the foreign affairs spokesman of the main Venstre party in the Danish coalition government, Michael Aastrup Jensen, was forthright about Chinese involvement in Greenland.
"We don't want a communist dictatorship in our own backyard," he said.

Much-needed wealth
China's sales technique in other countries where its companies operate is to offer the kind of infrastructure they badly need: airports, roads, clean water.
The Western powers that once colonised many of them haven't usually stepped in to help, and most of these governments are only too grateful for Chinese aid.
But it comes at a price.

The former prime minister says someone - anyone - has to invest in Greenland

China gets access to each country's raw materials -- minerals, metals, wood, fuel, foodstuffs. 

Still, this doesn't usually mean long-term jobs for local people. 

Large numbers of Chinese are usually brought in to do the work.
Country after country has discovered that Chinese investment helps China's economy a great deal more than it helps them. 

And in some places -- South Africa is one of them -- there are complaints that China's involvement brings greater corruption.
But in Nuuk it's hard to get people to focus on arguments like these.
What counts in this vast, empty, impoverished territory is the thought that big money could be on its way. 

Kuupik Kleist put the argument at its simplest.
"We need it, you see," he said.

In South China Sea, a display of U.S. Navy strength — and a message to Beijing

By Shibani Mahtani

A U.S. Navy plane is seen at the hanger below the deck of the U.S.S. Ronald Reagan, where dozens of fight jets, helicopters and other aircraft are stored and maintained. 

ABOARD THE USS RONALD REAGAN — As fighter jets roared off the flight deck and darted above the South China Sea, visitors onboard the carrier USS Ronald Reagan raised their phones for the inevitable selfies.
Among those clicking souvenir images was a lieutenant general from the Chinese People’s Liberation Army, who was part of a VIP guest list as the carrier moved through contested waters.
The carrier — which docked last week in Hong Kong in a good-faith gesture from Beijing — also offered a snapshot into challenges for the Pentagon in the Asia-Pacific region as China builds up its own naval prowess and ramps up efforts to solidify territorial demands.
The United States seeks to keep its place as the dominant naval power across East Asia, where Washington and its allies believe Beijing is trying to reorder international rules and military alliances in place since World War II.
But Washington also has to contend with China’s fast-growing military reach. 

That includes investments to its navy and missile systems to directly counter American military might.
Few places display Beijing’s ambitions more clearly than in the South China Sea.

China has built a number of artificial structures and begun to militarize them. 

Western military analysts say China is able to position missiles that could destroy American aircraft carriers and other warships.
China claims it has historic rights to these waters, a crucial waterway where one third of global trade flows.
The United States and its allies, meanwhile, view the South China Sea as a vital international maritime corridor. 

Nations bordering the sea, including the Philippines, look to the U.S. Navy to help defend their access.
The United States has historical alliances in the Pacific that offer some advantage. 

But the Belt and Road Initiative — a grand plan of investment and construction across Asia and beyond — is widely seen as a way to chip away at the U.S. bonds in the region by trading economic favors for influence.
Trade issues are expected to dominate planned talks later this week between President Trump and Chinese dictator Xi Jinping on the sidelines of a summit of Group of 20 industrialized nations in Buenos Aires this week.
But military concerns, including China’s expansion into the South China Sea, have raised alarm in Washington. 

Speaking at a regional summit in Singapore this month, Vice President Pence said these seas do not “belong to any one nation” and reaffirmed American military commitment to the region — but analysts say this is getting harder to do as China builds up its own arsenal.
“There’s a need for the U.S. to recognize that China’s growing diversity and range of missiles is going to complicate anything we seek to do in any contingency, be it in the South China Sea, or with Taiwan or North Korea,” said Derek Grossman, a senior defense analyst who specializes in the Indo-Pacific region at the Rand Corp.
A recent Rand study found the Chinese navy during the past two decades caught up to the United States by modernizing “extraordinarily quickly by any reasonable historical standard.”
“In basically every category, China has narrowed the gap [with the United States] significantly,” Grossman added.
A bipartisan committee created by Congress also concluded in a report that the United States has lost its military edge and could lose in a potential war with Russia or China.
In a speech Nov. 17, Adm. Phil Davidson, commander of the U.S. Indo-Pacific Command, identified China as the greatest challenge to the “long-term stability” of the region. 

He referred to Beijing’s infrastructure building across Asia as “insidious” debt-trap diplomacy and accused China of intimidating countries in the region by militarizing these seas.
China, he added, has built a “Great Wall of SAMs” — surface-to-air missiles — that has the “potential to exert national control over international waters and airspace.”
These have been built on artificial islands China constructed in the South China Sea, where the Philippines, Vietnam and others also have claims of sovereignty, backed by international law.
China has rejected a 2016 ruling by an international court that invalidates its claims to the sea. 

At the same time, Beijing has long objected to this heavy American military presence in these waters.
As the USS Reagan and another aircraft carrier were conducting drills off the coast of the Philippines last week, a spokeswoman for the Chinese Foreign Ministry said pointedly that military actions under the “pretext freedom of navigation” undermine the sovereignty of countries around the South China Sea.
Aside from land missiles, China is developing its own aircraft carriers — a move directly aimed at competing with the United States, which has 11.
But it has a long way to go.
The one Chinese aircraft carrier in service, the Liaoning, is under maintenance.
A second is conducting trials, and a third is in the pipeline.
“We have been operating aircraft carriers for an awful long time; we’re pretty good at it,” Rear Adm. Karl O. Thomas, commander of the Reagan strike group, said in an interview.
“It will take [the Chinese] some time to get there,” he added.
Collin Koh, an expert on Chinese maritime strategy at Singapore’s Nanyang Technological University, said the Chinese navy continues to face difficulty in recruiting pilots.
“The U.S. Navy carrier has been a result of decades of experience; it is a gap that China can’t necessarily bridge within a short span of time and hone it to a level comparable to the U.S.,” he said.
The Chinese navy, he adds, has had no combat experience for three decades, and technology such as its anti-ship ballistic missiles has not been tested.
The Chinese lieutenant general invited on board, Tan Benhong, the commander of the PLA garrison in Hong Kong, had an amicable exchange with his counterparts.
“We had a great meeting with them when they came onboard,” said Thomas.
“We have the opportunity to show our contemporaries how we operate our aircraft carrier.”
But just last month, a Chinese warship came within 45 yards of a U.S. destroyer as it sailed past the Chinese-claimed Spratly Islands in the South China Sea, almost causing a collision.

US And Australia Try To Tame China's South China Sea Ambitions, As Duterte Gives Up

By Panos Mourdoukoutas

America and Australia are working hard to tame China’s ambition to turn the South China Sea into its own sea, as the Philippines President Rodrigo Duterte is giving up.
Specifically, the two countries are teaming up to develop the Lombrum naval base on Manus Island.
That’s according to a story published last weekend in The Guardian.

The base is part of an effort by the two countries to keep an important passage to the South China Sea open.
Last September, the two countries performed join naval exercises in the region, though Australian vessels avoided disputed areas.
A growing conflict between China on the one side and America on the other over who will write the navigation rules for the South China Sea raise geopolitical risks for the global economy. 

And it adds to investor anxieties over the fate of the economic integration of the Asia-Pacific region.

The recent move by America and Australia came as Asian leaders gathered in Papua New Guinea to address ways to advance cooperation in the world’s most populated region.

“The US move is not a surprise,” says Washington-based global strategist, Jeffrey Borda. 

”There is Chinese military interest in Vanuatu. ASEAN lacks a cohesive vision. The US needs a southern passage to the South China Sea.”
But a naval base may not be sufficient to counter China’s strategy to control the southern waterway leading to the South China Sea.
“If the US wants to contain Chinese expansion, defense posture is only one side of the equation,” adds Borda. 

 “China's strategy is long term and equally focused on using investment and trade as a tool of power projection.”
While America and Australia are trying to counter China’s South China Sea ambitions, Rodrigo Duterte is giving up, admitting that the body of water is already China’s own sea and calling on “America and everybody else to realize it.”
That’s according to a report published in Strait Times on November 15, where Duterte was quoted as saying that China was "already in possession" of the South China Sea and went on criticizing naval exercises by America and its allies. 

"China is there. That's a reality, and America and everybody should realize that they are there."
Apparently, Rodrigo Duterte is concerned that his country may caught in the middle of an open military confrontation between China and the U.S.
But he doesn’t seem to have made his mind up concerning who’s the friend and who’s the enemy in the South China Sea disputes. 

He is looking for friends in Beijing one day and in Washington the next, and leaving foreign investors confused on the direction in which his country—and its economy—is heading.
Duterte’s flip-flops on South China Sea disputes can be traced back to July 2016 after an international arbitration ruling, which determined that China has no historic title over the waters.
One month later, Duterte asked China to stay away from our territory or else face the possibility of a “bloody” confrontation. 

That was followed by the Duterte decision to side with the Philippines’ “friend,” China in the dispute, and seek a “divorce” from the U.S.
Apparently, Beijing had offered Manila something Washington couldn’t: the promise of peace and a partnership for prosperity on its own terms.
But making promises in high stake disputes is one thing, keeping them is another.
Only time will tell for sure whether Duterte’s flip-flops save the peace. 

Meanwhile, they won’t help America’s and Australia’s efforts to tame China’s ambitions.

A New Battle for Guadalcanal, This Time With China

By Damien Cave
Australia pledged in June to build an undersea internet cable to the Solomon Islands.

GUADALCANAL, Solomon Islands — When Toata Molea looks to the sea and his fleet of fishing boats on the island of Guadalcanal, he imagines the possibilities from a new connection to the outside world: a planned undersea internet cable to be built by Australia.
When he turns the other way, however, to the main road passing through Honiara, the capital of the Solomon Islands, he sees another form of foreign investment: dozens of buildings and businesses bought or built by Chinese immigrants.
“They own everything,” Mr. Molea, 54, said of his ethnic Chinese neighbors. 

“My fear is that in the next 10 years, this place will be taken over by the Chinese.”
The last time Guadalcanal concerned itself with a takeover, 60,000 American troops were fighting Japanese soldiers for control of the island in one of the fiercest battles of World War II. 

Now, this stretch of jungle — a linchpin of the Australian-American alliance with a long history of naval importance — has become the stage for a new cold war of strategic competition.
After years of largely unchecked Chinese investment and immigration throughout the South Pacific, Australia and the United States are stepping up their efforts here and across the region — warning local officials against relying too much on China, and pushing to compete with more aid, infrastructure and diplomacy.
There is no denying that “strategic competition for influence in the Indo-Pacific region is on the rise,” said Matt Matthews, a deputy assistant secretary of state in the Bureau of East Asian and Pacific Affairs. 

As a result, he said, “we must not take our longstanding friendships with the Pacific islands for granted.”

At the central market in Honiara, the capital, many of the employees are locals but the owners are Chinese immigrants.

The United States has committed more than $350 million to Pacific island countries, in the form of law enforcement assistance, help with managing fisheries and other aid. 

The World Bank more than doubled its main development budget for the Pacific too, increasing it to $808 million over a three-year period.
But Australia has gone even further. 

Pacific aid jumped to 1.3 billion Australian dollars ($960 million) in this year’s budget, an 18 percent increase. 

Nearly a third of Australia’s aid budget is now set aside for the Pacific — a region of nearly two dozen countries and territories with around 11 million people spread across more than 20,000 islands.
A large portion of that money will go toward installing the undersea cable connecting Guadalcanal (and Papua New Guinea) to Australia’s global internet hub.
Experts consider Australia’s spending spree the strongest example yet of its intensified push to counter Chinese efforts in the region.
The Chinese networking company Huawei announced last year that it planned to lay a cable and provide the Solomon Islands with a high-speed internet connection.
When Australia learned of that plan, it threatened to withhold a connection license when the cable reached Sydney because Huawei is a cybersecurity threat.
Australian officials immediately offered an alternative: Australia would pay for a cable and it would be up and running by 2019.
“The Australian government had been tracking that very closely,” said James Batley, a former Australian high commissioner to the Solomons and other countries in the region.
When they saw the Chinese cable proposal, he said, the Australians “made an intervention and said, ‘Sorry, that’s a red line for us.’”
For business owners in particular, the undersea cable is long overdue. 

Connectivity is so weak across the Solomons that storm clouds often interfere with the satellites that currently provide internet access.
“It’s important,” said Mr. Molea, the fish wholesaler, who also praised a small grant program from Australia that helped him build an ice factory for his sustainable fishing business. 

“With that cable, hopefully we can set up electronic banking and payment.”
But to truly compete with China, many people said, Australia, the United States and their allies need to do more, more visibly, with less bureaucracy.
Anthony Veke, the premier of Guadalcanal Province, said he was willing to work with any foreign partners who presented a good opportunity.

The cable stands out because it is a rarity. 

The aid packages cited with pride by officials in Canberra and Washington tend to focus not on the tangible infrastructure that struggling countries like this one crave, but rather on institutional assistance with governance and law enforcement.
That work is gradual, vital and complicated. 

Many Solomon Islanders still see Australia through the lens of a security intervention that ended last year after more than a decade of mixed reviews for its effort to establish stability in the wake of chronic ethnic violence.
And just as some Pacific islands have become more vocal about Australia’s “paternalistic aid,” officials in the Solomons often complain that the Australian and American governments do more dictating than developing.
Regional officials often argue that too much of the aid money is tightly restricted or boomerangs back to foreign consultants and contractors, leading many to ask: Well, why not try our luck with China?
Anthony Veke, 41, the ambitious premier of Guadalcanal, counts himself among those pushing toward a future with various partners.
He told me he has gone to China twice in the past year to pursue investment for a tourism development on the island’s west coast that would include a new airport.
Islanders attend a birthday celebration for Queen Elizabeth II, the head of state. The occasion was a reminder of the country’s historic links to the West.

He added that he would like to see a new road circumnavigating Guadalcanal, and an upgrade for the international airport.
“We can’t be boxed in,” Mr. Veke said, sitting in his office on the main road through Honiara, where dust and potholes still dominate. 

“We have to be given an opportunity to look at other places for things that are good for our people.”
Given the history, it is a striking shift — for the Solomons and the postwar order.
Honiara exists largely because of World War II and the United States Navy.
The airport Mr. Veke wants to upgrade was originally Henderson Field, the airstrip that thousands of American Marines in particular fought and died to capture and defend.
Naval Construction Battalions, better known as Seabees, built most of the city’s roads, its major bridges and what was until recently its largest hospital.
Little development has occurred since — the airport still feels like a World War II relic — but much of what is new or prosperous seems to be owned by someone from China.
Honiara’s Chinatown has been the scene of racial tension in the past.

Many, if not most, of the shops along the main road have Chinese owners, who sit in corner booths towering over their China-made merchandise and local employees.
In Honiara’s Chinatown, a small strip of shops that has existed since the first wave of Chinese migrants arrived a century ago, signs of growth are visible: Scaffolding climbs above a new Chinese school that has received financial support from the Chinese government.
Matthew Quan, 52, the president of the Solomon Islands’ Chinese Association and a third-generation Solomon Islander who runs a large wholesale business across from the school, said Chinese expansion had been organic, driven by migration and economic factors rather than political or military direction from Beijing.
Centrally planned or not, the influx has not always been welcome. 

Frustration with Chinese shop owners flared up in 2006, leading to riots, and in 2014 Chinatown was set ablaze during another spasm of violence.
The main concern for many people on Guadalcanal involves not Chinese government interference, but rather cronyism and corruption fueled by Chinese wealth. 

No one knows the extent of Chinese property ownership in the Solomons; even the size of the Chinese population is a mystery, Mr. Quan said, since many migrants come in as tourists and bribe officials for visas that let them stay.
“I suppose you could say they’re a lot more ruthless in how they do things,” Mr. Quan said, referring to the recent migrants. 

“And the government of the Solomon Islands is easily manipulated.”

The World Bank has pledged to build a power plant along the Tina River.

Mr. Molea called what’s happening “a different form of colonialism that’s a consequence of democracy.”
He has called on officials to halt all Chinese purchases and investment until there is a public accounting of who owns what.
But such an audit is unlikely. 

For Guadalcanal and many other islands in the region, this is a moment to embrace competing offers from world powers, not spurn them.
It is a contest seen across the South Pacific in countries like Vanuatu, where a new wharf has spurred a heated debate about China’s ambitions, and even in communities far from major cities.
An hour or two inland from the Guadalcanal coast, along the Tina River, the World Bank hopes to build a hydroelectric dam that could drive down electricity prices. 

But more than a decade after it was proposed, the dam has yet to be constructed, leading World Bank officials to praise the legal precedents that have been set rather than the services they have provided.
Not far away, by contrast, is an obvious example of Chinese productivity: a large gold mine that was closed by an Australian company in 2014, then sold last year to a Chinese developer who made a fortune in Australian real estate.
The mine reopened in May, providing jobs — but in a riskier work environment.
Local tribes have discovered that the new owners are less careful about worker safety than the Australians. 

According to a monitor they sent to investigate, employees don’t wear goggles or safety boots as often as they should, and tasks that used to be closely monitored no longer are.
The company that owns the mine, the AXF Group, did not respond to requests for comment.
Asked whether the return of the mining jobs was worth the potential danger to workers, the tribes’ investigator, Densley Kesi, said he couldn’t be sure.
“The Australians had a lot of regulation,” he said. 

“The Chinese don’t. It worries me.”

Iron Lady

Julie Bishop raises objections to China's activities in South China Sea
By Katharine Murphy

Julie Bishop has raised objections to China’s militarisation of the South China Sea after weekend reports that a Chinese bomber capable of carrying a nuclear warhead had been on the disputed Paracel Islands.
With relations between Canberra and Beijing tense, courtesy of the Turnbull government’s pursuit of a crackdown against foreign interference, the Australian foreign minister has held a lengthy meeting with her Chinese counterpart, Wang Yi, on the sidelines of the meeting of G20 foreign ministers in Argentina.
Bishop characterised the discussion as “very warm and candid and constructive” and said she would shortly visit the Chinese capital.
She said she had a good long-term relationship with her Chinese counterpart and told the ABC that Australia would “continue to approach our bilateral relationship with goodwill and realism and pragmatism and open communication”.
While the meeting in Argentina was obviously intended to achieve a diplomatic thaw, Bishop confirmed she had raised objections about China’s activities in the South China Sea, including the weekend incident.
The Chinese airforce said several bombers of various types – including the long-range, nuclear strike-capable H-6K – carried out landing and take-off drills at an unidentified island airfield after carrying out simulated strike training on targets at sea.
“Australia’s position has been very clear and consistent and it is very well known to China. Our concern about militarisation of disputed features of the South China Sea has been the subject of a number of discussions, and was again today,” Bishop said on Tuesday.
She said Australia had consistently raised concerns about activities in the disputed territory as part of “enduring, broad dialogue with China, and I don’t believe China was surprised by my raising it again today”.
Bishop also discussed the South China Sea with the US at the G20 meeting. 

She said Australia would continue to exercise its rights to freedom of navigation and overflight “and support the rights of others to do so” – and had conveyed that position to China.

China lands nuclear strike-capable bombers on South China Sea islands
The foreign minister has been criticised over her handling of the Australia-China relationship by a former Australian ambassador to Beijing, Geoff Raby, now a Chinese agent based in China.
Bishop has hit back at the critique from Raby, calling him ill-informed and “profoundly ignorant, might I say, about the level of engagement between Australia and China at present and the state of the relationship”.
In a translated press statement after the G20 talks, the Chinese foreign minister was less upbeat than Bishop. 

He acknowledged China-Australia relations had “encountered some difficulties”.
He also urged Australia to adopt a more positive disposition towards Beijing. 

“If Australia sincerely hopes that the relations between the two countries will return to the right track... they must break away from traditional thinking, take off their coloured glasses, and look at China’s development from a positive angle,” Wang said.

La mer méridionale de l’Asie de l’Est en ébullition

Progression de la mainmise de la Chine sur les Paracels et les Spratly aux dépens du Vietnam
Par DANG PHUONG NGHI

Ms. Dang Phuong Nghi -- PhD in Vietnamology (Sorbonne, Paris) -- is an archivist palaeographer (National School of Palaeography and Archival Studies, Ecole Nationale des Chartes) and a historian. She was Director General of the National Archives and Libraries of the Republic of Vietnam. She currently lives in France.

Tout d’abord, entendons-nous sur le terme idoine pour désigner cette mer que tous les media occidentaux appellent Mer de Chine alors qu’aucun pays riverain autre que la Chine ne l’appelle ainsi. 

En ces temps où la Chine veut se l’approprier entièrement aux dépens des autres riverains, même et surtout dans la partie Sud au-delà du 18e parallèle de cette mer qui ne baigne aucune de ses côtes, qualifier de chinoise, fût-ce par un usage acquis, une mer qui abrite les eaux territoriales d’autres pays et fait l’objet de revendications conflictuelles, c’est conforter le délire de puissance prédatrice de la Chine et épouser ses prétentions.
Puisque la Mer concernée borde les pays de l’Asie de l’Est, nous proposons de l’appeler simplement Mer de l’Asie de l’Est (MAE), quitte à préciser Mer septentrionale de l’Asie de l’Est (MsAE) et Mer méridionale de l’Asie de l’Est (MmAE) si on veut se référer à ses parties Nord et Sud.

Jusqu’au début du 20e siècle, avant que l’éventualité de gros gisements en hydrocarbures sous ses eaux n’excite la convoitise des pays riverains de la Mer de l’Asie de l’Est, la dizaine de ces nations qui se la partagent n’en faisaient guère un sujet de discorde, et l’autorité du Vietnam sur les deux archipels Paracels (15.000 km2) et Spratly (160.000 km2), administrés par les souverains Nguyễn depuis le 17e siècle n’était contestée par aucun pays, y compris la Chine, dont les gouverneurs frontaliers se faisaient un devoir de reconduire vers le Vietnam les bateaux échoués chez eux à la suite des tempêtes dans les parages des archipels, sous prétexte que tout ce qui s’y rapportait relevait de la Cour de Huế. 

Il faut dire que ces archipels composés d’îlots, d’atolls et de récifs, pour la plupart immergés, fouettés par le vent, n’intéressaient personne, à part les pêcheurs et les recueilleurs de guano.
La donne changea à partir de 1921, avec les rêves d’une « Grande Chine » des dirigeants de la nouvelle république (en ce qui concerne les archipels, les prétentions de la Chine non communiste/Taïwan et Chine communiste sont semblables), déterminés à asseoir la présence chinoise dans le Sud de la mer orientale, lieu de passage de tous les navires faisant le commerce entre l’Europe et l’Asie : Se basant sur le rapport d’un voyage de reconnaissance au-delà de l’île de Hainan d’une petite flotte de l’amiral Lý Chuẩn (Li Zhun) des Qing en juin 1909 qui faisait état de la découverte d’îles dans le Sud-ouest de Hainan, le gouvernement de la Chine du Sud les déclara îles chinoises sous le nom de Xisha (nom apparu alors pour la première fois), en dépit du fait que ces îles, qui portaient déjà le nom de Hoàng Sa en vietnamien et Paracels en français, étaient déjà sous la juridiction du Vietnam, ou plutôt sous celle du gouvernement général de l’Indochine, le Vietnam étant devenu alors colonie française, et étaient habitées par des pêcheurs vietnamiens que la patrouille de pré-reconnaissance commandée par Ngô Kính Vinh (Wu Jingrong) s’était permis de faire prisonniers puis d’emmener à Hainan avec leurs familles pour que l’amiral pût dire que c’étaient des îles désertes; les Chinois rattachèrent ces îles au district Châu Nhai (nom phonétisé à la vietnamienne) de l’île Hainan, alors qu’au Vietnam elles dépendaient depuis le 17e siècle du district de la province Quảng Nam avant de l’être de celle de Thừa Thiên puis de nouveau de celle de Quảng Nam (les Spratly étant longtemps incorporés aux Paracels avant d’être gérés séparément par la province de Bà Rịa en 1933, puis celle de Phước Tuy en 1956) . 

La manoeuvre du gouvernement de Canton, non reconnu par la communauté internationale, ne fut pas prise au sérieux par la France coloniale ; mais en 1935 la république chinoise revendiqua officiellement la propriété sur toutes les îles de la mer méridionale de l’Asie de l’Est, et pour renforcer ses dires fit ériger subrepticement 12 stèles antidatées jusqu’en 1908 sur 4 îles des Paracels!
Pendant la 2e guerre mondiale, en 1939, le Japon s’empara des Paracels qu’il occupa jusqu’en 1946. Cette année-là, profitant de la mission de désarmement des Japonais qui lui était confiée par les Alliés selon les accords de Postdam, la république chinoise se saisit de la plus grande île des Paracels (Phú Lâm, île Boisée, 2,6km2) puis au début de 1947 de la plus grande île des Spratly (Ba Bình, Itu-Aba, 46ha), la seule de cet archipel à posséder de l’eau potable, mais suite à son expulsion du continent pour Formose, elle dut se retirer de ces îles en 1950. 

Après le traité de San Francisco en 1951 par lequel le Japon restituait les deux archipels au gouvernement vietnamien et où les revendications chinoises sur eux furent rejetées à l’unanimité moins trois, Trần Văn Hữu, le premier ministre du roi Bảo Đại put déclarer la souveraineté du Vietnam sur les deux archipels sans aucune protestation de la part des 50 autres pays participants à la conférence, dont les deux Chines étaient, il faut le dire, exclues.
En 1948, avant de plier bagage pour l’île de Formose, Tchang Kai Chek (Jiang Jieshi) fit imprimer une carte de la Chine avec pour frontière maritime une ligne fantaisiste en forme de U appelée langue de buffle obtenue en joignant 11 traits censés délimiter les eaux territoriales de la Chine et attribuant ainsi à la Chine 70% de la superficie de la mer méridionale de l’Asie de l’Est, au détriment des autres riverains. 

Cette carte passa inaperçue, mais en 1953, Pékin la fit réimprimer avec des modifications sur le nombre de traits, réduits à 9, situés cependant de telle sorte que la portion de mer que les Chinois s’attribuent comprend maintenant 80% de la superficie totale (3,5 millions de km2). 

A usage interne, la ligne U n’était guère invoquée jusqu’en 1998 dans les diverses déclarations de la Chine sur ses zones maritimes ; cependant cette carte est une bombe à retardement car, introduite dans l’enseignement, elle inculque depuis dans l’esprit de tous les Chinois la conviction que les archipels et la mer qui les entoure appartiennent de plein droit à la Chine et exacerbe un nationalisme aisément manipulé.
En 1956, profitant de l’évacuation des troupes françaises et des balbutiements du nouveau gouvernement du Sud-Vietnam à laquelle était dévolue l’administration des archipels selon le traité de Genève, les deux Chines s’emparèrent, Taipei de la plus grande île des Spratly (Ba Bình, Itu Aba, Taiping) ainsi que d’un banc attenant, et Pékin de la partie Est des Paracels (comprenant la grande île Boisée, Phú Lâm, Yongxing) qu’elles détiennent depuis. 

Le gouvernement sud-vietnamien ne put que protester et surtout renforcer la garde sur les îles restantes. 

En 1959, Pékin envoya 82 soldats déguisés en pêcheurs sur 5 bateaux armés pour s’attaquer aux îles de l’Est des Paracels, mais ils furent démasqués par les soldats sud-vietnamiens et faits prisonniers avant d’être renvoyés en Chine.




Le retrait des troupes américaines après le traité de Paris (1973) et les empêtrements de l’armée sud-vietnamienne dans la guerre désormais seule contre Hanoï et ses alliés sino-russes furent l’occasion pour Pékin d’envoyer le 14/1/1974 deux navires de guerre aux Paracels pour s’emparer des îles de l’Ouest encore sous administration vietnamienne ; les quatre destroyers sud-vietnamiens dépêchés à la rescousse n’en purent venir à bout pendant la bataille navale qui s’ensuivit (17-20/1/1974), quoique qu’ils fussent plus nombreux, parce que le personnel technique de ces navires récemment remis au Sud-Vietnam par les Etats-Unis n’avait pas encore reçu de formation sérieuse et que les Américains en avaient enlevé les équipements sophistiqués. 

Les Vietnamiens durent battre en retraite après avoir perdu 75 marins contre 21 du côté chinois, laissant les Chinois maîtres désormais de tout l’archipel des Paracels. 

Le plus révoltant, c’est que la 7e flotte américaine qui patrouillait au large de la Mer de l’Asie de l’Est, refusait de prêter main forte à la marine sud-vietnamienne sur ordre même de Washington, censée pourtant être alliée de Saïgon, et ce malgré la promesse de Nixon d’intervenir au cas où le Sud-Vietnam était menacé sérieusement. 

Pire encore, Washington fit pression sur le président Nguyễn Văn Thiệu pour qu’il ne fît pas décoller les 5 avions déjà appareillés pour aller repousser les Chinois des îles. 

La raison était que les Etats-Unis venaient de renouer des relations avec la Chine et avaient en quelque sorte « vendu » les Paracels à ce nouveau partenaire.
Dans les années 1970, la faiblesse du Sud-Vietnam aux prises avec une guerre meurtrière éveilla chez les autres riverains le désir de s’emparer au moins d’une partie des Spratly dont les richesses en hydrocarbures et poissons étaient devenues notoires. 

En 1977, le président Ferdinand Marcos, sous le prétexte qu’un citoyen philippin, Tomas Cloma avait pris possession en 1947 de plusieurs îlots des Spratly désertés par les Japonais pour y installer un Freedomland (Kelayaan) avant d’en être chassé en 1956 par les Taïwanais venus réoccuper Itu-Aba, revendiqua la souveraineté des Philippines sur les îlots et récifs estimés faire partie de Kelayaan et ceux situés à proximité de ses eaux territoriales. 

En fait dès 1968, les Philippins étaient déjà allés occuper les îlots et rochers sans garnison. 

Comme ils étaient des alliés du Sud-Vietnam dans la guerre, le gouvernement sud-vietnamien laissa faire sans protester mais à la fin de la guerre réussit à leur reprendre un îlot. 

Et depuis les Philippines contrôlent 7 îlots (sur 14 au total) dont le 2e plus grand de l’archipel (Thitu island, Thj Tứ) et 3 récifs, laissant au Vietnam 6 îlots, dont celui de Spratly qui donne son nom à tout l’archipel, et 21 récifs.
En 1979 c’est au tour de la Malaisie de proclamer sa souveraineté sur tous les récifs relevant, selon elle, de son plateau continental, et à partir de 1983 y envoya des garnisons pour les défendre. 

Parmi les cinq récifs et bancs occupés par la Malaisie deux sont revendiqués par les Philippines et un par Brunei. 

Cependant Brunei, qui n’a pas de marine, s’est jusqu’ici contenté d’affirmer son droit sans se laisser aller à la violence militaire.
L’appétit des autres riverains raviva celui de la Chine qui se mit dans la partie et à bien plus grande échelle. 

Vers la fin de la guerre sino-vietnamienne, saisissant le revirement défaitiste des dirigeants de Hanoï, la Chine décida de s’emparer des Spratly. 

En 1987-88, après avoir pris possession de plusieurs récifs (đá Chữ Thập/Fiery Cross, đá Châu Viên/London Reef, đá Gaven, đá Tư Nghĩa/Hugh Reef) vietnamiens laissés à l’abandon, trois frégates chinoises se dirigeaient vers celui de Gạc Ma (Johnson South Reef ) quand, au moment où elles allaient y débarquer, elles virent arriver une centaine de Vietnamiens sur trois bateaux de transport venus construire une borne et planter un drapeau ; selon la version officielle, une bataille en découla (le 14/3/1988) à la suite de laquelle 64 Vietnamiens furent tués et 9 faits prisonniers par les Chinois qui eurent 6 morts et 18 blessés ; incapables de résister aux feux de l’ennemi, les Vietnamiens durent s’enfuir et laisser les Chinois s’emparer des récifs. 

La réalité dévoilée en mars 2015 par le général Lê Mã Lương, directeur du musée d’histoire militaire vietnamien, fut plus tragique et révoltante (cf. https://www.rfa.org/vietnamese/in_depth/who-ord-no-fir-in-garma-03122015052720 ) : Le ministre de la défense Lê Đức Anh, acquis avec d’autres dirigeants à l’idée d’une capitulation générale devant la Chine, avait empêché l’armement des bateaux et interdit la distribution des fusils aux marins, et avait donc envoyé délibérément la centaine de soldats à la mort sous les canons chinois, histoire de faire croire à l’opinion que la cession des récifs à la Chine n’était pas décidée à l’avance mais due à une défaite militaire. 

A noter dans cette affaire de Gạc Ma la collusion de Taïwan avec la République populaire de Chine : les frégates chinoises étaient ravitaillées par les soldats taïwanais d’Itu-Aba (comme elles le seront plus tard en 1995 lors d’une attaque du récif Mischief des Philippins) ; leur solidarité dans la conquête des archipels se confirme d’ailleurs dans une déclaration du ministre de la défense taïwanaise de l’époque Cheng Wei-Yuan (Trịnh Vi Nguyên) : « Si la guerre éclate, l’armée nationale (de Taïwan) assistera l’armée populaire dans son combat » (cf. https://vi.wikipedia.org/wiki/H%E1%BA%A3i_chi%E1%BA%BFn_G%E1%BA%A1c_Ma-C%C3%B4_Lin-Len_%C4%90ao_(14-3-1988 ).
A partir du traité de Chengdu en 1990, la Chine se sent stimulée à accélérer sa mainmise sur la mer de l’Asie de l’Est, sûre désormais de la soumission tacite du Vietnam, son principal opposant : Loin de protester violemment contre les empiètements de plus en plus poussée de la Chine dans ses possessions, jusque dans sa zone économique exclusive (ZEE) puis ses eaux territoriales comme définies par la convention des Nations unies sur le droit de la mer (CNUDM) de 1982 — selon ladite convention, un Etat côtier est souverain sur le sol, le sous-sol et l’espace aérien de ses eaux territoriales jusqu’à 12 milles marins ou environ 20 km, et au-delà jusqu’à 200 milles ou environ 370 km il a droit de pêche, de construction et d’exploitation du sol et du sous-sol mais ne peut s’opposer à la libre circulation sur les eaux et au-dessus –, au nom de la préservation de la paix avec le puissant «ami » du Nord, Hanoï met en prison tout citoyen osant manifester haut et fort son hostilité à la Chine. 

Pékin commença d’abord par faire entériner en 1992 par son parlement la souveraineté historique de la Chine sur la Mer méridionale de l’Asie de l’Est puis ordonna à ses historiens de chercher dans les annales chinoises des « preuves » à l’appui.

En même temps, il commença à agrandir artificiellement l’île Boisée dans les Paracels pour y construire une véritable base militaire avec port et aéroport ainsi que des hangars pour missiles. 

Taïwan lui emboîta le pas en 1995 pour élever la même revendication sur toute la mer comprise dans la ligne U mais à la différence de la Chine, l’a suspendue en 2015 sauf en ce qui concerne l’île Taiping (Itu-Aba) et les Pratas déjà entre leurs mains.

Puis, muni de preuves historiques bidons qui parlent surtout de découvertes des îles lors de voyages d’exploration, Pékin les présenta à l’ONU en 2009 avec la carte de ses eaux territoriales en ligne aux 9 traits en forme de langue de buffle pour revendiquer des droits souverains sur 80% de la Mer de l’Asie de l’Est, ligne sur laquelle en 2014 elle ajouta un dixième trait pour englober cette fois 90% de la Mer. 

Mais ses preuves n’ont aucune force convaincante, d’autant plus que la CNUDM ne considère les droits historiques qu’en cas de continuité d’occupation pacifique. 

D’ailleurs dans toutes les cartes de la Chine, depuis les plus anciennes jusqu’en 1933, le territoire chinois s’arrête à l’île d’Hainan, son point le plus extrême dans le Sud, et la Mer méridionale de l’Asie de l’Est tout comme les archipels qui s’y trouvent lui étaient étrangères. 

Et en juin 2012, sans tenir compte de l’opinion internationale, Pékin donna aux archipels et la mer environnante en U le statut administratif d’une ville appelée Sansha (c’est-à-dire les trois archipels : les Paracels, Spratly et banc Macclesfield, Xisha, Nansha et Zhongsha) avec l’île Boisée (Yongxing) comme siège municipal. 

Cette provocation déclencha chez les Vietnamiens des manifestations régulières, pour une fois permises car téléguidées par la faction du pouvoir hostile à la sujétion à la Chine.
Nonobstant les protestations unanimes contre ses prétentions, la Chine consolide les étendues conquises et y déploie sa nouvelle puissance militaire mettant chaque jour un peu plus devant le fait accompli le monde tétanisé autant par ses menaces que par ses chantages financiers.

Dès 1990 elle commença à construire une piste d’aviation sur l’île Boisée (promue sous-préfecture des trois archipels des Paracels) et de fil en aiguille y bâtit une véritable base militaire avec rangées pour missiles sol-air. 

En 2013, ce fut le tour des Spratly d’être poldérisés puis militarisés, à une échelle encore plus importante ; sur les 9 récifs qu’elle occupe, la Chine fit élever des îles artificielles qui forment un ensemble de 13,5 km2 avec ports, aéroports, etc. (alors que la surface totale des 14 îlots naturels de tout l’archipel ne mesure que 2 km2) au prix d’une immense destruction écologique : près de 5 millions de m3 de sable et coraux pompés, déplacés et détruits, 15 km2 de récifs coralliens extrêmement précieux par la diversité des espèces qui s’y nichent à jamais disparus, sans compter 104 km2 de coraux dévastés par les chalutiers chinois avec leur raclage des fonds à la recherche de grosses palourdes dont leur peuple est friand (cf. https://www.rfa.org/vietnamese/news/southchinaseadispute/china-s-activities-in-the-scs-take-up-huge-toll-on-the-marine-environment-vh-11022016103953.html )
Le premier but affiché de la mainmise sur les Spratly étant l’appropriation de ses réserves de pétrole (estimées seulement à 1,5 milliards de tonnes par les Américains, mais jusqu’à 50 milliards de tonnes récupérables par les Chinois), une fois maître d’une partie de l’archipel, la Chine s’empressa donc d’en exploiter les ressources. 

Dès 1992 la Chinese National Offshore Oil Company (CNOOC) signa un accord de prospection pétrolière dans le banc de Tư Chính/Vanguard Bank situé dans la ZEE vietnamienne avec la compagnie Creston Energy et les Chinois poussèrent le bouchon plus loin en empêchant PetroVietnam et ConoPhilipps de prospecter dans les eaux vietnamiennes à côté de Tư Chính — incidents qui amenèrent le Vietnam à rejoindre l’ASEAN en 1995 — puis ne cessèrent de causer des obstacles à d’autres projets de prospection ou simplement de recherche scientifique de PetroVietnam avec d’autres compagnies étrangères (comme en 2007 avec British Petroleum, avec 2008 avec Exxon Mobil, en 2011 avec Veritas, plus récemment en 2017 avec Repsol).
Le problème pour les Chinois est que 90% du pétrole se trouve dans les marges continentales des pays riverains : une partie dans ses eaux de Hainan et Guangdong certes, mais surtout dans le golfe du Tonkin, les plateaux continentaux du Vietnam et de la Sonde, au nord-ouest de Bornéo. 

Comme ces deux derniers et plus gros gisements appartiennent à des pays relativement prospères (Indonésie, Malaisie, Brunei) pour mettre la main sur plus de pétrole en Mer de l’Asie de l’Est, la Chine n’a d’autre choix que piller le Vietnam« soumis » dont les réserves en hydrocarbures sont à la 3e place de l’Asie-Pacifique. 

D’où ses prospections illégales de pétrole dans la ZEE vietnamienne sous la protection menaçante de ses navires militaires ou parfois l’offre d’exploitation « conjointe » des gisements qui lui donneraient la quasi-totalité du pétrole et du gaz produit puisqu’elle aurait apporté les capitaux nécessaires ! 

Que fait alors Hanoï ? 

Elle se tait ou déclare son inquiétude et au mieux envoie quelques vaisseaux faire un tour près des lieux d’incident sans leur permettre d’agir !
En mai 2014, l’arrivée de la plate-forme de forage et d’extraction chinoise HYSY 981 à 120 milles marins des côtes vietnamiennes et à 30 milles des Paracels , accompagnée de 80 navires dont 7 bâtiments de guerre, suscita une vive indignation dans la population vietnamienne, dont les manifestations contre la Chine se continuaient depuis une année, et donna lieu à des émeutes anti-chinoises (attaques d’usines, agressions de Chinois).
Par peur de l’ire de Pékin et à son instigation, les dirigeants de Hanoi se tournèrent alors contre la faction « progressiste » et se livrèrent à une répression implacable des manifestants, muselant ainsi pour plusieurs années l’opposition. 

D’autre part, devant les réactions négatives de l’opinion internationale les Chinois retirèrent leur plate-forme en juillet de la même année, mais c’est pour la faire revenir quelques mois après, en 1/2015, avec une escorte menaçante de navires militaires ; et sûrs de leur impunité, ils continuent de forer et d’extraire dans les gisements vietnamiens du golfe du Tonkin, envoyant même d’autres plates-formes prêter main forte à la HYSY 981 (la HYSY 943 en 2016). 

A partir de 2017, c’est au tour des réserves dans les Spratly d’être mises à sac avec la plate-forme HYSY 270 qui vint en juillet, accompagnée de 40 bâtiments militaires et 40 bateaux de pêche armés narguer le Vietnam à 210 km de ses côtes, autour de la Vanguard Bank (bãi Tư Chính) où la PetroVietnam s’exerçait au forage pour l’exploitation du gisement du Dragon rouge (Rồng đỏ) avec la Repsol espagnole; les Chinois se montrèrent tellement agressifs que le Vietnam dut arrêter son projet de partenariat avec Repsol et laisser le champ libre aux envahisseurs, toujours selon la politique capitularde de Hanoï qui ne permit pas à sa marine de réagir.
Poissons et crustacés, une autre richesse des Spratly, constituent un autre objet de la cupidité chinoise. Comme dans la mer de l’Asie de l’Est, 15 millions de personnes vivent de la pêche dont les produits représentent 38% de la pêche mondiale (chiffre de la FAO de 2012), les prétentions de souveraineté de la Chine sur 90% de cette mer ne peuvent que générer de nombreux conflits avec les autres riverains. 

D’autant plus que, comme pour le pétrole, 90% des stocks de poissons se situent à moins de 200 milles marins des côtes, c’est-à-dire dans leurs eaux et ZEE. 

Or, en tant que souveraine auto-proclamée de la mer de l’Asie de l’Est, la Chine impose unilatéralement depuis 1999 un moratoire annuel de la pêche à tous les pêcheurs même étrangers, et en 2014 oblige tout chalutier étranger à demander sa permission pour y pêcher : les contrevenants s’exposent à des amendes (près de 8000 USD), des confiscations de matériels, allant jusqu’à la destruction du bateau et les violences physiques. 

Pour appliquer ses mesures arbitraires, elle peut compter sur ses milliers de chalutiers armés (23.000 envoyés en mer méridionale de l’Asie de l’Est en 8/2012 ; 18.000 après le 16/8/2017 à la fin d’une interdiction générale de 108 jours), une véritable troupe de choc agissant en avant-garde de sa marine toujours présente dans les environs, prête à chercher noise aux autres pêcheurs de la région et à les chasser de leur mer « personnelle ».
Vis-à-vis du Vietnam, après en avoir obtenu en 2000 la cession de 9% de ses eaux territoriales dans le golfe du Tonkin par un traité sur les frontières maritimes plus avantageux pour la Chine (qui détient maintenant 47 % du golfe au lieu de 38% auparavant), Pékin a forcé sa main pour une « coopération» halieutique dans une zone commune qui mord encore dans 13,5% des eaux vietnamiennes, ce qui diminue d’autant le stock de poissons pour les Vietnamiens ; de plus, forts de cet accord, les Chinois ne se gênent pas pour venir concurrencer les petits et moyens bateaux de pêches vietnamiens avec leurs gros chalutiers et même leurs énormes bateaux-usines qui dépassent souvent la limite de la zone commune pour pêcher près de la côte vietnamienne (7781 violations du traité de « coopération » par les bateaux de pêche chinois et 1800 par d’autres navires chinois en 10 ans, selon le rapport du Ministère de l’Agriculture et de développement rural de 2014) ; avec pour conséquence l’épuisement des stocks déjà régulièrement en baisse à cause de la surpêche généralisée. 

A cela s’ajoute l’empoisonnement des eaux du littoral par les usines chinoises implantées le long de la côte vietnamienne depuis 2016. 

Pour trouver des poissons les pêcheurs vietnamiens sont obligés de s’éloigner dans la ZEE nationale du côté des Paracels et Spratly et y sont harcelés, attaqués, coulés et tués par des commandos de chalutiers armés et de navires militaires chinois. 

On ne compte pas les exactions chinoises sur ces pauvres pêcheurs auxquels les Chinois refusent même le refuge sur une île des Paracels en cas de grosse tempête comme l’exige le droit de la mer (cf. https://www.voatiengviet.com/a/3465438.html ).
Avec les Malaisiens et les Indonésiens, plus prospères, la Chine observe une certaine prudence et les pêcheurs chinois s’aventurent moins souvent dans leurs eaux ; si la Malaisie qui attend beaucoup des investissements chinois fait encore le gros dos devant leurs incursions, depuis 2016 l’Indonésie montre les dents et se tient prête à les arrêter. 

Restent les Philippines sans moyen militaire contre lesquelles la Chine multiplie les provocations. 

En 2012, elle envoya une véritable armada s’emparer du récif de Scarborough occupé par les Philippins auxquels elle interdit désormais l’accès. 

Or ces eaux très riches en poissons de grande qualité fournissaient aux Philippins une bonne partie de leur alimentation ; que les Chinois fassent des Spratly leur chasse gardée, « c’est une formule pour la famine ; plus qu’une question de sécurité nationale, elle engage la sécurité alimentaire » (sénateur Rudolph Recto). 

Comparant cette annexion de Scarborough à celle de la Tchécoslovaquie par Hitler, le président Benigno Aquino III porta en 2013 l’affaire devant la Cour internationale de justice de La Haye (Cour permanente d’arbitrage, CPA) laquelle rendit son verdict le 12/7/2016, donnant raison à Manille : « Il n’y a aucun fondement juridique pour que la Chine revendique ses droits historiques sur des ressources dans les zones maritimes à l’intérieur de la « ligne en 9 traits »». 

En même temps, la Cour dénie aux îlots, récifs et iles artificielles compris dans les Paracels et Spratly le statut d’île c’est-à-dire la possibilité d’avoir droit à une ZEE, ce qui constitue aussi un désaveu des prétentions de Taïwan sur Taiping/Itu-Aba. 

Pas étonnant donc que non seulement Pékin mais également Taïpei déclarèrent ne pas reconnaître l’autorité de la CPA dont le jugement « sera une feuille de papier bonne à jeter », dixit une agence de presse taïwanaise.
Logiquement le verdict de la CPA devrait pousser les autres pays côtiers à intenter le même procès à la Chine et à se servir de la sentence en principe favorable comme arme dans leurs démêlés avec elle ; ou tout au moins ces pays de l’ASEAN devraient s’y appuyer pour former un front uni contre la Chine qui les brime, mais les chantages et promesses financières de Pékin dans les négociations bilatérales avec chacun d’eux brise toute solidarité entre eux, le premier à se désolidariser étant les Philippines dont le nouveau président Rodrigo Duterte s’est mis volontiers sous la bannière chinoise contre coopération « halieutique » et arrangements pécuniers. 

Quant au Vietnam qui a le plus gros contentieux avec la Chine, ses dirigeants trop inféodés à Pékin n’osent guère faire appel à la CPA malgré l’opinion publique qui l’y presse.
Dès le lendemain de la sentence, la Chine furieuse, par défi, menaça d’instituer sur la mer méridionale de l’Asie de l’Est une zone d’identification aérienne (Air defense identification zone, ADIZ) comme elle l’a déjà fait dans la mer septentrionale en 2013 à la grande colère du Japon dont les îles Senkaku (Diaoyu, revendiquées par la Chine) relèvent de cette zone. 

Elle poussa même la provocation en organisant quelques jours après (18/7/2016) des exercices militaires dans la partie nord de la Mer. 

Le recours à l’ADIZ tout comme les démonstrations de force révèlent que l’objectif réel poursuivi par Pékin en faisant main basse sur les archipels (Paracels et Spratly) et la mer de l’Asie de l’Est environnante est surtout militaire : se rendre maître d’un territoire hautement stratégique, lieu de transit du transport maritime reliant l’Europe à l’Extrême-Orient en passant par le Moyen-Orient, représentant 40% du fret maritime mondial d’un montant de 5000 milliards de dollars par an, et surtout par où passent ¾ des importations d’hydrocarbures de la Chine, juste en amont du détroit de Malacca, passage obligé du trafic international. 

Déjà pourvue de plusieurs bases navales dans des îles côtières de la baie du Bengale et de la mer d’Andaman cédées par le Myanmar en 1992 et 1994, en aval du détroit, avec aussi des bases dans les Spratly la Chine contrôlerait militairement le détroit qu’elle aurait la possibilité de bloquer à sa guise pour nuire à l’économie de tel ou tel pays ennemi.
La mainmise sur l’ensemble de la mer de l’Asie de l’Est avec les archipels qu’elle abrite pour en faire sa « mare nostrum » est donc d’une nécessité vitale pour la Chine impérialiste qui renforce chaque jour sa présence militaire dans la région, équipant les îles artificielles de missiles sol-air HQ9, de radars, de tours de contrôle, de logements pour soldats au nombre d’environ 10.000 et bientôt d’usines nucléaires flottantes (des réacteurs à neutrons rapides portatifs, capables de tenir dans container de 6,1 x 2,6 m, inquiétants pour les pays voisins à cause du risque de catastrophe meurtrière, la technologie pour ce genre de centrale restant peu sûre !) déployant ses flottilles de chalutiers armés sous la protection d’hélicoptères et d’avions porte-missiles et parfois du porte-avion Liaoning, et bien sûr de navires de guerre et de sous-marins. 

Or, ces derniers avec les missiles jouent un rôle clé dans la course à la suprématie maritime voire mondiale avec les Etats-Unis, et la mer méridionale de l’Asie de l’Est de ce point de vue offrirait aux sous-marins chinois un immense abri (3 millions de km2) indétectable et inattaquable relié directement à leur base de Longpo, Yulin (Hainan). 

En effet, sous les Spratly, à 3000 m de profondeur en moyenne, des corridors sinueux suivant deux axes est-ouest et nord-sud permettent aux sous-marins de se cacher ou de se déplacer à l’insu de tous les appareils espions. 

La crainte exprimée au ministère philippin de la défense en 1982 : « Si une nation hostile peut cartographier cette région avec un degré tel qu’elle peut faire naviguer un sous-marin porteur de missiles balistiques, cette nation peut stationner des sous-marins de type Polaris et pourrait être capable de contrôler ou menacer une région dans un rayon de 4000 km contenant un tiers de la population mondiale dont l’ensemble de l’ASEAN. 

La bathymétrie de la région est telle qu’il n’est pas possible de détecter un sous-marin, donc il est impossible de contre-attaquer » (cf. https://asialyst.com/fr/2016/10/20/mer-de-chine-du-sud-le-secret-des-routes-sous-marines /) est en passe de se concrétiser. 

Depuis juillet 2017 des robots sous-marins chinois explorent la mer méridionale de l’Asie de l’Est dans le but d’y collecter des images et mesurer des paramètres chimiques et physiques, cependant que 12 planeurs sous-marins y sont déployés pour récolter des données sur le milieu marin (température, salinité, turbidité, etc.) ; et les sous-marins chinois de classe Jin 094 sont capables de lancer le missile balistique Julang II dont la portée est de 8000km !

Imperturbable devant la réprobation internationale, la Chine se conduit en mer de l’Asie de l’Est comme chez elle, exerçant sa souveraineté auto-proclamée, et considérant les eaux entourant ses récifs, atolls et îles artificielles comme ses eaux territoriales. 

Grâce à ses installations portuaires et aéroportuaires, ses sous-marins et ses missiles, elle est capable d’y instaurer un déni d’accès et d’interdiction de zone (Anti Access / Area Denial ou A2/AD). Patrouilleurs et garde-côtes chinois omniprésents surveillent tous les bateaux étrangers et les empêchent de s’approcher des archipels dans la limite des 12 milles, bien que le droit de la mer autorise le passage inoffensif de tous les navires étrangers, navires militaires compris. 

Et dans les airs surplombant ces eaux, ses chasseurs menacent et éconduisent les avions étrangers, en particuliers militaires. 

Avec le Vietnam, elle ne se gêne absolument pas, et agit d’ores et déjà comme avec un pays conquis : du 29/8 au 4/9/2017 elle a procédé à des manœuvres militaires avec des tirs à balles réelles dans le golfe du Tonkin dans la ZEE vietnamienne à seulement 75 milles de la ville de Đà Nẵng, interdisant aux bateaux vietnamiens de s’approcher de la zone ! 

D’ailleurs même en jours ordinaires, les bateaux vietnamiens naviguant dans leurs propres eaux se font régulièrement harcelés, rançonnés et arraisonnés pour avoir « violé » la ligne U imaginaire. 

Et dans les airs surplombant « leur territoire », si les Chinois se contentent de chasser et d’accompagner les avions d’autres pays, avec les Vietnamiens ils tirent sans sommation, comme ce fut le cas de deux appareils Sukhoi de l’armée de l’air vietnamienne abattus par des missiles chinois tirés d’un des sous-marins stationnés sous l’île Boisée le 14/6/2016 alors qu’ils faisaient un vol d’exercice à 32 milles de la côte et donc au-dessus de la ZEE vietnamienne – un acte de guerre criminel qui ne souleva aucune protestation des lâches dirigeants de Hanoï et qui serait même caché à la population si l’un des deux pilotes n’était pas sauvé par des pêcheurs — ; et depuis, par peur des tirs sans sommation, les avions de ligne Hanoï-Saïgon joignent prudemment leur destination par un détour au-dessus le Laos plutôt que par le littoral !
Face à l’ambition agressive de la Chine dont le budget militaire augmente de 132% en 10 ans (191 milliards USD en 2016, selon France-info), ses voisins asiatiques (Japon, Corée du Sud, Taïwan, Indonésie, Malaisie et Vietnam) sont poussés à une course aux armements tout en nouant des relations économiques avec elle. 

Même l’Australie située loin de la mer de l’Asie de l’Est et jusqu’ici plutôt complaisante avec Pékin, s’inquiète de la voir menacer la paix dans la région et vient de commander 12 sous-marins à la France dans le cadre d’un programme de renouvellement de son attirail militaire. 

En ne s’opposant pas fermement dès le début aux prétentions sans fondement de Pékin, le monde se retrouve avec une puissance sans retenue qui s’approprie brutalement des richesses des autres et qui, pour arriver à ses fins, se livre au chantage à l’épreuve de force ainsi qu’à la ruse des investissements et prêts « fabuleux » contre une coopération asymétrique qui s’avéreront préjudiciables au bénéficiaire. 

Devant le hold-up de la mer de l’Asie de l’Est et le danger potentiel qu’il renferme, les Etats libres commencent à réaliser que les mots paix et pacifiques constamment dans la bouche des dirigeants de Pékin doivent se comprendre dans le sens contraire comme dans l’Océanie de « 1984 ». 

Pour faire comprendre à ses lecteurs la gravité du problème, un auteur, Antoine Brunet, (cf. http://www.atlantico.fr/decryptage/asie-se-livre-plus-grande-course-aux-armements-de ) compare la situation à celle d’une Turquie revendiquant la pleine souveraineté sur la mer Méditerranée où plus aucun riverain n’aurait accès sans sa permission. 

En fait cette visée hégémonique a eu lieu, au XVIe siècle, mais fut enrayée par une coalition menée par l’Autriche qui défit les Turcs à Lépante (1570).
Une telle coalition contre l’hégémonie chinoise est-elle possible aujourd’hui ? 

On en doute, vu la force d’attraction du portefeuille agité par Pékin à laquelle cèdent volontiers la plupart des pays, surtout corrompus, en mal de capitaux ou friands de contrats ; et tant que l’opinion générale n’est pas édifiée sur la nature mensongère, cynique et cruelle de la plus grande dictature communiste du monde. 

Or, il ne manque pas de gauchistes nourris contre l’impérialisme américain pour saluer la montée de l’impérialisme chinois, censé être juste et généreux (qu’ils se renseignent sur le génocide au Tibet et contre les Vietnamiens en cours !).
Les Etats-Unis eux-mêmes, seule puissance capable de contrecarrer la Chine et que cette dernière veut évincer de l’Asie, ne se sont inquiétés que lorsque les Chinois se sont mis à remblayer les récifs et à élever leur « grande muraille de sable ». 

Leur appel à l’arrêt de cette poldérisation restant sans effet, et ne pouvant pulvériser les constructions chinoises sans risquer une guerre destructrice, ils n’ont d’autre solution que celle de prôner le maintien de la liberté de navigation dans les parages des archipels, car selon le droit de la mer seules les eaux intérieures permettent d’interdire le passage des navires étrangers. 

Pour ce, ils ont décidé depuis 2015 des opérations de liberté de navigation FONOP (freedom of navigation operation) qui consiste à envoyer plusieurs fois par an des navires et avions dans les archipels y compris à moins des 12 milles marins des îles revendiquées par la Chine. 

Chaque opération suscite des protestations de la Chine qui se contente cependant d’escorter le vaisseau ou l’avion « violateur » par ses patrouilleurs, sauf en décembre 2016 quand le navire océanographique USNS Bowditch se fit dérober un drone, mais cette subtilisation tout comme celle d’un sonar de l’USNS Impeccable en 2009 entre plutôt dans le cadre du vol des nouveautés technologiques pour les copier pratiqué systématiquement par les Chinois. 

Attaché aussi à la liberté de navigation le Canada décide de participer au FONOP avec deux frégates dans les eaux contestées en juillet 2017, et la Grande-Bretagne promet de faire de même le mois prochain. 

Quant à la France, sans adhérer au FONOP, elle fait transiter depuis 2014 une dizaine de navires dans les mêmes zones comme en octobre 2017 avec la frégate Auvergne, car comme le déclare l’amiral Denis Bertrand, « si la liberté de navigation est bafouée en mer de Chine, elle le sera partout » (cf. Le Monde du 30/10/2017).
Ces opérations symboliques qui irritent Pékin ne l’empêchent pas de poursuivre la consolidation de son immense forteresse marine d’où il pourra contrôler le commerce international et menacer tous les Etats qui s’opposent à son hégémonie, une hégémonie féroce, irrespectueuse du droit international et insoucieuse de la vie d’autrui, auprès de laquelle l’impérialisme américain fait figure de domination bon enfant. 

De facto la Chine règne déjà sur la mer de l’Asie de l’Est et en est inexpugnable ; mais pour que son autorité soit admise internationalement, elle doit l’être de jure. 

Bien qu’elle n’ait que faire de la loi et s’assoie ainsi sur le verdict de la CPA, elle a besoin de la loi pour justifier son annexion. 

C’est pourquoi mijote-t-elle la création d’un autre tribunal international à sa botte (cf. http://www.epochtimes.fr/chine-envisage-de-creer-propres-tribunaux-internationaux-revendications- ) qui légalisera ses actions, tout en sachant que le jugement de ce dernier n’aura pas plus de valeur que ses pseudo-documents historiques. 

En fin de compte c’est encore par le Vietnam, le seul pays dont le droit sur les archipels a été longtemps reconnu, qu’elle pourra obtenir par un transfert officiel de souveraineté une certaine légitimité. 

Heureusement, jusqu’ici, malgré sa soumission tacite, par peur de la réprobation unanime comme de la révolte de ses sujets, le pouvoir de Hanoi refuse de déclarer publiquement sa reddition à la Chine. 

Si le monde libre tient à le rester, il a intérêt à profiter de cette réticence qui ne durera pas pour aider le peuple vietnamien à secouer le joug communiste et donc la dépendance envers Pékin contre lequel le Vietnam libre constituera un solide rempart.