Han peril: China’s island chain plans

Beijing’s not just keen to annex the South China Sea and Taiwan — it has its eyes set on whole other island chains to dominate the Indian and Pacific Oceans.
By Jamie Seidel

Beijing wants to be an international super power.

To achieve this, it needs to carve out a vast swath of economic and military influence. 

And it has a plan.
A recent US Defense Intelligence Agency analysis of China’s growing strength and expanding international ambitions judged Xi Jinping wants to project power far beyond its shores.
The China Military Power report delves into deep detail about what is known about Beijings capabilities and intentions.
“China is rapidly building a robust lethal force with capabilities spanning the ground, air, maritime, space and information domains designed to table to impose its will in the regional and beyond,” A DIA spokesperson told media at its launch.
Beijing is seeking to ‘unchain’ itself from what it sees as the shackles of Western cultural, military and economic dominance.
To do this, it has its eyes set on a series of five ‘island chains’ over which it seeks to exert its national interests.
Any one of them could be the spark of an international crisis.
And the talk has been getting tough.

The US Naval Base at Guam’s Apra Harbor.

RESTRAINING CHAINS
Beijing’s ‘Belt and Road initiative’ is an expansive project to connect China’s expansive economy with the rest of Europe and Asia.
But there are ‘choke-points’.
On land, the narrow mountain passes of China’s East Turkestan colony (where the suppressed ethnic Muslim Uighurs reside), along with Pakistan and Afghanistan, funnel road and rail traffic with the Middle East.
At sea, Singapore and the slender Malacca Straits is an unavoidable bottleneck in the flow of shipping between the South China Sea and the Indian Ocean.
And then there is the small island democracy of Taiwan, the last outpost of pre-Communist China, acting as what Beijing believes as a link in a chain holding it back from the broader Pacific.

It already dominates what has been defined as the “First Island Chain”: the waters of the East and South China Seas following a rough ‘nine-dash line’ from Japan in the north, past Taiwan and the Philippines down to Singapore and Malaysia.
It’s achieved this through a rapid build-up of its navy and long-range strike aircraft, along with the internationally condemned construction of artificial island fortresses on remote reefs also claimed by neighbouring countries.
Now this victory of might over right has been achieved, analysts believe Beijing is setting out on its next objective: dominating the “Second Island Chain”.
Meanwhile, it’s begun defining the next boundaries of its desired influence … a ‘Third Island Chain’ (encompassing Alaska, Hawaii and New Zealand), a ‘Fourth Island Chain’ (Linking Pakistan, Sri Lanka, the Maldive Islands and the US/UK military facility at Diego Garcia in the midst of the Indian Ocean), and, finally, the ‘Fifth Chain’ extending from Djibouti on the Horn of Africa, past Madagascar to South Africa.

US strategic bombers on the island of Diego Garcia, in the middle of the Indian Ocean.

DANGEROUS IDEAS
Every island chain represents a sphere of influence over the nations they encompass.
Every island chain has at least one major US military base.
Every island chain is a potential flashpoint for international tensions.
All affect Australia: they fall to the north, east and west of the remote island nation.
But the nations most fearful of a dramatic shift in regional power dynamics from Washington to Beijing are Singapore and Japan.
Both could rapidly find themselves encompassed by seas dominated by China’s navy and skies by its air force.
Australia and New Zealand would soon follow.
But it’s the remote islands that are most at risk of conflict.
The United States has long since built up a strategy of using island bases to project power over a region.
Warships and combat aircraft can be based there.
But, most importantly, they can be used as launch pads for strong ground-based forces (such as troops and tanks).
Beijing has followed this line of thinking.
Its artificial island fortresses in the South China Sea are bristling with missiles, guns and military radars.
Their airfields and ports are military-grade.
They have strong garrisons.
All that is missing — for the time being — are permanently stationed combat aircraft and warships.
And it’s keenly aware of the strategic geographic importance of the Pacific island chains.
Which is why there’s a diplomatic land-grab underway.
Australia and the US have moved to head-off Beijing’s interest in Papua New Guinea’s Manus Island, making a last-minute deal to reactivate the old World War II naval facility there as a forward operating base.
A recent change in government in Micronesia upset Beijing’s ambitions there, and resulted in what is in effect an economic embargo — the suspension of government-sanctioned holiday tours there.
It’s a similar story in the Indian Ocean, with a democratic change of government stifling Beijing’s growing economic dominance over the Maldive Islands.
Such ‘push-back’ has led some international affairs analysts, including in China, to suggest Xi Jinping has ‘overextended’ himself.
He’s moved too hard, too early — and is meeting an unexpected backlash over his plans to make China great again.
The question is: how will he react?

HMAS Choules pictured at the Manus Island Lombrum Naval Base, Paupa New Guinea. The US and Australia are planning a joint military facility there to stave-off Beijing’s interest. 

THE NEXT CRISIS
China’s own 2015 Military White Paper outlines a mission statement: “It is a Chinese Dream to achieve the great rejuvenation of the Chinese nation. The Chinese Dream is to make the country strong …”
It’s already been enacting this mission through the building of extensive artificial island fortresses in the South China Sea, as well as establishing its first foreign military places at locations including Djibouti and Pakistan.
But military analysts are worried this expansion is set to accelerate.
With the European Union hobbled and distracted by a shambolic ‘Brexit’ divorce with the United Kingdom, and President Donald Trump’s insular ‘Make America Great Again’ perspective, Beijing has sensed an opportunity.
This has Australian, Singaporean and Japanese strategic think-tanks worried: can we rely on our treaties and relationships with the US, UK and Europe in the face of growing Chinese ambition?
Or will they retreat from their old island chains of influence?
The next real test will be the ‘Second Island Chain’.
This is defined as a wavy line starting in the middle of Japan, weaving through the scattered islands of Micronesia (including the major US military base of Guam) and down to the Indonesia’s Western New Guinea
Its growing naval and missile strength appears designed to project power at this scale.
Aircraft carriers can provide protection and strike power for naval formations.
Swarms of long-range guided missiles can force back larger US carrier battle groups.
Beijing’s already working to extend its diplomatic influence into the region.
As its hydrographic survey ships plough the waters to the north of Papua New Guinea and through Micronesia, it’s also pushing hard to establish a strong economic and diplomatic foothold in these Pacific states as well as the Philippines.
The major US defence facility on the Japanese island of Okinawa is grappling with deep unpopularity among the island’s residents.
Ties with Thailand are being cultivated, with talk of a possible canal to bypass Singapore.
And Xi is becoming increasingly vocal over ‘reunification’ with Taiwan — whether it wants it or not.

Cartographic Rape

Han Megalomania: China Just Claims Hawaii (and Most of the Pacific Ocean)
By Harry J. Kazianis

Even though the map and article were someone’s attempt at a little fun, there is a larger point. China’s use of maps, passports and other mapfare-style methods of pushing a narrative of rightful territorial claims whether over Taiwan or the 9 or actually 10-dash-line in the South China Sea and others areas has been part of Beijing’s toolkit for sometime now. 

The fact that none of us at the conference were shocked speaks volumes to the now ingrained perception of China on the international stage as a power bent on changing the status-quo—no matter what the cost. 

A reputation as some sort of rogue state is a tough thing in international politics to change—and it's something Beijing should bear in mind.
The neverending ups and downs of what is quickly becoming the hottest geostrategic flashpoint on the planet, none other than the South China Sea, was the subject of a conference at Yale University this last May. 

Panels were filled with world-class experts promoting their latest research (including yours truly) detailing the various claims, counterclaims and strategic challenges surrounding this important body of water. 

And yet, it wasn’t the heated Q&A sessions or slick powerpoints that drove debate among the attendees, but rumors of China’s latest territorial claims—a 251 dash-line that extends over almost all of the Pacific Ocean—that created the most buzz.

According to a ‘report’ on the website Elitereaders, a ‘clicky’ website that reports ‘viral’-styled news, Beijing is now claiming Hawaii and most of Micronesia. 

Delegates to the conference furiously began to share the article through various social media channels. 

Red-faced attendees were debating the nature of such claims as soon as they scanned the article. Many wondered if this was simply a negotiating strategy on Beijing’s part, a carefully crafted ploy to make equally outrageous claims in the South China Sea look meager by comparison—claiming massive chunks of the Pacific Ocean would sort of do that.
From there, things got even more interesting. 

On the sidelines of the conference, a Vietnamese filmmaker was shooting a documentary on the South China Sea and asked me on camera what I thought of the claims. 

Without being able to do any in depth reading or fact-checking the piece, I expressed hope the report would be proven untrue, but if somehow Beijing was bold enough to make such a claim, it would only go further to cement the narrative as China becoming an international bully—taking the concept of what I referred to as ‘Mapfare’ to a whole new level.
The text of the article is interesting to say the least:
“In a move expected to escalate global tensions, China’s Ministry of Education has released a new world map in which China claims large swaths of the Pacific Ocean, including Hawaii and most of Micronesia.
According to Xinhua, the Education Ministry also issued a directive ordering “all educational facilities and government offices to replace their outdated world maps with the current iteration.”
Though the United States has yet to offer any comment, Micronesian President Manny Mori has called the map “absurd” and accused China of “cartographic rape.”
It goes on—and where it all falls apart as a poorly-timed comedic ruse:
“China’s new territory also encompasses Mexico’s Clarion Island and France’s Clipperton Island, which officials say will be allowed full autonomy. 

American possessions in the region, however, will be combined to form Xinmeiguo Province.
China’s new neighbors will almost certainly raise questions about the map’s legitimacy and protest the country’s expanded borders. 

Indeed, China’s previous “nine-dash map,” which included the contested Paracel and Spratly Islands in the South China Sea, was already a source of controversy.
But Ministry of Education officials defended the new “251-dash map” by pointing to several Qing-era documents which show the Caroline, Northern Mariana and Marshall Islands under Chinese control.
“The study of what constitutes Chinese territory is ongoing,” said one ministry official.
At press time, proof had been found that the Ming Empire once controlled a large portion of Antarctica. 

The Ministry of Education said it would immediately begin production of a new, revised map.”
Only reading the open paragraphs—and certainly before taking a more detailed look at article—
I assumed like many of my colleagues at the conference it could very well be possible. 

Heck, if China has the guts to try to make a case for claims on Okinawa, why not go all in? 

Call it ‘mapfare’ on steroids.
But as I let the shock and horror subside and read on I realized we all had been had—thank god.
Besides the obvious hysterics like new provinces and claims over Antarctica, in just a matter of a few minutes of Googling I realized the article was not an original piece but was actually written in 2014 for a site called Ministry of Harmony. 

Described on its Twitter feed as “The Onion with Chinese Characteristics” it seems we had all been had—at least for a little while anyway.
Even though the map and article were someone’s attempt at a little fun, there is a larger point. 

China’s use of maps, passports and other mapfare-style methods of pushing a narrative of rightful territorial claims whether over Taiwan or the 9 or actually 10-dash-line in the South China Sea and others areas has been part of Beijing’s toolkit for sometime now. 

The fact that none of us at the conference were shocked speaks volumes to the now ingrained perception of China on the international stage as a power bent on changing the status-quo—no matter what the cost. 

A reputation as some sort of rogue state is a tough thing in international politics to change—and it's something Beijing should bear in mind.