China Is Threatening Foreign Vessels Near Its Island Fortresses, And The US Military Isn’t Changing A Thing

By RYAN PICKRELL

The U.S. Navy and regional allies have reportedly noticed an increase in Chinese radio queries to foreign ships and planes operating in the South China Sea — some said to be less than friendly, and others actually threatening.
“Leave immediately,” Chinese forces in the disputed Spratly Islands warned earlier this year when a Philippine military aircraft flew close to a Chinese outpost, The Associated Press reported Tuesday, citing a new Philippine government report.
“Philippine military aircraft, I am warning you again, leave immediately or you will pay the possible consequences,” the report said the Chinese forces threatened soon after, according to the AP.
In the latter half of last year, Philippine military aircraft patrolling near contested territories received at least 46 Chinese radio warnings, the government report says, according to the AP. 

While these warnings have traditionally been delivered by Chinese coast guard units, they’re now thought to be broadcast by personnel stationed at military outposts in the South China Sea, the news agency reported.
“Our ships and aircraft have observed an increase in radio queries that appear to originate from new land-based facilities in the South China Sea,” Cmdr. Clay Doss, a representative for the U.S. 7th Fleet, told the AP.
“These communications do not affect our operations,” he added, noting that when communications with foreign militaries are unprofessional, “those issues are addressed by appropriate diplomatic and military channels.”
The Philippine military tends to carry on with its activities. 

“They do that because of their claim to that area, and we have a standard response and proceed with what we’re doing,” Philippine air force chief Lt. Gen. Galileo Gerard Rio Kintanar Jr. told the AP.
Though an international arbitration tribunal sought to discredit China’s claims to the South China Sea two years ago, China has continued to strengthen its position in the flashpoint region.
In recent months, China has deployed various defense systems — such as jamming technology, surface-to-air missiles, anti-ship ballistic missiles, and even heavy bombers — to the South China Sea, leading U.S. Secretary of Defense Jim Mattis last month to accuse China of “intimidation and coercion” in the waterway.
Despite Chinese warnings and objections, the U.S. military has repeatedly made clear that it will maintain an active military presence in the South China Sea.
“International law allows us to operate here, allows us to fly here, allows us to train here, allows us to sail here, and that’s what we’re doing, and we’re going to continue to do that,” Lt. Cmdr. Tim Hawkins told the AP in February.
The U.S. military has also expressed confidence in its ability to deal with China’s military outposts in the region should the situation escalate.
“The United States military has had a lot of experience in the Western Pacific taking down small islands,” Lt. Gen. Kenneth McKenzie, the director of the Joint Staff, told reporters in May, adding: “It’s just a fact.”
The US earlier this year disinvited China’s People’s Liberation Army Navy from participating in this year’s iteration of the multilateral Rim of the Pacific maritime exercises, citing what it characterized as alarming Chinese activities in the South China Sea. 

The Philippines has at least twice raised the issue of radio warnings with Beijing, the AP reported Tuesday.

Axis of Evil

North Korea is helping China in the South China Sea
By Steve Mollman

Like most of the world, China is fed up with North Korea, which yesterday (May 29), in defiance of international pressure, conducted its third missile test in three weeks. 

The unpleasant neighbor is steadily progressing toward its goal: the ability to hit much of the world, including the US mainland, with nuclear-tipped intercontinental ballistic missiles.
But, for Beijing, North Korea’s saber-rattling does serve one useful purpose: It distracts attention from the contested South China Sea. 

Last year, the world fretted over China’s territorial aggression in that resource-rich waterway, with critics warning it could become virtually a “Chinese lake.” 

Beijing claims nearly the entire sea, based on what an international tribunal ruled last July to be bogus reasoning, both legally and historically.
Now, thanks to North Korea, the issue has faded into the background—just as China might have hoped.
When US secretary of state James Mattis appeared on Face the Nation this past Sunday (May 28), he talked at length about North Korea, which he described as a “direct threat” to the United States, adding that a conflict there would be “probably the worst kind of fighting in most people’s lifetimes.”
The South China Sea didn’t come up.
That was notable since just four days earlier the US conducted a “freedom of navigation” operation (Fonop) in the sea’s Spratly archipelago, where China has been steadily improving upon seven militarized islands it’s built atop reefs. 

Taking place at Mischief Reef, it was the first Fonop under Trump, and some took it as the start of a more challenging stance.
More likely, though, the operation was timed for the June 2 Shangri-La Dialogue, an annual meeting in Singapore of the region’s defense ministers. 

It would have been difficult for Mattis, who will attend the gathering, to reassure his counterparts about America’s ongoing commitment to the area without having done a single Fonop since Trump took office.
Meanwhile China continues to make steady progress fortifying its military installations in the sea, while on the diplomatic front it routinely warns other nations against saying or doing anything that challenges its stance. 

For instance, it recently fitted out its manmade island at Fiery Cross Reef with an anti-frogman rocket launcher defense system, and it admonished Japan and New Zealand for agreeing that last July’s ruling should be adhered to with regards to the South China Sea.
North Korea has its own reasons for attracting attention to its weapons tests and improving capabilities. 

It has a long history of selling arms to other countries, including Syria and Iran, and each test serves as an advertisement of sorts. (It faces sanctions on selling arms but has shown it can work around them.) 

Greater offensive capability also means greater negotiating power in any future talks about reducing arms. 

Pyongyang cashed in after conducting its first test of a nuclear bomb in 2006. 

It soon received a substantial US-led aid package in exchange for denuclearizing (which never happened).
US secretary of state Rex Tillerson said in late April that the US isn’t interested in forcing regime change in North Korea and instead wants to begin negotiations about denuclearization.
Meanwhile Trump has indicated that, in exchange for help on North Korea, he’s willing to be less tough on China in other areas, including trade. 

He said in late April: “I think that, frankly, North Korea is maybe more important than trade. Trade is very important. But massive warfare with millions, potentially millions of people being killed? That, as we would say, trumps trade.”
He’s likely applying the same logic to the South China Sea. 

A recent Foreign Affairs column noted, “Exactly why the South China Sea has fallen off the administration’s agenda is not clear. But it is possible that U.S. officials have decided to lift the pressure on China’s maritime outposts because they believe that doing so could help secure Beijing’s help in managing North Korea.”
Meanwhile a transcript of a recent call between Trump and Philippines president Rodrigo Duterte showed the US president urging his counterpart to call Beijing and “tell them we are all counting on China” with regards to pressuring North Korea.
When it comes to the South China Sea, both Trump and Duterte have been accused of being soft on Beijing. 

According to the transcript, the issue of the sea didn’t come up at all during their conversation. Duterte warned Trump that North Korean leader Kim Jong-un is “playing with his bombs” and “might just go crazy.”
China’s strategy in the sea has been described as “salami slicing,” as in making advances just small enough to avoid a strong reaction, and then slowly continuing to do that. 

It’s already achieved much in the South China Sea using this subtle tactic. 

North Korea’s attention-grabbing antics are making it all the easier to pull off.

World’s oldest and largest democracies vs. China's dictature

The US-India-Japan Trilateral: Economic Foundation for a Grand Strategy
By Hemal Shah

What happens when the world’s oldest, largest, and most responsible democracies meet? 

Six years ago, the United States, India and Japan set up their first official trilateral meeting and decided to meet annually. 

Together, they represent 25 percent of the world’s population and 35 percent of global GDP. 

Common goals of economic development, managing China’s territorial aggression in South and East Asia, and preservation of the liberal democratic order bind them together. 

Undoubtedly, they make a compelling strategic logic to come forward and work together to ensure peace and stability in the Indo-Pacific region.
But so far, this trilateral has failed to graduate from constructive symbolism to actual substance. 

The absence of a robust economic foundation is stunting its strategic potential. 

A deeper economic engagement will enmesh each other’s priorities, giving shape and form to their strategic goals in the Indo-Pacific region.
Skeptics are right when they question the real value of this partnership: The Obama Administration’s “pivot to Asia” is arguably dead and Asian allies and partners are rethinking their reliance on the United States. 

In a last-ditch effort, despite his unpredictability, hopes are pinned on President Trump’s promise of standing up to China’s belligerence. 

In India, one wonders if Prime Minister Modi’s “Look East” policy involves the United States, or is a strategy to exclusively strengthen East Asian camaraderie. 

India is still a developing country, remains uncomfortable with any labels of “alliances,” and its relationship with Japan is largely defined by development assistance rather a trade partnership. 

Meanwhile, the U.S. withdrawal from the Trans Pacific Partnership and Trump’s inward-looking trade policies signal a huge blow to Prime Minister Abe’s attempt at addressing Japan’s economic woes.
China unites them. 

Its military continues to encroach on India’s northeastern border; while refusing to scale down its territorial infringement on international waters in the East and South China Sea. 

But China also divides them: The trio flirted with establishing a “democratic quadrilateral” with Australia in 2007, which was quickly dismantled for fear of ruffling China’s feathers. 

The combined trilateral trade of $400 billion pales in comparison with U.S.-China trade of $660 billion alone.
Yet this combination — America’s commitment to democracy and robust military capabilities, the promise of India’s rapid economic growth and strategic location in the Indian Ocean, and Japan’s initiative to protect the collective freedom of navigation for trade — cannot be squandered away. 

For the trilateral to succeed and mount the pinnacle, economic goals should drive the relationship to move from symbolism to functionality, and eventually substance. 

It will also help assert India’s foreign policy posture in the region.
First, the trilateral should be used to strengthen the respective bilateral relationships. 

The United States and India have never been closer but need to act on a clear plan to rise from their goal of $100 billion to $500 billion in bilateral trade. 

They need to prioritize the free trade deal and operationalize the nuclear deal that marked the peak of their relationship.
The shifting dynamic of the revered U.S.-Japan alliance should be addressed. 

In their upcoming bilateral summit, both Trump and Abe need to resolve qualms on trade and tariffs, cost of basing U.S. forces, and a renewed Japanese commitment to stand up for the United States with the reinterpretation of the Constitution on collective self-defense. 

While the India-Japan relationship enjoys an enviable bonhomie, their bilateral trade currently hovers just around $15 billion. 

Leadership chemistry could tie the partnership well together. 

For instance, the indomitable kinship between Modi and Abe, and their respective optimistic beginnings with Trump, should be leveraged for the upcoming dialogue in Delhi this summer.
Second, the United States and Japan should double down to propel economic reform in India. 

As a non-ally of the United States, India is the odd man in the relationship. 

As a developing country, joint strategic goals also mean opportunity costs when capital is deployed to scale up economic prowess. 

At the government level, the United States and Japan are best placed to work together to share recommendations with India on ease of doing business and global best practices on trade facilitation. Modi is competitive and wants India to rise up the ranks of global indices measuring business friendliness. 

The United States and Japan should also help develop India into a major logistics hub in the Indian Ocean region – witness to 40 percent of global trade – and help design the criteria for their new ranking on logistics performance for states. 

They should also work as partners to improve India’s innovation and intellectual property environment to enable defense technology transfer as well as address liability issues with regard to their respective nuclear deals with India.
Third, the government-level dialogue should create a forum on the sidelines to involve the private sector. 

This will inject the missing ingredient to pivot the economic relationship forward. 

The three countries could start with a shortlist of jointly investable projects and exclusively identify special economic zones. 

For example, the Delhi-Mumbai Industrial Corridor currently being developed by Japan offers several opportunities for U.S. companies. 

As India moves into a cashless economy, already well-established U.S. financial services companies could help set up payment systems for the Japanese high speed rail project between Mumbai and Ahmedabad in India. 

The United States and Japan could also adopt a Smart City in India to develop urban infrastructure.
In light of Trump’s deal-making nature, Modi’s incremental shift away from a nonaligned foreign policy, and Abe’s vision of a more assertive Japan, a stronger trilateral partnership makes sense. 

It is heartening to see their annual Malabar naval exercise graduating from a relationship of trust and goodwill to that of building joint capabilities. 

Japan’s emphasis on a long term Asia strategy and patience with India can help neutralize America’s impatience to socialize India to play a bigger role in regional strategic affairs, and ultimately use the platform to reaffirm the liberal world order. 

A strong economic foundation would best dictate the grand strategy of this trilateral partnership.