Affichage des articles dont le libellé est DF-21D. Afficher tous les articles
Affichage des articles dont le libellé est DF-21D. Afficher tous les articles

lundi 30 juillet 2018

Paper Dragon: Just How Good Is China's Military?

Fact: China lost the last war it fought... in 1979. 
By Harry J. Kazianis


While America’s ideas for negating A2/AD are important, Washington must move to the next level of operational and strategic planning. 
The United States must begin to develop a comprehensive strategy to deal with A2/AD, and specifically Chinese A2/AD, and move past vague and often-contradictory operational concepts. 
At the same time, considering the alliances and strategic partnerships Washington holds throughout the Asia-Pacific and wider Indo-Pacific, allies must be consulted as such a strategy is developed. While marketing slogans like a “pivot” or “rebalance” sound good on paper or in the headlines, a strategy must be adopted that continues America’s military edge in the Asia-Pacific for years to come.
China’s military is growing in terms of raw power and basic power projection. 
Many of Beijing’s defense investments over the last two decades are aimed at limiting Washington’s ability to intervene in areas that China describes as being of “core interest.” 
But just how much should Washington worry about it? 
A good question, for sure. 
The answer, however, is as not as black and white as many might want it to be. 
And just how much should America prepare to duel with such anti-access/area-denial (A2/AD) forces in the future?
Let’s start with the obvious: While various A2/AD combat scenarios can paint a decidedly bleak picture for America and its allies in Asia in the event of a conflict with China, there are a number of reasons such a war will never come to pass in the first place. 
While large trade flows have not stopped conflicts in the past, with U.S.-Chinese bilateral trade now valued at over $550 billion and growing, this vital statistic would likely be an important factor in both sides’ strategic calculus on a path towards some sort of large-scale kinetic conflict. 
However, as history has shown us, the rise of a new regional great power with the potential to wield hegemonic dominance can spark a security competition, even war. 
This is one of the key reasons nations in the Asia-Pacific have looked to Washington to provide a hedge or a “buffer” against a rapidly rising China.
One must also consider the simple fact that there have been many so-called “revolutions” in military affairs dating back to the beginning of human history. 
While China’s version of the A2/AD strategy boasts weapons that have headline-grabbing names, like “carrier-killer,” and are certainly cause for concern, one must look back to the past at how other nations have worked to negate potential changes in how wars are conducted and how new technologies impact modern warfare. 
One example is China’s DF-21D, the “carrier-killer” itself. 
The U.S. Navy has faced challenges to its dominance of the global commons at various times in the past. 
How will America deal with such a challenge this time around? 
In analyzing the DF-21D, what many consider the most potent A2/AD challenge facing U.S. and allied forces today, such tests have been met before, according to one source, and will be addressed yet again :
While a major advance in military capability, it is not the first “game changing” weapon system mitigated or countered by the U.S. Navy. 
The naval mine, the self-propelled torpedo, the submarine, the airplane and the cruise missile all presented the same potentially lethal threat to surface warships. 
While naval leaders should respect the power of this weapon system, there is no reason to endow it with supernatural abilities or allow it to unilaterally limit operational thinking. 
As in the past, the inevitable march of technology will find an effective countermeasure or mitigating technique for this system and the DF-21D will just be another threat in a constellation of dangers inherent in the pursuit of war at sea.
To expand this line of thinking to the whole of A2/AD (and specifically Chinese A2/AD), the ideas inherent in such a strategy—limiting the ability of your enemy’s freedom of movement or, in an even broader sense, looking for weaknesses—are certainly rooted in past strategic and military thought. 
In fact, many other nations have used anti-access or area-denial–type strategies—the USSR and Imperial Japan are two often-cited examples. 
Strategic thinkers from competing nations are constantly looking for ways to negate and minimize the impact of new technologies, strategies and weapons systems. 
A2/AD, at its core, is part of a long line of past and present potentially disruptive military strategies that planners from around the world will now seek to improve on, mimic and defeat.
All in all, Washington must take a balanced approach towards China’s A2/AD challenge—not overhyping the threat, but certainly not underappreciating the challenge, either. 
In the very near future (some would argue even today), American strategists must now factor in the challenges presented by an increasingly robust Chinese military that holds growing capabilities to effectively deny large sections of the Pacific Ocean to U.S. forces. 
American defense experts are already at work recognizing the challenge and are developing the tools to negate such a scenario. 
Washington clearly realizes A2/AD weapons and strategies are diffusing around the globe, putting American and allied forces in danger, unless they evolve or adapt. 
This is why work towards the Third Offset strategy and the successor to ASB, JAM-GC, are of vital importance.
While America’s ideas for negating A2/AD are important, Washington must move to the next level of operational and strategic planning. 
The United States must begin to develop a comprehensive strategy to deal with A2/AD, and specifically Chinese A2/AD, and move past vague and often-contradictory operational concepts. 
At the same time, considering the alliances and strategic partnerships Washington holds throughout the Asia-Pacific and wider Indo-Pacific, allies must be consulted as such a strategy is developed. While marketing slogans like a “pivot” or “rebalance” sound good on paper or in the headlines, a strategy must be adopted that continues America’s military edge in the Asia-Pacific for years to come.

samedi 23 septembre 2017

Chinese Peril

China May Have Created a New Way to Sink U.S. Aircraft Carriers
By Dave Majumdar
The Pentagon just released its annual report on China’s military power, which once again highlighted Beijing’s efforts to put American aircraft carriers at risk. 
Right on cue, China announced a major milestone for a system that might be a key component of its antiaccess/area-denial (A2/AD) strategy.
This week, Chinese state media reported that the Caihong-T 4 (CH-T4), China’s massive, solar-powered drone, for the first time flew at an altitude of twenty thousand meters. 
This is important because there are no clouds above twenty thousand meters, which allows solar-powered drones to operate for significantly longer periods of time.
How long? 
Basically, indefinitely. 
According to China Daily, “future improvements will enable it to remain aloft several months or even several years.”
Jeffrey Lin and P.W. Singer, who write the excellent Eastern Arsenal blog, note that the CH-T4 is an impressive combination of big and light. 
The drone’s wingspan is around 130 feet, which is wider than a Boeing 737. 
At the same time, the CH-T4 only weighs between 880 and 1,100 pounds. 
By way of comparison, Boeing 737’s lowest typical operating empty weight is over seventy thousand pounds, and its maximum gross takeoff weight can reach as high as 170,000 pounds. 
Besides being slender, the CH-T4’s lightness is due to its carbon fiber and plastic components.
The drone can also travel at speeds of 125 miles per hour. 
However, it will also be able to cruise at sixty-five thousand feet, so it will be able to cover a huge swath of land without moving very far. 
Indeed, Lin and Singer point out: “It can utilize its high flight ceiling to maintain line-of-sight contact with over 400,000 square miles of ground and water. That's about the size of Egypt. For both militaries and tech firms, covering so much territory makes it an excellent data relay and communications node.”
What Lin and Singer don’t mention is that these capabilities will make the CH-T4 an excellent asset in China’s quest to hold America’s aircraft carriers at risk in the Western Pacific. 
Much of the attention given to that effort focuses on China’s so-called “carrier-killer” missile, the DF-21D
But as I noted last week in relation to North Korea, the missile itself is only one piece of the puzzle. Even more important is the sophisticated “kill chain” of surveillance, radar and communications systems needed to track and provide updated targeting information to the antiship ballistic missile while it is in flight.
Publicly available information indicates that America’s efforts to defeat China’s antiaccess/area-denial strategies focus on disrupting this “kill chain.” 
For example, in 2013, then chief of naval operations Jonathan Greenert and then Air Force chief of staff Gen. Mark Welsh coauthored an essay in Foreign Policy on how Air-Sea Battle intended to overcome A2/AD threats
In the article, they wrote that “Air-Sea Battle defeats threats to access by, first, disrupting an adversary’s command, control, communications, computers, intelligence, surveillance, and reconnaissance (C4ISR) systems; second, destroying adversary weapons launchers (including aircraft, ships, and missile sites); and finally, defeating the weapons an adversary launches.”
The logic of this approach, they argued, is that it “exploits the fact that, to attack our forces, an adversary must complete a sequence of actions, commonly referred to as a ‘kill chain.’ 
For example, surveillance systems locate U.S. forces, communications networks relay targeting information to weapons launchers, weapons are launched, and then they must hone in on U.S. forces. 
Each of these steps is vulnerable to interdiction or disruption, and because each step must work, our forces can focus on the weakest links in the chain, not each and every one.”
Once it is operational, the CH-T4 will complicate these efforts by increasing the redundancies in China’s kill chain. 
For instance, if America is able to disrupt or destroy Chinese satellites, Beijing can rely on the drone to provide the information necessary to track American ships. 
The CH-T4 will have other comparable advantages over other surveillance systems. 
On the one hand, they will be cheaper and more flexible than satellites, while at the same time flying higher and farther away from the battlefield than different surveillance aircraft and ships. 
This combination will make it more difficult for Washington to destroy the surveillance step of the kill chain, although it could still focus on other steps such as disrupting the communication networks.
None of this is news to the U.S. military. 
Although the Pentagon’s newest report on China’s military didn’t mention the CH-T4 by name, it did note that “the acquisition and development of longer-range unmanned aerial vehicles (UAVs) will increase China’s ability to conduct long-range ISR and strike operations.”
Fortunately, the U.S. military will have some time to figure out its response, as China Daily reports that it will “take several years for designers and engineers to improve and test the aircraft before it is delivered to users.” 
If the United States’ own record at developing this type of technology is any guide, Beijing should expect a few more hiccups along the way. 
NASA's Environmental Research Aircraft and Sensor Technology (ERAST) began working on the Helios Prototype well over a decade ago. 
In 2001, it completed an important milestone by flying at an altitude of ninety-six thousand feet (29,260 meters). 
Yet a Helios crashed during a flight test just two years later. 
Europe, meanwhile, is also trying to develop so-called pseudo satellites.

mardi 7 février 2017

Overpopulation Solution

China Is Practicing Missile Strikes Against U.S. Bases in Asia
By Kyle Mizokami

Are the United States and China set on a collision course that ends in war? 
White House advisor Stephen Bannon thinks so
Both countries are preparing for the worst case scenario. 
War on the Rocks has an intriguing set of satellite images that indicate that preparations on the Chinese side are farther along—and more specific—that anyone previously believed.
The United States maintains an extensive network of bases in the Asia-Pacific region. 
Much of the network is a holdover from World War II, preserved through the Cold War, and still in place today. 
Naval bases such as Yokosuka and Sasebo, and air bases such as Yokota, Kadena, and Osan protect America's allies while projecting American power into the region. 
Some of America's most advanced military equipment, from F-22 Raptors to B-1 Lancer and B-2 Spirit bombers to a full carrier battle group are deployed in an arc stretching from South Korea to Guam.
China sees those bases as a threat—and it's not necessarily wrong. 
The great distances between the continental United States and China mean the U.S. military will need those bases to prosecute any war between the two countries. 
According to WotR, China is actively practicing hitting those bases with long-range ballistic and cruise missiles.
For decades, China's main means of power projection was in the form of ballistic missiles, and large numbers of them. 
Ballistic missiles—placed under the command of what is now the People's Liberation Army-Rocket Forces—are an inexpensive and efficient way of delivering warheads long distances. 
They're cheaper than aircraft carriers, or long-range bombers, but can still pack a considerable punch. Modern guidance systems, even those not using GPS, can target with precision. 
The DF-21D intermediate-range ballistic missile, for example, can hit moving aircraft carriers at sea.
Japan's attack on Pearl Harbor, the preemptive strike that brought the United States into World War 2, was a tactical success but a strategic failure. 
Although Japan managed to sink several battleships, it failed to destroy the what really mattered—the port facilities, fuel storage depots, and other critical infrastructure that sustained American air and naval power. 
Ships and planes eventually need fuel and maintenance. 
Without those facilities, the U.S. Navy could not have sustained the counterattack that led to the Battle of Midway, and might have even been forced to withdraw thousands of miles eastward to the West Coast.
Satellite imagery shows China is preparing to target ships in port, particularly at Yokosuka naval base, and individual hardened aircraft bunkers at Kadena Air Force Base on the island of Okinawa
What's more, China appears to have learned Japan's lesson: it's also practicing targeting electrical substations, above-ground fuel storage depots, and other support facilities. 
The goal would be to force American forces back to Guam or even Hawaii, isolating America from allies Japan, Australia, and even South Korea.
The attack plan appears comprehensive and well thought-out. 
The satellite imagery shows that cluster munition strikes have been carried out against simulated Patriot PAC-2 and PAC-3 missile batteries, the primary American defense against Chinese missile strikes. 
A mobile, land-based air defense missile capable of shooting down aircraft, cruise missiles, and ballistic missiles, Patriot is particularly vulnerable to attack by ballistic missiles that dump cluster munitions over a wide area.
The imagery should serve as a reminder that the Chinese are maximizing their resources and are prepared to take on the might of the U.S. military. 
The Pentagon should be prepared for a tough fight.

World War III Casualties
2016 PopulationKilledSurvivors
CHINA1 373 541 2781 057 119 68977%316 421 589
UNITED STATES323 995 52819 089 7836%304 905 745
EUROPEAN UNION513 949 445371 356 95872%142 592 487
RUSSIA142 355 41530 924 81622%111 430 599
INDIA1 266 883 5981 158 499 17491%108 384 424
PAKISTAN201 995 540175 747 47387%26 248 067
JAPAN126 702 133114 241 88990%12 460 244
VIETNAM95 261 02184 340 68889%10 920 333
PHILIPPINES102 624 20992 732 90290%9 891 307
KOREA, NORTH25 115 31121 141 05084%3 974 261
KOREA, SOUTH50 924 17247 636 30294%3 287 870
TAIWAN23 464 78722 278 49095%1 186 297
4 246 812 4373 195 109 21475%1 051 703 223