Will Balochistan Blow Up China’s Belt and Road?

Violence in the Pakistani province is on the rise—and now Chinese are the target.
BY MUHAMMAD AKBAR NOTEZAI
Pakistani naval personnel stand guard near a ship at the Gwadar port on Nov. 13, 2016. 

Freedom fighters: The Balochistan Liberation Army (BLA) released a video warning China to stop aiding Pakistan to brutally suppress Baloch people.

In 2015, when Chinese dictator Xi Jinping’s plane entered Pakistani airspace, eight Pakistan Air Force jets scrambled to escort it. 

The country’s leadership warmly welcomed the Chinese leader—and his money. 

On his two-day state visit, he announced a multibillion-dollar project called the China-Pakistan Economic Corridor (CPEC), which would form part of China’s Belt and Road Initiative and would revolve around the development of a huge port in the city of Gwadar.
Gwadar, a formerly isolated city in Pakistan’s southwestern Balochistan province, boomed. 

As soon as the CPEC was announced, tourists, including journalists, started visiting Gwadar. 

The Pearl Continental, the only five-star hotel in the area, had been on the brink of closure. 

Now guests thronged. 

But not everyone was happy about that. 

Baloch nationalists and underground organizations opposed the CPEC from the beginning, on the grounds that it would turn the Baloch people into a minority in their own province. 

They threatened attacks on any CPEC project anywhere in Balochistan.
There was plenty of reason to believe their threats. 

During the tenure of Pakistani President Pervez Musharraf, who led Pakistan from 1999 to 2008, Baloch insurgents killed Chinese engineers and workers in the province. 

One of the incidents took place in Gwadar, where in May 2004, militants killed three Chinese engineers. 

The engineers had been driving to work. 

When they slowed down to pass over a speed bump, a terrorist in a nearby car detonated the barrier with a remote control.
In recent years, violence had waned. 

There were no new projects, and the city seemed to have settled into its own rhythm. 

But following the CPEC announcement, according to the News International, a Pakistani English daily, Pakistan deployed a total of 17,177 security personnel from the Army and other security forces to ensure the security of Chinese nationals. 

In the years since, Gwadar has become something of a military cantonment. 

Army, police, and other law enforcers mill about.
And locals traveling around Gwadar face routine harassment at security checkpoints.
The policing has done little to deter attacks. 

In recent months, two reported incidents have put the province on edge. 

The first attack occurred on April 18, when 15 to 20 Baloch insurgents dressed in military uniforms forms forced 14 passengers off a public bus and shot them, one by one. 

Most of victims were from the Pakistan Navy and Coast Guards, whom Baloch insurgents view as an occupying force.
Then, on May 11, the Pearl Continental in the heart of Gwadar came under fire. 

Situated on a promontory overlooking the port and the Arabian Sea, the hotel is mammoth and a favorite of foreign dignitaries. 

Security there is intense, and since it is near Gwadar’s port area there are already plenty of military personnel in the area. 

Three armed attackers from the Balochistan Liberation Army’s Majeed Brigade nevertheless managed to breach the defenses and open fire on people inside. 

According to officials, five individuals—four hotel employees, including three security guards, and a navy officer—lost their lives.
The Pearl Continental attack in particular bodes ill for Chinese investment in Balochistan.
Before this month, it was hard to imagine that Baloch insurgents would be capable of carrying out the attack in the center of Gwadar, even with the local support. 

But now any sense of security has been undermined.
Established in 2011, the Majeed Brigade, a suicide attack squad within the Balochistan Liberation Army (BLA), is reportedly named after Abdul Majeed Baloch, who attempted to assassinate then-Prime Minister Zulfikar Ali Bhutto in 1974 in Balochistan. 

In 1973, Bhutto had ordered a military operation against the Baloch because Baloch insurgents had vowed war against the state of Pakistan after Islamabad had dismissed the democratically elected National Awami Party government in Balochistan in February 1973. 

The operation triggered a major insurgency in Balochistan that lasted until 1977. 

Majeed was killed by security forces before he could carry out his plan against Bhutto.
In the first several years after the BLA was formed in 2000, it mostly waged attacks on national security forces, state infrastructure, and Punjabi settlers. 

In more recent years, under Aslam Baloch, who died in Kandahar in December 2018, the Majeed Brigade has focused on Chinese nationals and Chinese-funded projects. 

Such attacks seemed more likely to provoke media attention. 

He tapped his oldest son, Rehan Baloch, for a suicide attack on Chinese engineers in Dalbandin, a city in Balochistan, last August. 

The attack resulted in minor injuries for the engineers. 

He also oversaw an attack on the Chinese consulate in Karachi a few months later. 

Two police officials and two visa applicants were killed.
As these incidents suggest, the Majeed Brigade is gaining momentum. 

And it is joined by new groups, such as the Baloch Raaji Aajoi Sangar, an alliance of Baloch separatist groups specifically focused on attacking CPEC projects. 

From the beginning, the Baloch have been pushed to the wall. 

They have never been treated as equal citizens of Pakistan, nor have they been given equal constitutional, economic, and political opportunities. 

This is why some Baloch protest peacefully, some do nothing, and some have taken up arms against the state.

China's Era of Debt-Trap Diplomacy May Pave the Way for Something Sinister

Beijing cannot bend history to its will, but it will try.

By Patrick Mendis and Joey Wang

The key enabler that has allowed Beijing to protect its sovereign claims and project its power has been China’s explosive economic growth. 

As it cools, however, major programs such as the BRI will be critical to any future projection of power. 

As envisioned, the purpose of BRI is to “promote regional economic cooperation, strengthen exchanges and mutual learning between different civilizations, and promote world peace and development.” 

Behind this heady mixture of material, economic, and cultural aspirations, however, there are other hidden motivations not likely to be mentioned in official Chinese literature.
First, China also wants to decrease the dependence on its domestic infrastructure investment and begin moving investments overseas to address the capacity overhang within China. 

It should not come as an astonishment that the key instrument of this investment transfer comes with the Chinese system of “state capitalism,” which has further been solidified by Xi Jinping. 

Among the BRI infrastructure development projects, Chinese companies accounted for 89 percent of the contractors, according to a five-year analysis of BRI projects by the Center for Strategic and International Studies in Washington.
BRI also parallels numerous regional economic and infrastructure development initiatives such as the Bay of Bengal Initiative for Multi-Sectoral Technical and Economic Cooperation (BIMSTEC), the Ayeyarwady-Chao Phraya-Mekong Economic Cooperation Strategy (ACMECS), and the Regional Comprehensive Economic Partnership (RCEP). 

As the country with the deepest pockets, a number of these member-countries have found Chinese capital too attractive to resist. 

Chairing the BIMSTEC this year, Sri Lanka, for example, now finds itself granting China a ninety-nine-year lease at the Hambantota Port as well as approximately fifteen thousand acres of land nearby for an industrial zone to help pay for part of the $1.1 billion it owes China. 

Laos and Cambodia—members of ACMECS—are so indebted to China that Australia’s former Foreign Minister Gareth Evans has purportedly opined that they have become “wholly owned subsidiaries of China.” 

Some countries have now learned from the Sri Lanka experience and have recognized that the costs far outweigh the benefits. 

Bangladesh, for instance, has declined Chinese funding for the much needed “the twenty kilometers-long rail and road bridges over Padma river” and has instead opted to “self-generated funds.” Thailand, under ACMECS, is also working to create a regional infrastructure fund to reduce reliance on China and avoid what has generally been called China’s “debt-trap diplomacy.”
Even outside the immediate domain of the BRI, China is using its wealth to isolate Taiwan diplomatically. 

In Latin America , China peeled away El Salvador in August after peeling away the Dominican Republic in May 2018. 

With growing Chinese influence in Africa, Swaziland—a tiny landlocked country— remains the only African country to recognize Taiwan after Burkina Faso established diplomatic relations with Beijing in May 2018.
China is also expanding its presence and engagement in the Caribbean with capital investments and infrastructure financing, which have played significantly to China’s advantage given the Caribbean’s proximity to the hurricane belt in America’s backyard. 

The Caribbean—so-called the “Third Border” of the United States—has been neglected even after Congress passed the U.S.-Caribbean Strategic Engagement Act of 2016. 

The Trump White House has shown little interest in engaging the Caribbean basin. 

Many observers think that the region is “too democratic and not poor enough” to get on the American foreign-policy agenda even though Washington has long noticed the Chinese “inroads” in America’s Third Border region.
Beijing has often hailed the Chinese investments as “win-win.” 

However, given that many of these countries both within and outside the BRI are now indebted to China, it is not clear whether the partnership is a win for both China and its counterpart—or China actually wins twice , since 

a) it is generally well understood that the switching of allegiance is more monetary than ideological, and 

b) the recipient often ends up indebted to China without the means to repay the debt.
Second, China wants to internationalize the use of its currency along BRI and with the new partners of Africa, Latin America, and the Caribbean basin. 

Making the renminbi (RMB) a global currency in 2015 had been one of the highest economic priorities of Beijing’s grand plan. 

China and some sixty-five BRI countries—which account collectively for over 30 percent of global GDP, 62 percent of the population, and 75 percent of known energy reserves—are increasingly using the RMB to facilitate trade and infrastructure projects. 

Pakistan, for one, has switched from the dollar to the RMB for bilateral trade with China after President Donald Trump publicly attacked Pakistan onTwitter for harboring terrorists. 

The China-Pakistan Economic Corridor (CPEC) to East Turkestan—as one of the massive projects under the BRI—can now depend upon a steady stream of Chinese capital. 

Pakistan can now also minimize the risk of Washington’s threats such as cutting off economic assistance and military support. 

Use of the RMB would also help authoritarian regimes like Iran, North Korea, and Sudan to undermine the American-imposed “financial sanctions” on the violations of such norms as human rights, child labor, and human trafficking. 

Furthermore, the success of BRI, if achieved, would establish Eurasia as the largest economic market in the world and the changing currency dynamics could initiate a shift in the world away from the dollar-based financial system.
Third, China seeks to secure its energy resources through new pipelines in Central Asia, Russia, and South and Southeast Asia’s deep-water ports. 

Beijing’s leadership for some years has been concerned about its “Malacca Dilemma” as Hu Jintao declared in 2003 that “certain major powers” may control the Strait of Malacca and China needed to adopt “new strategies to mitigate the perceived vulnerability.” 

The Strait of Malacca is not only the main conduit connecting the Indian Ocean and the Pacific Ocean to China via the South China Sea but also the shortest sea route between oil suppliers in the Persian Gulf and key markets in Asia. 

In 2016, sixteen million barrels of crude oil transited through the Malacca Strait each day, of which 6.3 million barrels were destined for China. 

In 2017, China surpassed the United States as the world’s largest crude oil importer. 

Therefore, the sustainability and security of energy supplies is a key input not only to China’s domestic stability and economic growth but also to its military operations and, concomitantly, the very legitimacy of the CPC. 

Initiatives under the BRI—such as the CPEC to East Turkestan colony, the Kyaukpyu pipeline in Myanmar that runs to Yunnan province, and the ongoing discussions for the proposed Kra Canal in Thailand —are of vital interest to China because they would provide alternative routes for energy resources from the Middle East directly to China that bypass the Malacca Strait. 

The BRI will also support the expansion of China’s military bases across the Bay of Bengal, Indian Ocean, and the Arabian Sea.

Global Response Led by Washington
As Beijing’s intentions become clear, the continuing tensions have now revived the Quadrilateral Security Dialogue with Australia, India, Japan, and the United States. 

Each of these Quad members has its own economic and geostrategic concerns over balancing China’s expanding power and influence with a host of counter-strategies. 

President Trump has, for example, signed into law the Asia Reassurance Initiative Act of 2018—a belated expression of America’s commitment to the security and stability of the Indo-Pacific region.
The U.S. Senate has also passed the Better Utilization of Investments Leading to Development (BUILD) Act of 2018 to reform and improve overseas private investment to help developing countries in ports and infrastructure. 

It is also aimed at countering China’s influence and assisting BRI countries with alternatives to China’s “debt-trap diplomacy.”
Viewed in the context of history, China’s rise has been nothing short of meteoric. 

In the sixty-plus years since U.S. Secretary of State John Foster Dulles declared the three principles—that 

1) the United States would not recognize the People’s Republic of China, 

2) would not admit it to the UN, and 

3) would not lift the trade embargo—

China has grown from a veritable economic backwater to one that is now projecting its economic and military power around the world. 

China now seeks to create a new set of global norms, while overturning the existing norms that Beijing claims it had no role in creating. 

That may be true, but China should remember that those existing international norms have also played a critical role in raising China to where it is today.

War Indications and Warnings
Successive American and Chinese leaders have come and gone. 

But China’s strategic objectives have remained much the same as they were in 1965 when the CIA concluded, inter alia , that the goal of CPC for the foreseeable future would be to “eject the West, especially the US, from Asia and to diminish US and Western influence throughout the world.” 

The CIA further reported that Beijing also aimed to “increase the influence of Communist China in Asia” as well as to “increase the influence of Communist China throughout the underdeveloped areas of the world.”
While tensions remain fraught between Washington and Beijing, the logic of China’s exercise of military power and its willingness to go to war, however, is more nuanced.

In any confrontation with the United States, Beijing’s strategy will include “creating sufficient doubt in the minds of American strategists” as to the likelihood of winning an armed conflict with China. 

In his book, On China, former Secretary of State Henry Kissinger concludes that rather than measuring success by the battles won, the Chinese are likely to measure success through “the means of building a dominant political and psychological position, such that the outcome of a conflict becomes a foregone conclusion.” 

By its own actions, the United States has helped China all along by sowing doubt among nations in the Indo-Pacific as to Washington’s own commitment to the security and stability of the region.
Security cooperation between the United States and its allies are not intended to “contain China.” Rather, they are aimed to maintain a balance of power in the region to ensure regional stability and no one power overwhelmingly dominates the others. 

Whatever claims China has made to a “Peaceful Rise,” it is clear that “peaceful” is ringing somewhat hollow. 

The United States should continue to engage allies and friends to maintain a consistent and persistent presence—irrespective of the administration in place—as an expression of its resolve, unity, and commitment to security, peace, and stability in the Indo-Pacific region. 

As China continues its military buildup and modernization, the challenge for American negotiators is that intentions may change, but not capabilities. 

The fact that the United Kingdom is now seeking to establish military bases in Asia and the Caribbean reflect continuing concerns not only for the United States and the countries of those regions, but also those on the European continent.
In addition, the United States and its allies should firmly apply a unified front in pressuring China and engaging Beijing to respect global norms in areas such as trade, technology transfer, and intellectual property theft. 

In this regard, it is quite clear that China’s behavior in pursuit of its Made in China 2025 goals is not only a concern for the United States but also for other advanced economies. 

In the broader scheme of things, China should measure its ideological priorities against its costs. 

If and when China and Taiwan unite, then it will be based upon mutual amity and the belief that it is in the interest of all Chinese people to do so—not through coercion and aggression. 

Beijing cannot bend history to its will.

Axis of Evil

Pakistan is the next victim of Chinese imperialism
By Ishaan Tharoor

It’s been barely more than two weeks since Imran Khan’s electoral victory in Pakistan, but the country’s next prime minister is already facing a geopolitical crisis. 

Pakistan’s current-account deficit is perilously high, its foreign-currency reserves perilously low. 

Its external debt has ballooned after accepting some $62 billion in Chinese financing, part of an ambitious regional infrastructure project that has yet to boost Pakistan’s economy. 

Khan’s first major act as prime minister may be asking the International Monetary Fund for a new bailout.
But that’s where the trouble begins. 

Critics at home lament Pakistan’s addiction to the fund — it has spent 22 of the past 30 years laboring under the terms of more than a dozen successive IMF bailouts. 

The austerity measures the IMF demands, they argue, have shackled growth and prevented Pakistan from making substantive reforms. 

Pakistan could instead turn to China for fresh loans, but that could make Islamabad even more beholden to Beijing than it already is.
In that regard, Pakistan is becoming the latest testing ground of a key plank in China’s global strategy. 

Its sweeping One Belt, One Road initiative — a vast $1 trillion infrastructure and development plan that has led to Chinese companies investing in bridges, airports, dams, railroads and other ventures in dozens of countries — is Beijing’s signature global project. 

But it has prompted accusations that it fuels corruption and autocratic behavior in vulnerable countries. 

From Malaysia to Colombia, the opacity surrounding Chinese-backed endeavors has led to allegations of graft, mismanagement and, in the case of at least one mega-dam project, possibly triggered a devastating landslide.
Moreover, the initiative has pushed some countries into a morass of debt. 

The starkest example so far has been Sri Lanka, whose government was unable to repay $6 billion in loans used to build an expensive Chinese-led port and airport project in Hambantota, a once-sleepy but strategically located backwater. 

As a result, Sri Lankan authorities ceded control of the port and some 15,000 acres of land around it to Beijing on a 99-year lease. 

The move led to accusations that China is engaging in a 21st century style of “creditor imperialism."

Fishermen stand on a boat outside Gwadar Port, operated by China Overseas Ports Holding Co., in Gwadar, Balochistan, Pakistan, on Tuesday, July 4, 2018. What used to be a small fishing town on the southwestern corner of Pakistan is giving way for construction of roads and buildings to house banks, insurance and clearing agents. China Overseas Port Holdings, Gwadar Port’s operator, has separately spent $250 million to add five new cranes, construct a building in less than six months by importing ready made parts and create space for a free zone. 

“States caught in debt bondage to China risk losing both their most valuable natural assets and their very sovereignty,” warned Indian commentator Brahma Chellaney. 

“The new imperial giant’s velvet glove cloaks an iron fist — one with the strength to squeeze the vitality out of smaller countries.”
At a Tuesday panel in Washington, Husain Haqqani, a former Pakistani ambassador to Washington, quipped that the Chinese-Pakistan Economic Corridor (CPEC)— the formal name for a complex $62 billion infrastructure-development plan — actually should be called “Colonizing Pakistan to Enrich China.”
In recent years, China has stepped up its involvement in various sectors of the Pakistani economy, from its nuclear-energy industry to the establishment of a host of special economic zones to a costly port project in the city of Gwadar on the Arabian Sea.

“Pakistan does need China’s help, as it faces a slew of economic challenges, including a backward industrial supply chain, weak foreign trade and a huge portion of its population still living in poverty and without proper education,” noted an editorial in China’s state-run Global Times, urging Beijing officials to “ignore the noise and step up its investment in Pakistan.”
Khan, meanwhile, is a fiery nationalist and economic populist. 

He has repeatedly gestured to the “China model” as something Pakistan should emulate. 

But it’s not yet clear what any of that means in practice, and the enthusiasm for his rhetoric may simply reflects widespread frustration with Pakistan’s systemic corruption and long-standing habit of turning to the IMF and accepting its diktats.
“The pattern is always the same,” wrote Nadeem Ul Haque, a former IMF official and former deputy chairman of the Pakistani government’s Planning Commission. 

“With the Fund’s blessing, the government goes on a shopping spree, taking out costly loans for expensive projects, thus building up even more debt and adding new inefficiencies. After a few years, another crisis ensues, and it is met by another IMF program.”
Khan doesn’t look set to break that tradition. 

But the Trump administration may force him to. 

“Make no mistake. We will be watching what the IMF does,” said Secretary of State Mike Pompeo at the end of last month, arguing that he didn’t want the U.S. to indirectly refinance Pakistani loans to China. 

“There’s no rationale for IMF tax dollars — and, associated with that, American dollars that are part of the IMF funding — for those to go to bail out Chinese bondholders or China itself."
As tensions flare between China and the United States over trade, that outlook is only gaining support. 

In Washington, lawmakers are increasingly wary about China’s opportunistic maneuvering across Asia, Africa and Latin America.
“The goal for the [Belt and Road Initiative] is the creation of an economic world order ultimately dominated by China,” read a recent letter from a bipartisan group of senators to Pompeo and Treasury Secretary Steven T. Mnuchin. 

“It is imperative that the United States counters China’s attempts to hold other countries financially hostage and force ransoms that further its geostrategic goals.”
For Pakistan, caught between China’s ambition and Washington’s concern, there are few good choices.
“These are our two masters,” said Turab Hussain, an economics professor at the Lahore University of Management Sciences, told the New York Times. 

“How do you serve both?”

Chinese Paranoia

China Wants To Turn The Indian Ocean Into The China Ocean
By Panos Mourdoukoutas 

China wants to turn the vast Indian Ocean into the China Ocean. 

When it comes to investment and commerce that is.
To execute this grand plan, Beijing is investing heavily in several infrastructure projects. 

Like Sri Lanka’s ports of Colombo and Hambantota, which give Beijing a trade outpost into the Indian Ocean. 

And the China–Pakistan Economic Corridor (CPEC), a colossal infrastructure project, which connects China’s western territories to the Indian Ocean.
But that’s the old news. 

The new news is that China is turning Maldives into another trading outpost with the acquisition of land there, and the signing of a free trade agreement.
These developments have irked India, for a couple of reasons. 

One of them is economic. 

Sri Lanka and Maldives can serve as a base for China to flood the Indian market with its products. Malvides, for instance, has a free trade agreement with both India and China. 

This means that Beijing can send products to Maldives first, and then re-export them to India.
The other reason is geopolitical. 

China wants to encircle India by turning trade outposts into military outposts.
To be fair, China has repeatedly asserted that it doesn’t plan to use the port for military purposes.
The trouble is that history proves otherwise. 

In the past four years, Chinese submarines have begun suddenly and repeatedly showing up in the Chinese-operated South Container Terminal in the port of Colombo.
And that’s in spite of India’s high-profile protests, which included join naval exercises with America, Japan, and Australia.
While it is unclear whether China will succeed in turning the Indian Ocean into the China Ocean, one thing is clear: antagonism between China on the one side and India and its allies on the other will intensify, as China rises economically.
And that raises geopolitical risks, something investors should be concerned.

Pakistan Can’t Afford China’s ‘Friendship’

Pakistan's elites think Chinese cash can save the country. They're wrong.
BY C. CHRISTINE FAIR

In recent months, the Chinese-Pakistan Economic Corridor (CPEC) has left Pakistanis emboldened, Indians angry, and U.S. analysts worried. 

Ostensibly, CPEC will connect Pakistan to China’s western Xinjiang province through the development of vast new transportation and energy infrastructure. 

The project is part of China’s much-hyped Belt and Road Initiative, a grand, increasingly vague geopolitical plan bridging Eurasia that Xi Jinping has promoted heavily.
Pakistani and Chinese officials boast that CPEC will help address Pakistan’s electricity generation problem, bolster its road and rail networks, and shore up the economy through the construction of special economic zones. 

But these benefits are highly unlikely to materialize. 

The project is more inclined to leave Pakistan burdened with unserviceable debt while further exposing the fissures in its internal security.

Pakistan and China often speak of their “all-weather friendship,” but the truth is that the relationship has always been a cynical one. 

China cultivated Pakistan as a client through the provision of military assistance; diplomatic and political cover in the U.N. Security Council; and generous loan aid in an effort to counter both American influence and the system of anti-Communist Western treaty alliances. 

China also sought to embolden Pakistan to harangue India, but not to the point of war because that would expose the hard limits of Chinese support. 

Despite Pakistan’s boasts of iron-clad Chinese support, when Pakistan went to war with India in 1965, 1971, and 1999, China did little or nothing to bail out its client in distress.
During the 1971 war, when India intervened in Pakistan’s civil war in its Bengali-dominated eastern wing, President Richard Nixon requested China move troops along its eastern border with India to intimidate India and stave off Pakistan’s defeat. 

However, China declined to undertake even this modest effort to preclude India from vivisecting Pakistan. 

East Pakistan became independent Bangladesh in 1971. 

In a nod to Pakistan, China refused to recognize Bangladesh until August 1975, even after Pakistan did so in February 1974.
There’s little reason to think China has made a sudden conversion to altruism when it comes to CPEC. 

The project originated in 2013, when the Chinese premier, Li Keqiang, and Pakistan’s then-president, Asif Ali Zardari, agreed to build an economic corridor between the two countries. 

The project inched closer to fruition in 2014, when Pakistan’s President Mamnoon Hussain and Prime Minister Nawaz Sharif traveled to China on different occasions to further discussions. 

In November 2014, the Chinese government announced that it would finance $46 billion in energy and infrastructure projects in Pakistan as part of CPEC. 

In September 2016, China announced a new loan deal for CPEC valued at $51.6 billion. 

In November 2016, part of CPEC became “operational” when products were moved by truck from China and loaded onto ships at Pakistan’s port Gwador along the Makran coast for markets in West Asia and Africa. 

After this major development, China declared that it would increase its investment again to $62 billion in April.
Pakistan’s civilian and military leadership alike have told the public that CPEC will solve Pakistan’s chronic electricity shortages, improve an aging road and rail infrastructure, provide a fillip to Pakistan’s economy, knit an increasingly pariah state to a new Chinese-led geopolitical order, and diminish the role of the much-reviled United States in the region. 

CPEC has the bonus of irritating the Indians because it strengthens Pakistan’s hold on territory in Jammu and Kashmir that it snatched in the 1947-48 war as well as portions of that territory that Pakistan subsequently ceded to China in 1963 as a part of the Sino-Pakistan boundary agreement. 

India claims these lands, currently held by Pakistan and China, and deems their occupation illegal.
Despite the bold claims made by China and Pakistan, there are many reasons to be dubious about the purported promises of CPEC. 

There’s already violence all along the corridor. 

The north-most part of CPEC is the Karakoram Highway (KKH), which gashes through the Karakoram Mountain Range to connect Kashgar in Xinjiang with Pakistan’s troubled province of Gilgit-Baltistan. 

Xinjiang is in the throes of a slow-burning insurgency by the Muslim Uighur minority against the Communist state. 

Gilgit-Baltistan, a Shiite-majority polity under the thumb of a Sunni-dominated Pakistan, is part of the above-noted contested territory of Jammu-Kashmir. 

Here, geology and weather further limit CPEC. 

The Karakoram Highway, a narrow road weaving through perilous mountains, can’t bear heavy traffic. 

Expanding the KKH will not be easy. 

Residents of Gilgit-Baltistan worry about the environmental costs in relation to the few benefits they will enjoy. 

There have been episodic protests, which the Pakistani government has ruthlessly put down. Meanwhile, Gwador is experiencing a prolonged drought, frustrating the project while the four extant desalination plants remain idle.
In the south, CPEC is anchored to the port at Gwador in Pakistan’s insurgency-riven Balochistan province. 

The local Baloch people deeply resent the plan because it will fundamentally change the demography of the area. 

Before the expansion of Gwadar, the population of the area was 70,000. 

If the project comes to full fruition the population would be closer to 2 million — most of whom would be non-Baloch. 

Many poor Baloch have already been displaced from the area. 

Since construction has begun, there have been numerous attacks against Chinese personnel, among other workers.
There’s also the stubborn problem of economic competitiveness. 

For CPEC to be more competitive than the North-South Corridor that is rooted to the Iranian port of Chabahar, Gwador needs to offer a safer and shorter route from the Arabian Sea to Central Asia. 

For that to happen, Gwador needs to be connected by road to the Afghan Ring Road in Afghanistan’s Kandahar province, which is under sustained attacks by the Afghan Taliban. 

Alternatively, a new route could connect Gwador with the border crossing at Torkham (near Peshawar) by traveling up Balochistan, with its own active ethnic insurgency, through or adjacent to Pakistan’s Federally Administered Tribal Areas, which is the epicenter of Islamist terrorism and insurgency throughout Pakistan. 

It takes great faith — or idiocy, or greed, or all of the above — to believe that this is possible.
All of these issues raise salient questions about the real utility of this unfolding fiasco. 

If CPEC is not an economically viable route for actual commerce, what purpose does it serve? Analyst Andrew Small, among others, has argued that CPEC is, in reality, a redundant supply route for China should it face an embargo during a military conflict. 

It’s also possible that if the port at Gwador is not economically sustainable the real goal is the creation of a Chinese naval outpost. 

Many in India, Pakistan’s historic rival, have also come to this conclusion. 

They may well be correct, according to recent Chinese reports indicating that China may “expand its marine corps and may station new marine brigades in Gwadar.”
While the benefits to transit may be illusory, it is possible that Pakistan could benefit from purportedly low-hanging fruit, including the much-lauded economic zones and power plants. 

Pakistan does struggle with power shortages. 

But its problem is not a lack of supply, rather the complex issue of “circular debt” referring to the accumulating unpaid bills of the power sector; the theft of power through illegal connections, meter tampering, and other means; and an inadequate transmission system. 

Meanwhile, Pakistanis have learned that the current Chinese development model will do little for their economy. 

China prefers to use its own companies and employees rather than hire locally.
Pakistani citizens also have no way to know what CPEC will cost them. Neither government has been clear about what projects are part of the plan. 

Costing has been completely opaque. 

China sets the price, contracts the work out to Chinese companies, and saddles Pakistan with the loans. 

Given the ongoing security threats on Chinese nationals in Pakistan, Islamabad is raising a CPEC Protection Force, the costs of which will be passed on to Pakistani citizens. 

The State Bank of Pakistan has repeatedly called for more transparency, to no avail. 

Astonishingly, according to the Pakistani daily The Dawn, “Despite the frantic activity, Islamabad had yet to determine the expected cost and benefit, expressed in monetary terms, of the mega project.” 

And that’s before factoring in other costs such as the cultural and religious tensions between Chinese and Pakistanis, although there’s been a public relations push by both governments to downplay them.
Recently, The Dawn claimed to have accessed the alleged CPEC “master plan,” drawn up by the China Development Bank and the National Development Reform Commission of the People’s Republic of China. 

It suggests that CPEC is really about agriculture, an issue that had not previously been discussed in the extensive media coverage of the plan. 

As part of the overall project, thousands of acres of productive agricultural land will be leased to the Chinese for “demonstration projects” for newly developed seed varieties and irrigation technology. 

Chinese companies will be the primary beneficiaries of these initiatives.

Pakistanis should be worried about the way CPEC is shaping up. 

If it is even partially executed, Pakistan would be indebted to China as never before. 

And unlike Pakistan’s other traditional allies, such as the United States, China will probably use its leverage to obtain greater compliance from its problematic client. 

China is particularly concerned about the Islamist militant groups active among China’s Uighur Muslim population in Xinjiang. 

Uigher militant groups have long shared ties with groups in Afghanistan and Pakistan, some of which have been patronized by the Pakistani state, such as the Afghan Taliban. 

China has used religious and political oppression, along with crude violence, to eviscerate the Islamist revival among Xinjiang’s Uighers and has counted on Pakistan to give China political cover while doing so. 

In taking on Chinese debt, Pakistan may also risk severely worsening its already critical relations with India, which has been watching the CPEC drama unfold with growing alarm. 

In the north, CPEC continues to make permanent the Pakistani and Chinese grip on territory India claims. 

In the south, Chinese naval vessels may dock in the deep port of Gwador, threatening New Delhi in the Arabian Sea. 

In normal times, this would be a serious concern for the United States — but Washington is so distracted by the chaos of the Trump administration that the issue has gone largely under the radar.
But the news may not be all bad. 

For China to get maximal returns on its extensive investments in Pakistan as well as Afghanistan it needs stability in both countries. 

In recent years, China has stepped up its role in trying to negotiate peace in Afghanistan by helping to mediate between Pakistan and Afghanistan. 

As Pakistan’s economy becomes evermore interwoven with China’s, China may be in a position to dampen Pakistan’s worrying affinity for terrorist groups and nuclear proliferation — particularly the latter, because China enabled Pakistan’s nuclear program to begin with. 

If China took on the responsibility of managing Pakistan, Washington might be happy to wash its hands of the problem and let the civilians in Islamabad and the uniformed men in Rawalpindi stab someone else in the back for a change.

Chinese Peril

India's "new Silk Road" snub highlights gulf with China
Reuters

India's snub to the "Belt and Road" project was the strongest move yet by Modi to stand up to China.
NEW DELHI -- China invited Indian Prime Minister Narendra Modi and six cabinet colleagues to its "new Silk Road" summit this month, even offering to rename a flagship Pakistani project running through disputed territory to persuade them to attend, a top official in Modi's ruling group and diplomats said.
But New Delhi rebuffed Beijing's diplomatic push, incensed that a key project in its massive initiative to open land and sea corridors linking China with the rest of Asia and beyond runs through Pakistani controlled Kashmir.
The failure of China's efforts to bring India on board, details of which have not been previously reported, shows the depths to which relations between the two countries have fallen over territorial disputes and Beijing's support of Pakistan.
India's snub to the "Belt and Road" project was the strongest move yet by Modi to stand up to China.
But it risks leaving India isolated at a time when it may no longer be able to count on the United States to back it as a counterweight to China's growing influence in Asia, Chinese commentators and some Indian experts have said.
Representatives of 60 countries, including the United States and Japan, travelled to Beijing for the May 14-15 summit on Xi Jinping's signature project.
But Ram Madhav, an influential leader of Modi's ruling Bharatiya Janata Party (BJP) involved in shaping foreign policy, said India could not sign up so long as the China-Pakistan Economic Corridor (CPEC) -- a large part of the "Belt and Road" enterprise -- ran through parts of Pakistan-administered Kashmir that India considers its own territory.
"China routinely threatens countries when it finds issues even remotely connected to its own sovereignty question being violated," Madhav said. 

"No country compromises with its sovereignty for the sake of trade and commerce interests."
India, due to the size and pace of expansion of its economy, could potentially be the biggest recipient of Chinese investment from the plan to spur trade by building infrastructure linking Asia with Europe, the Middle East and Africa, according to a Credit Suisse report released before the summit.
Chinese investments into India could be anything from $84 billion to $126 billion between 2017 to 2021, far higher than Russia, Indonesia and Pakistan, countries that have signed off on the initiative, it said.
China has not offered any specific projects to India, but many existing schemes, such as a Bangladesh-China-India-Myanmar Economic Corridor that has been planned for years, have now been wrapped into the Belt and Road enterprise.
China is also conducting feasibility studies for high-speed rail networks linking Delhi with Chennai in southern India that would eventually connect to the modern day "Silk Road" it is seeking to create.
But if India continues to hold back from joining China's regional connectivity plans the commercial viability of those plans will be called into question, analysts say.
China has held talks with Nepal to build an $8 billion railway line from Tibet to Kathmandu, but it ultimately wants the network to reach the Indian border to allow goods to reach the huge Indian market.

STRATEGIC FEARS
India has other worries over China's growing presence in the region, fearing strategic encirclement by a "string of pearls" around the India Ocean and on land as China builds ports, railways and power stations in country such as Nepal, Sri Lanka and Bangladesh.
Ashok Kantha, who was India's ambassador to China until 2016, said India had repeatedly conveyed its concerns to China, especially about the China-Pakistan Economic Corridor and the need to have open discussions about it.
"Where is the economic rational for CPEC?" he said. 

"There is no major economic driver, the drivers are essentially political and strategic in character."
Just a week before the summit, China's ambassador to India, Luo Zhaohui, offered to change the name of CPEC to placate New Delhi and ensure it didn't boycott the Beijing conference.
Luo did no elaborate on the proposal, made during a speech at an Indian military think-tank, according to people who attended the meeting and local media reports. 

A transcript released later by the Chinese embassy did not include a reference to changing the project's name.
But Chinese officials in the past have suggested this could mean adding India to the name to make it the "China-Pakistan-India Economic Corridor".
A Chinese diplomat, speaking on condition of anonymity, suggested India could build infrastructure on its side of Kashmir which could eventually be linked to the roads and power lines China planned to build in Pakistani Kashmir.
Indian experts said another proposal explored in meetings between former diplomats and academics from the two sides was renaming the project the "Indus Corridor" to overcome India's objection that the "China-Pakistan" name endorses Pakistan's claim to Kashmir. 

Pakistan and India have fought two of their three wars over Kashmir, which they both claim in full. Chinese Foreign Ministry spokeswoman Hua Chunying did not comment directly on any offer to change the name of CPEC, but drew attention to Xi's remarks during the summit that China would follow the principle of peaceful co-existence and that New Delhi need not worry.
"I think the concerns from the India side should be able to be resolved," she said.
Indian Foreign Ministry spokesman Gopal Baglay said New Delhi had not received any suggestions through proper channels and that India wanted a meaningful discussion with China on the whole project.

China's Water Aggressions

India's water security concerns over China's dam building spree are legitimate, require action
By Rashme Sehgal

China's water aggressions
India has cause to be concerned about the large number of dams being constructed by China. 

A memorandum of understanding (MoU) signed by Pakistan's prime minister Nawaz Sharif and Beijing last week to build the Bhasha and Bunji Dams on the River Indus in Gilgit-Baltistan – which India claims to be its own territory – has triggered fresh alarm bells.
The Bhasha Dam, being built with a height of 272 metres, will produce 4,500 megawatts of electricity. 

It is being built as a gravity dam and will be the highest roller-compacted concrete dams in the world.
The Bunji Dam is also being built on the Indus River. 

It will be 190 metres high and will have an installed capacity of 7,100 megawatts.
These two mammoth dams are being constructed at a total cost of $27 billion and can be seen as part of the One Belt One Road (OBOR) initiative of the Chinese government, which is expected to bolster the Chinese economic and geopolitical footprint across a swathe of nations.
The Three Gorges Corporation, which built the largest dam in the world (Three Gorges), will help finance this project with a capital of $50 billion.
Last Saturday, India came out openly against the OBOR policy manoeuvre, describing it as little more than a colonial enterprise, while also expressing reservations against the 'ecological and environmental' damages that a project of this size would cause. 

India also went on to add that a connectivity project (China-Pakistan Economic Corridor) must be pursued in a manner that respected the sovereignty and territorial integrity of other nations as well.
Activists in India concede that while Chinese engineers possess great expertise in building mammoth dams, the environmental impact of these hydro projects has not been placed in the public domain.
Environmental activist Himanshu Thakkar, who has specialised in the study of dams, pointed out, "Large dams change the micro-climate of a region. Both the Bhasha and Bunji Dams are much larger than any existing dam in India. In fact, the entire installed hydropower projects in Jammu & Kashmir do not equal even the Bhasha Dam, which is the smaller of these two dams. This helps provide an idea of just how mammoth these projects are."

Thakkar believes, "These dams will involve large scale deforestation and will require large-scale evacuation of thousands of families. We are still to study just how close India is to the submergence area of these dams because if the river is in flood, then the backwater impact of these dams can come to India."
What Thakkar found surprising was how the Chinese are proceeding to build these dams in disputed territory.
The reason why the Chinese engineers have chosen this particular area for construction is because the Indus River has 46 percent snow melt and is a perennial river which flows through these high mountains at tremendous speed.
Vikram Soni, professor emeritus at Jawaharlal Nehru University, who has specialised in the study of rivers, said, "The more the slope, the greater the power. China is an energy deficient nation and they have negotiated with Pakistan to use the electricity generated from these two dams for their own use,"

"In terms of ecological destruction," Soni warns, "when the Tehri Dam was constructed, it is known to have caused a great deal of ecological destruction. Since the size of these dams is much larger than our own Tehri Dam, the amount of destruction is going to be that much greater."
"What kind of fallout it will have in the Kashmir Valley is something one will need to study in much greater detail. But Pakistan-occupied Kashmir faced flash floods some time ago which is known to have been triggered by heavy rainfall and deforestation."
Professor V Bhutani (retd) of the Delhi University, who has specialised in China, expresses apprehension at the stationing of Chinese troops in Gilgit-Baltistan to protect their strategic assets. "Tibet has been run over by a large Han population. With Pakistan expected to be turned into an economic colony of China, the increasing presence of Chinese troops in the northern sectors is not something India will feel comfortable about."
China is also planning to build 55 reservoirs on the rivers flowing from the Tibetan plateau. 

Already, they have completed the Zangmu Dam, built on the upper reaches of the Brahmaputra in 2010. 

Three more dams at Dagu, Jiacha and Jeixu are presently under construction, while in 2015, work started on the Zam hydropower station – which will be the largest dam on the Brahmaputra river, which the Chinese refer to as the Yarlung Tsangpo.
The origins of the river are from a glacier in western Tibet, close to the origins of the Indus and Sutlej rivers, all of which emanate from Lake Mansarovar and Mount Kailash. 

Medog has been selected as the site of this mega project as the river makes a huge bend inside a giant canyon, which is around 198-miles long and 3.1-miles wide. 

Medog, incidentally, is located just 30 km north of the Indian border.
The Chinese have moved the entire team which built the Lhasa-Beijing railway line to execute this mammoth project, which will involve the construction of massive tunnels and reservoirs and turbines in order to generate 40,000 megawatts of power.
The first hint of this scheme emanated from an official Chinese newspaper in the 1990s, pointing out that the Chinese wanted to exploit the spectacular 2,000-metre-drop in the river to generate electricity.
The dam will be constructed before the Brahmaputra flows into Arunachal Pradesh and this water is expected to be diverted to the vast, arid areas of Xingjian region and the Gansu province in China.
India has repeatedly shown displeasure as well as apprehension with respect to China's activities on the Brahmaputra. 

In fact, as far back as 2013, India complained to China about the hydro projects on the Brahmaputra.
Union water minister Uma Bharti has also expressed her reservation about these Chinese moves as she believes this can adversely affect both India and Bangladesh. 

Being the lesser of the two riparian countries, India is, of course, concerned about the likely fallout of Chinese activities in the long run.
An Inter-Ministerial Expert Group set up to study the impact of these dams on the Brahmaputra had not reflected positively on Chinese activities on dam-building and establishing hydropower stations within 500 kilometres of the India-China border. 

But China has not cared to heed these apprehensions.
As soon as India had indicated that it was planning to assert its rights within the Indus water treaty versus Pakistan, China went public with its plan to build a large dam, with an investment of $740 million, on Xiabuqu River, close to the city of Xigaze.
Xigaze is a strategic location close to Bhutan and Sikkim and is the town from where China intends to extend its Beijing-Lhasa railway line up to Nepal. 

Work on this dam will be completed by 2019.
Water experts insist that the ministry of external affairs and the ministry of water resources must start negotiations for an international treaty on the Brahmaputra before North East India is subjected to major water scarcity.
Dr Chandan Mahanta, an expert on the Brahmaputra river basin, who heads the Centre for Environment at IIT Guwahati, believes the ministry of water resources must set up the Brahmaputra River Valley Authority (BRVA) at the earliest.
Mahanta pointed out that with China building four dams on the Brahmaputra, it was imperative for such an organisation to undertake a comprehensive study of the Brahmaputra basin.
"There is no clarity about the nature of dams being constructed by the Chinese, who claim they are building run-of-the-river dams. The Indian government is going by that assurance but the people in Assam have serious doubts about the Chinese plans," said Mahanta.
"We need to undertake a sound scientific investigation about both the lean flows of the river and how the dam construction by the Chinese will affect the river. We feel that once the dams are in place, the Brahmaputra will become a seasonal river, causing water scarcity in our region," he said.
"Such an apprehension is being expressed by people throughout Asia, who want to know just how much water the Chinese plan to divert across Asian rivers," Mahanta said, adding that a bilateral collaborative study between the two countries will help allay these fears.
India and China have an agreement on sharing the data of the Brahmaputra water but do not have any treaty, similar to India and Pakistan on the sharing of the river waters. 

China has so far not communicated officially about the construction of the three dams – Dagu, Liacha and Jiexu – on the Brahmaputra.
It is for this reason that the Indian government is pressuring China to set up a joint water commission or work towards having a joint water sharing treaty, following an inter-governmental dialogue on this subject.
Political analysts believe that India's response to all these developments remains weak-kneed. Bhutani added, "India has a huge trade balance with China since we import much more than we export but even this factor has not been used to our advantage. Instead of following a policy of appeasement with Beijing, New Delhi needs to forcefully take up its concerns since water security remains critical for any country."

India boycotts China's global trade jamboree

by Rishi Iyengar

There's a chill in the air between China and its fastest growing regional rival.
Representatives from dozens of countries -- including 30 heads of state -- gathered in Beijing on Sunday for a lavish summit to discuss China's trillion-dollar global trade and investment initiative, known as One Belt, One Road.
India, however, was conspicuous by its absence.
The South Asian nation -- the world's fastest growing major economy and Asia's third biggest -- chose not to attend the gathering, where China laid out its plan to connect nearly 70 countries through a series of global trade pacts, inspired by the ancient Silk Road trading route.
India's main objection is the partnership China is developing with Pakistan. 

The China-Pakistan Economic Corridor, a key component of One Belt, One Road -- passes through the disputed region of Kashmir, which both India and Pakistan claim in its entirety.
"No country can accept a project that ignores its core concerns on sovereignty and territorial integrity," India's foreign ministry said in a statement Saturday.
The foreign ministry also cited concerns about the "unsustainable debt burden" China's partner countries along the route would have to bear.
"We have been urging China to engage in a meaningful dialogue," the Indian statement said. 

"We are awaiting a positive response from the Chinese side."
In an opinion piece published Sunday, China's state-run Global Times said it was "regrettable" that India had decided to boycott the event but the project would go ahead, with or without New Delhi's support.
It pointed out that China and Pakistan signed new deals worth $500 million over the weekend, while Nepal -- sandwiched between India and China -- has also formally joined the Belt and Road initiative.
Despite staying away from the Beijing showcase, India is involved in the Belt and Road initiative.
Outside China, it is the largest stakeholder in the Beijing-led Asian Infrastructure Investment Bank and a founding member of the New Development Bank. 

Both are major funding sources for the new trade route.
It also participates directly via an agreement called the Bangladesh-China-India-Myanmar economic corridor.
"It wasn't a very wise decision to boycott [the forum]," said Swaran Singh, an expert on India-China relations at New Delhi's Jawaharlal Nehru University.
Singh described the quarrel over Pakistan as "a fuss" that would only benefit Beijing and Islamabad.
"I'm not saying the prime minister should have gone, but we are stakeholders, we are partners... so we should have had some presence," he added.
India has some cards to play. 

India's booming economy and its increasingly affluent middle class of more than 300 million people provide it with growing regional clout.
"Both in terms of political endorsement and economic viability, India [attending the event] would have really benefited the Chinese," Singh said. 

"That's why they tried really hard to get us on board."
Before this weekend's summit, China's Ambassador to India Luo Zhaohui tried to reassure New Delhi that the initiative was only about economics. 

Beijing would not get involved in disputes India and Pakistan, he said.
The dispute is unlikely to hamper the two countries' existing economic cooperation. 

China is India's largest trading partner, and some of the biggest Chinese firms including Alibaba, Xiaomi and Oppo have a huge presence in the country -- either as investors or through their own operations.
For now, China is playing it cool when it comes to India's role in the Belt and Road initiative.
"The role is still available if India changes its mind," the Global Times concluded, "but it may only be a small role if it is left too late."

Chinese Peril

China’s One Belt, One Road initiative ignores India’s territorial sovereignty
Scroll

The Indian government on Saturday decided to make its absence felt at China’s One Belt, One Road Forum, which includes the China-Pakistan Economic Corridor, by not sending a representative to the event scheduled for May 14 to May 16.
New Delhi has opposed the project on the grounds that it does not respect India’s sovereignty and territorial integrity.
“Connectivity projects must be pursued in a manner that respects sovereignty and territorial integrity,” said Spokesperson for the Ministry of External Affairs Gopal Baglay.
India has repeatedly urged China to maintain a meaningful dialogue on the project.
Stressing that connectivity initiatives should not give way to unsustainable financial burden and ecological damage, Baglay said donor governments should focus on transparent assessment of project costs and skill and technology transfer to help long-term running.
Chinese Foreign Ministry spokesperson Geng Shuang said Indian scholars were participating in “relevant activities” at the forum, according to The Indian Express. 
The summit will have 29 heads of states and governments, including Russian President Vladimir Putin, and high-level delegations from Sri Lanka, Bangladesh, Nepal and Myanmar in attendance. The United States, Germany, France and the United Kingdom are also participating in the seminar.
India has persistently raised its concerns over the China-Pakistan Economic Corridor.
During the Raisina dialogue, Foreign Secretary S Jaishankar had said, “China is a country that is very sensitive on matters concerning its sovereignty... so we would expect that they would have some understanding of other people’s sensitivity about their sovereignty,” he had said.
“CPEC passes through a piece of land that we call Pakistan-occupied Kashmir, which is a territory that belongs to India and is illegally occupied by Pakistan.”
China had dismissed reports that the One Belt, One Road initiative will give it vested interest in the Kashmir matter.
Chinese Ambassador to India Luo Zhaohui had said Beijing could consider renaming CPEC, while stressing that it was an economic matter.
His offer was later deleted by the Chinese Embassy from his speech posted on the consulate’s website.
India’s ties with China soured after the Dalai Lama’s recent visit to Arunachal Pradesh, which was followed by the neighbouring nation renaming parts of the state to “standardised” Chinese names. Beijing has also maintained its cordial ties with Pakistan, even giving Pakistan two patrol ships to help monitor their economic corridor and the Gwadar port.

Welcome to an emerging Asia: India and China stop feigning friendship while Russia plays all sides

By Harsh V Pant

In a hard place.

After a few timid signs of warming, Sino-Indian relations seem to be headed for the freezer. 

While Beijing refuses to take Indian security concerns seriously, New Delhi may have decided to take the Chinese challenge head-on. 

To complicate matters for India, its erstwhile ally Russia, which has become a close friend of China, is showing interest in establishing closer ties with Pakistan.
The latest move that clenches teeth in India is China refusing to lift a hold on Pakistan-based Jaish-e-Mohammad chief Masood Azhar, accused of plotting multiple acts of terrorism against India, and blocking him in December from being listed as a terrorist by the United Nations. 

Since March, China has blocked India’s attempts to put a ban on Azhar, under the sanctions committee of the UN Security Council, despite support from other members of the 15-nation body. 

In response, India has gone beyond expressing dismay by testing its long-range ballistic missiles—Agni IV and Agni V—in recent weeks. 

Pakistan, aided by China, has also jumped in by testing its first sea cruise missile that could be eventually launched from a Pakistani submarine.
China has upped the ante, indicating a willingness to help Pakistan increase the range of its nuclear missiles. 

China’s official mouthpiece, Global Times, contended in an editorial: “if the Western countries accept India as a nuclear country and are indifferent to the nuclear race between India and Pakistan, China will not stand out and stick rigidly to those nuclear rules as necessary. At this time, Pakistan should have those privileges in nuclear development that India has.”

China’s $46 billion investment in the so-called China-Pakistan Economic Corridor, or CPEC, also troubles India as the land corridor extends through the contested territory in Kashmir which India claims as its own. 

India views CPEC as an insidious attempt by China to create new realities on the ground and a brazen breach of India’s sovereignty and territory. 

The Chinese media have suggested that India should join CPEC to “boost its export and slash its trade deficit with China” and “the northern part of India bordering Pakistan and Jammu & Kashmir will gain more economic growth momentum.”
New Delhi has questioned if China would accept an identical situation in Tibet or Taiwan, or if this is a new phase in Chinese policy with China accepting Pakistan’s claims as opposed to the previous stance of viewing Kashmir as disputed territory.

Faced with an intransigent China, India under the centre-right government led by Narendra Modi is busy reevaluating its China policy. 

Modi’s initial outreach to China soon after coming to office in May 2014 failed to produce any substantive outcome and he has since decided to take a more hard-nosed approach. 

New Delhi has strengthened partnerships with like-minded countries, including the United States, Japan, Australia, and Vietnam. 

India has bolstered its capabilities along the troubled border with China and the Indian military is operationally gearing up for a two-front war. 

India is also ramping up its nuclear and conventional deterrence against China by testing long-range missiles, raising a mountain strike corps for the border with China, enhancing submarine capabilities, and basing its first squadron of French-made Rafale fighter jets near that border.
More interesting is a significant shift in India’s Tibet policy with the Modi government deciding to bring the issue back into the Sino-Indian bilateral equation. 

India will openly welcome the Dalai Lama, Tibet’s spiritual leader who has lived in exile in India since 1959, at an international conference on Buddhism to be held in Rajgir-Nalanda, Bihar, in March. 

And ignoring Beijing’s protests, the Dalai Lama will also visit the Indian state of Arunachal Pradesh which China claims as part of its own territory.
After initially ceding ground to Chinese sensitivities on Tibet and refusing to explicitly acknowledge official interactions with the Dalai Lama, a more public role for the monk is now presented as an essential part of the Indian response to China. 

In the first meeting in decades between a serving Indian head of state and the Dalai Lama, Indian President Pranab Mukherjee hosted the Buddhist leader at the inaugural session of the first Laureates and Leaders for Children Summit, held at the president’s official residence in New Delhi in December.

Pawn for giants: China strives to curb the influence of the Dalai Lama, who lives in India. The religion emerged in India during 5th century BC and has numerous sects.

China has not taken kindly to these moves by India and vehemently opposes any attempt to boost the image or credibility of the Dalai Lama.
China has been relentless in seeking isolation for the Dalai Lama and often succeeds in bullying weaker states to bar the monk. 

After the Dalai Lama’s November visit to the predominantly Buddhist Mongolia, where he is revered as a spiritual leader, the nation incurred China’s wrath and soon apologised, promising that the Dalai Lama would no longer be allowed to enter the country.
But India is not Mongolia. 

There is growing disenchantment with Chinese behaviour in New Delhi. 

Appeasing China by sacrificing the interests of the Tibetan people has not yielded any benefits for India, nor has there been tranquility in the Himalayas in recent decades. 

As China’s aggressiveness has grown, Indian policymakers are no longer content to play by rules set by China. 

Although India has formally acknowledged Tibet as a part of China, there is a new push to support the legitimate rights of the Tibetan people so as to negotiate with China from a position of strength.
This Sino-Indian geopolitical jostling is also being shaped by the broader shift in global and regional strategic equations. 

Delhi long took Russian support for granted. 

Yet, much to India’s discomfiture, China has found a new ally in Russia which is keen to side with it, even as a junior partner, to scuttle western interests. 

Historically sound Indo-Russian ties have become a casualty of this trend and to garner Chinese support for its anti-West posturing, Russia has refrained from supporting Indian positions.
Worried about India’s growing proximity to the United States, Russia is also warming up to Pakistan. 

The two held their first joint military exercise in September and their first bilateral consultation on regional issues in December. 

After officially lifting an arms embargo against Pakistan in 2014, Russia will deliver four Russian-made Mi-35M attack helicopters in 2017 to Pakistan’s military. 

It is also likely that the China-backed CPEC might be merged with the Russia-backed Eurasian Economic Union. 

Jettisoning its traditional antipathy to the Taliban, Russia indicates a readiness to negotiate with the Taliban against the backdrop of the growing threat of the Islamic State in Afghanistan. 

Towards that end, Russia is already working with China and Pakistan, thereby marginalising India in the regional process.
As the Trump administration takes office in Washington on Jan. 20, it will be rushing into headwinds generated by growing Sino-Indian tensions and a budding Sino-Russian entente. 

Trump’s own pro-Russia and anti-China inclinations could further complicate geopolitical alignments in Asia. 

Growing tension in the Indian subcontinent promises to add to the volatility.

China's Strategic Encirclement Of India’s Core Interests

By Bhaskar Roy

Having failed to constrict India within South Asia with its “String of Pearls” Strategy, China has now embarked on a new initiative to trip India’s growing comprehensive national power (CNP) and influence beyond South Asia.
India’s neighbours swam with China periodically, depending on the government in those countries. For example, the Mahinda Rajapksa government in Sri Lanka jumped into China’s lap for their own political reasons. 

The Mathiripala Sirisena government has restored the balance.
The BNP led four party alliance government (2001-2006) in Bangladesh brought relations with India to the lowest ebb. 

The alliance had parties like the Jamaat-e-Islami which were beholden to Pakistan and actively complicit in the savage rape and attempted extermination of the pro-liberation Bengalees in 1971. They were natural allies of not only Pakistan but also China which supported Pakistan. 

The return of the Awami League to power changed this policy drastically. 

The Awami League government, due to practical necessity and real politics, crafted a friendly relationship with China, but not at the expense of their relationship with India. 

China, however, is trying to entice Dhaka, but this does not worry India because India-Bangladesh relationship has more than political market imperatives. 

There is a cultural and historical conjunction.
Nepal has been vacillating between India and China. 

Lodged between the two giant countries, they are trying to get the best out of the two. 

China recognises India’s influence in Nepal, but has been consistently trying to weaken the India-Nepal relationship.
Pakistan has emerged as China’s mainstay in the region and extends to the Gulf, the Central Asian region, and now they are trying to draw in Russia in this ambit. 

Weakening India-Russia relations is one of its aims. 

With its promised 46 billion investment in Pakistan for the China-Pakistan Economic Corridor (CPEC), Control of the Gwadar Port (a military project), primary arms and defence equipment supplier and recent acquisition of 40 percent of the Pakistan stock market by a Chinese conglomerate, Pakistan is fast emerging as a country under Chinese suzerainty. 

Evidence suggests Pakistan may soon become a platform for the projection of both soft and hard power for being along the route envisaged for the “One Belt, One Road” (OBOR) project. 

China is unlikely to declare Pakistan as one of its “core” interests, but it is already acting as such.
Lately, China has been expressing concerns about achieving the full potential of the CPEC. 

In an article in the Communist Party affiliated newspaper Global Times (Dec. 28, 2016), Wang Dehua, Director of the Institute of Southern and Central Asian Studies, Shanghai Municipal Center for Internal Studies, wrote that the CEPC was facing challenges. 

He went on to describe the project as having “significant economic, political and strategic implications for both China and Pakistan”.
Wang wrote this in the context of a spat between the Chinese Chargé d'Affaires in Islamabad Zhao Lijian and a journalist of the Pakistani newspaper Dawn. 

The concerned journalist asked Zhao some uncomfortable questions including use of Chinese prisoners as labour. 

The senior Chinese diplomat lost his cool in a public place, which is very uncharacteristic of the Chinese.
Wang Dehua revealed that Chinese investment was raised to $51 billion from the initial $46 billion. The Chinese party media have extolled the virtue of the CPEC not only for China and Pakistan but other countries of the region including India, Iran, Afghanistan and Russia. 

The emphasis has been more on India, suggesting that India joining the project could help reduce tensions between India and Pakistan. 

Simultaneously, there is a suggestion to link Gwadar and Chabahar ports as sister ports and sister cities.
The CPEC is the flagship project of the larger OBOR strategic conception of extending China’s circulatory system far and wide. 

It has political and strategic penetration as significant benefits. 

Most important is the fact that it is Xi Jinping’s prestige project. It cannot be allowed to fail at any cost. 

It is also part of China’s great power signature.
At the same time, Beijing is ramping up pressure on India in a shower, trying to destabilise India’s emerging foreign policy. 

Beijing’s stand will have serious negative implications especially on the biggest threat to the world at this moment, terrorism. 

In the last week of December, China vetoed India’s move to designate Masood Azhar, head of Pakistan-based terrorist organisation Jaish-e-Mohammad as a “terrorist” at the UN Committee 2167 on terrorism. 

This, when the organisation itself is designated as a terrorist organisation by the same committee.
This one move by China has hit at the very roots of the global movement against extremism and terrorism. 

Read plainly, China will use terrorism as a political weapon against perceived enemies, in this case India.

It also encourages Pakistan to use terrorism with impunity against India, Afghanistan and even, perhaps Bangladesh.
India is determined to continue its efforts to bring other Pakistani-based and backed terrorists in front of the 2167 committee. 

China is the only member of their 15 member committee to oppose the move against Azhar. 

In a manner China stands isolated.
China took umbrage and accused India of interfering in China’s internal affairs after the Indian President met His Holiness the Dalai Lama at a function which was totally non-political. 

Their official media threatened India of retaliation of the kind they subjected the tiny country of Mongolia after Dalai Lama’s visit to Mongolia that was a purely religious one. 

Mongolia is a Buddhist Country, mostly of the Gelugpa sect of Buddhism which the Dalai Lama heads spiritually. 

This is a stupid threat. 

Mongolia a tiny land locked country, with a population of around two million, is dependent on China for outside access. 

Such threats do not impress the Indian government and the Indian people. 

The Chinese threat appears to be an act of frustration.
Nevertheless, Tibet is a declared core interest of China, hence the Dalai Lama. 

The 80 year spiritual leader has withdrawn himself from politics, but his influence and reverence among Tibetans inside China and outside is palpable. 

The Chinese have not been able to come to a firm conclusion whether the living 14th Dalai Lama or deceased 14th Dalai Lama will be to their interest.
The Chinese leadership has tried to denigrate the Dalai Lama in all possible ways, calling him a ‘splittist’ (separatist), ‘devil’, ‘wolf in sheep’s clothing among other things, but these have not impressed anyone. 

Beijing suspects India is using Dalai Lama as a ‘card’ against China.
India has accepted Tibet Autonomous Region as a sovereign part of China (2003). 

The Tibetan refugees in India are not allowed political activities. 

Successive governments in New Delhi have bent over backwards to accommodate China’s concerns. But if China continues to attack India on this issue, India will be forced to fight back: Allow the Dalai Lama and the generally accepted Kargyupa head Ughen Thinley Dorjee freedom to move around India including Tawang and the rest of Arunachal Pradesh.

China is trying to push the OBOR to and through Nepal and Bangladesh. 

They hope that through persuasion from these two countries India may succumb and agree to join the OBOR in the interest of its good neighbourhood policy. 

If India does not relent China may seek alternative policies in India’s neighbourhood to constrict India. 

The Global Times has already hinted at this.
Beijing remains determined to keep India out of the Nuclear Supplies Group (NSG). 

It has now objected to India’s successful testing (Dec. 16, 2016) of the 5000 kms nuclear capable ballistic missile Agni V. 

In a sharply worded statement Chinese foreign ministry spokespersons threatened to take this issue to the UN Security Council resolution 1172 after the 1998 nuclear tests by India and Pakistan. 

The resolution passed at the heat of the moment and engineered by China and the US calling on the two countries to stop further nuclear tests, cap their nuclear weapon programmes, cease all fissile material production, and end development of ballistic missiles capable of carrying nuclear weapons. The resolution, however is non-binding. 

China’s threat falls through the floor.
Since then, India has come a long way on the nuclear issue. 

It issued a moratorium on nuclear testing, announced no first use of nuclear weapons policy and signed the India-US nuclear deal. 

India, however, will have to counter Chinese pressures in several such areas in the future.
The Chinese spokesperson also said that “China maintains that preserving the strategic balance and stability in South Asia is conducive to peace and prosperity of regional countries ‘and beyond’. Basically, the statement implied that India may have disturbed the strategic balance in South Asia and beyond, without counting its own intercontinental nuclear capable ballistic missiles and other weapons. 

As China its military development is defensive and not aimed at any country, so is the official India position.
But things between India and China may get worse if the CPEC and OBOR falter seriously. 

This is closely linked to Xi Jinping’s politics and stature of “core” leader of the Chinese Communist Party. 

The 19th Congress to the party will be held in autumn this year and major leadership changes will take place. 

Xi cannot have any chinks in his armour.