Chinese Aggressions

Indonesia deploys fighter jets in stand-off with China
By Stanley Widianto, Agustinus Beo Da Costa






JAKARTA -- Indonesia’s air force deployed four fighter jets to the South China Sea on Tuesday in a stand-off with Beijing after Jakarta protested over a Chinese violation of its exclusive economic zone.
The stand-off began in mid-December when a Chinese coast guard vessel, accompanying Chinese fishing boats, entered waters off the coast of Indonesia’s northern Natuna islands, prompting Jakarta to summon Beijing’s ambassador.
The issue has soured Indonesia’s generally friendly relationship with China, its biggest trading partner and a major investor in Southeast Asia’s largest country.
Fajar Adriyanto, the air force spokesman, said four F-16 jets had been conducting flights over the islands, though he also played down fears of any confrontation with Beijing.
“They’re doing standard patrols to protect our sovereign area. It just so happened that they’re patrolling Natuna,” Adriyanto said.
“We don’t have the order to start a war with China.”
The South China Sea is a global trade route with rich fishing grounds and energy reserves and China claims most of it based on what it says is its historic activity.
But Southeast Asian countries, supported by the United States and much of the rest of the world, say such claims have no legal basis.
On Monday, Indonesia said it was mobilizing fishermen to the northern Natuna region and had deployed several naval ships.
There has been no negotiation with the Chinese vessels as of Tuesday, Nursyawal Embun, director of sea operations of Indonesia’s Maritime Security Agency, told Reuters.
According to data from Maritime Traffic, a ship tracking website, at least two Chinese ships — Zhongguohaijing and Haijing 35111 — were in waters on the edge of Indonesia’s exclusive economic zone on Tuesday, approximately 200km (124 miles) off Indonesia’s Riau Islands.
The ships were within China’s unilaterally-declared “nine-dash line”, which marks a vast expanse of the South China Sea that it claims, including large swathes of Vietnam’s continental shelf where it has awarded oil concessions.
The China Coast Guard ship Haijing 35111 is one of a handful of Chinese ships that was involved in a months-long standoff with Vietnamese ships last year near the offshore oil block in the disputed waters, which fall within Hanoi’s exclusive economic zone.
Luhut Pandjaitan, the coordinating minister in Indonesia’s cabinet overseeing resources and investment, told reporters on Tuesday that Indonesia’s sovereignty was not negotiable, despite China’s economic importance for his country.
“I would not sell our sovereignty for investment, never,” he said. “I’m not stupid.”

Chinese Aggressions

Indonesia Will Not Negotiate Its Sovereignty in South China Sea

• Indonesia will never recognize China’s fallacious claims
• Indonesia has plans to develop fishing grounds near Natuna

By Arys Aditya and Philip Heijmans
Natuna Islands

Indonesia will not compromise on its sovereignty in the South China Sea amid the recent sighting of Chinese fishing vessels near the Natuna Islands, which lie between Malaysia and Borneo, President Joko Widodo said.
Speaking at a plenary cabinet session in Jakarta Monday, Jokowi, as Widodo is known, said the increased presence of Chinese ships in the disputed waters since December was a violation of international law. 
He said in a statement posted on the cabinet secretariat website there would be “no negotiation when it comes to our sovereignty.”
Jokowi is scheduled to visit Natuna on Wednesday, according to Defrizal, head of communications at the Natuna regency who goes by one name, while the Indonesian Air Force had deployed four F-16 fighter jets to the islands, Detik news site reported on Tuesday.
Indonesia has also stepped up patrols in the gas-rich area, deploying five ships and two aircraft last week. 
On Monday, the navy dispatched additional warships to the area, Channel News Asia reported citing Commander Fajar Tri Rohadi, a public affairs officer with the First Fleet Command of the Indonesia Navy.
“This is our sovereign right,” Indonesian Foreign Minister Retno Marsudi said after the cabinet meeting, urging China to comply with the United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea.
 “Indonesia will never recognize nine dash lines or unilateral claims made by China that do not have legal reasons recognized by international law.”
The latest conflict follows accusations by the U.S. and other coastal states in Southeast Asia that China was taking a more aggressive stance on its claims to more than 80% of the lucrative waters in the South China Sea.
China has said it’s operating legally, and has called on the U.S. to stop interfering in the region.
There were several reported incidents involving Chinese coast guard vessels entering waters controlled by other claimants last year, including one that resulted in a nearly four-month-long standoff with Vietnam.
Malaysia also drew an objection from Beijing on Dec. 12 when it issued a submission to the UN defining its continental shelf.
 
Sovereignty Battle
The incident began more than two weeks ago when Chinese coast guard vessels escorting dozens of fishing vessels were spotted in Indonesia’s exclusive economic zone, the Jakarta Post reported, triggering the foreign ministry to send a diplomatic protest to Beijing on Dec 30.
Last year, the Indonesian government announced plans to develop the lucrative fishing grounds near Natuna in part to assert its sovereign authority there.
It also pledged to build new cold-storage facilities to turn the area into a functional fishing hub by the year’s end.
In addition to the navy, Mahfud MD, coordinating Minister for Political, Legal, and Security Affairs, said on Monday 120 fishing vessels had been called in to further reinforce patrols.
“Aside from using your rights as a citizen, you are also obligated to help defend the country, showing that this is ours,” Mahfud said in a statement on the coordinating ministry website.
This is not the first time the two sides have faced conflict near Natuna.
Indonesia has for years fended off Chinese fisherman caught poaching in its waters -- confiscating and destroying hundreds of boats.
While Indonesia has sought to remain neutral in the wider dispute, Jokowi also offered a similar statement on Indonesia’s sovereignty in May 2016 following several incursions by Chinese fishing boats and its coast guard.
“This is how it has responded since the 2016 incursions. So if there was posturing, it was back then,” said Aaron Connelly, a research fellow at the International Institute for Strategic Studies’ Southeast Asian Political Change and Foreign Policy program.
“Indonesian policy has been remarkably consistent on this issue.”— With

Chinese ship inches closer to Vietnam coastline amid South China Sea tensions

By Khanh Vu

HANOI -- A Chinese survey vessel on Saturday extended its activities to an area closer to Vietnam’s coastline, ship tracking data showed, after the United States and Australia expressed concern about China’s actions in the disputed waterways.
The Haiyang Dizhi 8 vessel first entered Vietnam’s exclusive economic zone (EEZ) early last month where it began a weeks-long seismic survey, triggering a tense standoff between military and coastguard vessels from Vietnam and China.
The Chinese vessel continued to survey Vietnam’s EEZ on Saturday under escort from at least four ships and was around 102 kilometers (63 miles) southeast of Vietnam’s Phu Quy island and 185 kilometers (115 miles) from the beaches of the southern city of Phan Thiet, according to data from Marine Traffic, a website that tracks vessel movements.
The Chinese vessel group was followed by at least two Vietnamese naval vessels, according to the data.
Vietnam’s foreign ministry did not immediately respond to a request from Reuters for comment.
A country’s EEZ typically extends up to 200 nautical miles (370 kilometers or 230 miles) from its coastline, according to an international UN treaty. 

That country has sovereign rights to exploit any natural resources within that area, according to the agreement.
Vietnam and China have for years been embroiled in a dispute over the potentially energy-rich stretch of waters and a busy shipping lane in the South China Sea.
China’s unilaterally declared “nine-dash line” marks a vast, U-shaped, expanse of the South China Sea that it claims, including large swathes of Vietnam’s continental shelf where it has awarded oil concessions.
On Friday, Vietnamese Prime Minister Nguyen Xuan Phuc and his Australian counterpart expressed their concern about China’s activities in the South China Sea, known in Vietnam as the East Sea.
Earlier in the week, the United States said it was deeply concerned about China’s interference in oil and gas activities in waters claimed by Vietnam, and that the deployment of the vessels was “an escalation by Beijing in its efforts to intimidate other claimants out of developing resources in the South China Sea”

Chinese Aggressions

Japan builds an ‘island wall’ to counter China’s intensifying military, territorial incursions
By Simon Denyer

An officer with Japan’s Ground Self-Defense Force looks out over a new base on the Japanese island of Miyako on July 28. 

MIYAKO, Japan — A high-stakes “game of chicken” is playing out in the East China Sea, as Beijing pokes and provokes Tokyo with an intensifying campaign of aerial and maritime encroachments designed to challenge Japan’s control of its islands.
Every day, around the clock, Japan scrambles fighter jets and dispatches coast guard vessels to counter some new Chinese provocation and ward off the intruding boats and planes. 

It is also building a “wall” of defensive installations, including missile bases, along the chain of subtropical, touristed islands that make up the archipelago’s southwestern arc.
“China wants to change the status quo, but it does not want a military confrontation,” said Michael Bosack, a special adviser at the Yokosuka Council on Asia-Pacific Studies in Japan. 

“The problem here is that miscalculation may lead to confrontation and/or escalation.”
The contest has prompted a shift in Japan’s defense strategy. 

Over the past few years, the country has significantly expanded its air force and coast guard bases centered on the southwestern island of Okinawa, which already hosts tens of thousands of U.S. troops and the largest U.S. air base in the Asia-Pacific.
A 2,100-strong Japanese Amphibious Rapid Deployment Brigade, the first of its kind, was created in March 2018, with a mandate to defend — and if necessary, retake — Japanese islands that could be targets of invasions.
Military bases are being established on more-remote islands stretching west toward Taiwan, to house troops and missiles capable of defending territory, waterways and airspace. 

Defense experts call it the “southwestern wall.”
On the island of Miyako, among sugar-cane fields, Japan’s Ground Self-Defense Force opened a new base in March that will accommodate 700 to 800 troops, anti-ship and surface-to-air missile batteries, and radar and intelligence-gathering facilities.
A similar base was established on the island of Amami Oshima at the same time. 

A smaller facility opened on the westernmost island of Yonaguni in 2016, and another is planned for the island of Ishigaki by 2021, each forming a brick in the wall.
The territorial dispute centers on five small, uninhabited islands controlled by Japan and known as the Senkakus.
Tensions over those islands have flared in recent years as Beijing has sought to assert its maritime claims more aggressively, especially since Japan purchased three of the islands from a private owner in 2012 and China declared an air defense identification zone covering the area in 2013.
Since then, armed Chinese coast guard vessels and armed fishing boats known as the “maritime militia” have been regular visitors to the territorial seas around the Senkakus and to the wider contiguous zone between 12 and 24 nautical miles from the islands. 

Between April and June, Chinese ships penetrated that area for a record 64 consecutive days, Japan says.
Not everyone on Miyako island is a fan of Japan's new military base

Experts refer to these tactics as “gray zone” operations, intended to gain an advantage without provoking military conflict.
“China engages in unilateral, coercive attempts to alter the status quo based on its own assertions that are incompatible with the international order,” Japan’s Defense Ministry said in its latest strategy paper, adding that “expanding and intensifying military activities at sea and in the air” represent a serious security concern.
China denies its moves are expansionist or aggressive but says it has an “unshakable will” to uphold its "territorial sovereignty".
It is the same language that China uses to defend similar tactics in the South China Sea, where it has built a string of artificial islands equipped with military facilities in disputed waters.
In the East China Sea, Japan and China are competing not only for control of the disputed Senkaku islands but for dominion over the broader western Pacific Rim.
The Japanese archipelago forms part of the “first island chain,” a string of island groups stretching across East Asia from Russia to Borneo. 

During the Cold War, the United States saw control of this island chain as a way to contain the Soviet Union and China; these days, Beijing wants to break the chain to gain untrammeled access to the Pacific.

Japan’s new island bases are also intended to monitor and protect two key waterways in that chain, the Miyako and Tokara straits. 

China contests Japan’s right to control those waters, and last month its aircraft carrier, the Liaoning, sailed through the Miyako Strait for the third time in just over a year. 

Its fighters and bombers take similar routes.
China has the right of passage under international maritime law, but Japan bristles to see so much military hardware crossing freely between the links in its island chain. 

It scrambled its warplanes a record 851 times in 2016 and 179 times between April and June this year.
The Center for International and Strategic Studies calls the situation a “slow-moving crisis”, warning that an accidental collision could easily spiral into conflict. 

The Rand Corp. warns that China’s steady escalation and increasingly provocative penetrations could “strain Japan’s capacity to respond” while avoiding the risk of an armed conflict that could potentially draw in the United States.
The standoff is already straining domestic politics in Japan, where defense spending has fallen far behind China’s in the past three decades and efforts by the government of Prime Minister Shinzo Abe to reverse the downtrend have proved controversial.
On the islands, resistance to the new Japanese bases is significant. 

On Miyako, a small but determined group of protesters says the Defense Ministry lied about its plans to store missiles there and does not prioritize the islanders’ welfare and safety.
Like the people of Okinawa’s main island who are protesting against U.S. bases, people of this once independent region remember bitterly how civilians suffered here in intense fighting between American and Japanese troops during World War II. 

Many want no part in big nations’ wars.
Similar protests and petitions signed by thousands have slowed construction of the Ishigaki base and stalled the deployment of a U.S.-made missile defense system in Akita in northern Japan and Yamaguchi in western Japan and Osprey aircraft in Saga in the southwest.
Japan’s government has acknowledged it needs to better manage local concerns but insists it will not be deterred from its strategic goals.
As well as bolstering its own defenses, Japan’s navy says it has also increased the frequency of joint exercises with friends and allies such as the United States, Australia and India as it seeks to build what it calls a “free and open Indo-Pacific.”

U.S. Ends Cold War Missile Treaty, With Aim of Countering China

U.S. officials say that the treaty tied their hands on China and that Russia was not complying with it.
By David E. Sanger and Edward Wong

Military vehicles carrying ballistic missiles through Tiananmen Square during a military parade in Beijing in 2015. The first deployments of new American missiles would likely be intended to counter China.

WASHINGTON — The United States on Friday terminated a major treaty of the Cold War, the Intermediate Nuclear Forces agreement, and it is already planning to start testing a new class of missiles later this summer.
But the new missiles are unlikely to be deployed to counter the treaty’s other nuclear power, Russia, which the United States has said for years was in violation of the accord. 

Instead, the first deployments are intended to counter China, which has amassed an imposing missile arsenal and is now seen as a much more formidable strategic rival than Russia.
The moves by Washington have elicited concern that the United States may be on the precipice of a new arms race, especially because the one major remaining arms control treaty with Russia, a far larger one called New START, appears on life support, unlikely to be renewed when it expires in less than two years.
At a moment when the potential for nuclear confrontations with North Korea and Iran is rising, the American decision to abandon the 32-year-old treaty has prompted new worries in China.

The resurgence of nuclear geopolitics was evident in the Democratic debate on Tuesday night, when presidential hopefuls grappled with whether the United States should renounce “first use” of nuclear weapons in any future conflict.

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On Feb 2nd, 2019 the U.S. gave Russia six months to return to compliance with the Intermediate-Range Nuclear Forces Treaty. Russia refused, so the treaty ends today. The U.S. will not remain party to a treaty when others violate it. Russia bears sole responsibility.
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Barack Obama considered terminating the treaty when Moscow was first accused of violating its terms. 

On Thursday, just as his aides were confirming the American withdrawal and blaming Russia for the breakdown, President Trump told reporters that Russia “would like to do something on a nuclear treaty” and added later, “So would I.” 

But he appeared to be discussing a broader treaty that would involve China — which has said it has no intention of negotiating a limit on its arsenal.
In fact, the administration has argued that China is one reason Mr. Trump decided to exit the I.N.F. treaty. 

Most experts now assess that China has the most advanced conventional missile arsenal in the world, based throughout the mainland. 

When the treaty went into effect in 1987, China’s missile fleet was judged so rudimentary that it was not even a consideration.
Today hundreds of missiles in southeast China are within range of Taiwan, the self-governing democratic island supported by the United States. 

Missiles at other sites can hit Japan and India, and there are Chinese missiles that can strike the United States territory of Guam and other potential targets in what American strategists call the second-island chain.
“Unilateral constraint was a losing proposition: China developed the world’s foremost force of missiles precisely within the ranges that I.N.F. would prohibit,” said Andrew Erickson, a professor of strategy at the United States Naval War College. 

“So this increasingly antiquated treaty had no future.”
Until now, the Trump administration has held off on testing new missiles that would violate the treaty; under its terms, even testing is prohibited. 

But that stricture lifts on Friday, and the first test of new American intermediate-range missiles is likely to begin within weeks, according to American officials familiar with the Pentagon’s plans.
The first, perhaps as early as this month, is expected to be a test of a version of a common, sea-launched cruise missile, the Tomahawk. 

It would be modified to be fired from the ground. (The treaty prohibited intermediate-range ground-launched missiles, but not missiles launched from ships or airplanes.) 

If successful, officials say, the first ground-launched cruise missiles could be deployed within 18 months or so — if the United States can find a country willing to house them.
That would be followed by a test of a new mobile, ground-launched ballistic missile with a range of 1,800 to 2,500 miles, before the end of the year. 

But that would be an entirely new missile, and it is not likely to be deployed for another five years or so — meaning the very end of the Trump presidency, if he is re-elected.
But the question is where to deploy them. 

“I don’t think the Europeans want to host them,” Gary Samore, the director of the Crown Center for Middle East Studies at Brandeis University and the chief nuclear strategist at the National Security Council under Obama, said on Thursday. 

In Asia, he noted, the two countries where it would make most sense to deploy the missiles would be Japan and South Korea, though any move to put the missiles there could infuriate China.
“The real question is where and whether or not there would be pushback,” said Bonnie S. Glaser, a senior adviser for Asia at the Center for Strategic and International Studies. 

“The most obvious place is someplace in Japan.”
Mr. Samore noted that the fate of New START, which governs the strategic weapons the United States and Russia have deployed, “is much more important than I.N.F.” 

Senior military officials agree, but have added that once the I.N.F. treaty dies, it is hard to imagine a negotiation to renew New START, which expires in February 2021, right after the next presidential inauguration.
Even if it is renewed, Mr. Samore noted that in coming years, the source of strategic instability may not come just from nuclear weapons but also “from space weapons, artificial intelligence and cyber — and there we have no restraints.”
But it is China’s rocket forces that have focused the attention of the Pentagon and the Trump administration. 

In 2017, Adm. Harry B. Harris Jr., then the head of United States Pacific Command, said in congressional testimony that the People’s Liberation Army Rocket Force controls the “largest and most diverse missile force in the world, with an inventory of more than 2,000 ballistic and cruise missiles.” 

He pointed out that the United States capability lagged because of its adherence to the treaty with Russia, and that if China were a signatory, 95 percent of its missiles would be in violation.
But deploying a counterforce to Taiwan would be too provocative, officials say, and Japan may have hesitations: Prime Minister Shinzo Abe would have to consider the blow that would result to relations between Beijing and Tokyo, which have been improving.
China’s fury at deployment of American ground-based missiles in an Asian nation probably would be even greater than its reaction in 2016 and 2017 to plans to install an American antimissile system in South Korea.
For more than a year after the announcement of the deployment, Beijing denounced the move and called for a wide boycott of products from South Korea, whose companies then suffered. 

The Americans began deploying the system, commonly known as THAAD, in March 2017, and Beijing did not relent on its actions against South Korea until that October. 

Communist Party leaders feared the United States was laying the groundwork for an expansive antimissile system across Asia.
Chinese officials have also balked at any attempt to limit their missiles with a new treaty, arguing that the nuclear arsenals of the United States and Russia are much larger and deadlier.
“The Trump idea of a trilateral arms control agreement is not realistic,” Mr. Samore said. 

“The Chinese are not going to codify an inferior number of weapons compared to the United States and Russia. And Russia and the U.S. won’t give China equal status.”

Chinese Aggressions

Chinese Hackers Conduct Mass-Scale Espionage Attack On Global Cellular Networks
By Zak Doffman

An Israeli-U.S. cybersecurity firm released a new report on Monday evening, claiming that Chinese hackers had compromised the systems of at least ten cellular carriers around the world to steal metadata related to specific users. 

None of the affected carriers or targeted individuals have been named.
Cybereason claimed that the sophistication and scale of the attack, which they have dubbed Operation Softcell, bear the hallmarks of a nation-state action and that the individual targets—military officials and dissidents—tie to China. 

All of which points to the Chinese government as the culprit. 

The affected carriers were in Europe, Africa, the Middle East and Asia. 

None were thought to be in the United States.
"The advanced, persistent attack targeting telecommunications providers," the company said, "has been active since at least 2017... The Chinese were attempting to steal all data stored in the active directory, compromising every single username and password in the organization, along with other personally identifiable information, billing data, call detail records, credentials, email servers, geo-location of users, and more."
The attack was described in the report as a "game of cat and mouse between the Chinese and the defenders." 

As soon as the compromise [of] critical assets, such as database servers, billing servers, and the active directory" was detected, "the Chinese stopped the attack" only to resume later.
The implications of China "infiltrating into the deepest segments of providers’ network, including some isolated from the internet," enabling hackers to "compromise critical assets and steal communications data of specific individuals in various countries" are extremely significant. 

It suggests almost open access for intelligence harvesting.
Cybereason also pointed out that "even though the attacks targeted specific individuals, any entity that possesses the power to take over the networks of telecommunications providers can potentially leverage its unlawful access and control of the network to shut down or disrupt an entire cellular network as part of a larger cyber warfare operation."
According to the Wall Street Journal, "Cybereason Chief Executive Lior Div gave a weekend, in-person briefing about the hack to more than two dozen other global carriers. For the firms already affected, the response has been disbelief and anger, Mr. Div said. 'We never heard of this kind of mass-scale espionage ability to track any person across different countries'."

The nature of the data harvested in the attack is of real value to intelligence agencies, which analyze the metadata for patterns. 

Even if the call or messaging content is not retrieved, analysis of who talks to who and when and how often and for how long and from where is a rich seam to be mined. 

In essence, every piece of metadata collected by the networks from registered smartphones was potentially vulnerable. 

And once the network's core security was compromised, the threat became almost internal in nature.
In the U.S. and U.K., when national intelligence agencies "hoover up" such data or campaign for additional collection legislation to enable them to do so, there is inevitably a privacy backlash. 

And this collection campaign has gone beyond anything a national agency would campaign for. 

The WSJ reported that "Operation Soft Cell gave Chinese hackers access to the carriers’ entire active directory, an exposure of hundreds of millions of users... [with] the hackers creating high-privileged accounts that allowed them to roam through the telecoms’ systems, appearing as if they were legitimate employees."
Cybereason pointed towards China's APT10—Advanced Persistent Threat 10—as the likely hackers behind this attack. 

The group is known for long-term, persistent threat campaigns, harvesting information as might an actual agency. 

And this campaign is thought to have been running for as long as seven years. 

Coincidentally, NASA, one of the previous targets of APT10, confirmed in recent days that it had also been hacked, a compromise which again bears nation-state hallmarks.
"Cybereason said it couldn't be ruled out that a non-Chinese actor mirrored the attacks to appear as if it were APT 10," reported the WSJ, "as part of a misdirection. But the servers, domains and internet-protocol addresses came from China, Hong Kong or Taiwan... All the indications are directed to China."

FireEye and Crowdstrike, the cybersecurity firms that have painted the most complete profile of APT10, told Wired that "they couldn't confirm Cybereason's findings, but that they have seen broad targeting of cellular providers, both for tracking individuals and for bypassing two-factor authentication, intercepting the SMS messages sent to phones as a one-time passcode."
Two hackers allegedly linked to APT10 were indicted on federal charges in the U.S. last year.
The fact that a Chinese state hacking outfit has targeted cellphone metadata will clearly be tied to the ongoing U.S. campaign against Chinese telecoms equipment manufacturers in general, and Huawei in particular. 

The argument will now run that this is exactly the kind of vulnerability that becomes exposed if the Chinese government uses its influence over domestic companies to pull intelligence from overseas.
"We’ve concluded with a high level of certainty," Cybereason claimed on issuing its report, "that the threat actor is affiliated with China and is state-sponsored. The tools and techniques used throughout these attacks are consistent with several Chinese threat actors, specifically with APT10, a threat actor operating on behalf of the Chinese Ministry of State Security."

The Necessary War

South China Sea: Chinese fighter jets deployed to contested island
By Brad Lendon

ImageSat International (ISI).

Hong Kong -- A satellite image obtained by CNN shows China has deployed at least four J-10 fighter jets to the contested Woody Island in the South China Sea, the first known deployment of fighter jets there since 2017.
The image was taken Wednesday and represents the first time J-10s have been seen on Woody or any Chinese-controlled islands in the South China Sea, according to ImageSat International, which supplied the image to CNN.
The deployment comes as tensions remain high in the South China Sea and Chinese dictator Xi Jinping prepares to meet Donald Trump at the G-20 summit in Japan next week.


Analysts who looked at the satellite photo for CNN said both the placement of the planes out in the open and accompanying equipment is significant and indicates the fighter jets were on the contested island for up to 10 days.
"They want you to notice them. Otherwise they would be parked in the hangars," said Peter Layton, a former Royal Australian Air Force officer and fellow at the Griffith Asia Institute. 

"What message do they want you to take from them?"
Carl Schuster, a former director of operations at the US Pacific Command's Joint Intelligence Center, said the deployment is designed to "demonstrate it is their territory and they can put military aircraft there whenever they want."
"It also makes a statement that they can extend their air power reach over the South China Sea as required or desired," Schuster said.
The J-10 jets have a combat range of about 500 miles (740 kilometers), putting much of the South China Sea and vital shipping lands within reach, Schuster said.
The four planes are not carrying external fuel tanks, the analysts said. 

That suggests they were to be refueled on the island, so the plan may be to keep them there awhile.

Chinese J-10 fighters fly at Airshow China in Zhuhai in 2010.

"It could be an early training deployment as part of getting the J-10 squadron operationally ready for an ADIZ (air defense identification zone) declaration," Layton said. 

"This activity may be the new normal."
China said in 2016 it reserved the right to impose an ADIZ over the South China Sea, which would require aircraft flying over the waters to first notify Beijing. 

It set up an ADIZ over the East China Sea in 2013, prompting an outcry from Japan and the United States, but the zone has not been fully enforced.
Woody Island (đảo Phú Lâm) is the largest of the Paracel chain, also known as the Hoàng Sa.
The Paracels (Hoàng Sa) sit in the north-central portion of the 1.3 million-square-mile South China Sea. 

They are also claimed by Vietnam and Taiwan, but have been occupied by China since 1974, when Chinese troops ousted a South Vietnamese garrison.
The past several years have seen Beijing substantially upgrade its facilities on the islands, deploying surface-to-air missiles, building 20 hangars at the airfield, upgrading two harbors and performing substantial land reclamation, according to the Asia Maritime Transparency Initiative.
Woody Island has served as a blueprint for Beijing's more prominent island-building efforts in the Spratly chain to the south, AMTI said in a 2017 report.
The appearance of the J-10s on Woody Island comes just over a year after China sent its H-6K long-range bombers to the island for test flights for the first time.
The PLA claimed that mission was a part of China's aim to achieve a broader regional reach, quicker mobilization, and greater strike capabilities.
A military expert, Wang Mingliang, was quoted in a Chinese statement as saying the training would hone the Chinese air force's war-preparation skills and its ability to respond to various security threats in the region.
In 2017, a report in China's state-run Global Times, said fighter jets -- J-11s -- were deployed to Woody Island for the first time, with the new hangars able to protect the warplanes from the island's high heat and humidity.
That report said such hangars would be useful on other Chinese islands to greatly enhance Beijing's control over the South China Sea.

Chinese Aggressions

Philippines Accuses Chinese Vessel of Sinking Fishing Boat in Disputed Waters
By Jason Gutierrez

Protesters marched in Manila on Wednesday to denounce Chinese actions in the South China Sea.

MANILA — The Philippines on Wednesday accused a Chinese vessel of ramming a Philippine boat in the disputed South China Sea, causing it to sink and putting the lives of the crew at risk.
Although the 22 fishermen onboard were rescued by a Vietnamese fishing vessel in the area, Philippine officials said the collision on Sunday had left them “to the mercy of the elements.”
“We condemn in the strongest terms the cowardly action of the Chinese fishing vessel and its crew for abandoning the Filipino crew,” Defense Secretary Delfin Lorenzana said in a statement.

“This is not the expected action from a responsible and friendly people.”
Mr. Lorenzana called for a formal investigation and for diplomatic action “to prevent a repeat of this incident.”
The Chinese Embassy in Manila, the Philippine capital, could not be reached for comment on Wednesday, which was a holiday in the Philippines commemorating its independence from Spain.
President Rodrigo Duterte of the Philippines has courted China as a strategic partner since he was elected in 2016. 

He was most recently in China last month, his fourth visit in three years, but bilateral ties have been fraying, particularly over territorial disputes.
The Philippine vessel, FB Gimber1, was anchored near Recto Bank in the South China Sea, a strategically important area that is claimed in whole or in part by China, the Philippines, Brunei, Malaysia, Taiwan and Vietnam. 

Manila calls the area the West Philippine Sea, and an international tribunal in The Hague ruled in 2016 that it was in the country’s exclusive economic zone.
China has refused to abide by the ruling, and Mr. Duterte has said there is no way to enforce it in the face of China’s military strength.
At a meeting of Asia-Pacific defense officials in Singapore this month, Mr. Lorenzana called on all South China Sea claimants to exercise utmost caution to prevent an escalation of hostilities. 

He pushed for freedom of navigation in the area, while the United States said it was investing heavily in new technology that would improve its defense capabilities along with those of its allies. 

Patrick Shanahan, the acting United States secretary of defense, also urged Beijing to follow a “rules-based order” in the region.
Hundreds of protesters marched in Manila on Wednesday over China’s actions in the South China Sea and called on Filipinos to defend their country’s sovereignty.
Pamalakaya, a group of fishermen who joined the protest, demanded that Chinese vessels immediately withdraw from the disputed area and that Duterte toughen his stance against the Chinese dictator, Xi Jinping.
Bobby Roldan, a spokesman for the group, said members could not fish in peace “courtesy of China’s intimidating presence in our waters.”
“And yet we don’t hear any condemnation from the Duterte administration,” he said.

China’s growing influence in Latin America is a threat to our way of life

• In countries just a few hundred miles away China is taking every opportunity it can to gain influence and exert control.
• Latin America is the new battleground in the greatest geopolitical conflict of our time.

By Rick Scott

Chinese Cosco Shipping Rose container ship sails the newly inaugurated Cocoli locks, during the visit of Chinese dictator Xi Jinping, in the Panama Canal, on December 3, 2018.

Last month I traveled to Panama, Colombia and Argentina. 

The purpose of my trip was to get an update on the fight for freedom and liberty in Venezuela, to highlight the important economic relationships between Latin America and my state of Florida and to continue building on the progress made to stop narco-trafficking.
On all of those fronts we made important progress and had great conversations about the future.
I came away with another impression that I, quite honestly, hadn’t expected. 

But it’s one that is stark and unmistakable. 

All across Latin America, we’re seeing the creeping influence of China in our hemisphere.
We know that China is a bad actor. 

China is not our friend. 

China sees the United States as its global adversary and is taking the steps necessary to win the great power conflict of the 21st Century.
We know they’ve been stealing our technology and our intellectual property. 

We know they manipulate their currency. 

We know they’ve been developing bases in the South China Sea. 

We know they’ve flooded the United States with dangerous fentanyl. 

We know their state sponsored technology companies like ZTE and Huawei have been accused of fraud, violating the Iran sanctions and stealing intellectual property. 

We know China consistently violates human rights. 

We know that China suppresses freedom of speech.
We know what China is. 

And yet, how many Americans realize that in countries just a few thousand miles (and in some cases a few hundred miles) away, China is taking every opportunity it can to gain influence and exert control. 

Latin America is the new battleground in the greatest geopolitical conflict of our time.
In Panama, the Chinese government is building its own port in Colon to exert more control over international trade between the Eastern and Western Hemispheres and drive out competition. 

Street restaurants in Panama have menus in English, Spanish and – you guessed it – Chinese.
Meanwhile, Colombia is experiencing a mass-influx of refugees from Venezuela. 

Venezuela’s president Nicolás Maduro’s policies are not only causing the deaths of thousands of his own people, he’s also created a refugee crisis with millions of Venezuelans fleeing his brutal regime. Most have gone to Colombia, which is struggling to keep up with the migration.
Chinese dictator Xi Jinping knows what Maduro is doing to his own people. 

He knows that he’s intentionally starving them, that he’s using Cuban security forces to harass dissidents and beat children in the streets. 

Xi doesn’t care. 

China is a willing participant in Maduro’s genocide.
China continues to prop up the Maduro regime, along with Cuba, Russia and Iran. 

Why? 

It’s pretty simple. 

Venezuela, before the tyranny of Hugo Chavez and Maduro, was an economic hub with huge reserves of oil and other natural resources. 

It can become that again and China wants in on the ground floor.
Even after the revelations of their dubious dealings, Maduro announced that Venezuela would make major investments in Huawei and ZTE despite not being able to even feed his own people. 

China’s support for Maduro is already paying off for them.
Almost 3,000 miles due south of Bogota, in Argentina, China is set to build a nuclear facility after signing an agreement with President Mauricio Macri. 

The deal includes a $10 billion loan from China.
Make no mistake. 

This is not by accident. 

Everything China does is on purpose. 

And right now, under our very noses, its purpose is to gain a foothold in Latin America by any means necessary, even if it means propping up ruthless dictators.
Politicians too rarely look at anything besides what’s directly in front of them. 

It’s hard for them to look beyond next week, let alone beyond the next election. 

So, I’ll say something that very few people are willing to say. 

The so-called trade war with China is causing some pain in our country right now.
I believe some short-term pain is worth it if we’re taking real steps to combat the greatest geopolitical foe we have. 

If we take a stand against China now, American businesses and American consumers will come out on top. 

Our manufacturing sector will be stronger. 

America will export more products. 

Our trade secrets will be protected. 

The average American consumer will benefit.
If we don’t face this threat head-on right now, we will still face it eventually. 

But if we wait, we’ll be in a much weaker position than we are now. 

China will just continue to walk all over us.
I think President Donald Trump is doing the right thing by standing up to China now. 

But there’s another step that we can all take to stem the tide of China’s growing influence in Latin America and around the world – support American businesses.
American taxpayers are funding China’s aggression every day. 

Every time we buy a product “made in China” we are putting another dollar into the pocket of the people stealing our technology, denying their people basic human rights and supporting genocide in Venezuela. 

It’s time to take a stand.
In my state, we take immense pride in products “Made in Florida.” 

It’s a driving force that led to our incredible economic turnaround. 

A return to this pride in home-grown businesses and products ensures America remains strong as the undisputed leader of the global economy.
I’m committed to supporting American businesses over Chinese products. 

I hope you’ll join me.
Washington politicians have let this happen. 

They’re too concerned with short-term political success and have ignored the long-term threats to our way of life. 

It needs to end, and it needs to end now.

South China Sea: Deterring a Fait Accompli

Many rogue states have resorted to limited land grabs designed to unilaterally change the territorial status quo before the target could muster an effective response. China is following this pattern.

by Lan D. Ngo

While the South China Sea has experienced a period of relative calm following HYSY-981 oil rig crisis in 2014, it is unclear whether the dispute would fully stabilize in the coming years, despite continuous efforts to negotiate a binding Code of Conduct.
Russia’s bolt-from-the-blue annexation of Crimea in early 2014 reminds states that their territories could be swiftly seized by an aggressive neighbor with territorial ambitions.
Therefore, claimants to the South China Sea dispute, such as Vietnam and the Philippines, should be prepared to deter a potential fait accompli, especially when modern history shows that states increasingly choose fait accompli rather than brute force to conquer new territory.

The Logic of Fait Accompli
States that seek to expand their territories have three basic options:
(i) brute force,
(ii) coercion, or
(iii) fait accompli. 
In a brute force scenario, the aggressor first defeats the target state on the battlefield and then makes territorial demands.
Defeated militarily, the target state has no choice but to acquiesce to the victor’s demands. Alternatively, the aggressor could coerce the target to give up some of its territories.
Facing coercive pressures and in some cases, the looming threat of war, the target may decide that it would be better off acceding to the demands of the aggressor rather than risking escalation.
The problem with brute force is that it tends to be very costly in blood and treasure.
Even the weakest victims would fight back if their survival is truly at stake.
Hence a deliberately short war could quickly turn into an inextricable morass.
This is why brute force may be the only option when the aggressor seeks to conquer another state’s entire territory but makes little sense in the pursuit of limited territorial goals.
Coercion is less costly than brute force, but its track record is rather dismal, especially when the coercive demand involves territory.
Furthermore, by coercing the target, the aggressor inevitably reveals its intentions, thus giving an early warning to the target which may then engage in military preparations to blunt a possible first-strike advantage.
In other words, coercion is an ineffective tool of territorial conquest that would also reduce the range of options available to the aggressor to achieve its territorial goal.
This is why many states have resorted to fait accompli, i.e. limited land grabs designed to minimize risks of escalation.
A fait accompli allows the aggressor to unilaterally change the territorial status quo before the target could muster an effective response.
This forces the target into a tough position as it must choose between two unappealing choices:
(i) try to dislodge the invaders from the seized territory and risk escalation or
(ii) accept the territorial loss.
Every time an aggressor resorts to fait accompli, it is betting that the territorial loss for the target is small enough that it would rather give up than fight back and risk a larger conflict.
This is why decisiveness and limited scale are intrinsic features of every fait accompli.
While any fait accompli only directly involves two states, it usually has significant implications for third parties.
Russia’s annexation of Crimea is a territorial loss only for Ukraine, but the United States and other European countries are rightly concerned about the broader implications of Russia’s land grab. European leaders could be forgiven for believing that Crimea was just the first act and that Russia’s westward expansion would not stop in Ukraine.
Even if they can be absolutely certain of Moscow’s limited territorial appetite, many states still have strong incentives to reverse Russia’s fait accompli because failing to do so could embolden countries that also seek territorial expansion.
Yet fait accompli is a tactic designed to deter external intervention.
Brute force and coercion unfold over a lengthier period of time that allows third parties like the UN or a great power to intervene.
By rapidly changing facts on the ground, the aggressor could achieve its territorial goal before any third party could intervene.
Once faced with an accomplished fact, third parties could only intervene by attempting to roll back the aggressor’s territorial gains, which usually demands the use of force.
Since using force is costly and risky, third parties are less likely to intervene after the fait accompli had already occurred.
Thus a fait accompli usually aims at two targets simultaneously: the immediate victim and potential third party interveners.
In launching a fait accompli, the aggressor seeks to minimize two kinds of risk:
(i) risk of a protracted conflict (if the target fights back) and
(ii) risk of a broader conflict (if a third party intervenes).

After the Fact: Dealing with Territorial Loss after Fait Accompli
Assuming that states always seek to reclaim their lost territory over the long term, states facing a fait accompli have two basic options in the short term: they could immediately try to recapture the lost territory or they could wait for a more opportune moment to reclaim the lost territory in the distant future.
This decision, to respond immediately or delay, crucially hinges on two factors: the value of the contested territory and the visibility of the fait accompli.
A contested territory could be highly valuable for strategic and/or symbolic reasons.
A strategic territory usually offers immediate military advantages to the state that controls it.
The Crimean Peninsula with the Sevastopol naval base and the Strait of Malacca are examples of strategic territory.
Some territories are important because they hold symbolic importance, either because they are considered sacred grounds (e.g. Temple Mount/Haram al-Sharif) or because they symbolize a larger power struggle (e.g. Berlin during the Cold War).
Leaders of a state facing the loss of a high-value territory should have strong incentives to immediately dislodge the invaders because losing such vital territory could endanger national security.
Even when security is not at stake, failing to immediately respond to such fait accompli could lead to severe political punishment as the people would not tolerate the loss of symbolically important territory.
This is why Ukraine immediately responded to recover Crimea after the Russian annexation in 2014.
What happens when the fait accompli targets a territory with little intrinsic value?
In such cases, leaders are likely to respond immediately only when the fait accompli is highly visible to the public audience.
When Argentina seized the Southern Thule island in 1976, the Callaghan government turned a blind eye toward the incident, even keeping the parliament and the British people in the dark for eighteen months before the fait accompli became public knowledge.
In contrast, when the Argentines seized the Falklands in 1982, Thatcher immediately appealed to the UN Security Council and dispatched the Navy across the Atlantic to recapture the islands.
Neither the Falkland Islands nor Southern Thule held much value in the eyes of British policymakers. The crucial difference here is that whereas Argentina stealthily took over Southern Thule, they publicly seized the Falklands.
Because the Falklands invasion was such a public event, it was a direct assault on British national honor and therefore humiliating.
Thatcher did not have any other choice than to respond immediately to Argentina’s fait accompli because failing to respond would have opened herself to attacks by her political rivals and precipitated the fall of her government.

Deterring a Fait Accompli in the South China Sea
Although China has not used military force to expand their territorial control in the South China Sea in recent years, this is no cause for complacent.
After all, China is the only claimant in the South China Sea dispute to have used force to seize islands controlled by other states.
They forcibly took the Paracel Islands from South Vietnam in 1974 and in 1988, the PLA Navy once again opened fire to seize control over a number of islands in the Spratlys controlled by Vietnam.
The 1995 Mischief Reef incident and more recently, the Scarborough Shoal standoff in 2012 remind us that Beijing will resort to force when it finds no other way to enforce its claims in the disputed area.
The risk of a Chinese fait accompli in the South China Sea is also high because many factors play to its advantage.
Given the high level of asymmetric economic interdependence, China’s neighbors like the Philippines and Vietnam will pay an enormous cost for trying to recapture an island that China seizes. Furthermore, given the clear imbalance of power in favor of China, small countries are unlikely to resort to force to dislodge Chinese invading troops, lest the response provokes a larger and more devastating conflict.
The great power most capable of deterring Chinese adventurism in the South China Sea at this point is the United States. 
Ideally, the United States would announce that it does not tolerate any attempt to solve the dispute by force, similar to its veiled deterrent threat against a potential Chinese invasion of Taiwan.
However, this is unlikely to happen any time soon as U.S. behavior thus far shows that it lacks the resolve to directly challenge China in the South China Sea.
The best way to deter China from attempting a fait accompli, for the time being, is to convince Beijing that there is no possible way they could take the islands in a swift and bloodless fait accompli. 
States increasingly rely on fait accompli rather than war or coercion because they believe it is a low-cost and low-risk alternative that could achieve similar territorial goals.
Consequently, fait accompli will become less attractive if those contemplating are convinced that the tactic actually carries more risk and costs than they previously believed.
Thus, states at risk of having their territories seized through fait accompli must convince the potential aggressors that they would definitely make an attempt to reclaim the lost territory, regardless of its intrinsic value.
To make this deterrent threat credible, leaders have to sacrifice policy flexibility and tie their hands by raising the public’s awareness about the disputed territories and therefore ensure strong public reaction should the disputed territories be invaded.
States should also garrison troops in territories that are vulnerable to a fait accompli. 
In extreme cases, they could convince their own populace to inhabit the hitherto uninhabitable islands by supplying them with all necessary wherewithals to sustain a normal life on these islands.
These measures enhance the credibility of a retaliatory threat because it precludes the possibility of stealthily seizing a piece of territory.
More importantly, it ensures that leaders of target state must respond to the territorial challenge or risk losing power at home.

Aggressive Outbursts Mar Xi's Plan to Raise China on the World Stage

Beijing rewards diplomats that are aggressive advocates of China’s views and scorns those that it perceives as overly timid

Bloomberg News

China’s diplomats aren’t being very diplomatic.
In the past few months, its envoy to Canada publicly accused his hosts of “white supremacy,” its ambassador in Sweden labeled the Swedish police “inhumane” and blasted the country’s “so-called freedom of expression,” and its chief emissary in South Africa said President Donald Trump’s policies were making the U.S. “the enemy of the whole world.”
“I don’t think we are witnessing a pattern of misstatements and slips of the tongue," said Ryan Hass, a fellow at the Brookings Institution who previously oversaw China affairs at the U.S. National Security Council. 

“We seem to be watching China’s diplomats matching the mood of the moment in Beijing. Beijing rewards diplomats that are aggressive advocates of China’s views and scorns those that it perceives as overly timid.”
That may be damaging Xi Jinping’s efforts to win friends abroad and capitalize on Donald Trump’s international unpopularity. 

While China has seized on the trade war and U.S. disengagement abroad to pitch itself as a champion of globalization, 63 percent of respondents to a 2018 Pew poll in 25 countries said they preferred the U.S. as a world leader, compared with 19 percent for China.

Backlash Builds
At stake is China’s avowed goal of establishing itself as a global superpower with influence over a network of allies to balance U.S. influence. 

China is pouring billions into global efforts such as Xi’s Belt and Road Initiative to forge stronger links with countries around the world.
But China’s increasingly strident diplomatic approach could do more harm than good. 

Anti-China sentiment has played a pivotal role in election surprises across Asia, and more countries around the world are becoming skeptical of Chinese investment -- particularly in telecommunications, with fears growing about using its equipment in 5G networks due to concerns about espionage.
China’s foreign ministry didn’t respond to faxed questions about the more aggressive language from diplomats. 

After Trump took office, China has sought to portray itself as a supporter of the international order, with Xi himself defending globalization at the World Economic Forum in Davos, Switzerland. 

His charm offensive stood in contrast to Trump, who has reshaped public discourse with regular insults of other world leaders on Twitter.
Even so, foreign diplomats in Beijing say that the behavior of Chinese officials has become far more aggressive and assertive in private meetings in recent years. 

Their discussions have become more ideological, according to one senior foreign envoy, who described the behavior as a strong sense of grievance combined with increasing entitlement about China’s international role and rights.
China’s reported behavior at the APEC summit in November highlighted the shift. 

Papua New Guinea police were called after Chinese officials attempted to “barge” into the office of the country’s foreign minister to influence the summit’s communique, according to the Agence France-Presse news agency. 

Chinese officials later denied the report, calling it “a rumor spread by some people with a hidden agenda.”

Huawei Advocacy
Chinese diplomats’ advocacy for the country’s embattled tech giant, Huawei Technologies Co., has even riled heads of government. 

After the Chinese ambassador to the Czech Republic, Zhang Jianmin, announced in November that the Czech cyber security body’s decision to ban Huawei did not represent the view of the Czech government, Prime Minister Andrej Babis said, “I do not know what the ambassador is talking about," according to Czech Radio. 

One European ambassador in Beijing said China’s aggressive advocacy for the company has been prevalent across the 28-nation bloc.

Zhang Jianmin

In some regions, China’s overseas rhetoric has been hardening for years. 

Foreign officials noticed an increasingly strident tone from Beijing following the global financial crisis. 

At a 2010 meeting hosted by Southeast Asian nations in Hanoi, then foreign minister Yang Jiechi famously dismissed some of China’s neighbors as “small countries” when challenged over Beijing’s stance in the South China Sea.
Foreign diplomats said the outbursts have increased in both frequency and intensity since Xi took power in 2012. 

In the last few years, South Korea, the Philippines, Australia and now Canada have all incurred Beijing’s wrath, with diplomatic barbs often accompanied by economic pressure through import restrictions, store inspections and safety warnings to Chinese tour groups.
In a speech at the 2017 Communist Party conclave that saw Xi appointed for a second term as party chief without an apparent successor, Xi described China as “standing tall and firm in the East” and pledged to make the country a global leader in innovation, influence and military might. 

At a conference for Chinese ambassadors at the end of that year, Xi urged diplomats to play a more proactive part in an increasingly multipolar world -- a speech China’s ambassador to the United Kingdom described as a “mobilization order,” or “bugle call.”

‘Crags and Torrents’
China’s diplomatic corps has been quick to show its loyalty to Xi. 

In a 2017 essay in the party’s theoretical magazine Qiushi, top diplomat Yang Jiechi pledged to study and implement Xi’s thought on diplomacy in a “deep-going way.” 

And Foreign Minister Wang Yi recently praised Xi for “taking the front line of history” and “braving 10,000 crags and torrents.”
“Chinese ambassadors always feel they have to speak to the leaders in Beijing more than to the local public. Their promotions depend on it,” said Susan Shirk, a former U.S. deputy assistant Secretary of State for East Asia. 

“If today what they say is more overtly anti-American or anti-Western then that reflects the changing foreign policy line.”
In line with national “party-building” campaigns, Chinese diplomats regularly engage in “self-criticism” sessions at the Ministry of Foreign Affairs, according to people familiar with the meetings. Last month, the former deputy head of the party’s powerful Organization Department, Qi Yu, was appointed as the foreign ministry’s Party Secretary despite a lack of diplomatic experience. 

One foreign ambassador said Chinese diplomats are increasingly “scared.”
China has seen this kind of ideology-driven diplomacy before. 

During the Cultural Revolution, Chinese diplomats in London videotaped themselves fighting protesters on the streets of London, according to the book China’s Quest by historian John Garver. 

In Beijing, British and Soviet diplomatic missions were besieged or invaded and other diplomats were threatened on the streets.
The new wave of truculence is also affecting how foreign envoys are treated in China. 

Detained Canadian citizen and former diplomat Michael Kovrig has been questioned about his work as a diplomat, according to people familiar with the discussions. 

The move is a violation of Article 39 of the Vienna Convention, which explicitly covers the past work of former diplomats. 

China is a signatory.
Foreign diplomats visiting China’s far western colony of East Turkestan have been followed, temporarily detained and forced to delete photographs from their phones, while Swedish citizen Gui Minhai was grabbed by Chinese authorities in front of Swedish diplomats.
The shift in mood, and tensions with the U.S., have altered the tone of discussions inside China’s bureaucracy. 

One Chinese trade diplomat said that while it’s never been easy to be a dove in China, all but the most senior officials now refrain from publicly voicing moderate positions toward the U.S.
“Beijing has established a pattern of making examples of middle powers in hopes that doing so deters others from challenging China’s interests,” said Hass at the Brookings Institution. 

“Some in Beijing also seem to be growing frustrated that China’s rising national power is not yet translating into the types of deference from others that it seeks.”

Chinese Aggressions

Pompeo promises intervention if Philippines is attacked by China
By Regine Cabato and Shibani Mahtani

Philippines Foreign Secretary Teodoro Locsin, left, shakes hands with visiting Secretary of State Mike Pompeo after their joint news conference in Manila on March 1. 

MANILA — Secretary of State Mike Pompeo said Friday that any attack on Philippine aircraft or ships in the South China Sea will trigger a response from the United States under a mutual defense treaty between the two countries, a firm assurance to its longtime ally amid rising Chinese militarization in the contested waters.
“China’s island building and military activities in the South China Sea threaten [Philippine] sovereignty, security and therefore economic livelihood, as well as that of the United States,” said Pompeo, speaking at a joint news conference in Manila, where he landed last night after the conclusion of the Hanoi summit between President Trump and North Korean leader Kim Jong Un.
“As the South China Sea is part of the Pacific, any armed attack on Philippine forces, aircraft or public vessels in the South China Sea will trigger mutual defense obligations under Article 4 of our mutual defense treaty,” Pompeo added.
The article spells out that the Philippines and the United States would come to each other’s defense if either is attacked, as such an attack on either party would “be dangerous to its own peace and safety.”
Pompeo’s comments seek to reassure the Southeast Asian country at a time when China is increasingly building military outposts on artificial islands it has claimed for its own in the contested waters. 

China claims it has "historic" rights to the South China Sea, a crucial waterway where one-third of global trade flows, but its claims overlap with that of several nations in the region, including Vietnam and the Philippines.
Pompeo’s visit also comes at a time when the long-standing alliance between the Philippines and the United States is being questioned by some skeptics inside the administration of Rodrigo Duterte, who has been courting investment from and closer ties with China. 

Last November, Xi Jinping visited Manila, the first Chinese leader to make a state visit there in over a decade.
Pompeo, who is making his first trip to Manila as secretary of state, met with Duterte as well as Philippine Foreign Secretary Teddy Locsin.
A pro-China camp in the administration “is using the argument that China is a geographical reality, whereas America is a geopolitical anomaly,” said Richard Heydarian, a Manila-based defense and security analyst. 

“People asking: Do we really need America? That’s so Cold War.”
Philippine Defense Secretary Delfin Lorenzana has called for a review of the 1951 Mutual Defense Treaty between Washington and Manila, the agreement that guarantees a U.S. military response if the Philippines is to be attacked. 

The Philippine defense establishment has long argued that the language of the document is too vague, especially as China gets more aggressive in the waters off the Philippine archipelago.
A report earlier this month from the Asia Maritime Transparency Initiative (AMTI), run by the Center for Strategic and International Studies, found that China had sent a large fleet of almost 100 ships to stop construction work by the Philippines on an island in the Spratly chain.
After Pompeo’s assurances that the South China Sea is covered in the mutual defense agreement, the “impetus will be on Manila to decide whether that’s good enough,” said Greg Poling, director of the AMTI.
Speaking at their joint news conference Friday, Locsin said the review of the mutual defense treaty was something that “requires further thought,” indicating that he believed Pompeo’s comments were a sufficient guarantee.
“We are very assured, we’re very confident, that the United States has — in the words of Trump to our president: We have your back,” he said.
Speaking to reporters as he flew from Manila and Hanoi, Pompeo said he was “absolutely” concerned about Chinese influence in the Philippines and more broadly across the region. 

In his Friday statement, he warned his counterparts about Chinese state-backed companies — who have promised billions of dollars in big-ticket infrastructure and investment in the Philippines under Duterte.
“American companies . . . operate with the highest standards of transparency, and adherence to the rule of law,” said Pompeo. 

“The same cannot be said for Chinese state-run or state-backed enterprises.”

Chinese Aggressions

South China Sea: Indonesia And Vietnam Prove Duterte Wrong
By Panos Mourdoukoutas

Indonesia joined Vietnam recently to challenge Duterte’s doctrine in the South China Sea.
That’s the notion that any Asian-Pacific country that dares to tame Beijing’s ambitions to control the entire South China Sea will face war with China.
This week, Indonesia drew a “red line” in the South China Sea establishing fishing rights in areas where China claims “overlapping” rights, according to BenarNews.
Indonesia’s move comes roughly two years after the country renamed its maritime region in the southwest part of the South China Sea as the “North Natuna Sea,” asserting sovereignty in the area.
Meanwhile, Vietnam has been taken its own steps to tame Beijing’s ambitions to control the South China Sea. 

Last month, Hanoi pushed for a pact to outlaw many of China’s ongoing activities in the South China Sea. 

Like the building of artificial islands, blockades and offensive weaponry such as missile deployments; and the Air Defense Identification Zone—a conduct code China initiated back in 2013.
Chinese, Indonesian, and Philippines Shares
These activities are part of Beijing’s efforts to assert complete dominance in the South China Sea and push the US out.
“Although China does not want to usurp the United States’ position as the leader of the global order, its actual aim is nearly as consequential,” says Oriana Skylar Mastro in “The Stealth Superpower: How China Hid Its Global Ambitions,”published in the January/February issue of Foreign Affairs. “In the Indo-Pacific region, China wants complete dominance.; it wants to force the United States out and become the region’s unchallenged political, economic, and military hegemon.”
That’s why America has stepped up patrols in disputed South China Sea waters, asserting its willingness to keep the waterway an open sea to all commercial and military vessels.
And that has provided some sort of insurance for Indonesia and Vietnam against an unmeasured response from China.
Meanwhile, Indonesia’s and Vietnam’s moves have proved Duterte wrong: standing up to China doesn’t lead to war.
So far, financial markets in the region have been discounting these developments as “noise,” rather than something more serious, focusing instead on the trade war between Beijing and Washington. 

But they could come back to haunt markets once the trade war is settled.
A growing conflict between China on the one side and America on the other over who will write the navigation rules for the South China Sea raises geopolitical risks for the global economy. 

And it adds to investor anxieties over the fate of international trade and the economic integration of the Asia-Pacific region.

Chinese Aggressions

The UK’s shift in attitude to the threat of China
By James Forsyth

Defence secretary Gavin Williamson



Gavin Williamson’s speech today is another demonstration of how the UK government’s attitude to China has changed.
In the Cameron Osborne era, the UK was determined to be China’s best friend in the West.
All the emphasis was on creating a ‘golden era’ in Anglo-Chinese relations.
But now, the government strikes a more realistic tone on China.
In his speech today, Williamson brackets China with Russia as a threat.
The headlines today have been about Williamson’s decision to send the UK’s new aircraft carrier, carrying both US and UK jets, to the Pacific in a message to Beijing.
But just as telling is the emphasis that Williamson places on various alliances.
He talks about the Five Eyes—the intelligence sharing agreement between the US, the UK, Canada, Australia and New Zealand—which is at the forefront of efforts to deal with Chinese intellectual property theft. 
Williamson also stresses the UK’s growing closeness to Japan, South Korea and India—three countries that are vital to any attempt to balance and contain Chinese power in Asia.
The government’s shift in thinking on China is sensible.
Ultimately, the UK will not benefit from a world in which China’s power grows unchecked.

Rogue Nation

Systematic aggression by Chinese against our people, our business and jobs has rendered them unworthy of our trust.
By Charles Wallace

Copper plates move along a conveyor at the Jinguan Copper smelter, operated by Tongling Nonferrous Metals Group Co., in Tongling, Anhui province, China, on Thursday, Jan. 17, 2019. On the heels of record refined copper output last year, China's No. 2 producer, Tongling, says it'll defy economic gloom and strive to churn out even more of the metal in 2019. 

Tyler Cowan, an economist whom I normally greatly admire, has come out with his diagnosis of what ails the US-China relationship. 

It’s not trade, he says, but a “lack of trust.”
This has to qualify as an understatement of epic proportions. 

Here are just a few issues of note:

1. After joining the World Trade Organization in 2000, China heavily subsidized state-owned companies in the steel sector with the goal of taking over the world steel industry. It largely succeeded, despite having neither raw materials or a cheap labor way of making steel. The major price advantage was that it gave their steel companies free electricity with which to price US and European steel companies out of the market, in direct violation of WTO rules.
2. China has been feverishly building man-made islands in the South China Sea with the goal of vastly expanding its territory and threatening any country that has the temerity to believe in international waters and the law of the sea. Just ask Malaysia, Taiwan, Vietnam and the Philippines if there is a "lack of trust" over the Spratly Islands.
3. Chinese drug factories are cranking out tons of cheap fentanyl, a drug 10 times more potent than heroin, and using the US mails to distribute them to dealers in the US. Does anyone really think that China, which after all is still a closely controlled police state, doesn’t know who is doing this and could easily stop them?
4. Chinese army hackers are stealing not military secrets from the US, but private company information and turning it over to Chinese firms so that they can achieve a commercial advantage over foreign competitors. Now, I’m sure the US military does try to penetrate China’s military secrets, at least I hope they do. But I seriously doubt that the National Security Agency is helping Apple by stealing plans for the next Xiaomi.
5. China’s industrial policy known as “Made in China 2025” contains a prescription for taking over the global chip industry in the same way it has seized the steel industry. State owned companies will be sent out to buy up every Western firm they can get their hands on. Is it any wonder that the new US committee looking at these purchases is taking a dim view of them?
6. China is depending on the thousands of Chinese engineers who trained at US universities, which really have never dealt with a systemized program of economic warfare before. US universities were friendly, open and helpful to their Chinese students, as they should be, but they will find that this knowledge is being turned against the US with the goal of destroying key US industries. Did anyone mention artificial intelligence research?

Faced with the laundry list of aggressive behavior, it just plain silly to call this a “lack of trust.”
To his credit President Trump has been very vocal about what China was trying to do and has put in place trade restrictions in an effort to force Beijing to accept international standards for trade and navigation in the oceans, for starters.
The measures have had some effect -- China’s economy has slowed dramatically, not entirely due to tariffs from the US, but the taxes have begun to bite.
While China is often described as a market economy, consider this: shortly after Beijing put retaliatory tariffs on soybeans, Chinese imports of US soybeans went nearly to zero. 

Was this in reaction to a 10% tax, or did the government spread the word that US soybeans were not to be imported. 

I suspect the latter, which demonstrates that the term market economy really doesn‘t apply to a one-party system with no respect for the rule of law.
So my answer to Professor Cowan: it’s not a lack of trust but systematic aggression by China against our people, our business and jobs that has rendered them unworthy of our trust.
I hope the current round of negotiations will help restore that trust by curbing that aggression, but I seriously doubt it.

Faced With Chinese Aggressions, Taiwan Rallies Around Its Leader

Tsai Ing-wen: “Democratic values are the values and way of life that Taiwanese cherish, and we call upon China to bravely move toward democracy.”

By Chris Horton

President Tsai Ing-wen, center, in Taipei this month. Public support for Ms. Tsai has increased after she delivered a rebuke of a speech by Xi Jinping.

TAIPEI, Taiwan — Just a few weeks ago, President Tsai Ing-wen of Taiwan was struggling politically. 

Her party had lost in key local elections, imperiling her run for a second term next year.
But then she got help from an unlikely source: the dictator of China.
In a speech this month to the people of Taiwan, a self-ruled democracy that Beijing considers Chinese territory, Xi Jinping said the island “must be and will be” united with China and warned that independence efforts could be met by armed force.
Xi’s speech raised anxieties in Taiwan that Ms. Tsai was able to tap into by delivering a rebuke of Xi’s proposal, in a rare departure from her usual cautious ambiguity.
“Democratic values are the values and way of life that Taiwanese cherish,” she said, “and we call upon China to bravely move toward democracy.”
Ms. Tsai’s approval ratings surged after her speech, according to Taiwanese news reports. 

She also appeared to reassert her influence within her party with the appointment of an ally, Cho Jung-tai, as chairman this month.
The revitalization of Ms. Tsai’s political prospects highlights the challenge that the increasingly authoritarian government in Beijing faces in offering a political formula for unification that would be attractive to Taiwan’s vigorous democracy.
Most of Taiwan’s 23 million people are in favor of maintaining the island’s de facto independence without taking any formal moves that might bring a military response from China. 

Still, Taiwan has tended to push back against threats from Beijing.
Ms. Tsai’s response “looked very presidential” to many Taiwanese, said Hans H. Tung, an associate professor of political science at National Taiwan University. 

He said it also earned Ms. Tsai greater support from her Democratic Progressive Party, which leans toward independence.
It was a notable turnaround after Ms. Tsai’s party lost several crucial mayoral elections in November to the opposition party, the Kuomintang, or K.M.T., largely because of unhappiness with how her government has handled economic issues.
The losses led Ms. Tsai to resign as party chairwoman, making her less certain to be the party’s candidate in the presidential election next year.

A television in New Taipei City showing Xi giving a speech earlier this month. He said that Taiwan “must” be united with China and that independence efforts could be met by armed force.

But Ms. Tsai’s firm rejection of Xi’s speech has earned her the support of voters like Li Imte, a resident of Taipei. 

Ms. Li said she had until recently been disappointed with Ms. Tsai’s unwillingness to prioritize same-sex marriage, an issue she had campaigned on before she was elected in 2016.
“In terms of changing Taiwan’s situation for the better, I really can’t think of anyone out there more capable than Tsai Ing-wen,” Ms. Li said.
Expressions of encouragement for Ms. Tsai have flooded Taiwanese social media, with one viral post portraying her as a mother defending her child from a bully. 

Hundreds of female doctors from across Taiwan took out a front-page advertisement in two local newspapers urging readers to support Ms. Tsai.
In a joint declaration last week, representatives of Taiwan’s aboriginal peoples also challenged Xi’s assertion that Taiwan is part of China.
“Taiwan is the sacred land where generations of our ancestors lived and protected with their lives,” their letter read. 

“It has never belonged to China.”
Xi’s speech also helped Ms. Tsai by dealing a blow to the opposition Kuomintang, which favors closer ties with China and is Beijing’s preferred dialogue partner.
At the heart of the Taiwan dispute is the so-called 1992 Consensus, an unwritten agreement between Beijing and the Kuomintang government that monopolized political power in Taiwan at that time. That agreement holds that there is only one China, which includes Taiwan, but that both sides can define “One China” in their own way.
For Beijing, that means the People’s Republic of China. 

For the Kuomintang it is the Republic of China, Taiwan’s official name.
Ms. Tsai has refused to endorse the 1992 Consensus at all, leading Xi’s administration to suspend official contacts with her government.
In his speech, Xi also said that in the event of peaceful unification Taiwan would be administered under the “one country, two systems” political model China uses to govern Hong Kong, a territory where there are concerns about shrinking freedoms under Xi’s rule.
Analysts say Ms. Tsai skillfully used Xi’s speech to equate the 1992 Consensus with Beijing’s “one country, two systems” formula. 

That has put the Kuomintang on the defensive over its support for the 1992 Consensus.

The changing of the guard at Chiang Kai-shek Memorial Hall in Taipei. Chiang’s party, the Kuomintang, which favors closer ties with China, has been on the defensive over Xi’s speech.

“The K.M.T. doesn’t want to be tagged as defending Xi’s mode for unification that has led to the erosion of freedoms in Hong Kong,” said Bonnie Glaser, director of the China Power Project at the Center for Strategic and International Studies in Washington.
The “one country, two systems” arrangement has been used in Hong Kong since it was returned from British colonial control in 1997. 

The model provides the territory with some autonomy from Beijing, allowing Hong Kong residents more freedom than citizens in the rest of China. 

But the space for pro-democratic activism and freedom of expression has shrunk in recent years.
In China, Ma Xiaoguang, a spokesman for the Taiwan Affairs Office, said Wednesday that the 1992 Consensus and the “one country, two systems” model were not the same thing. 

“The leadership of the D.P.P. has mixed up these two purposefully to misguide the Taiwanese people,” Ma said, referring to Ms. Tsai’s party.
Zhu Songling, director of the Institute of Taiwan Studies at Beijing Union University, said that a “one country, two systems” arrangement for Taiwan would not have to replicate the one in Hong Kong.
“The ‘two systems’ for Taiwan can be negotiated,” Zhu said. 

“How do you know that ‘one country, two systems’ does not suit Taiwan even before starting a negotiation?”
But Ms. Tsai’s rejection of “one country, two systems” has support in Taiwan that stretches across party lines. 

The Kuomintang’s chairman, Wu Den-yih, said in a speech last week to party members that the 1992 Consensus was “unrelated” to the “one country, two systems” model proposed by Xi.
Wayne Chiang, a Kuomintang legislator whose great-grandfather, Chiang Kai-shek, was the longtime president of the Republic of China, praised Ms. Tsai’s emphasis on the need for Beijing to respect Taiwan’s democracy and freedom. 

For that, Mr. Chiang was criticized by fellow members of the party and its supporters.
Mr. Chiang also dismissed Xi’s proposal. 

“Taiwan is not Hong Kong,” he told reporters last week. 

“The majority of Taiwanese people also find it impossible to accept ‘one country, two systems.’”
Another Kuomintang legislator, Jason Hsu, went even further, saying in an interview that Xi’s speech showed that the 1992 Consensus was no longer viable for his party as an approach to relations with China and that the Kuomintang needed to think of a new strategy.
It is unclear if the current wave of support for Ms. Tsai will improve her chances at re-election, given that it changes little about the domestic challenges she still faces.
“The question is whether the boost in Tsai support will be only temporary,” Ms. Glaser said.
But she noted that China’s threats against Taiwan tended to benefit the party that is more critical of Beijing.
“The people want a government that can protect them from outside threats when they feel insecure,” she said.