Welcome to an emerging Asia: India and China stop feigning friendship while Russia plays all sides

By Harsh V Pant

In a hard place.

After a few timid signs of warming, Sino-Indian relations seem to be headed for the freezer. 

While Beijing refuses to take Indian security concerns seriously, New Delhi may have decided to take the Chinese challenge head-on. 

To complicate matters for India, its erstwhile ally Russia, which has become a close friend of China, is showing interest in establishing closer ties with Pakistan.
The latest move that clenches teeth in India is China refusing to lift a hold on Pakistan-based Jaish-e-Mohammad chief Masood Azhar, accused of plotting multiple acts of terrorism against India, and blocking him in December from being listed as a terrorist by the United Nations. 

Since March, China has blocked India’s attempts to put a ban on Azhar, under the sanctions committee of the UN Security Council, despite support from other members of the 15-nation body. 

In response, India has gone beyond expressing dismay by testing its long-range ballistic missiles—Agni IV and Agni V—in recent weeks. 

Pakistan, aided by China, has also jumped in by testing its first sea cruise missile that could be eventually launched from a Pakistani submarine.
China has upped the ante, indicating a willingness to help Pakistan increase the range of its nuclear missiles. 

China’s official mouthpiece, Global Times, contended in an editorial: “if the Western countries accept India as a nuclear country and are indifferent to the nuclear race between India and Pakistan, China will not stand out and stick rigidly to those nuclear rules as necessary. At this time, Pakistan should have those privileges in nuclear development that India has.”

China’s $46 billion investment in the so-called China-Pakistan Economic Corridor, or CPEC, also troubles India as the land corridor extends through the contested territory in Kashmir which India claims as its own. 

India views CPEC as an insidious attempt by China to create new realities on the ground and a brazen breach of India’s sovereignty and territory. 

The Chinese media have suggested that India should join CPEC to “boost its export and slash its trade deficit with China” and “the northern part of India bordering Pakistan and Jammu & Kashmir will gain more economic growth momentum.”
New Delhi has questioned if China would accept an identical situation in Tibet or Taiwan, or if this is a new phase in Chinese policy with China accepting Pakistan’s claims as opposed to the previous stance of viewing Kashmir as disputed territory.

Faced with an intransigent China, India under the centre-right government led by Narendra Modi is busy reevaluating its China policy. 

Modi’s initial outreach to China soon after coming to office in May 2014 failed to produce any substantive outcome and he has since decided to take a more hard-nosed approach. 

New Delhi has strengthened partnerships with like-minded countries, including the United States, Japan, Australia, and Vietnam. 

India has bolstered its capabilities along the troubled border with China and the Indian military is operationally gearing up for a two-front war. 

India is also ramping up its nuclear and conventional deterrence against China by testing long-range missiles, raising a mountain strike corps for the border with China, enhancing submarine capabilities, and basing its first squadron of French-made Rafale fighter jets near that border.
More interesting is a significant shift in India’s Tibet policy with the Modi government deciding to bring the issue back into the Sino-Indian bilateral equation. 

India will openly welcome the Dalai Lama, Tibet’s spiritual leader who has lived in exile in India since 1959, at an international conference on Buddhism to be held in Rajgir-Nalanda, Bihar, in March. 

And ignoring Beijing’s protests, the Dalai Lama will also visit the Indian state of Arunachal Pradesh which China claims as part of its own territory.
After initially ceding ground to Chinese sensitivities on Tibet and refusing to explicitly acknowledge official interactions with the Dalai Lama, a more public role for the monk is now presented as an essential part of the Indian response to China. 

In the first meeting in decades between a serving Indian head of state and the Dalai Lama, Indian President Pranab Mukherjee hosted the Buddhist leader at the inaugural session of the first Laureates and Leaders for Children Summit, held at the president’s official residence in New Delhi in December.

Pawn for giants: China strives to curb the influence of the Dalai Lama, who lives in India. The religion emerged in India during 5th century BC and has numerous sects.

China has not taken kindly to these moves by India and vehemently opposes any attempt to boost the image or credibility of the Dalai Lama.
China has been relentless in seeking isolation for the Dalai Lama and often succeeds in bullying weaker states to bar the monk. 

After the Dalai Lama’s November visit to the predominantly Buddhist Mongolia, where he is revered as a spiritual leader, the nation incurred China’s wrath and soon apologised, promising that the Dalai Lama would no longer be allowed to enter the country.
But India is not Mongolia. 

There is growing disenchantment with Chinese behaviour in New Delhi. 

Appeasing China by sacrificing the interests of the Tibetan people has not yielded any benefits for India, nor has there been tranquility in the Himalayas in recent decades. 

As China’s aggressiveness has grown, Indian policymakers are no longer content to play by rules set by China. 

Although India has formally acknowledged Tibet as a part of China, there is a new push to support the legitimate rights of the Tibetan people so as to negotiate with China from a position of strength.
This Sino-Indian geopolitical jostling is also being shaped by the broader shift in global and regional strategic equations. 

Delhi long took Russian support for granted. 

Yet, much to India’s discomfiture, China has found a new ally in Russia which is keen to side with it, even as a junior partner, to scuttle western interests. 

Historically sound Indo-Russian ties have become a casualty of this trend and to garner Chinese support for its anti-West posturing, Russia has refrained from supporting Indian positions.
Worried about India’s growing proximity to the United States, Russia is also warming up to Pakistan. 

The two held their first joint military exercise in September and their first bilateral consultation on regional issues in December. 

After officially lifting an arms embargo against Pakistan in 2014, Russia will deliver four Russian-made Mi-35M attack helicopters in 2017 to Pakistan’s military. 

It is also likely that the China-backed CPEC might be merged with the Russia-backed Eurasian Economic Union. 

Jettisoning its traditional antipathy to the Taliban, Russia indicates a readiness to negotiate with the Taliban against the backdrop of the growing threat of the Islamic State in Afghanistan. 

Towards that end, Russia is already working with China and Pakistan, thereby marginalising India in the regional process.
As the Trump administration takes office in Washington on Jan. 20, it will be rushing into headwinds generated by growing Sino-Indian tensions and a budding Sino-Russian entente. 

Trump’s own pro-Russia and anti-China inclinations could further complicate geopolitical alignments in Asia. 

Growing tension in the Indian subcontinent promises to add to the volatility.

Target: Beijing

India successfully tested a nuclear-capable ICBM that can reach Beijing
By Joshua Berlinger

The Agni-V is displayed during the Republic Day parade in New Delhi on January 26, 2013.
Hong Kong -- It's a frightening prospect, India and China going to war.
The countries are home to 2.5 billion people, a long and sometimes disputed border -- which they've fought wars over -- and each have nuclear weapons.
And India announced last month it successfully tested the Agni-V intercontinental ballistic missile (ICBM), which could deliver a nuke to Beijing.
Indian Prime Minister Narendra Modi tweeted the accomplishment "makes every Indian proud."
But some in China see the test as a provocation. 

And provocations can make the region less stable, which can lead to hostilities, says Victor Gao, the director of the China National Association of International Studies.
An Indian Foreign Ministry spokesman responded by telling CNN that its "strategic capabilities are not targeted against any particular country," and that the country abides by its international obligations.
But not everyone shares such a sanguine view of the Sino-Indian relationship.
"Everyone should be interested in and concerned about India's successful ICBM test, inc(luding) China because it's within range of this new missile and because it especially of the major Asian countries understands the dangers of nationalism and its volatility," says Yvonne Chiu, a professor of at Hong Kong University.

'Precisely ambiguous'
India and China both maintain what's called a "no first use" policy as part of their nuclear doctrine.
The policy means exactly what it sounds like -- in the event of a war, the country won't use nuclear weapons unless they're attacked by an enemy using nuclear weapons.
But India's nationalist defense minister, Manohar Parrikar, publicly mused in November whether India should be bound by the "no first use" policy.
"If a written down policy exists, or you take a stand on a nuclear aspect, I think you are truly giving away your strength in nuclear," Parrikar said. 

"Why should I bind myself? I should say I'm a responsible nuclear power and I will not use it irresponsibly."
It's important to note that Parrikar said those were his personal opinions, and that India's nuclear doctrine was not changing.
And he made those comments in November, after tensions with Pakistan were on the rise due to unrest in Kashmir.

Kashmir: A bitter dispute

But Parrikar isn't the only one in India questioning the "no first use" doctrine.
"Nuclear deterrence is a curious thing -- it succeeds when it creates doubts in the mind of the adversary state, and doubt is created in the nuclear realm by being precisely ambiguous about your intentions, your capabilities and about the possibilities of its use," said Bharat Karnad​,​ a professor of national security studies at the Indian Centre for Policy Research.
"We are far too certain about our retaliatory strike certainties. It's not the kind of certainty you'd like your adversaries to believe, primarily because it undermines your own deterrent posture."
It could be all smoke and mirrors -- what better way to publicly sow doubt about your intentions than to publicly muse about changing them, but in private, stay committed to "no first use."​
But any ambiguity doesn't look great from China's position.
What would you do if southern neighbor, which you fought a war against in the 1970s, starts beating nationalist drums and gives mixed messages on whether or not they'll fire a nuke first in a war?

Keeping enemies closer?
Indian Prime Minister Modi has made rapprochement a staple of his China policy since he took office.
Modi and Xi Jinping met early at the start of the Indian leader's premiership in 2014. 

The two sides spoke glowingly of what the countries could accomplish by working together.
Gao, who was Deng Xiapoing's translator, believes Modi has done a good job engaging with China.
But just because trade and diplomatic ties are strengthened doesn't preclude India from trying to catch up to China militarily.
"There are long-standing tensions and ongoing disputes between the two countries, and one possible path to better relations is to come at it from a position of relative strength, particularly if the increased strength in question is both a genuine threat (nuclear capability)," Chiu, the professor at HKU, told CNN in an email.


The elephant in the room
Pakistan is the big wild card.
The country, which boasts its own nuclear arsenal, is India's historic adversary and considered an "all-weather" friend of China.
Those relationships form a double-edged sword, analysts say.
On the one hand, it offers India an excuse for building up its missile systems that doesn't involve China, so "both sides can continue relations without the sense one of them has suddenly been put under undue pressure," Chiu says.

Tensions flare between nuclear neighbors
But it's not clear if China is buying that argument.
Patrick Bratton, an associate professor of national security strategy at the US Army War College, says that contrary to popular beliefs, China, not Pakistan, was the original focus of the Indian nuclear weapons program.
And Pakistan was already in range of India's nuclear-capable missiles before the Agni-V was developed.
The other big concern is that Pakistan sees the Agni-V development as proof it's falling behind in an arms race.
"There are multiple audiences for this missile test and multiple possible targets, and I think India's increased capability will ultimately be more of a concern for Pakistan, since it does not yet have a missile with that range of capacity," says Chiu.
So by trying to level the playing field with China in terms of nuclear deterrence, India could in effect have spurred Pakistan into the arms race.
"That's both the logic and illogic of nuclear deterrence," Chiu says.

Many analysts don't believe the countries would go to war for a host of reasons, the biggest being that both sides are acutely aware of how destructive it could be.
As far as we know, India does not currently keep its warheads and delivery systems -- the missiles and rockets that would be used to launch a nuke at an adversary -- in the same location, ready to use at a moment's notice, Bratton said in an email to CNN.
And though the December missile test of the Agni-V was the fourth successful one, it was only the second time the projectile was launched from a canister.
That likely means India will need to conduct more tests, meaning it could be years before the system is deployed and operational, Bratton said.
"India has been working on developing this capability for a number of decades and it's no surprise for China," he said. 

"This should not be seen as a radical departure in Sino-Indian relations."

Beijing has fallen?