EU demands China investigate torture of lawyer and release political prisoners

Rare statement cites China’s own laws that prohibit torture in condemnation of mistreatment of detained rights lawyer Xie Yang and others.

By Benjamin Haas in Hong Kong

Lawyer Xie Yang who has been detained by Chinese authorities as part of a crack down on human rights. 

China must investigate a harrowing account of torture by a detained lawyer and release several political prisoners, the European Union has demanded in a rare statement amid a deteriorating human rights situation under Xi Jinping.
Detained rights lawyer Xie Yang detailed his treatment in detention last week, where he was beaten, forced into stress positions, denied medical care and deprived food, drink and sleep by police. 

Interrogators threatened him repeatedly, allegedly saying: “We’ll torture you to death just like an ant”.
Separate reports have said two other civil rights attorneys, Li Heping and Wang Quanzhang, have also been tortured while in custody.
“If verified, this mistreatment would amount to torture,” the European Union’s foreign affairs spokesperson said in a statement. 

“All necessary measures to ensure the safety and wellbeing of these individuals need to be taken.”
“If the accounts of mistreatment or torture are confirmed, this should result in the punishment of the responsible persons,” the statement added, citing China’s own laws that prohibit torture.
All three were detained in July 2015, part of an unprecedented nation-wide crackdown on human rights lawyers, legal assistants and activists. 

Nearly 250 people were targeted during the campaign, with some still held by police without trial over 18 months later.
“We reiterate our call for the release of the lawyers and human rights defenders who remain in detention, including Jiang Tianyong,” the EU statement said, referring to another lawyer who disappeared into police detention in November.
The EU applauded the release of two other rights defenders, Xie Yanyi and Li Chunfu, but for relatives there is little cause for celebration.
Li, who’s brother is Li Heping, was granted bail earlier this month and returned home. 

But relatives claim nearly 17 months of severe abuse have transformed the 44-year-old lawyer into a shadow of his former self.
“His mind is shattered,” his wife, Bi Liping, was quoted as saying in one online account of the lawyer’s ordeal. 

A local hospital offered a preliminary diagnosis of schizophrenia.
The EU statement comes just days after a group of leading lawyers and judges writing in The Guardian expressed “grave concern” over the detention of legal professionals.
“In order to vindicate its claim to be a responsible stakeholder in the international community and to be a respected global superpower, it is imperative that China honour its international commitments to international conventions and human rights,” the letter said.

'America First' Versus 'One China'

Trump is laying the groundwork for a stronger U.S.-Taiwan relationship.
By Russell Hsiao and David An

Donald J. Trump is now the forty-fifth president of the United States. 

As president of the world’s strongest democracy, Trump is bound by the Take Care Clause of the U.S. Constitution to execute the laws of the land—laws such as the Taiwan Relations Act of 1979. 

Under the principle of separation of powers enshrined in the U.S. Constitution, the executive branch—now headed by President Trump—is responsible for implementing the laws of the land by formulating policies.
As president-elect, Trump indicated that his administration’s approach to foreign policy would not be bound by the outdated conventions and self-imposed restrictions toed needlessly by previous administrations. 

He suggested that those policies would be recalibrated to better suit American interests in the twenty-first century. 

Indeed, the president-elect took a congratulatory phone call from the democratically elected leader of Taiwan—a key security partner of the United States—and questioned the efficacy of the former administration’s China policy.
Despite the public outcry, nothing Trump said or did as president-elect changed U.S. policy or the law. 

Also, Trump was completely within his legal rights to take a phone call and “question” the former administration’s policies. (Obama said as much when he stated, “I think all of our foreign policy should be subject to fresh eyes.”) 

Additionally, even if President Trump does change U.S. policy, there is nothing to legally stop him from doing so.
While much fuss has been made about the policies in question, there has been limited discussion about the dangerous logic that feeds the fear over the president’s questioning of policy. 

Lost in the polemic discourse following the president’s comments is a recognition of the legal underpinnings of U.S. policies toward Taiwan, which remain ever constant, and the elasticity of the U.S. “One China” policy itself.
The reaction, even among experts, was telling and laid bare a critical blind spot in the United States’ approach to cross-Strait relations. 

To be sure, U.S. policy towards Taiwan has operated over the past forty-five years on the premise that America’s primary interest is in the process—as opposed to the outcome—of resolving differences between the two sides of the Taiwan Strait.
It was inherently a passive policy by design, but the emphasis on process intentionally ceded the initiative of shaping the outcome to the two other parties: Taiwan and the People’s Republic of China. It was an approach that some senior policymakers at the time expected would create a fait accompli, yet it provided Washington, DC with the flexibility to adapt and respond to broader geopolitical challenges while maintaining stability in the Taiwan Straits.
Despite expectations to the contrary, Taiwan thrived in the ensuing four decades. 

The government liberalized from the top down while an active civil society fervently pushed for political reforms from the bottom up. 

Taiwan evolved from an authoritarian government to a vibrant democracy. 

Support for Taiwan and its democracy grew within the United States as well.
As the power disparity between the two sides widens, however, the policy focused on the process is increasingly under strain and has left Taiwan more susceptible to coercion and Beijing more emboldened to use military force. 

Indeed, the PRC is gradually and unceasingly pushing toward its own desired outcome for Taiwan. All the while, America’s focus on process is drawing it towards China’s objectives at the expense of its values and strategic interests.
American scholars and former policymakers have sounded the alarm about the need to accommodate China by reaching a new modus vivendi with Beijing, which will effectively abandon Taiwan. 

A debate over a Hobson’s choice, however, obscures a much-needed discussion about a Taiwan strategy that not only focuses on ensuring a peaceful process but also a vision for a desired outcome.
As the two sides of the Taiwan Strait struggle to engage in dialogue, the scope of this process-based approach to policymaking has barred U.S. policymakers from actively shaping conditions in the Taiwan Strait that would be more conducive to long-term peace and stability. 

This outdated and partly flawed premise of the approach is based on a Washington tendency to construct events in the Taiwan Strait in binary terms: independence or unification. 

That is a false dilemma, which Beijing has framed as a Hobson’s choice.
On ensuring a peaceful process, the Taiwan Relations Act—which legally governs relations between the United States and Taiwan—sets out the primary goal of U.S. policy towards cross-Strait relations as ensuring that the resolution is “not coercive, unilateral, or detrimental to U.S. interests.” 

Towards that end, the new president has a lot of tools and legal authority at his disposal to recalibrate Taiwan policy.
Five provisions within the Taiwan Relations Act are useful to highlight:

1. • The future of Taiwan will be determined by peaceful means.
2. • Consider any effort to determine the future of Taiwan by other than peaceful means, including by boycotts or embargoes, a threat to the peace and security of the Western Pacific area and of grave concern to the United States.
3. • Provide Taiwan with arms of a defensive character.
4. • Maintain the capacity of the United States to resist any resort to force or other forms of coercion that would jeopardize the security—or the social or economic system—of the people on Taiwan.
5. • The preservation and enhancement of the human rights of all the people on Taiwan are hereby reaffirmed as objectives of the United States.

On the second prong, former Pentagon official and Air Force Lt. Col. Mark Stokes mapped out possible future policy options in the Taiwan Strait. 

The report, known as The United States and Future Policy Options in the Taiwan Strait, outlines four alternative schools of thought on the future of Taiwan policy: 

1. The Accommodation School; 
2. The Status Quo School; 
3. The Normalization School; 
4. and The U.S. “One China, Two Governments” School. 

As Stokes astutely observed in a recent follow-up article, “U.S. policy has yet to catch up with the changes that have taken place on Taiwan since 1996, especially since the first peaceful transfer of power in 2000.”
Despite all the uproar, the new U.S. president—with his iconoclastic persona—has not changed U.S. policy. 

Rather, his administration has raised an important and fundamental question about the long-term viability of this current approach to policy. 

To be sure, the previous ambiguous approach has outlived its utility, and the effects have been an emboldened Beijing and a Taiwan that is now being gradually pushed into a corner (see, e.g., Beijing’s diplomatic offensive).
Alternatives to a gradual change in policy present equally destabilizing propositions, and there is a great deal of uncertainty that comes with any change. 

However, a fear of change could lead to a state of paralysis that is equally disruptive in the Taiwan Strait. 

A one-sided focus on the process has left U.S. interests increasingly susceptible to the vagaries of cross-Strait relations and Beijing’s increasing leverages. 

Indeed, policy towards Taiwan has operated over the past forty-five years on the premise that America’s primary interest is in the process—as opposed to the outcome. 

It is time for U.S. policymakers to refocus on a desired outcome.

The Just and Necessary War: How War Against China Is Justified

• China’s actions threaten international stability and the rule of international law.
• China is increasingly powerful and takes an explicit position against values like democracy and universal human rights

By Anders Corr

This aerial photo taken through a glass window of a military plane on May 11, 2015 shows China's alleged on-going reclamation of Mischief Reef in the Spratly Islands in the South China Sea. China’s campaign of island building in the South China Sea might soon quadruple the number of airstrips available to the People’s Liberation Army in the highly contested and strategically vital region. That is bad news for other regional contenders, especially the U.S., the Philippines and Vietnam.

There is increasing talk of U.S. military options against China in military, economic, academic, and government venues. 

This discussion follows chiefly from China’s incrementalist military tactics of territorial acquisition in places like the South China Sea, East China Sea, and the Arunachal Pradesh region of India. 

It also stems from China's support of North Korea, which increasingly threatens the U.S., South Korea, and Japan with provocative statements and nuclear weapons development. 

China’s actions and allies threaten international stability and the rule of international law. 

Because China is increasingly powerful and takes an explicit position against values like democracy and universal human rights, China threatens foundational enlightenment principles, including as instituted in European and American forms of government.
Defensive military options short of war, such as naval blockades and acquisition of nuclear weapons by Japan and South Korea, entail risk of uncontrollable escalation into military confrontation. 

So, states considering these risky steps should consider whether such risk of war is justified.
Just war theory finds that states have a responsibility to protect the territory of their citizens, uphold international law, and defend justice. 

Wars should have a just cause, be the last resort, have right intentions, possess a reasonable chance of success, and have a means proportional to the end.
Consider one example -- China’s continued occupation of Mischief Reef, which is in the Philippine exclusive economic zone (EEZ) as recognized by the United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea (UNCLOS). 

The Philippines has an obligation to defend the territory of its citizens, such as maritime territory, so should do that to the best of its ability, including by requesting assistance from the U.S., its treaty ally. 

This satisfies just war theory’s recognition of the responsibility of the state to protect its citizens and territory.
Defense of an ally upholds international law, defends justice, and has right intentions. 

The Philippines is a U.S. treaty ally per the Mutual Defense Treaty of 1951. 

China occupied Mischief Reef in the Spratly Islands in 1995. 

In compliance with the UNCLOS dispute resolution process, the Philippines brought China to the Permanent Court of Arbitration in the Hague in 2013. 

This satisfies the last resort requirement of just war theory, as well as the requirement of the Mutual Defense Treaty (Article 1) that “The Parties undertake, as set forth in the Charter of the United Nations, to settle any international disputes in which they may be involved by peaceful means in such a manner that international peace and security and justice are not endangered and to refrain in their international relations from the threat or use of force in any manner inconsistent with the purposes of the United Nations.”
Contrary to what many commentators said in the "liberal" press, China can not reasonably claim the U.S.-Philippine blockade, quarantine, or other denial of access of Mischief Reef as an act of war, tantamount to war, or a casus belli (cause for war). 

Rather, China violated the dignity and sovereignty of the Philippine state when it occupied the reef in 1995 , and a blockade would be a reasonable attempt at enforcing international law. 

The Hague’s Permanent Court of Arbitration confirmed Philippine sovereignty over the feature in the 2016 findings when it states: “Having found that Mischief Reef, Second Thomas Shoal and Reed Bank are submerged at high tide, form part of the exclusive economic zone and continental shelf of the Philippines, and are not overlapped by any possible entitlement of China, the Tribunal concluded that the Convention is clear in allocating sovereign rights to the Philippines with respect to sea areas in its exclusive economic zone.”
China refused to recognize or abide by the 2016 international court ruling that its Mischief Reef occupation violated Philippine sovereignty. 

Following a pattern that stretches back to at least the earliest days of the Chinese Communist state, China is the first and only aggressor here. 

China's continued occupation of the Philippines’ Mischief Reef is therefore just cause for a blockade of that feature, at a minimum, and at a maximum, is a casus belli. 

The Philippine state, having exhausted all means through the courts, now has a duty to its citizens to pursue other means, including activation of the 1951 U.S. Mutual Defense Treaty.
A U.S.-Philippine blockade would be a minimum means through which to satisfy state responsibilities to defend territories and uphold alliance commitments. 

To argue that such a blockade would be an "act of war" by the U.S. and Philippines and therefore unjustifiable makes no normative sense given China’s aggressor status. 

Economic sanctions against China would be another minimum means, should be pursued simultaneously, and would be justified by a similar line of argumentation.
War is by no means inevitable. 

That a U.S. blockade would cause armed clashes is a very small probability. 

Given armed clashes, the probability of a significant escalation, much less a broader war, is small still. 

The probability that a blockade escalates to a major war is therefore minuscule. 

China has had near-continuous modern border disputes, with just a few becoming violent. 

Militarized border disputes with Russia (1969) and Vietnam (1979), for example, did not escalate into nuclear war, despite China and Russia being nuclear powers, and an alliance between Russia and Vietnam.
If military action did take place, China would seek to de-escalate quickly, because U.S. nuclear technology dominates the upper rungs of the escalation ladder. 

Herman Kahn’s theory of escalation dominance predicts that in war, a clearly weaker party backs down first and early. 

That there is a low probability of a blockade escalating into a war satisfies, for a blockade, that the means is proportional to the end and that there is a reasonable chance of success. 

All major requirements of a just war, in the case of a blockade, are therefore fulfilled.
Xi Jinping tries to project a tough image, and China's lethality is not in question. 

Five of the ten most lethal wars began in China. 

But the U.S. and its allies in the E.U. are now far more powerful economically, diplomatically, and militarily than China. 

China’s nuclear weapons deficit is particularly stark, so China is unlikely to risk significant military escalation. 

That could change in the next five to ten years, which is why it is important to preempt China’s aggressiveness now through relatively peaceful means such as economic sanctions, and if necessary, a naval blockade.
Dr. Gerrit van der Wees, a former Netherlands diplomat and Professor at George Mason University, said in an email that, "From my contacts with diplomats from [Southeast] Asian nations ... I know that they are deeply concerned about the [People’s Republic of China] moves, and quietly welcome a more pronounced verbal and military US presence in the region." 

My experience with East and Southeast Asian diplomats over the last four years has been the same.
China is acting like a bully in Asia, which is seeking a stronger U.S. military presence and counterweight to hedge against China’s expansionism. 

It would be strategic to start with less risky, and probably more persuasive, economic sanctions. 

But China should be put on notice that a joint U.S.-Philippines blockade of Mischief Reef, with all attendant risks, is justified. 

Similar logic can be applied to disputes that China has picked with Japan, South Korea, India, and Vietnam. 

It would therefore be best for China to take proactive and unilateral steps to quietly vacate its military forces from the Philippines’ exclusive economic zone, and to de-escalate tensions elsewhere. 

Now is the opportunity for China to save face and decrease the risk of war.

China Threat

THAAD Deployment Should Not Be Postponed Despite Chinese Objections, South Korean Acting President Hwang Kyo-Ahn Says
By Vishakha Sonawane

North Korea’s nuclear and missile threats are “clear existential threats” and deployment of a U.S. anti-ballistic missile is “a self-defensive measure” to counter that danger, South Korea’s Acting President Hwang Kyo-ahn said Monday. 

He also said that the instalment of the Terminal High Altitude Area Defense (THAAD) system should not be delayed despite China’s opposition.
Washington and Seoul are planning to install the THAAD system in South Korea by the end of this year.
"[North Korea] has been expanding its nuclear capabilities and developing the technology to create nuclear weapons. They are also miniaturizing nuclear weapons," Hwang said. 

"Right now is not the time to talk to try to resolve North Korea's nuclear issues."
Hwang also said that the THAAD deployment is necessary to “protect national security.”
"The deployment of the THAAD is a self-defensive measure that is absolutely needed to protect national security and the people's lives," Hwang said.
Last July, South Korea and the U.S. agreed to deploy THAAD in the Korean Peninsula. 

However, the move elicited strong criticism from China, which has cited security reasons as causes for its concern. 

According to China, the THAAD system could be used to supervise its missile launches as far inland as Xi'an in the northwest. 

Beijing has reportedly imposed several economic measures to put further pressure on Seoul to stop the instalment.
On Thursday, Sen. John McCain (R-Arizona) said that China is “bullying” South Korea over decision to deploy THAAD.
“Meanwhile, China is escalating its campaign of economic retaliation against South Korea for the joint alliance decision to deploy the THAAD missile defense system … Actions speak louder than words. If China believes in free trade and has genuine concerns about the deployment of THAAD in South Korea, it should cease its attempts to undermine South Korea’s sovereign ability to defend itself and use its considerable influence to pressure North Korea to stop its destabilizing behavior,” the senator said.

Chris Patten: UK risks selling its honour on Hong Kong

"I wonder what has happened to our sense of honour and our sense of responsibility"

By Danny Vincent

Chris Patten: "What has happened to our sense of honour and our sense of responsibility?"

The former governor of Hong Kong, Chris Patten, says the UK risks not meeting its promises to the territory and "selling its honour" in an attempt to reach trade deals with China.
Speaking to BBC Newsnight, Lord Patten said the UK had let down "a generation" of democracy activists.
It is 20 years since Hong Kong was returned to China after more than a century of British rule.
The UK government says it takes its commitments to Hong Kong seriously.
Anson Chan, former Hong Kong chief secretary -- who worked as Lord Patten's deputy -- also expressed deep concern about China's behaviour towards Hong Kong.
Citing the example of the alleged kidnapping by China of five booksellers and other rights abuses, she told BBC Newsnight that the "one country, two systems" form of rule itself is under threat.
"Unfortunately the rest of the world -- particularly Great Britain -- would rather pretend not to see what is going on," she said.
"If they continue to ignore this steady erosion, by the time they wake up to the fact that 'one country, two systems' exists only in name, it will be too late."
In the 1980s the Chinese and British leadership agreed that Hong Kong would be guaranteed certain freedoms not enjoyed in the rest of China -- freedom of press, freedom of assembly and a partially-elected law-making council.
This principle, known as "one China, two systems", was a part of the Sino-British joint declaration -- an international agreement guaranteeing Hong Kong those freedoms after the handover.
Lord Patten said the UK government has not "manifestly stood up for Hong Kong".
"I wonder what has happened to our sense of honour and our sense of responsibility -- particularly in Britain. It's above all a British question," he said.
"We signed the joint declaration with China. It's a treaty at the UN. It's supposed to commit us to standing up for Hong Kong's rights until 2047."
"And you don't get much sense of the British government actually standing over those promises and obligations and I think that's a great pity."
Lord Patten said the UK risks putting its desire to do trade with China, over its commitment to Hong Kong.
"It's all for derisory, ludicrous reasons," he said. 

"The argument that the only way you can do trade with China is by kowtowing to China on political issues is drivel -- it's complete nonsense."
"I worry about how people are prepared to sell our honour for alleged trade deals which never actually happen. I think that that would be calamitous. And what do we represent to the world if that's what happens?"
In 2015, five publishers selling critical articles about the Chinese leadership disappeared, only to reappear in detention in the mainland.
One bookseller had been abducted while in Hong Kong. 

Four of the publishers -- including a British passport-holder -- were eventually returned to Hong Kong. 

One Swedish national remains in Chinese detention.
Tens of thousands of protesters took to the streets of Hong Kong in 2014 in what came to be known as the "Umbrella Protests". 

The protests lasted several weeks, and captured the world's attention, but failed to achieve any concessions from Beijing.
" I feel very strongly that we let down the parents of this generation of democracy activists. I think it would be a tragedy if we let down these kids as well," Lord Patten said.
A Foreign Office spokesperson said: "The UK takes our longstanding commitment under the Sino-British Joint Declaration very seriously."
"We believe that 'one country, two systems' continues to be the best arrangement for Hong Kong's long term stability and prosperity, as it has been for nearly 20 years.
"We hope and expect that 'One Country Two Systems' will be respected and successful long into the future."
The spokesperson added: "We regularly discuss the importance of respect for 'one Country, two Systems' and Hong Kong's high degree of autonomy with the Chinese Government. The Foreign Secretary made this clear to his Chinese counterpart when they met in London in December."

Giving Chinese second chance at tech firm 'dangerously naive'

Canada's national security is not for sale

By Amanda Connolly

Conservative leader Rona Ambrose says the decision by the Liberal government to give a second chance to a Chinese company’s rejected bid to take over a Montreal tech firm is “dangerously naive.”
“The fact that the Trudeau Liberals are paving the way for foreign interests and foreign powers to take over Canadian companies shows they are just trying to curry favour with China,” Ambrose said in a speech Thursday from Quebec City, where the Conservatives held a caucus retreat. 

“When Justin Trudeau holds cash-for-access fundraisers, surrounded by Chinese flags and influential communist officials, and then weeks later reopens national security reviews, Canadians rightly wonder, is our national security for sale?”

The deal in question concerns the acquisition of ITF Technologies of Montreal by O-Net Communications, which is based on Hong Kong but is viewed by national security officials as being under the control of the Chinese government.
Adding to the concerns is the fact that ITF Technologies has sold technology to the Department of National Defence and participated in research with CSIS, Canada’s spy agency.
Both CSIS and defence officials have raised serious concerns about the deal, noting that the risk cannot be mitigated and that allowing it to proceed would jeopardize military advantages held by Canada and its allies because of the type of military-grade laser technology produced by the firm.
“If the technology is transferred, China would be able to domestically-produce advanced-military laser technology to Western standards sooner than would otherwise be the case, which diminishes Canadian and allied military advantages,” says a 2015 national security assessment given to the Canadian cabinet in 2015 by security and defence officials and obtained by the Globe and Mail.
Ambrose said the Conservatives, who were in government when the deal was rejected the first time, will not let the deal float under the radar.
“We will be giving these issues the attention they need,” she said. 

“That’s what Canadians expect of their Conservative opposition.”

Chinese Peril

Trump may have found his big ally to counterbalance China... and it's not Russia
By Seema Mody 

For all the talk about the mutual admiration between Donald Trump and Vladimir Putin, it may not be Russia that the U.S. president sees as America's critical new ally.
In his first few days in office, Trump scheduled a phone call with Narendra Modi, making the prime minister of India one of the first leaders he spoke to following his inauguration.
In its official statement Tuesday evening, the White House said that Trump and Modi "discussed opportunities to strengthen the partnership between the United States and India in broad areas such as the economy and defense."
Sources close to the prime minster said the conversation was focused on defense. 

The White House did not respond to a CNBC request for further comment.
A tightening of relations with India is something that was already accelerating under Barack Obama, whose administration saw the world's biggest democracy as a counterbalance to China's rising power. 

Trump may take the relationship further.

Hindu Sena party president, Vishnu Gupta places a garland of flowers on a poster of US President-elect Donald Trump during an event in New Delhi on January 19, 2017.
"Through successive administrations and strong congressional support, the United States has made tremendous investments to expand its relationship with India over the past several years," said Manpreet Anand, former U.S. deputy assistant secretary in the Bureau of South and Central Asian Affairs.
"The Trump administration has an opportunity to double down on those efforts as the strategic interests of our two countries continue to align," Anand told CNBC.
Foreign policy experts say Washington needs India to counter China's growing dominance in Asia and to ensure the United States cements some type of influence in that part of the world.
That task is all the more important now that Trump has withdrawn from the Trans-Pacific Partnership. 

That free trade bloc, which had the United States at its center and which excluded China, would have further buttressed U.S. leadership in Asia. 

With the TPP off the table, however, China immediately has begun to step in to fill the void.
"U.S. strategic thinkers see the rise of India as a natural balancer to China as beneficial to the U.S.," said Sasha Riser-Kositsky, Asia analyst at consulting firm Eurasia Group. 

"Over roughly the last 10 years, U.S. policy has broadly followed this logic, helping strengthen ties with India and offering unprecedented cooperation in terms of civilian nuclear power and co-development and co-production of defense technologies while asking relatively little in exchange."

'Security in the region of South and Central Asia'
Trump's hostile rhetoric toward Muslims plays well with members of India's Hindu majority.

India has a large Muslim minority, and the country has suffered many terror attacks within its borders that New Delhi claims are supported by Muslim-majority Pakistan. 

Modi's political party, called the Bharatiya Janata Party, has its roots in Hindu nationalism.
The White House also said on Tuesday that the two leaders of the largest democracies in the world discussed "security in the region of South and Central Asia."
India rarely gets involved in conflicts that do not directly involve the country, especially given India's perpetual border disputes with Pakistan. 

At the same time, however, during Modi's visit to Washington, which is expected sometime the year, the Indian leader will likely want Trump to take a more aggressive position toward Pakistan and support New Delhi's counterterrorism efforts.
Trump's rhetoric toward India — and Modi himself — has been consistently positive. 

Analysts say the U.S. president could be setting the table for a stronger relationship between Washington and New Delhi in the coming years and could ultimately elevate India's global profile, which has been a key objective for Modi. 

For years India has been living in the shadow of China as the second-best emerging market for investors.
Trump's and Modi's phone conversation on Tuesday came one week ahead of the release of India's annual budget, in which New Delhi is expected to announce further fiscal spending.
Despite economic headwinds and uncertainty around Trump's foreign policy, DoubleLine Capital's Jeffrey Gundlach told Barron's over the weekend that India is an attractive destination for investors. Bombay's Sensex stock index is trading about 6 percent below its all-time closing high.

A possible area of conflict?
One point of contention between Trump and Modi could be immigration. 

India is home to many companies that host technology work for U.S.-based companies — meaning that they employ Indians to do work previously done by American workers.
Companies in India are able to provide highly skilled workers at a discount to what Americans get paid. 

Trump arguably has been more outspoken about protecting U.S. jobs than any other president in decades.
"They also have a major item that needs to be resolved around IT outsourcing," said M.R. Rangaswami, a software executive and founder of Indiaspora, a U.S.-based community for people of Indian descent.
"The president has stated that jobs be kept in the U.S., while India is the place most Fortune 500 companies have direct IT operations or outsourcing partners. Most H-1B visas" — supposedly temporary passes that give skilled foreign nationals the right to work in the United States — "are used for supplementing the U.S. IT workforce by bringing professionals from India," Rangaswami said.
"This could become a messy issue that could cause tension."