Hero

Joshua, the Hong Kong teen taking on the might of China
Frankie TAGGART

Hong Kong politician Joshua Wong attends a political forum hosted by Taiwan's grassroot New Power Party (NPP), in Taipei, on January 8, 2017.

A scrawny millennial with gaunt features and a studious frown, Joshua Wong looks like he'd struggle to take on a large steak, let alone the might of Communist China.
Yet the bespectacled activist is the unlikely hero to a generation in Hong Kong, where he led a movement inspiring hundreds of thousands to join his cause for elections free from Beijing's interference.
At the age of just 17, he spearheaded mass blockades that brought parts of the Asian financial center to a standstill in 2014, sparked by restrictions from Beijing on how Hong Kong's next leader will be chosen.
Hailed as one of the world's most influential figures by Time, Fortune and Foreign Policy magazines, he is now the focus of an award-winning Netflix documentary due for release later this year.
"We hope people around the world recognize that social movements can make things happen. They can make things change," Wong, now 20, told AFP by telephone from Hong Kong.
"People may be depressed or downhearted with the political situation in their own country, but it's still optimistic to see hope and seek change by street activism."
"Joshua: Teenager vs. Superpower" tells the story of how Wong became one of China's most notorious dissidents after the mainland Communist Party backtracked on its promise of autonomy to Hong Kong.

- 'David and Goliath' -
Critics say the 79-minute documentary could not have picked a better moment, with political engagement piqued in the West as protesters take to the streets to decry the policies of new US leader Donald Trump.
"You have a lone teenager taking on China and it's one of the things that attracted me to the story. The odds don't get much bigger. Talk about David and Goliath," Los Angeles-based director Joe Piscatella said in an interview.
At the age of just 14, Wong campaigned successfully for Hong Kong to drop a pro-China "National Education" program, rallying a crowd of 120,000 to his cause.
He was one of the 78 people arrested in September 2014 during another giant pro-democracy protest after China reneged on a pledge made during the handover to give Hong Kongers the right to choose their next leader.
Umbrellas were used to shield activists from waves of police pepper spray, giving the nascent "Umbrella Movement" its banal yet iconic symbol of resistance.
Galvanized by Wong's passion, the Umbrella Movement made headlines around the world, but was ultimately unable to shake up Hong Kong politics after weeks of protest.
Wong continues to campaign under the banner of a new political party, Demosisto, for a referendum to determine who will rule Hong Kong after the "one party, two systems" principle codified in Chinese agreements with Britain expires in 30 years.
"I'm still hopeful for the young generation here. In Hong Kong, more young people may be legislators in the future. I would say that this is just a starting point," Wong said.

- 'That's my life' -
Born to middle class Christian parents Grace and Roger Wong in 1996, Wong began his life of activism at age 13 with a protest against plans for a high-speed rail link between Hong Kong and the mainland.
It was here that Piscatella's producer, documentary filmmaker Matthew Torne, first encountered Wong and, seeing something extraordinary in the youngster, started his camera rolling.
"The first time I met Joshua, I was in awe... He's kind of a conundrum in that, when he walks into a room, he's not somebody you notice right away," Piscatella said.
"You give him a microphone and a bullhorn and there's a change in him where suddenly he just becomes this other person where he's passionate and has this ability to connect with a large group of people."
"Joshua: Teenager vs. Superpower" was picked up by Netflix and awarded the audience prize at this year's Sundance Film Festival, where Wong attended screenings, describing the support for the film as "unbelievable."
Since the end of the Umbrella Movement, Wong has been denied entry into Malaysia and Thailand, attacked in the street and abused by pro-China protesters in Taiwan. 

But he takes it all in his stride.
"That's my life," he shrugs, describing the drawbacks of his high profile, with a quiet insouciance, as "inconvenient" and vowing to fight on.
"We didn't win in the last battle," he said, "but I'm still optimistic for winning in the final war."

The Just War

Steve Bannon: 'We're going to war in the South China Sea ... no doubt' 
By Benjamin Haas In Hong Kong
Steve Bannon: ‘We’re going to war in the South China Sea in five to 10 years. There’s no doubt about that.’

The United States and China will fight a war within the next 10 years over islands in the South China Sea, and “there’s no doubt about that”.
At the same time, the US will be in another “major” war in the Middle East.
Those are the views of one of the most powerful men in Donald Trump’s administration, Steve Bannon, the former head of news website Breitbart who is now chief strategist at the White House.
In the first weeks of Trump’s presidency, Bannon has emerged as a central figure.
He was appointed to the “principals committee” of the National Security Council in an unusual move and was influential in the recent travel ban on citizens from seven Muslim-majority countries, overruling Department of Homeland Security officials who felt the order did not apply to green card holders.
While many in Trump’s team are outspoken critics of China, in radio shows Bannon hosted for Breitbart he makes plain the two largest threats to America: China and Islam.
“We’re going to war in the South China Sea in five to 10 years,” he said in March 2016.
“There’s no doubt about that. They’re taking their sandbars and making basically stationary aircraft carriers and putting missiles on those. They come here to the United States in front of our face – and you understand how important face is – and say it’s an ancient territorial sea.”
China says the entire South China Sea falls within its territory, with half a dozen other countries maintaining partially overlapping claims.
China has built a series of artificial islands on reefs and rocks in attempt to bolster its position, complete with military-length airstrips and anti-aircraft weapons.
Bannon’s sentiments and his position in Trump’s inner circle insure a military confrontation with China, after secretary of state Rex Tillerson said that the US would deny China access to the seven artificial islands. 
Bannon is clearly wary of China’s growing clout in Asia and beyond, framing the relationship as entirely adversarial, predicting a global culture clash in the coming years.
“You have an expansionist Islam and you have an expansionist China. Right? They are motivated. They’re arrogant. They’re on the march. And they think the Judeo-Christian west is on the retreat,” Bannon said during a February 2016 radio show.
On the day Trump was inaugurated, China’s military warned that war between the two countries was a real possibility.
“A ‘war within the president’s term’ or ‘war breaking out tonight’ are not just slogans, they are becoming a practical reality,” an official wrote on the website of the People’s Liberation Army.
Aside from conflict between armies, Bannon focused on his perception that Christianity around the world is under threat.
In one radio show, Bannon focused heavily on China’s oppression of Christian groups.
“The one thing the Chinese fear more than America … they fear Christianity more than anything,” he said.

Chinese aggressions in South China Sea: What's at stake

• China has been fortifying disputed islands in the South China Sea
• Secretary of state Rex Tillerson has said China's island-building must stop

By Katie Hunt

Secretary of state Rex Tillerson: "China's island-building must stop"

Rex Tillerson, who was sworn in as US Secretary of State Wednesday, takes responsibility for US policy in one of the world's biggest flashpoints: the South China Sea.
President Donald Trump says the former Exxon CEO will bring "a clear-eyed focus to foreign affairs."
He'll need it.
The contested waters are a crucial shipping route and home a messy territorial dispute that pits multiple countries against each other.
Tensions have ratcheted up since 2014 as China has turned sandbars into islands, equipping them with airfields, ports and weapons systems and warned US warships and aircraft to stay away from them.
The Trump administration looks set to take a much more confrontational stance toward China than its predecessor.
During his confirmation hearing, Tillerson said China should be blocked from accessing the artificial islands it's built, setting the stage for a potential showdown.
Here's what's at stake:

Who claims what?

China bases its claims on the fictitious "nine-dash line" -- its claimed territorial waters that extend hundreds of miles to the south and east of its island province of Hainan, abut its neighbors' claims and, in some cases, encroach upon them.
The Paracel Islands (Hoàng Sa) have been controlled by China since 1974, but they are also claimed by Vietnam.

Tensions flared in 2014 when China installed exploratory oil rigs in the vicinity.

The situation is more complicated in the Spratlys (Truong Sa).
The archipelago consists of 100 smalls islands and reefs of which 45 are occupied by China, Malaysia, Vietnam or the Philippines.
All of the islands are claimed by China and Vietnam, while some of them (or nearby waters) are claimed by the Philippines, Malaysia and Brunei.

What's China been building?
In early 2014, China quietly began massive dredging operations centering on the six reefs it controls in the Spratly Islands -- Fiery Cross Reef, Subi Reef, Mischief Reef, Cuarteron Reef, Gaven Reef and Hughes Reef.
According to the US, China has reclaimed more than 3,000 acres since the beginning of 2014.
On his 2015 trip to Washington, Xi Jinping said China wouldn't militarize the islands, but a December report from the Asia Maritime Transparency Initiative (AMTI) said China had installed comprehensive weapons systems on seven reefs that include anti-aircraft guns.
Some have called the islands China's "unsinkable aircraft carriers."
Vietnam, Malaysia and the Philippines have also reclaimed land in the South China Sea, but their land grab -- the US says approximately 100 acres over 45 years -- is dwarfed by China's massive, recent buildup.

This composite image shows Chinese weapon installation on Gaven reef.
What's the US view?
It could be changing.
The US has traditionally taken no position on the territorial disputes in the South China Sea but has repeatedly asserted its right to freedom of navigation in the disputed waters, with the US military flying and sailing its assets close to the islands China controls.
Tillerson and Trump have not minced their words on the issue, suggesting that the State Department could take a more muscular approach.
"Building islands and then putting military assets on those islands is akin to Russia's taking of Crimea. Its taking of territory that others lay claim to," Tillerson said in his confirmation hearing.
"We're going to have to send China a clear signal that first, the island-building stops, and second, your access to those islands also not going to be allowed."
Blocking Chinese naval vessels from accessing South China Sea reefs would almost certainly trigger a US-China clash, says Ashley Townshend, a research fellow at the United States Studies Centre at the University of Sydney.

What could China do?
As China stretches its muscles as a growing superpower, the South China Sea, rich in oil and gas reserves, has become a testing ground for whether the country will rise as part of the existing international order or outside it.
China says both the Paracels and the Spratlys are an "integral part" of its territory, offering up maps that date back to 1947.
It has repeatedly defended its right to build both civil and defensive facilities on the islands it controls. 

In December, a Chinese warship unlawfully seized an underwater drone from a US oceanographic vessel.
One new strategy could be to declare an air defense zone in the South China Sea, which would require all aircraft to file flight plans even if they don't enter Chinese airspace.
Beijing has also ignored a landmark ruling last year by the Permanent Court of Arbitration in The Hague, which said there was no legal basis for China's maritime claims.
Even though they now have international law on their side, other claimants have done little to challenge Beijing. 

The Philippines, which originally brought the case, has pivoted towards Beijing under President Rodrigo Duterte.
Beijing's response to Tillerson and Trump's comments to date has been fairly muted, but some analysts think Beijing could soon test the new US commander in chief.

China's 'Silk Road' push stirs resentment and protest in Sri Lanka

By Shihar Aneez | HAMBANTOTA, SRI LANKA

Demonstrators react during a clash with police during a protest against the launching of a Chinese industrial zone by China Merchants Port Holdings Company, in Mirijjawila, Sri Lanka January 7, 2017. 

Demonstrators shout at police officers at a protest against the launching of a Chinese industrial zone by China Merchants Port Holdings Company, in Mirijjawila, Sri Lanka January 7, 2017. 

Police clash with demonstrators during a protest against the launching of a Chinese industrial zone by China Merchants Port Holdings Company, in Mirijjawila, Sri Lanka January 7, 2017. 

China signed a deal with Sri Lanka late last year to further develop the strategic port of Hambantota and build a huge industrial zone nearby, a key part of Beijing's ambitions to create a modern-day "Silk Road" across Asia.
The agreement was welcome relief for the island nation of 20 million people. 

As they try to reduce the country's debts, officials in Colombo see China's plans to include Sri Lanka on its "One Belt, One Road" initiative as an economic lifeline.
China has spent almost $2 billion so far on Hambantota and a new airport and wants to spend much more.
But Beijing now faces a new and unpredictable challenge to its presence in Sri Lanka and broader Silk Road project.
Hundreds of Sri Lankans clashed with police at the opening last month of the industrial zone in the south, saying they would not be moved from their land. 

It was the first time opposition to Chinese investments in Sri Lanka turned violent.
Leading the campaign against the latest deal, which is too generous to China, is former President Mahinda Rajapaksa, an influential opposition politician who first allowed Chinese investment in Sri Lanka when he was leader from 2005-15.
The clashes, in which demonstrators threw stones and police used tear gas and water cannon, underlined the depth of resentment at China's expansion felt by local people, who feared they would be forced from their homes.
The Chinese foreign ministry said Beijing was doing what was best for both countries. 

The Chinese embassy in Colombo did not respond to a request for comment on investments in Sri Lanka.
The Sri Lankan protests are not the first sign of opposition to China's One Belt plans to build land corridors across Southeast Asia, Pakistan and Central Asia and maritime routes opening up trade with the Middle East and Europe.
Rail links from China through Laos and Thailand have hit the buffers over resistance to Beijing's excessive demands and unfavorable financing.

"IMPINGES ON SOVEREIGNTY"
Under the original deal negotiated by Rajapaksa during his tenure, the container terminal at Hambantota was to be operated by a joint venture between China Harbor Engineering Co. and state-run China Merchants Port Holdings for 40 years.
The Port Authority of Sri Lanka would retain control of all other terminals in the harbor, as well as a 6,000 acre industrial zone.
But last month, the administration of Rajapaksa's successor President Maithripala Sirisena, who came to office threatening to cancel high-value Chinese contracts on the grounds they were unfair, approved a deal to lease 80 percent of the port to China Merchants Port Holdings for $1.12 billion.
The company also got the lease for 99 years.
Officials said Sirisena's hand was forced by the country's high debt burden and the fact that inflows from countries including India and the United States were less than expected, despite a $1.5 billion, three-year IMF loan program agreed last year.
"A 99-year lease impinges on Sri Lanka's sovereign rights, because a foreign company will enjoy the rights of the landlord over the free port and the main harbor," said Rajapaksa.
"This is not an issue with China or with foreign investors. It is about getting the best deal for Sri Lanka," he told Reuters in an interview.
The government also announced the lease of a much bigger 15,000 acres of land around the port for an industrial zone controlled by China Merchants Port Holdings, which has become a lightning rod for protests.
The demonstrators said they feared eviction from their land to make way for the site, a concern that China put down to a misunderstanding.
China Merchants Port Holdings declined to comment on the protests.

"WE ARE NOT LEAVING"
China has spent $1.7 billion building Hambantota port and the adjacent Mattala Rajapaksa airport, named after the former president, both of which are under-utilized and losing money.
Losses at the port added up to around $230 million in the five years to the end of 2016, according to the Sri Lankan finance ministry.
China's ambassador to Sri Lanka, Yi Xianliang, said the country would invest $5 billion more in the next three to five years and create 100,000 jobs "if everything goes well."
Last week, a policeman stood guard at the foundation stone of the proposed new zone in a forest clearing in Hambantota to prevent protesters from marching on the area.
"We are firmly against this project. We don't want our land to be given to the Chinese. We are not leaving the area," said Upul Dhammika, a farmer whose land is located where the government has tried to survey for the industrial zone.

SLEEPY OUTPOST
Rajapaksa questioned the need for the Chinese to be given 15,000 acres, which he said was more than three times the area of all other economic zones in the country combined.
Isolated from the West over allegations of human rights abuses during the country's civil war, Rajapaksa struck major deals with the Chinese when he was in power, including Hambantota and the nearby airport.
Sirisena, elected two years ago, vowed to review some of those agreements, including a $1.4 billion "port city" in the capital Colombo which was put on hold in 2015.
That, said a Chinese source with knowledge of the recent negotiations, upset Beijing, and so it pushed for the best possible deal on Hambantota.
"They (China) were really angry with the new government, until it agreed (to) an 80 percent port deal," the source said, speaking on condition of anonymity because of the sensitivity of the talks.
The Chinese embassy in Colombo did not respond when asked about that aspect of the negotiations.
Beijing also threatened lawsuits when the new administration sought to review some of the old agreements, an official in the international trade ministry said.
China's position was that it won the contracts on merit and a change of government should not have a bearing on these deals.
Sri Lankan Port Minister Arjuna Ranatunga said Hambantota port was losing money and the government had to go for a debt-for-equity deal to reduce the financial burden on the country.
Sri Lanka's national debt stands at around $64 billion, or 76 percent of gross domestic product, one of the highest among emerging economies. 

It owes China over $8 billion.
For now, Hambantota remains a sleepy outpost. 

Four years after the port and airport were completed, there is one flight a day and barely five to six ships docking each week.
The highway leading to the town is largely deserted, a new conference hall is unused and even a large cricket stadium built by the Chinese is used mainly for wedding receptions.

Why China Could Declare a South China Sea ADIZ Right About Now

By Harry J. Kazianis

The People’s Republic of China loves testing American Presidents. 

And, as the years have gone by, they’ve started doing it sooner and with more intensity.
Recent research seems to back up this assertion. 

As Andrew Erickson of the US Naval War College recently pointed out, Beijing undertook 44 “increasingly aggressive intercepts leading up to the EP-3 incident” back in 2001, only 77 days after George W. Bush entered the oval office. 

The crisis, according to Erickson, was “intended to test [Bush’s] intentions and persuade him to adopt a more conciliatory approach to China.”
Obama also had his own China test – this time a meager 44 days after his inauguration, in what is widely referred to as the USS Impeccable incident. 

According to Erickson, the move was designed as “part of a concerted Chinese effort to test [Obama’s] mettle and see if he could be pushed to reduce lawful US surveillance and reconnaissance operations in international waters and airspace.”
So what will Beijing do when it comes to Donald Trump? 

Let’s step back for a second and focus less on what China will do, but when it will do it— and that could be quite soon, as in now.
With Washington seriously distracted at home, the door is open for a number of actors (think not just China but Russia, Iran and/or North Korea) to make their move — and according to sources I have spoken with at the Pentagon, there is a real fear Beijing could make some sort of play fairly quickly.
I would argue that there could be no better time to test the Trump Administration from a Chinese perspective. 

In fact, there might not be a better time in the next several years to make a bold play in one of the strategically most important areas that Beijing considers its “core interest” and gain an important advantage over America. 

And these days, that likely means the South China Sea.
Consider where the United States is today, politically — a yuge, self-induced mess. 

Thanks to a number of what I would consider “unforced errors”, the new administration in Washington is constantly having to work through mini-crisis after mini-crisis. 

Whether it is the un-needed controversy over crowd sizes at the inauguration, near hourly “breaking news” over the latest Trump tweet and now a budding showdown over Trump’s executive action on refugees entering the country, foreign policy is not exactly front and center these days here in the nation’s capitol.
And from there things only get worse. 

There might not even be enough mid-level staffers, the backbone of many federal agencies, to respond to a crisis. 

When combined with the fact that many of the US State department’s most important positions are vacant, along with a rebooted National Security Council that just lost two of its most important members – none other than the heads of the Joint Chiefs and National Intelligence – there is what I could consider an obvious experience gap that is ripe for exploitation.
So, if China did decide to act swiftly, and specifically in the South China Sea, what would be its best play? 

My money is on an action that is bold, reinforces China’s claims of sovereignty and, most importantly, won’t be easy to retaliate against.
If I was Xi Jinping here is what I would do to test the new administration’s intentions and at the same time see Trump squirm: declare an Air Defense Identification Zone, or ADIZ, in the South China Sea.
Now, on the surface, such a move seems highly escalatory, and not in line with other Chinese moves intended to test Bush or Obama. 

However, the stakes in Asia are greater than ever before, and with President Trump’s rhetoric on the South China Sea and Taiwan much bolder than that of any other new US administration just taking office, China might decide quickly it needs to see where the rubber meets the road — and fast. 

And there is no better way to do that than a South China Sea ADIZ.
How would Beijing make such a move? 

Easy, just dust off the playbook it used in 2013 when China did the same thing in the East China Sea.
Beijing may not be able to actually police either sea with great credibility if Washington or Tokyo really decided to press the matter, and in fact, to this day – according to senior officials in the Pentagon I have spoken with – it does not enforce its claims “with much vigor”. 

Nevertheless, four years ago it was able to set an important marker in the East China Sea opposite Japan. 

In the South China Sea Xi might not be able to enforce the zone through the whole breadth of the massive nine-dash-line area, but he could create a credible military deterrent by permanently basing HQ-9 air-defense platforms and advanced fighter jets on as many of China’s “fake islands” as possible to make the zone as real as possible in a short amount of time.
So how would President Trump respond? 

Likely just as Obama did: send advanced bombers to fly into the zone right after it is declared. 

Trump could even order a naval response, conducting multiple freedom of navigation operations to make the point clear that Washington won’t ever fully accept China’s aggressive actions.
However, when it comes to such an ADIZ, it won’t be just China, America, or US allies who have the final say on its success or failure. 

Airlines that fly in the new the zone won’t risk their passengers lives with non-compliance and a possible shoot-down if a plane is misidentified, so they will of course send their flight plans to Beijing, making such a zone a reality.
But all of this should be no shock. 

A Chinese ADIZ in the South China Sea has been something that has been discussed and theorized for years now. 

And there might not be a better time to try and make it a reality.

How China Sees the U.S. Navy's Sea Hunter Drone

Chinese strategists are studying the implications of the U.S. Navy’s new sub-hunting unmanned surface vessel.
By Lyle J. Goldstein

The Sea Hunter antisubmarine warfare continuous trail unmanned vessel was unveiled to considerable fanfare during 2016. 

This vessel has the promise to revolutionize naval warfare in the same way that Predator and Reaper drone aircraft have fundamentally altered counterinsurgency and counterterrorism. 

The forty-meter-long trimaran is much larger than any other attempts at fielding drones into the maritime domain, but is said to be capable of patrols of up to seventy days at a bewildering distance of ten thousand nautical miles. 

Were that not impressive enough, the robot ship is tasked with the most challenging mission of tracking quiet adversary diesel submarines. 

At a single (and seemingly quite affordable) stroke, this new technological innovation may have overturned some starkly unfavorable strategic trends in the Asia-Pacific.
Naturally, Chinese strategists are somewhat unnerved by these developments. 

One authoritative source describes the Sea Hunter as a “severe challenge to our country’s future submarine force [对未来我海军潜艇部队构成严峻挑战].” 

Another Chinese defense analysis concludes, “Undoubtedly, dealing with this shadowing-type unmanned ‘sentry’ already confronts China with a new study topic with respect to equipment development and tactical employment [已经成为中国在装备发展和战术使用中面临的新课题].” This edition of Dragon Eye will make a brief survey of these Chinese analyses of Sea Hunter in the hopes of coming to some conclusions about the future trajectory of this intensifying naval rivalry on and under the sea.
The quote immediately above comes from a rather detailed analysis that appeared in the June 2016 issue of Ordnance Knowledge [兵器知识]. 

The article presents some reasonably detailed data on Sea Hunter’s capabilities, including maximum speed (fifty kilometers) as well as the boat’s seakeeping abilities in rough weather “even up to sea state 7 [甚至在7级海况下].” 

Using active sonar mode, this Chinese estimate suggests Sea Hunter can detect submarines at a distance of up to eighteen kilometers. 

Much of the article discusses the vessel’s rapid development process, detailing the interaction over several years between DARPA (Defense Advanced Projects Research Agency) and the U.S. defense companies Leidos and Sonalysts. 

A particular emphasis in the article is placed on the relatively low cost of Sea Hunter, which at just $20 million per unit is more than ten times cheaper than each P-8 Poseidon antisubmarine aircraft, according to this Chinese analysis. 

Similarly, the drastically lower daily operating cost of this unmanned vessel compared to manned ASW systems is also highlighted. 

Of course, the main advantage of deploying such a system, namely that it does not put lives at risk [不会引发人员伤亡的后果], is also mentioned. 

In terms of how the United States might deploy Sea Hunter in battle, the authors of this analysis project that large numbers of these craft will be sent to undertake twenty-four-hour monitoring of points of egress for the Chinese submarine force [对中国海军潜艇的重要进出水道和海峡实施24小时跟踪].
The somewhat highbrow forum Defense Science and Technology Industry [国防科技技术] also published a piece about the same time. 

It is quite unusual for this magazine to focus on singular platforms or weapons systems, so this attention speaks to the perceived importance of Sea Hunter for China’s future military development. Among the authors of this piece is the well-known Chinese military academic Li Daguang 李大光 of China National Defense University. 

Li and his colleagues do not mince words, but declare that Sea Hunter will “precipitate a revolution in the domain of naval strategy [在海军战略领域引发革命].” 

Touching on another key advantage of the platform, they observe that Sea Hunter is not constrained by “human physiological or psychological limitations.” 

Although understanding that the present boat has no weaponry, this analysis appraises the vessels as having “rather good stealth characteristics.” 

The piece conveys that the Sea Hunter can help the U.S. Navy with its problem of having insufficient numbers of submarine and surface ASW assets [攻击潜艇和水面舰数量缩减后搜潜力量不足的问题]. 

As in the previous article, there is a recognition that the pursuit of Sea Hunter by the Pentagon has been fundamentally an effort to reduce platform and also operating costs. 

One approach advocated by these Chinese defense analysts is to double down on fielding “new-type nuclear submarines, and thus fundamentally reverse the [current] situation.”
A third Chinese analysis published in 2016 (no. 11) in the journal Ordnance Industry Science and Technology [兵工科技] is especially interesting, as it casts a somewhat skeptical eye upon Sea Hunter unlike the other two papers summarized above. 

The analysis begins with the observation that the United States already has the world’s most advanced antisubmarine system, relying on a wide array of sensors and platforms ranging from space satellites to fixed sonar arrays operating in the most important channels and straits. 

However, the admiration ends there and this analyst suggests that “the hull and superstructure seem very simple from outward appearances [外形极为简单].” 

It continues, “The whole model seems [like] science fiction [整体造型相当科幻].” 

Regarding its sonar-detection capabilities, the piece notes that the sonar will be hull mounted and that the vessel is unlikely to be equipped with a relatively advantageous towed array sonar. 

Moreover, the author points out that computer algorithms could be deficient at reading sonar signals and may have difficulty distinguishing a “reef, from a whale, from a submarine. And if it indeed is a submarine, does it belong to one’s own navy, an ally, or the enemy.” 

This author doubts that such complexities of the undersea environment will be easily solved by unmanned systems. 

There is additional doubt about weaponizing Sea Hunter and so the innovative platform is dismissed as “just another . . . sensor node.” 

Further doubt is raised concerning whether such a small vessel can really operate effectively in rough seas [高海况].
In the end, the most severe critique offered in this third Chinese appraisal is the conclusion that Sea Hunter might be used effectively by the U.S. Navy against a “weak adversary, such as Iraq or Libya.” By contrast, against an opponent with a “highly effective submarine combat system . . . [along with] a comprehensive maritime strike system,” the author does not see a major role for Sea Hunter. 

Indeed, the final section of the article surmises that such unmanned vessels operating forward without cover could become easy targets themselves for either unmanned aircraft or even “fishing boat interference [渔船干扰].” 

In a somewhat haunting prophecy that seems to echo the recent Chinese drone snatch in the South China Sea, the final sentence of the analysis suggests that the Sea Hunter could well become the “adversary’s war prize [对方的战利器].”
Taken together, the articles above suggest that Chinese defense strategists and scientists are busy scrutinizing this latest innovation developed for the U.S. Navy. 

It is to be expected, of course, as this rivalry heats up in the maritime domain (among others), that each side will invest ever more heavily to counter the other. 

Not surprisingly, Chinese strategists seem to disagree with one another, to some extent, regarding the challenge to the PLA Navy that Sea Hunter represents. 

Possible clues to Chinese responses are revealed in these discussions and such steps could well include devoting more resources to nuclear-submarine development (vice diesel boats), as well as developing a system to track and destroy Sea Hunter itself, of course. 

Indeed, it must be emphasized that the undeniable trend toward unmanned systems over the last decade in U.S. strategy has developed within the rather permissive environments of counterinsurgency warfare rather than in high-intensity warfare between great powers. 

So, their value in contingencies against peer competitors remains a considerable unknown. 

Perhaps that is unduly pessimistic, and indeed American defense scientists are, once again, to be congratulated on this undeniably impressive technical feat. 

The scope for civilian spinoff applications in the commercial and scientific research realms, meanwhile, seems enormous.
But we military strategists are a pessimistic and dour lot. 

Much more unnerving than the possible extensive loss of these unmanned vehicles in combat would be the reasonably likely prospect in coming years of a PLA Navy version of Sea Hunter “with Chinese characteristics” that regularly plies the international waters off of Apra and Pearl, or maybe even Bremerton and, yes, King’s Bay eventually too. 

Mystery Surrounds Whereabouts of Chinese Tycoon

Hong Kong police investigate after speculation billionaire Xiao Jianhua was abducted.
By JOSH CHIN in Beijing and CHESTER YUNG in Hong Kong

Xiao Jianhua is a finance tycoon who had been living in Hong Kong. 

Hong Kong police waded into a mystery surrounding the whereabouts of a Chinese billionaire on Wednesday, saying they had asked mainland authorities for more information after determining the businessman crossed the border into China.
The police probe came after speculation the billionaire, Xiao Jianhua, a finance tycoon who had been living in Hong Kong, had been abducted by Chinese agents. 

The reports rekindled concerns over threats to the independence of the city’s legal system, which bars such operations. 

Many in Hong Kong were rattled last year when local bookseller Lee Bo, a British citizen, was seized by Chinese agents and taken to the mainland.
Xiao is the founder of Tomorrow Holding Ltd. Co, also known as Tomorrow Group, a Beijing-based holding company with investments in areas ranging from real estate to agriculture. 

The Hurun Report ranked Xiao, who is in his mid-40s, as No. 32 on its latest list of China’s wealthiest individuals with an estimated personal fortune of $6 billion.
China’s financial media frequently marvel at the quick rise of Xiao, who graduated from Peking University in 1990 while still a teenager. 

Several news organizations, including the Communist Party’s flagship newspaper People’s Daily, have referred to him as xiaoxiong, a play on his name that describes someone who is uncommonly ambitious and formidable.

Xiao Jianhua
Reports by Bloomberg in 2012 and the New York Times in 2014 said Xiao has helped broker deals for members of China’s political elite, including relatives of Xi Jinping. 

In a public statement in response to the New York Times profile, Tomorrow Group denied that the financier’s wealth stemmed from political connections, saying instead he made money by studying the methods of American investor Warren Buffett.
In the same statement, the company spoke about Xiao’s decision not to join the 1989 student protests around Beijing’s Tiananmen Square, saying the aggressiveness of the protesters led him to avoid politics and instead concentrate on his studies.
Disquiet over Xiao’s fate is likely to spread further if it emerges that Xiao, a well-connected businessman, was subject to the same treatment as Lee, the bookseller, in a city long celebrated as a capitalist sanctuary. 

Lee returned after three months and gave few details of his absence beyond saying he had gone to the mainland voluntarily to assist in an investigation
Concern around Xiao’s whereabouts was reported to Hong Kong police on Saturday, though police declined to say by whom. 

It set off a whirlwind of speculation. 

Some Chinese media, including the website of the state-run Securities Daily newspaper, dismissed as rumors reports that he had been abducted.
One of Xiao’s relatives reported to police on Sunday that the businessman told his family he was safe, according to Hong Kong police, which said that the investigation would proceed nonetheless.
Securities Daily and others quoted a statement posted Monday to Tomorrow Group’s public account on the WeChat messaging app that said Xiao was “recuperating overseas.” 

The Securities Daily article was no longer accessible by Wednesday morning.
Another statement posted to Tomorrow Group’s WeChat account on Tuesday explicitly denied that Xiao had been abducted, describing the Chinese government as "civilized" and "law-abiding".

It also said he is a Canadian citizen with permanent-resident status in Hong Kong. 

Both statements were attributed to Xiao himself.
“I’m a patriotic overseas Chinese. I’ve always loved the Communist Party and the nation and have never participated in any activity that harmed the interests of the country or the image of the government,” read the statement, which was reprinted as a full-page ad in Hong Kong’s Ming Pao newspaper on Wednesday. 

“Nor have I supported any hostile forces or organizations.”
By Wednesday, the two posts had been deleted from Tomorrow Group’s WeChat account. 

Calls and emails to Tomorrow Group went unanswered. 

The company’s website was also unavailable.
The Canadian consulate in Hong Kong said it had contacted authorities for more information and to provide assistance. 

It said it couldn’t release further information because of privacy concerns.
An official in the press office of China’s Ministry of Public Security said the office couldn’t process requests for comment during the Lunar New Year holiday. 

Calls to the Hong Kong and Macau Affairs Office went unanswered.
A number of high-profile businessmen have gone missing since Xi vowed to sweep away corruption four years ago. 

One notable example is Hua Bangsong, the founder of refinery designer Wison Engineering Services Co., who was detained by investigators in 2013 and sentenced in 2015 to three years in prison for bribery. 

Days after he was detained, he made his debut on the Hurun Report rich list at No. 335 with an estimated worth of $900 million.
Others reappeared after brief periods in government custody. 

They include Guo Guangchang, the billionaire founder of conglomerate Fosun Group, who disappeared briefly in December 2015. 

The company said Mr. Guo had been assisting authorities with an unspecified investigation.
In April 2015, property developer Kaisa Group Holdings welcomed back chairman Kwok Ying Shing less than four months after he resigned and disappeared amid speculation of his involvement in a corruption probe in the southern city of Shenzhen. 

Neither Mr. Guo nor Mr. Kwok have given details from their time away from the public view.